BT  21  .3532  1909  v.l 
Shedd,  William  Greenough 


Thayer ,  1820-1894. 

A  history  of  Christian 


doctrine 


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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
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https://archive.org/details/historyofchristi01shed_2 


CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE 


BY 

WILLIAM  G.  T.  SHEDD,  D.  D, 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 

YOL.  I. 


FIFTEENTH  EDITION 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 

1909 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1868,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER, 

In  the  Clerk’s  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern  District 

of  New  York. 

Copyright,  1891,  by 
W.  G.  T.  SHEDD 


PREFACE  TO  THE  TENTH  EDITION. 


This  work  was  published  in  1863,  and  has  had  a  steady 
circulation  in  this  country  and  Great  Britain.  The  favor¬ 
able  reception  of  a  professional  book  intended  for  a  special 
class  of  readers,  shows  that  the  interest  of  the  theological 
world  in  the  most  systematic  of  the  types  of  Christian  the¬ 
ology  is  unabated,  notwithstanding  the  strong  opposition 
which  the  historical  orthodoxy  meets  from  the  skeptical 
classes,  and  the  drift  away  from  it,  during  the  last  part  of 
the  century,  in  the  secular  mind,  and,  to  some  extent,  in  the 
Church  itself.  The  author  in  his  preface  to  the  first  edition 
acknowledged  his  subjective  point  of  view — namely,  his 
deep  interest  in  the  infallibility  of  Divine  revelation,  the 
Nicene  trinitarianism,  the  Augustinian  anthropology,  and 
the  Anselmic  soteriology,  and  admitted  that  his  studies  had 
been  more  extended  in  this  general  line  than  in  any  other. 
But  he  did  not  acknowledge  any  misrepresentation  of  other 
types  of  doctrine,  and  believes  that  his  demarcation  of  the 
principal  divisions  in  ancient,  mediaeval,  and  modern  theol¬ 
ogy  is  substantially  correct. 

A  violent  onset  is  now  being  made  upon  historical  opin¬ 
ions,  in  all  branches  of  knowledge.  The  historical  physics  is 
combated  by  the  materialistic ;  the  historical  metaphysics  by 


IV 


PREFACE  TO  THE  TENTH  EDITION. 


the  pantheistic ;  the  historical  Biblical  criticism  by  the  ra¬ 
tionalistic  ;  and  the  historical  theology  by  the  “  progressive.” 
The  opponents  of  historical  views  would  antiquate  them  by 
calling  them  antiquated,  as  Glendower  would  “  call  spirits 
from  the  vasty  deep.”  By  this  method  it  is  supposed  that 
the  carefully  constructed  systems  of  philosophy  and  religion 
which  underlay  Christendom  like  the  primitive  rocks,  can 
be  brushed  aside  like  gossamer.  In  every  one  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  centuries  the  oracle  has  gone  forth  from  the  local 
school  or  party,  that  the  days  of  the  traditional  theory  are 
ended,  but  the  oracle  is  never  verified  by  the  event.  That 
which  has  been  gained  by  the  concentrated  and  combined 
effort  of  the  human  intellect,  and  has  had  the  seal  of  time 
and  trial  stamped  upon  it,  lives  and  radiates  influence 
perpetually ;  while  the  provincial  scheme  of  the  individual 
champion  and  his  partisans  disappears,  to  be  succeeded  by 
another  equally  transitory.  Augustinianism  for  fifteen  cen¬ 
turies  has  more  or  less  moulded  the  scientific  theology  and 
the  practical  experience  of  evangelical  Christendom,  while 
Pelagianism  has  been  continually  on  the  defensive,  strug¬ 
gling  for  life,  and  leading  a  wavering  and  precarious  exist¬ 
ence  in  the  spiritual  declines  and  decadences  of  the  Church. 
Calvinism,  still  more  close  and  exact  in  its  logic,  for  more 
than  three  centuries  has  been  the  blood  and  iron  by  which 
the  stalwart  have  been  strong,  and  the  weak  have  been  stim¬ 
ulated  and  braced,  while  the  scores  of  schemes  antagonistic,  • 
and  often  defamatory,  have  vanished  like  the  flies  of  a  sum¬ 
mer.  In  this  time  of  mental  fermentation  and  unsettled 
thought,  when  the  old  truths  are  attacked  and  new  schemes 
are  proposed  in  their  places,  there  is  as  great  reason  as  ever 
to  believe  that  historical  opinions  are  the  only  ones  that  will 


PREFACE  TO  THE  TENTH  EDITION.  V 

in  the  future,  as  in  the  past,  hold  their  ground,  and  continue 
to  be  the  foundations  of  philosophy  and  religion,  of  liberty 
and  law,  of  human  hope  and  happiness. 

In  this  edition  some  verbal  errors  have  been  corrected, 
and  a  few  of  the  notes  enlarged.  No  one  is  more  sensible 
than  the  author  of  the  deficiency  of  the  treatise,  considered 
as  a  complete  account  of  the  opinions  that  have  arisen  in  the 
Christian  Church  during  its  two  millenniums.  No  single 
history  of  doctrine  can  ever  be  complete,  because  of  the 
immensity  of  the  materials  and  the  limited  powers  of  the 
individual  investigator.  The  author  might  perhaps  have 
made  some  additions  to  this  work,  had  he  not  published  a 
Dogmatic  Theology  in  which  some  of  the  deficiencies  of 
his  Dogmatic  History,  more  particularly  in  eschatology, 
are  supplied.  To  that  treatise,  as  somewhat  complemen¬ 
tary  to  this,  he  would  refer  his  readers. 


New  York,  February  6,  1891. 


PREFACE. 


The  History  of  Christian  Doctrine  here  giveu  to 
the  public  is  the  result  of  several  years  of  investi¬ 
gation,  while  the  author  held  the  professorship  of 
Ecclesiastical  History  in  the  Theological  Seminary 
at  Andover,  Massachusetts.  As  this  is  the  first 
attempt  of  the  kind  in  English  literature,  to  write 
an  account  of  the  gradual  construction  of  all  the 
doctrines  of  the  Christian  religion,  he  had  no  mod¬ 
els  before  him,  and  was  compelled  to  originate  his 
own  method.  Upon  a  survey  of  the  vast  field,  it 
appeared  to  be  the  most  simple  and  perspicuous 
plan  to  investigate  each  of  the  principal  subjects 
by  itself,  starting  from  the  first  beginnings  of  scien¬ 
tific  reflection  upon  it,  and  going  down  to  the  la¬ 
test  and  most  complete  forms  of  statement.  This 
method,  though  not  without  some  disadvantages, 
recommends  itself  by  reason  of  the  opportunity  it 


PREFACE. 


VU 

affords  for  continuous  investigation,  each  part  flow¬ 
ing  out  of  the  preceding  and  preparing  for  what 
follows,  and  the  whole  making  a  single  and  strong 
impression.  Such  a  method  is  in  harmony  with 
the  nature  of  history  itself.  The  reader  follows  a 
single  stream  from  its  rise  in  its  head-waters 
through  all  its  windings,  until  it  discharges  itself, 
immenso  ore ,  into  the  sea. 

The  history  of  Christian  doctrine  thus  conceived 
and  composed  is  one  of  the  strongest  of  all  defences 
of  the  Christian  faith.  It  is  a  common  remark,  that 
a  powerful  statement  is  a  powerful  argument.  This 
is  true  of  the  dogmas  of  Christianity.  But  there  is 
no  statement  of  revealed  truth  more  clear,  connect¬ 
ed,  and  convincing,  than  that  which  it  obtains  in 
the  gradual  and  sequacious  constructions  of  the 
Church,  from  century  to  century.  Let  any  one 
trace  the  course  of  thinking  by  the  theological 
mind,  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  e.  g.,  and 
perceive  how  link  follows  link  by  necessary  conse¬ 
quence  ;  how  the  objections  of  the  heretic  or  the 
latitudinarian  only  elicit  a  more  exhaustive,  and  at 
the  same  time  more  guarded,  statement,  which  car¬ 
ries  the  Church  still  nearer  to  the  substance  of 
revelation,  and  the  heart  of  the  mystery ;  how,  in 


PREFACE. 


•  •  • 

Vlll 

short,  the  trinitarian  dogma,  like  the  Christian  life 
itself  as  described  by  the  apostle,  “  being  fitly 
joined  together,  and  compacted  by  that  which 
every  joint  supplieth,  maketh  increase  unto  the 
edifying  of  itself”  into  a  grand  architectural  struc¬ 
ture, — let  this  process  from  beginning  to  end  pass 
before  a  thinking  and  logical  mind,  and  it  will  be 
difficult  for  it  to  resist  the  conviction  that  here  is 
science,  here  is  self-consistent  and  absolute  truth. 
It  cannot  be  that  the  earnest  reflection  of  all  the 
Christian  centuries  should  thus  have  spent  itself 
upon  a  fiction  and  figment.  The  symbol  in  which 
this  thinking  embodied  itself  must  be  the  exponent 
of  a  reality.  Such  is  the  impression  made,  and  such 
is  the  unavoidable  inference. 

Christianity  is,  ultimately,  its  own  best  defence. 
The  argument  of  a  holy  and  beautiful  life,  it  is  uni¬ 
versally  conceded,  is  unanswerable ;  and  so  is  the 
argument  of  a  profound  and  homogeneous  system. 
At  a  time  when  the  divine  origin  and  authority  of 
the  Christian  religion  are  disputed  and  combatted 
with  more  than  ordinary  violence,  it  is  seasonable 
to  introduce  the  opponent  to  the  Christian  dogmas 
themselves,  in  the  very  act  and  process  of  their 
scientific  construction.  If  he  is  capable  of  con- 


PREFACE. 


IX 


nected  thinking  himself,  and  his  mind  is  at  all  ac¬ 
customed  to  high  problems,  before  he  is  aware  he 
will  be  caught  in  the  intellectual  process,  and  whe¬ 
ther  he  accept  the  conclusions  of  the  ecclesiastical 
mind  or  not,  he  cannot  but  respect  the  mental  acu¬ 
men  and  energy  which  are  exhibited.  The  history 
of  such  a  mind  as  that  of  Ferdinand  Christian  Baur 
exemplifies  this.  To  what  degree  that  remarkable 
scholar  and  thinker  was  practically  affected  by  the 
studies  of  many  years,  in  the  mines  of  Christian 
doctrine,  is  known  only  to  the  Searcher  of  hearts ; 
but  no  one  can  peruse  a  page  of  any  of  his  dogma- 
tico-historical  works  without  perceiving,  that  con¬ 
tempt  for  that  great  system  which  the  oecumenical 
mind  has  built  up  out  of  the  living  stones  of  revela¬ 
tion  was  no  feeling  of  his.  The  system  w^as  too 
vast  in  its  reach,  too  comprehensive  in  its  scope, 
too  high  and  too  deep  in  its  aims,  to  provoke  either 
ridicule  or  scorn.  It  might  be  a  failure,  but  it  was 
a  splendid  failure. 

Respecting  the  sources  whence  this  history  is 
derived,  the  authors  mentioned  under  the  head  of 
“  Literature,”  at  the  beginning  of  each  book,  will 
indicate  the  works  that  have  been  most  drawn 
upon.  The  writings  of  Athanasius,  Augustine,  and 


X 


PREFACE. 


Anselm,  have  yielded  much  solid  and  germinant 
material.  To  the  dogmatic  historians  of  Germany 
of  the  present  century,  I  am  greatly  indebted  ;  and 
not  less  so  to  the  great  lights  of  the  English  Church 
in  the  preceding  centuries.  These  latter  have  been 
unduly  overlooked,  amidst  the  recent  fertility  of 
the  Teutonic  mind.  Though  comprising  no  con¬ 
tinuous  and  entire  history  of  Christian  doctrine,  and 
even  when  investigating  a  particular  subject  often¬ 
times  doing  it  incidentally,  the  labors  of  Hooker 
and  Bull,  of  Pearson  and  Waterland,  are  every  way 
worthy  to  be  placed  beside  those  of  Baur  and  Dor- 
ner.  The  learning  is  as  ample  and  accurate,  the 
logical  grasp  is  as  powerful,  and  the  judgment  more 
than  equal.  To  these  must  be  added  the  two  man¬ 
uals  of  Baumgarten-Crusius  and  Hagenbach,  which 
have  to  some  extent  furnished  the  rubric  under 
which  the  generalizations  have  been  made,  as  well 
as  considerable  material  itself. 

But  while  the  leading  ancient,  mediaeval,  and 
modern  authorities  have  been  used,  it  has  been  my 
endeavor  to  fuse  everything  in  my  own  mind.  Per¬ 
haps  the  chief  criticism  that  may  be  made  upon  the 
work  is,  that  it  betokens  subjective  qualities  unduly 
for  a  historical  production.  That  the  work  pays 


PREFACE. 


XI 


more  attention  to  the  orthodox  than  to  the  latitu- 
dinarian  drift  of  thought,  is  plain.  It  is  impossible 
for  any  one  author  to  compose  an  encyclopaedic 
history.  Every  work  of  this  kind  must  be  stronger 
in  some  directions,  than  in  others.  I  have  felt  a 
profound  interest  in  the  Nicene  trinitarianism,  the 
Augustinian  anthropology,  and  the  Anselmic  sote- 
riology,  and  from  these  centres  have  taken  my  de¬ 
partures.  To  what  degree  I  have  succeeded  in 
fairly  stating  the  variant  or  opposing  theories,  must 
be  left  to  the  judgment  of  each  reader. 

The  work  has  been  put  to  press  amidst  the  pres¬ 
sure  of  engagements  incident  to  a  large  pastoral 
charge.  More  leisure  would  have  improved  it. 
But  it  is  committed,  with  all  its  imperfections,  to 
the  common  current,  with  the  hope,  and  aspiration, 
that  it  may  contribute  something  towards  that  vic¬ 
tory  and  triumph  to  which  Christian  science  is  des¬ 
tined  in  the  earth. 


New  York,  Nov.  4 th,  1863. 


CONTENTS 

OF  THE  FIRST  VOLUME. 


INTRODUCTION. 


§1.  Methodology,  .... 

§  2.  Idea  and  definition  of  History,  . 

§  3.  Development  discriminated  from  creation,  . 

§  4.  Development  discriminated  from  improvement, 

§  5.  Distinction  between  Sacred  and  Secular  History, 
§  6.  Uses  of  these  definitions  and  distinctions, 

§  7.  Relation  of  doctrinal  to  external  history, 

1 8.  Specification  of  the  method  adopted, 


P  AG* 

1 

7 

11 

15 

18 

23 

25 

28 


BOOK  FIRST. 

INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS  UPON  THE  CONSTRUC¬ 
TION  OF  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Philosophical  influences  in  the  Ancient  Church:  A.  D.  1-730. 


§  1.  General  features  of  Platonism  and  Aristotelianism,  .  51 

§  2.  Philosophy  at  the  time  of  the  Advent,  ...  60 

§  3.  Philosophy  in  the  Apologetic  Period:  a.  d.  70-254,  .  62 

^  4.  Philosophy  in  the  Polemic  Period :  a.  d.  254-730,  .  68 


CONTENTS. 


Xlll 


CHAPTER  II. 

Philosophical  Influences  in  the  Mediaeval  Church :  A.D.  730-1517. 

PAG* 

§  1.  Platonism  of  the  Mystic  Theologians,  .  .  .75 

§  2.  Aristotelianism  of  the  Scholastic  Theologians,  .  .  81 

§3.  Reaction  against  extreme  Aristotelianism  from  the 

Later  Mystics,  and  the  revival  of  Greek  Literature,  .  85 

CHAPTER  III. 

Philosophical  Influences  in  the  Modern  Church:  A.  D.  1517-1850. 

§  1.  Philosophy  of  the  Reformers,  ....  89 

§  2.  Philosophy  of  the  English  and  Anglo-American  Churches,  .  92 

§  3.  Philosophy  in  the  German  Church,  ...  95 


BOOK  SECOND. 

HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Defences  of  Christianity  in  the  Apologetic  Period:  A.  D.  70-254. 

§  1.  Preliminary  Statements,  .....  103 

§  2.  Ebionite  Skepticism  and  Christian  replies,  .  .  106 

§3.  Gnostic  Skepticism  and  Christian  replies,  .  .  .113 

§4.  Pagan  Skepticism  and  Christian  replies,  .  .  117 

§5.  Recapitulatory  Survey,  .....  131 

CHAPTER  II. 

Defences  of  Christianity  in  the  Polemic  Period :  A.  D.  254-730. 

§  1.  Preliminary  Statements,  .  .  .  .  .133 

§  2.  Mutual  relations  of  Revelation  and  Reason,  .  .  .135 

§  3.  Mutual  relations  of  Faith  and  Science,  .  .  .  154 

§  4.  Mutual  relations  of  the  Supernatural  and  the  Natural,  .  164 

§  5.  Recapitulatory  Survey,  .....  170 


XIV 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  III. 


Mediaeval  Defences  of  Christianity  :  A.  D.  730-1517. 

§1.  Preliminary  Statements,  .... 

§  2.  Apologetics  of  Anselm,  Aquinas,  and  Bernard,  . 

§  3.  Apologetics  of  Abelard,  .... 


PAGE 

177 

179 

186 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Modem  Defences  of  Christianity  :  A.  D.  1517-1850. 
§1.  Preliminary  Statements,  . 

§  2.  Intellectual  Deism  of  Herbert  of  Cberbury, 

§  3.  Materialistic  and  sensual  Deism, 

§  4.  Replies  to  English  Deism,  .... 

§  5.  French  Encyclopsedaism  and  German  Rationalism, 


190 

192 

196 

203 

216 


BOOK  THIRD. 

HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY  (TRINITARIANISM)  AND  CHRISTOLOGY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

General  Doctrine  of  the  Divine  Existence. 

§  i.  Name  of  the  deity,  ..... 

§  2.  Pantheism  and  dualism  in  the  Church,  . 

§  3.  Evidences  of  the  Divine  Existence,  . 

§4.  Divine  Attributes,  .  .  .  .  . 

§  5.  The  Pagan  Trinity,  ..... 

CHAPTER  II. 

Ante-Nicene  Trinitarianism. 

§  1.  Preliminary  Statements,  . 

§  2.  Classes  of  Anti-Trinitarians, 

§  3.  Trinitarianism  of  the  Apostolic  and  Primitive  Fathers,  . 
§  4.  Origen’s  Trinitarianism,  .... 


223 

225 

229 

240 

243 


246 
253  U 
261 
288 


CONTENTS.  xv 

CHAPTER  III. 

Nicene  Trinitarianism. 

PAGE 

§  1.  Preliminary  Statements,  .....  306 

§  2.  Problem  before  the  Nicene  Council,  .  .  .  308 

§3.  Nicene  doctrine  of  Eternal  Generation,  .  .  .  315 

§  4.  Nicene  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  .  .  .  355 

§  5.  Terminology  of  Nicene  Trinitarianism,  .  .  .  362 

§  6.  Critical  estimate  of  the  Nicene  controversy,  .  .  372 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Post-Nicene  Trinitarianism. 

§1  Mediaeval  Trinitarianism,  ....  376 

§  2.  Trinitarianism  of  the  Continental  and  English  Reformers,  .  378 

§3.  Unitarianism,  ......  383 

§  4.  Latitudinarian  Trinitarianism  in  the  English  and  German 

Churches,  ......  385 

CHAPTER  Y. 

Doctrine  of  the  Person  of  Christ. 

§  1.  Principal  Heresies  in  Christology,  .  .  .  392 

§  2.  The  Chalcedon  Christology,  .  .  .  .399 


INTRODUCTION. 


§  1.  Methodology. 

Des  Cartes  :  Dissertatio  de  Methodo  (English  translation  published 
by  Sutherland,  Edinburgh,  1850).  Coleridge:  Essays  on  Method, 
Works  II.  408-472,  Harper’s  Ed.  Whewell:  History  of  Induc¬ 
tive  Sciences  (Introduction).  Agassiz:  Natural  History  (Essay 
on  Classification). 

Befoke  proceeding  to  investigate  the  several 
subjects  that  belong  to  a  History  of  Christian 
Doctrine,  it  is  necessary  to  make  preliminary  state¬ 
ments,  respecting  the  general  scheme  and  method, 
upon  which  the  investigation  will  proceed.  Meth¬ 
odology,  or  the  science  of  Method,  is  never  more  im¬ 
portant,  and  never  yields  greater  fruit,  than  when 
applied  to  historical  studies.  At  the  same  time,  it 
possesses  an  independent  value,  apart  from  its  uses 
when  applied  to  any  particular  subject.  Treating, 
as  it  does,  of  the  scientific  mode  of  approaching  and 
opening  any  department  of  knowledge,  it  is  a 
species  of  philosophia  prima ,  or  philosophy  of 
philosophy,  such  as  Plato  and  Aristotle  were  in 


2 


INTRODUCTION. 


search  of.  This,  in  their  view,  was  the  very  highest 
kind  of  science ;  for  the  reason  that  it  is  not  con¬ 
fined  to  some  one  portion  of  truth,  as  a  specific 
science  is,  but  is  an  instrument  by  which  truth 
universally  may  be  reached.  It  was  what  they 
denominated  an  organon , — an  implement  whereby 
the  truth  of  any  subject  might  be  discovered.  It, 
thus,  resembled  the  science  of  logic.  Logic  does 
not,  like  philosophy  or  theology,  enunciate  any  par¬ 
ticular  truths,  but  teaches  those  principles  of  uni¬ 
versal  reasoning,  by  which  particular  truths,  in 
these  departments  or  any  other,  may  be  discovered, 
and  defended.  If,  now,  we  conceive  of  a  science  of 
investigation,  that  should  stand  in  the  same  rela¬ 
tion  to  all  particular  investigations,  that  logic  does 
to  reasoning  generally,  we  shall  have  the  conception 
of  the  science  of  Methodology  ;  and  it  is  one  form 
of  that  primary  philosophy  which  Plato  and  Aris¬ 
totle  were  seeking  for. 

In  the  judgment  of  these  thinkers,  the  philoso- 
phia  prima  was  the  most  difficult  problem  that 
could  be  presented  to  the  human  mind ;  because,  it 
was  the  problem  for  solving  all  problems.  It  was 
like  those  general  formulas  which  the  mathemati¬ 
cian  seeks,  by  means  of  which  he  may  resolve  a 
great  number  of  particular  questions.  They  did 
not  claim  to  have  constructed  such  a  prima  philoso- 
pliia ,  yet  they  none  the  less  regarded  it  as  the  goal, 
which  should  be  continually  kept  in  view,  by  the 
philosopher.  And  they  would  measure  the  prog- 


METHODOLOGY. 


3 


ress  of  philosophic  thought,  from  age  to  age,  by 
the  approximation  that  was  made  towards  it. 
Even  if  the  goal  should  never  be  reached,  still  the 
department  of  philosophy  would  be  a  gainer,  by 
such  a  high  aim.  Lord  Bacon  himself  regrets,  that 
the  eye  had  been  taken  off  from  it,  and  that  think¬ 
ers  had  confined  themselves  to  mere  parts  of  truth. 
“Another  error,” — he  remarks,  in  enumerating  the 
“  peccant  humors  ”  of  learning, — “  is,  that  after  the 
distribution  of  particular  arts  and  sciences,  men 
have  abandoned  universality,  or  ‘  philosophia  pri- 
ma  ’ ;  which  cannot  but  cease  and  stop  all  progres¬ 
sion.  For  no  perfect  discovery  can  be  made  upon 
a  flat  or  level,  neither  is  it  possible  to  discover  the 
more  remote  and  deeper  parts  of  any  science,  if  you 
stand  but  upon  the  level  of  the  same  science,  and 
ascend  not  to  a  higher  science.” 1 

The  science  of  Method  seeks  from  this  higher 
level  to  survey  all  the  sciences,  and  from  an  elevated 
point  of  view,  to  discover,  in  each  given  instance, 
the  true  mode  of  investigation.  It  is  the  science  of 
the  sciences,  because  it  furnishes  the  philosophic 
clue  to  all  of  them,  and  stands  in  the  same  relation 
to  the  whole  encyclopaedia  of  human  inquiry,  that 
a  master-key  does  to  all  the  locks  which  it  opens. 
Its  uses  are  evident ;  for  if  the  method,  or  plan  of 
investigation,  is  the  avenue  by  which  the  human 
mind  makes  its4  entrance  into  a  subject,  then,  upon 
its  intrinsic  adaptation  to  the  case  in  hand,  depends 

1  Bacon:  Advancement  of  Learning,  Works  I.  173,  193,  Pa.  Ed. 


4 


INTRODUCTION. 


the  whole  success  of  the  inquiry.  If  the  method 
be  a  truly  philosophic  one,  the  examination  of  the 
topic  proceeds  with  ease,  accuracy,  and  thorough¬ 
ness.  But  if  it  be  arbitrary  and  capricious,  the 
inquirer  commences  with  an  error,  which,  like  a 
mistake  in  the  beginning  of  an  arithmetical  calcula¬ 
tion,  only  repeats,  and  multiplies  itself,  every  step 
of  the  way. 

Methodology  seeks,  in  each  instance,  to  discover 
the  method  of  nature ,  as  that  specific  mode  of  inves¬ 
tigation  which  is  best  fitted  to  elucidate  a  subject. 
By  the  method  of  nature  is  meant,  that  plan  which 
corresponds  with  the  internal  structure.  Each 
department  of  human  inquiry  contains  an  interior 
order,  and  arrangement,  which  the  investigator  must 
detect,  and  along  which  he  must  move,  in  order  to 
a  thorough  and  symmetrical  apprehension  of  it. 
The  world  of  mind  is  as  regular,  and  architectural, 
as  the  world  of  matter ;  and  hence  all  branches  of 
intellectual  and  moral  science  require  for  their  suc¬ 
cessful  prosecution,  the  same  natural  and  structural 
modes  of  investigation,  which  a  Cuvier  applies  to 
the  animal  kingdom,  and  a  De  Candolle  to  the 
vegetable.  The  method  of  the  anatomist  is  a  beau¬ 
tiful  example  of  the  method  of  nature.  As  in 
anatomy,  the  dissection  follows  the  veins,  or  mus¬ 
cles,  or  nerves,  or  limbs,  in  their  branchings  off,  so 
the  natural  method,  everywhere,  never  cuts  across, 
but  along  the  inward  structure,  following  it  out 
into  its  organic  divisions.  The  science  of  Method 


METHODOLOGY. 


5 


aids  in  discovering  such  a  mode  of  investigation, 
and  tends  to  produce  in  the  investigator,  that  fine 
mental  tact,  by  which  he  instinctively  approaches 
a  subject  from  the  right  point,  and  like  lie  slate 
quarryman  lays  it  open,  along  the  line  of  its  struc¬ 
ture,  and  its  fracture.  The  power  of  method  is 
closely  allied  to  the  power  of  genius.  A  mind 
inspired  by  it  attacks  a  subject  with  great  impetu¬ 
osity,  and  yet  does  not  mar,  or  mutilate  it,  while  it 
penetrates  into  all  its  parts.  “  I  have  seen  Michael 
Angelo,” — says  a  cotemporary  of  that  great  artist — 
“  at  work  after  he  had  passed  his  sixtieth  year,  and 
although  he  was  not  very  robust,  he  cut  away  as 
many  scales  from  a  block  of  very  hard  marble,  in  a 
quarter  of  an  hour,  as  three  young  sculptors  would 
have  effected  in  three  or  four  hours, — a  thing 
almost  incredible,  to  one  who  had  not  actually 
witnessed  it.  Such  was  the  impetuosity,  and  fire, 
with  which  he  pursued  his  labor,  that  I  almost 
thought  the  whole  work  must  have  gone  to  pieces ; 
with  a  single  stroke,  he  brought  down  fragments 
three  or  four  fingers  thick,  and  so  close  upon  his 
mark,  that  had  he  passed  it,  even  in  the  slightest 
degree,  there  would  have  been  a  danger  of  ruining 
the  whole ;  since  any  such  injury,  unlike  the  case 
of  works  in  plaster  or  stucco,  would  have  been 
irreparable.” 1  Such  is  the  bold,  yet  safe  power,  of 
a  mind  that  works  by  an  idea,  and  methodically. 

The  importance  of  a  philosophic  method  is 


1  Habfokd  :  Life  of  Angelo. 


6 


INTRODUCTION. 


nowhere  more  apparent  than  in  the  department 
of  History.  The  materials  are  so  abundant  and 
various,  that  unless  they  are  distributed  in  a  nat¬ 
ural  order,  they  accumulate  upon  each  other,  and 
produce  inextricable  confusion.  And  yet,  in  no 
province  is  it  more  difficult  to  attain  to  a  method  at 
once  comprehensive,  and  exhaustive.  For  History 
includes  so  much,  that  it  is  not  easy  to  enclose  it  all 
at  once ;  and  it  is  so  full  of  minute  details,  that 
many  of  them  escape.  And  even  when  we  separate 
some  one  division  of  the  subject,  such  as  Dogmatic 
History  for  example,  and  treat  it  by  itself,  the  same 
difficulty  remains.  Such  questions  as  the  following 
immediately  arise.  Shall  the  whole  system  of  Chris¬ 
tian  doctrine  be  described  together,  in  its  origin  and 
gradual  formation ;  or  shall  a  single  dogma  be  se¬ 
lected  and  followed  out  by  itself?  If  the  first  mode 
be  adopted,  we  secure  comprehensiveness  at  the 
expense  of  exhaustiveness.  If  the  latter  be  chosen, 
we  cannot  exhibit  the  reciprocal  influence  of  doc¬ 
trine  upon  doctrine,  and  lose  the  advantages  of  a 
comparative  view  of  the  whole,  in  securing  those  of 
minuteness  and  thoroughness  in  a  part.  A  multi¬ 
tude  of  such  questions  immediately  arises,  when  the 
dogmatic  historian  begins  to  lay  out  his  plan  of 
procedure,  and  he  finds  that  almost  every  advantage 
is  counterbalanced  by  some  disadvantage.  It  only 
remains  that  he  should  exercise  his  best  judgment, 
and  produce  the  best  method  that  is  possible  to 
him.  The  grade  of  its  excellence  can  be  known 


7 


IDEA,  AND  DEFINITION  OF  HISTORY. 

only  by  trial.  Just  so  far  as  it  proves  itself  to  be 
a  logical  instrument  of  investigation,  and  actually 
divides  and  distributes  the  historical  materials  in 
a  natural  order,  does  it  prove  its  author  to  be 
possessed  of  genuine  philosophic  talent. 

Addressing  ourselves,  then,  to  the  task  of  indi¬ 
cating  a  scientific  method  in  Dogmatic  History,  it  is 
evident,  that  the  first  step  to  be  taken  is,  to  enun¬ 
ciate  the  generic  idea  of  History  itself .  What  is 
History  in  its  own  nature  ?  What  is  the  funda¬ 
mental  conception  involved  in  it  ?  And  inasmuch 
as  Dogmatic  History  is  a  branch  of  Sacred,  in  dis¬ 
tinction  from  Secular,  or  Profane  History,  it  will 
become  necessary  to  discriminate  these  two  latter 
species  from  each  other,  so  that  the  special  subject 
of  our  investigations  may  be  narrowed  down  to  its 
real  and  distinctive  elements.  The  definition,  there¬ 
fore,  of  History  in  its  abstract  nature,  together  with 
its  subdivision  into  Sacred  and  Secular,  must  pre 
cede,  and  prepare  the  way  for,  the  distribution  of 
the  dogmatic  materials  which  we  are  to  analyze, 
and  combine. 

§  2.  Idea ,  and  definition  of  History . 

History,  in  its  abstract  and  distinctive  nature, 
we  define  to  be  a  development}  It  is  a  gradual  ex- 

xThe  reader  will  find  the  au-  Evolution:  Theological  Essays, 
thor’s  views  exhibited  more  at  pp.  53-210,  New  York,  1877 
length,  in  his  Essays  upon  the  Charles  Scribner’s  Sons. 

Historic  Spirit,  and  the  idea  of 


8 


INTRODUCTION. 


pansion  over  a  wider  surface,  of  that  which  at  the 
instant  of  its  creation  existed  in  a  more  invisible  and 
metaphysical  form.  The  development  of  a  tree 
from  a  rudimental  germ,  for  example,  constitutes  its 
historic  process.  Here  the  evolution,  or  expansion, 
is  continuous  from  the  seed,  or  rather  from  that 
invisible  principle  which  contains  the  whole  fabric 
potentially.  For  Cowper’s  lines  upon  the  Yardley 
Oak  are  literally  true  : 

“  Thou  wast  a  bauble  once,  a  cup  and  ball 
Which  babes  might  play  with  ;  and  the  thievish  jay, 
Seeking  her  food,  with  ease  might  have  purloined 
The  auburn  nut  that  held  thee,  swallowing  down 
Thy  yet  close-folded  latitude  of  boughs, 

And  all  thy  embryo  vastness,  at  a  gulp.” 

The  idea  of  an  evolution  from  a  potential  basis, 
is  identical  with  that  of  a  history.  In  thinking  of 
one,  we  unavoidably  think  of  the  other,  and  this 
evinces  an  inward  coincidence  between  the  two 
conceptions.  Unceasing  motion,  from  a  given  point, 
through  several  stadia,  to  a  final  terminus,  is  a 
characteristic  belonging  as  inseparably  to  the  his¬ 
tory  of  Man,  or  the  history  of  Doctrine,  as  to  that 
of  any  physical  evolution  whatever.  In  bringing 
before  our  minds,  for  example,  the  passage  of  an 
intellectual  or  a  moral  idea,  from  one  degree  of 
energy  and  efficiency  to  another,  in  the  career  of  a 
nation,  or  of  mankind,  we  unavoidably  construe  it 
as  a  continuous  expanding  process.  The  same  law 


IDEA,  AND  DEFINITION  OF  HISTORY.  9 

of  organic  sequence  prevails  in  the  sphere  of  mind, 
and  of  freedom,  that  works  in  the  kingdom  of 
matter  and  necessity.  There  is  a  growth  of  the 
mind,  as  truly  and  strictly  as  a  growth  of  the  body. 
The  basis  from  which  the  one  proceeds  is,  indeed, 
very  different  from  that  which  lies  at  the  foundation 
of  the  other.  The  evolution,  in  the  first  instance,  is 
that  of  a  spiritual  essence,  while  that  in  the  second 
is  the  unfolding  of  a  material  germ  ;  but  the  process 
in  each  instance,  alike,  is  an  organically  connected 
one.  The  history  of  matter,  and  the  history  of 
mind,  though  totally  different  from  each  other  in 
respect  to  the  substance  from  which  the  movement 
proceeds,  and  the  laws  that  regulate  it,  are  alike  in 
respect  to  the  continuity  of  the  movement. 

The  essential  substance  of  History,  be  it  that  of 
Nature  or  of  Man,  is  continually  passing  through  a 
motive  process.  The  germ  is  slowly  unfolding,  as 
it  is  the  nature  of  all  germs  to  do.  A  corn  of 
Egyptian  wheat  may  sleep  in  the  swathes  and  fold¬ 
ings  of  a  mummy,  through  three  thousand  springs, 
but  the  purpose  of  its  creation  cannot  be  thwarted, 
except  by  the  grinding  destruction  of  its  germinal 
substance.  It  was  created  to  grow,  and  notwith¬ 
standing  this  long  interval  of  slumbering  life,  the 
development  begins  the  instant  it  is  taken  from  the 
mummy,  and  cast  into  the  moist  earth.  In  like 
manner,  an  idea  which  inherently  belongs  to  the 
mind  of  man  may  be  hindered  in  its  progress,  and 
for  ages  may  seem  to  be  extinct ;  yet  it  is  none  the 


10 


INTRODUCTION. 


less  in  existence,  and  a  reality.  It  is  all  the  while 
a  factor  in  the  earthly  career  of  mankind,  and  the 
historian  who  should  throw  it  out  of  the  account 
would  misconceive,  and  misrepresent,  the  entire 
historic  process.  An  idea  of  human  reason,  like 
popular  liberty,  for  example,  may  make  no  external 
appearance  for  whole  periods,  but  its  reappearance, 
with  an  energy  of  operation  heightened  by  its  long 
suppression  in  the  consciousness  of  nations,  is  the 
most  impressive  of  all  proofs,  that  it  has  a  necessary 
existence  in  human  nature,  and  is  destined  to  be 
developed.  A  doctrine  of  Divine  reason,  like  that 
of  justification  by  Christ’s  atonement,  is  a  positive 
truth  which  has  been  lodged  in  the  Christian  mind 
by  Divine  revelation,  and  is  destined  to  an  univer¬ 
sal  influence,  a  historical  development,  in  and 
through  the  church ;  notwithstanding  that  some 
branc  hes  and  ages  of  the  church  have  lost  it  out  of 
their  religious  experience.  In  brief,  whatever  has 
been  constitutionally  inlaid  either  in  matter  or  in 
mind,  by  the  Creator  of  both,  is  destined  by  Him, 
and  under  His  own  superintendence,  to  be  evolved ; 
and  of  all  such  germinal  substance,  be  it  in  the 
sphere  of  Nature  or  of  Man,  we  may  say,  that  not  a 
particle  of  it  will  be  annihilated ;  it  will  pass 
through  the  predetermined  stages  of  an  expanding 
process,  and  obtain  a  full  development.  And  this 
its  development  is  its  history . 


CREATION  AND  DEVELOPMENT. 


11 


§  3.  Creation  discriminated  from  Development. 


The  doctrine  of  Development  has  been  greatly 
misconceived,  especially  in  modern  speculation,  and 
hence  it  becomes  necessary  to  discriminate  it  still 
more  carefully.  Theorists  have  handled  it  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  invalidate  the  principles  of  both 
natural  and  revealed  religion.  In  the  first  place, 
substituting  the  idea  of  development  for  that  of 
creation ,  they  have  constructed  a  pantheistic  theory 
of  the  origin  of  the  universe ;  and  in  the  second 
place,  confounding  a  development  with  an  improve¬ 
ment,  they  have  precluded  the  necessity  of  any 
supernatural  and  remedial  methods  for  human 
welfare. 

There  are  no  two  conceptions  more  diverse  from 
each  other,  than  those  of  Creation  and  Develop¬ 
ment.  The  one  excludes  the  other.  Development 
supposes  existing  materials ;  creation  supposes  none 
at  all.  Creation  is  from  nothing ; 1  development  is 


1  See  Cudworth’s  statement  of 
the  senses  in  which  the  dictum, 
“  ex  nihilo  nihil  fit,”  may  be  un¬ 
derstood,  Works  III.  90  (Tegg’s 
Ed.) ;  also  Anselm’s  Monologium, 
Caput  VIII.  (Ed.  Migne) ;  also 
Mosheim’s  Dissertation  on  crea¬ 
tion  out  of  nothing,  in  Cud- 
worth’s  Intellectual  System,  III. 
140  sq.  (Tegg’s  Ed.).  The  clause 
u  de  nihilo  ”  is  vital  in  defining  a 
creative  act.  For  the  human 
mind,  involved  in  the  unbroken 


chain  of  antecedents  and  conse¬ 
quents,  is  almost  irresistibly  prone 
to  ask  from  what  stuff  is  the  cre¬ 
ated  product  made.  The  old  ob¬ 
jection,  “de  nihilo  nihil  fit,” 
springs  out  of  this  proneness. 
Nothing  comes  from  nothing,  by 
the  method  of  development ,  it  is 
true ;  but  not  by  the  method  of 
creation.  The  early  fathers,  ow¬ 
ing  to  the  prevalence  of  the  Gnos¬ 
tic  theory  of  world-making,  were 
very  careful  to  mark  the  differ- 


12 


INTRODUCTION. 


from  something.  Creation  indeed  implies  a  pre¬ 
existing  Creator,  but  not  as  the  substance  or  stuff 
out  of  which  the  creature  is  made.  This  would  be 
emanation,  or  generation.  The  Creator,  when  he 
issues  a  creative  fiat,  does  not  send  out  a  beam  or 
efflux  from  his  own  substance,  but  by  a  miracle  of 
omnipotence  wills  an  absolutely  new  entity  into 
being.  This  creative  act  is,  of  necessity,  inexpli¬ 
cable,  because  explanation  would  imply  the  possi¬ 
bility  of  pointing  out  preexisting  materials  of  which 
the  created  product  is  composed.  But  by  the  very 
definition  of  creation,  there  are  none.  Develop¬ 
ment,  on  the  contrary,  implies  the  existence  of  rudi- 
mental  and  germinal  matter.  It  supposes  that  a 
creative  fiat  has  been  uttered,  and  cannot  be  ac- 


ence  between  creation,  and  com¬ 
position  or  formation.  Theophi- 
lus  (Ad  Autolycum,  II.  4)  re¬ 
marks  ;  “  Ei  6  3eoy  ayivi njros  Kai 
v\tj  ayevvTjTOS ,  ovk  eri  6  TroirjTrjs 
toov  oku>v  eVrri.”  IRENAEU8  (Ad- 
versus  Haereses,  II.  x.  4)  says : 
“  Homines  quidem  de  nihilo  non 
possunt  aliquid  facere,  sed  de  ma¬ 
teria  subjacenti ;  Deus  autem  ma- 
teriam  fabricationis  ipse  adinve- 
nit.”  Augustine  (Confessiones, 
XII.  vii),  in  the  same  strain  re¬ 
marks  :  “  Fecisti  coelum  et  terram 
non  de  te,  nam  esset  aequale  uni- 
genito  tno;  et  alind  praeter  te 
non  erat,  unde  faceres  ea,  et  ideo 
de  nihilo  fecisti  coelum  et  ter¬ 
rain.”  Ambrose  (Hexaemeron,  IL 
2)  teaches  the  same  truth  in  a 


terse  and  lively  manner.  “  Audi 
verba  Dei,  Fiat  dicit.  Jubentis 
est,  non  aestimantis.  Imperat 
naturae,  non  possibilitati  obtem- 
perat,  non  mensuras  colligit,  non 
pondus  exanimat.  Voluntas  ejus 
mensura  rerum  est.  Sermo  ejus 
finis  est  operis.”  Aquinas’s  defi¬ 
nition  (Summa  I.  Quaest.  lxv.  3) 
exhibits  his  usual  exhaustiveness. 
“  Creatio  est  productio  alicujus  rei 
secundum  suam  totam  substan- 
tiam,  nullo  praesupposito,  quod 
sit  vel  increatum,  vel  ab  aliquo 
creatuna.” — u  Creation,”  remarks 
Fuseli  (Lecture  III),  “is  an  idea 
of  pure  astonishment,  and  admis¬ 
sible  only  when  we  mention  Om¬ 
nipotence.” 


CREATION  AND  DEVELOPMENT. 


13 


counted  for,  except  upon  such  a  supposition.  It 
requires  a  potential  base  from  which  to  start,  and 
this  requires  an  act  of  absolute  origination  de  nihilo. 

For  there  is  nothing  more  absurd,  than  the  pan¬ 
theistic  notion  of  an  eternal  potentiality,  or,  which 
is  the  same  thing,  that  the  Infinite  is  subject  to  the 
same  limitations  with  the  Finite,  and  must  pass, 
by  the  method  of  development,  from  less  perfect,  to 
more  perfect  (yet  ever  imperfect)  stages  of  exist¬ 
ence,  and  in  this  manner  originate  the  worlds.  The 
idea  of  an  absolute  perfection  implies,  that  the  Be¬ 
ing  to  whom  it  belongs,  is  immutable, — the  same 
yesterday,  to-day,  and  forever.  The  whole  fabric 
of  ancient  and  modern  Pantheism  rests  upon  the 
petitio  principii ,  that  the  doctrine  of  evolution  has 
the  same  legitimate  application  within  the  sphere 
of  the  Infinite  and  Eternal,  that  it  has  within  that 
of  the  Finite  and  Temporal, — a  postulate  that  an¬ 
nihilates  the  distinction  between  the  two.  The 
idea  of  undeveloped  being  has  no  rational  meaning, 
except  in  reference  to  the  Created  and  the  Condi¬ 
tioned.  Progressive  evolution  within  the  Divine 
Nature  would  imply  a  career  for  the  deity,  like  that 
of  his  creatures,  in  which  he  was  passing  from  less 
to  more  perfect  stages  of  existence,  and  would  thus 
bring  him  within  the  realm  of  the  relative  and  im¬ 
perfect.  All  latency  is  necessarily  excluded  from 
the  Eternal  One,  by  virtue  of  that  absolute  perfec¬ 
tion,  and  metaphysical  self-completeness,  whereby 
his  being  is  “  without  variableness  or  shadow  of 


14 


INTRODUCTION. 


turning.”  His  uncreated  essence  is  incapable  of 
self-expanding  processes,  and  hence  the  created  uni¬ 
verse  cannot  be  an  effluent  portion  of  his  essence, 
but  must  be  a  secondary  substance  which  is  the 
pure  make  of  his  sheer  fiat.  To  the  question  which 
still  and  ever  returns  :  How  does  the  potential  basis 
which  lies  at  the  bottom  of  every  finite  develop¬ 
ment,  itself  come  into  existence  ?  to  what,  or  to 
whom,  do  these  germs  of  future  and  ceaseless  pro¬ 
cesses  owe  their  origin  ?  the  theist  gives  but  one 
answer.  He  applies  the  doctrine  of  creation  out  of 
nothing,  to  all  germinal  substance  whatsoever.  For 
the  doctrine  of  evolution  explains  nothing  at  this 
point.  A  development  is  simply  the  unfolding  of 
that  which  has  been  previously  folded  up,  and  not 
the  origination  of  entity  from  nonentity.  The  growth 
of  a  germ  is  not  the  creation  of  it,  but  is  merely  the 
expansion  of  a  substance  already  existing.  All 
attempts  to  explain  the  origin  of  the  universe,  by 
the  theory  of  development,  or  expansion,  like  the 
Indian  cosmogony,  drive  the  mind  back  from  point 
to  point  in  a  series  of  secondary  evolutions,  still 
leaving  the  inquiry  after  the  primary  origin,  and 
actual  beginning  of  things,  unanswered.  Mere  de¬ 
velopment  cannot  account  for  the  origin  of  a  strictly 
new  thing.  A  germ  can  only  protrude  its  own  la¬ 
tency,  and  cannot  inlay  a  foreign  one.  The  signifi¬ 
cant  fact  in  Natural  History,  not  yet  invalidated 
by  the  most  torturing  experiments  of  baffled  theo¬ 
rists,  that  one  species  never  expands  into  another, 


DEVELOPMENT  AND  IMPROVEMENT. 


15 


proves  that  though  a  process  of  development  can 
be  accounted  for  out  of  the  latent  potentiality  at 
the  base,  the  latter  can  be  accounted  for,  only  by 
recurring  to  the  creative  power  of  God.  The  ex¬ 
pansion  of  a  vegetable  seed,  even  if  carried  on 
through  all  the  cycles  upon  cycles  of  the  geological 
system,  never  transmutes  it  into  the  egg  of  animal 
life ;  and  this  only  verifies  the  self-evident  propo¬ 
sition,  that  nothing  can  come  forth,  that  has  never 
been  put  in. 

§  4.  Development  discriminated  from  Improvement. 

Of  equal  importance  is  it,  to  discriminate  the 
idea  of  a  Development  from  that  of  an  Improve¬ 
ment.  The  abstract  definition  of  history  merely 
describes  it  as  an  evolution,  or  movement  from  some 
germinal  point,  but  does  not  determine  whether  the 
movement  be  upward,  or  downward ;  from  good  to 
better,  or  from  bad  to  worse.  This  depends  upon 
the  nature  of  the  potential  base  from  which  the 
expanding  process  issues.  Within  the  sphere  of 
material  nature,  the  germ,  being  a  pure  creation 
of  God,  can  exhibit  only  a  healthy  and  normal  de¬ 
velopment.  But  within  the  sphere  of  free-ivill ,  the 
original  foundation,  laid  in  creation,  for  a  legiti¬ 
mate  growth  and  progress,  may  be  displaced,  and  a 
secondary  one  laid  by  the  abuse  of  freedom.  This 
has  occurred  in  the  apostacy  of  a  part  of  the  angelic 
host,  and  of  the  entire  human  race.  By  this  revolu- 


16 


INTRODUCTION. 


tionary  act,  the  first  potential  basis  of  human  his¬ 
tory,  which  provided  for  a  purer  progress,  and  a 
grander  evolution  than  man  can  now  conceive  of, 
was  displaced  by  a  second  basis,  which  likewise 
provided  for  a  false  development,  and  an  awful 
history,  if  not  supernaturally  hindered,  all  along 
through  the  same  endless  duration.  It  must,  how¬ 
ever,  be  carefully  observed,  that  the  secondary  foun¬ 
dation  did  not  issue  out  of  the  primary  one,  by  the 
method  of  development.  Original  righteousness  was 
not  unfolded  into  original  sin.  Sin  was  a  new 
thing,  originated  de  nihilo,  by  the  finite  will.  It 
had  no  evil  antecedents,  and  was  in  the  strictest 
sense  a  creation  of  the  creature.  As  it  is  impossible 
that  the  creature  should  originate  any  good  thing 
de  nihilo,  since  this  is  solely  the  Creator’s  preroga¬ 
tive,  so  it  is  impossible  that  the  Creator  should 
originate  evil  de  nihilo,  since  this  implies  a  mutable 
excellence,  and  a  possibility  of  self-ruin.  Under 
and  within  the  permissive  decree  of  God,  sin  is 
man’s  creation ;  he  makes  it  out  of  nothing.  For 
the  origin  of  moral  evil  cannot  be  accounted  for,  by 
the  expansion  of  something  already  in  existence, 
any  more  than  the  origin  of  matter  itself  can  be. 
Original  righteousness  unfolded  never  so  long,  and 
intensely,  will  never  be  developed  into  original  sin. 
The  passage  from  one  to  the  other  must  be  by  an 
absolutely  originant  act  of  self-will ;  which  act, 
subject  only  to  the  limitation  and  condition  above- 
mentioned,  of  the  permission  of  the  Supreme  Being, 


DEVELOPMENT  AND  IMPROVEMENT.  17 

is  strictly  creative  from  nothing.  The  origin  of  sin 
is,  thus,  the  origination  of  a  new  historic  germ,  and 
not  the  unfolding  or  modification  of  an  old  one; 
and  hence  the  necessity  of  postulating  a  creating,  in 
distinction  from  a  merely  developing  energy,- — such 
as  is  denoted  by  the  possibilitas  peccandi  attributed 
by  the  theologian  to  the  will  of  the  unfallen  Adam. 

The  origination  of  a  corrupt  nature  by  the  self- 
will  of  the  first  man,  and  the  subsequent  develop¬ 
ment  of  it  in  the  secular  life  and  history  of  the 
human  generations,  bring  to  view  another  aspect  of 
the  idea  of  development,  and  a  different  application 
of  the  doctrine  of  continuous  evolution.  This  stub¬ 
born  fact  of  apostacy  compels  the  theorist  to  ac¬ 
knowledge  what  he  is  prone  to  lose  sight  of,  viz. ; 
that  so  far  as  the  abstract  definition  is  concerned, 
development  may  be  synonymous  with  corruption 
and  decline,  as  well  as  with  improvement ;  that  the 
organic  sequences  of  history  may  be  those  of  decay 
and  death,  as  well  as  those  of  bloom  and  life.  For 
there  is  no  more  reason  for  regarding  evolution  as 
synonymous  with  improvement  alone,  than  with 
degeneracy  alone.  Scientific  terms  are  wide  and 
impartial.  No  particular  truth  is  told,  when  it  is 
asserted  that  there  is  a  process  of  development 
going  on  in  the  world.  This  is  granted  upon  all 
sides.  On  coming  into  the  sphere  of  free  agency, 
it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  any  definite  and  valuable 
statement,  to  determine  by  actual  observation,  what 
it  is  that  is  being  expanded  ;  whether  it  is  a  primi 
2 


18 


INTRODUCTION. 


tive  potentiality  originated  by  the  Creator,  or  a 
secondary  one  originated  by  the  creature,  to  either 
of  which ,  the  abstract  conception  of  development  is 
equally  applicable . 

§  5.  Distinction  between  Sacred  and  Secular 

History . 

This  discrimination  of  the  idea  of  development, 
from  that  of  improvement,  prepares  the  way  for  the 
distinction  between  Sacred  and  Secular  History. 
Had  the  course  of  human  history  proceeded  from 
the  original  basis,  laid  by  the  Creator,  in  the  holi¬ 
ness  and  happiness  of  an  unfallen  humanity,  human 
development  would  have  been  identical  with  human 
improvement.  The  evolution  of  the  primitive  his¬ 
toric  germ  would  have  exhibited  a  normal  and  per¬ 
fect  career,  like  that  of  the  unfallen  angels,  and  like 
that  of  the  beautiful  and  perfect  growths  in  the 
natural  world.  But  we  know,  as  matter  of  fact, 
that  the  unfolding  of  humanity  does  not  now  pro¬ 
ceed  from  this  first  and  proper  point  of  departure. 
The  creative  idea,  by  the  Creator’s  permission,  is 
not  realized  by  the  free  agent.  The  law  of  man’s 
being  is  not  obeyed,  and  his  true  end  and  destina¬ 
tion  is  not  attained.  The  original  historic  germ 
was  crowded  out  by  a  second  false  one,  from  which 
the  actual  career  of  man  now  proceeds.  But  this 
illegitimate  career,  or  development  of  a  secondary 
and  corrupted  nature,  exhibits  all  the  characteristics 
of  a  continuous  evolution.  The  depravation  of 


SACRED  AND  SECULAR  HISTORY. 


19 


♦ 


humanity  has  been  as  organic  a  sequence  from  a 
common  centre,  as  is  to  be  found  either  in  the 
realm  of  matter  or  of  mind.  The  history  of  apos¬ 
tate  man  is  as  truly  a  development  of  moral  evil, 
as  the  history  of  the  angelic  world  is  a  development 
of  moral  good.  And  this  species  of  history,  by 
one  of  those  spontaneous  epithets  which  oftentimes 
contain  a  wonderful  depth  of  truth,  for  the  very 
reason  that  they  are  the  invention  of  the  common 
and  universal  mind,  and  not  of  a  particular  philo¬ 
sophical  school,  is  well  denominated  profane.  The 
secular  career  of  man  is  a  violation  of  sacred  obli¬ 
gations,  and  of  a  divinely-established  order.  In 
reference  to  the  Divine  idea  and  intent,  in  the 
creation  of  man,  it  is  a  sacrilege.  It  displays  down¬ 
ward  tendencies,  connected  with  each  other,  and 
acting  and  reacting  upon  each  other,  by  the  same 
law  that  governs  any  and  every  evolution.  The 
acknowledged  deterioration  of  languages,  literatures, 
religions,  arts,  sciences,  and  civilizations ;  the  slow 
and  certain  decay  of  national  vigor,  and  return  to 
barbarism  ;  the  unvarying  decline  from  public  vir¬ 
tue  to  public  voluptuousness :  in  short,  the  entire 
history  of  man,  so  far  as  he  is  outside  of  the  recu¬ 
perating  influences  of  Christianity,  and  unaffected 
by  the  supernatural  intervention  of  his  Creator, 
though  it  is  a  self-willed  and  guilty  process,  is,  yet, 
in  every  part  and  particle  of  it,  as  organically  con¬ 
nected,  and  as  strict  an  evolution  from  a  potential 
base,  as  is  that  other  upward  tendency,  started  in 


20 


INTRODUCTION. 


tlie  Christian  Church,  and  ended  in  the  eternal 
state,  by  which  humanity  is  being  restored  to  the 
heights  whence  it  fell. 

For  Sacred  History  is  a  process  that  results  from 
the  replacement  of  the  original  righteousness,  and 
the  original  germ.  It  can  no  more  be  an  evolution 
from  the  corrupted  human  nature,  than  this  corrup¬ 
tion  itself  can  be  a  development  of  the  pure  and 
holy  humanity.  As  we  have  seen,  that  the  origin 
of  the  second,  and  false  foundation  for  man’s  career 
upon  the  globe,  can  be  accounted  for,  only  by  pos¬ 
tulating  an  absolutely  originating  activity  upon  the 
part  of  the  creature ;  so  the  origin  of  that  new 
foundation  which  is  laid  for  the  upward  and  recu¬ 
perative  career  of  man,  in  the  Christian  Church,  can 
be  accounted  for,  only  by  postulating  a  creative 
energy  and  influence  upon  the  part  of  God.  This 
energy  is  found  in  Revelation,  considered  in  its 
twofold  direction,  as  a  manifestation  of  truth,  and 
a  dispensation  of  spiritual  influence.  This  super¬ 
natural  energy,  seizing  upon  the  corrupt  and  help¬ 
less  man,  reinstates  him  in  his  original  relations, 
and  in  the  new  birth  of  a  principle  of  holiness,  lays 
again  the  foundation  for  an  upward  career,  which 
ends  finally  in  the  perfection  with  which  he  was 
originally  created  and  endowed.  Sacred  History  is 
thus  differentiated  from  Secular,  or  Profane,  by  its 
underlying  supernaturalism.  In  passing  from  Secu¬ 
lar  to  Sacred  History,  we  pass  from  the  domain  of 
merely  human  and  sinful,  to  that  of  divine  and 


SACKED  AND  SECULAR  HISTORY. 


21 


holy  agencies.  For  we  do  not  find  in  the  history 
of  the  world,  as  the  opposite  and  antagonist  of  the 
church — of  the  natural,  as  distinguished  from  the 
renewed  man, — any  evidence  of  a  special  and  direct 
intercommunication,  between  man  and  God.  We 
find  only  the  ordinary  workings  of  the  human  mind, 
and  such  products  as  are  confessedly  within  its 
competence  to  originate,  evil  included,  and  tinging 
all  the  elements  with  its  dark  stain.  We  can, 
indeed,  perceive  the  hand  of  an  overruling  Provi¬ 
dence  throughout  this  realm,  employed  chiefly  in 
restraining  the  wrath  of  man,  but  through  the 
whole  long  course  of  false  development,  we  see  no 
signs,  or  products,  of  a  supernatural  and  special  in¬ 
terference  in  the  affairs  of  men.  Empires  rise  and 
fall ;  arts  and  sciences  bloom  and  decay ;  the  poet 
dreams  his  dream  of  the  ideal,  and  the  philosopher 
elicits  and  tasks  the  utmost  possibility  of  the  finite 
reason ;  and  still,  so  far  as  its  highest  interests  and 
destiny  are  concerned,  the  condition  and  history  of 
the  race  remains  substantially  the  same.  It  is  not 
until  a  communication  is  established  between  the 
mind  of  man,  and  the  mind  of  God ;  it  is  not  until 
the  Creator  comes  down  to  earth,  by  miracle  and 
by  revelation,  by  incarnation  and  by  the  Holy 
Ghost,  that  a  new  order  of  ages,  and  a  new  species 
of  history  begins. 

This  new  and  higher  history,  this  new  and 
higher  evolution  of  a  regenerated  humanity,  is  the 
theme  of  the  Church  Historian.  The  subject  matter 


22 


INTRODUCTION. 


becomes  extraordinary.  The  basis  of  fact,  in  the 
career  of  the  Church,  is  supernatural,  in  both  senses 
of  the  term.  In  the  first  place,  from  the  expulsion 
from  Eden  down  to  the  close  of  the  apostolic  age,  a 
positively  miraculous  intervention  of  Divine  power 
lies  under  the  series  of  events,  momentarily  with¬ 
drawn,  and  momentarily  reappearing,  throughout 
the  long  line  of  Patriarchal,  Jewish,  and  Apostolic 
history, — the  very  intermittency  of  the  action  indi¬ 
cating,  like  an  Icelandic  geyser,  the  reality  and 
proximity  of  the  power.  And  if,  in  the  second 
place,  we  pass  from  external  events,  to  that  inward 
change  that  was  constantly  being  wrought  in 
human  character,  by  which  the  Church  was  called 
out  from  the  mass  of  men,  and  made  to  live  and 
grow  in  the  midst  of  an  ignorant,  or  a  cultivated 
heathenism  ;  if  we  pass  from  the  miraculous  to  the 
simply  spiritual  manifestation  of  the  divine  agency, 
as  it  is  seen  in  the  renewal  of  the  individual  heart, 
and  in  the  inward  life  of  the  Church,  we  find  that 
we  are  in  a  totally  different  sphere  from  that  of 
Secular  History,  and  in  a  far  higher  one.  There  is 
now  a  positive  intercommunication,  between  the 
human  and  the  Divine,  and  the  development  that 
results  constitutes  a  history  far  profounder,  far 
purer,  far  more  hopeful  and  beautiful,  than  that  of 
the  natural  man,  and  the  secular  world. 


USES  OF  THESE  DEFINITIONS. 


23 


§  6.  Uses  of  these  definitions  and  distinctions . 

In  these  definitions  and  discriminations,  we  find 
a  proper  introduction  to  Dogmatic  History.  For 
this  portion  of  the  general  subject  of  Ecclesiastical 
History  presents  a  very  transparent  and  beautiful 
specimen  of  a  historic  evolution.  The  germ,  or  base 
of  the  process,  is  the  dogmatic  material  given  in 
the  scriptures  of  the  Old  and  Hew  Testaments. 

|  In  the  gift  of  revelation,  the  entire  sum,  and  rudi- 
mental  substance,  of  Christian  theology  was  given.^ 
But  this  body  of  dogma  was  by  no  means  fully 
apprehended,  by  the  ecclesiastical  mind,  in  the 
outset.  Its  scientific  and  systematic  comprehension 
is  a  gradual  process ;  the  fuller  creed  bursts  out 
of  the  narrower ;  the  expanded  treatise  swells  forth 
growth-like  from  the  more  slender;  the  work  of 
each  generation  of  the  Church  joins  on  upon  that 
of  the  preceding ;  so  that  the  history  of  Christian 
Doctrine  is  the  account  of  the  expansion  which  re¬ 
vealed  truth  has  obtained,  through  the  endeavor  of 
the  Church  universal  to  understand  its  meaning, 
and  to  evince  its  self-consistence,  in  opposition  to 
the  attacks  and  objections  of  scepticism. 

The  idea  and  definition  of  History,  which  we 
have  thus  enunciated,  gives  to  this  branch  of  in¬ 
quiry  all  the  advantages  that  flow  from  the  dynamic 
theory,  or  the  theory  of  organic  connections,  and  at 
the  same  time  protects  it  from  the  naturalism  and 


24 


INTRODUCTION. 


pantheism  which  have  too  often  invaded  the  prov 
ince  of  history,  in  connection  with  the  doctrine  of 
development.  The  distinction  between  a  creation 
and  an  evolution,  carefully  observed  by  the  histo¬ 
rian,  preserves  in  his  investigations,  both  the  Super¬ 
natural  and  the  Natural, — both  the  supernatural 
fiat  or  creative  energy,  from  which  everything  takes 
its  beginning  of  existence,  and  the  natural  process 
of  development,  that  commences  and  advances 
gradually  from  that  point.  And  the  distinction 
between  Secular  and  Sacred  History,  if  firmly 
grasped,  likewise  yields  to  the  historical  investiga¬ 
tor  all  the  advantages  of  the  theory  of  connected 
and  gradual  processes,  while,  at  the  same  time,  it 
protects  him  from  the  error  of  those  who  overlook 
the  fact  of  human  apostasy,  and  who,  consequently, 
see  but  one  species  of  historical  development  in  the 
world, — that,  namely,  of  improvement  and  steady 
approximation  to  the  ideal  and  the  perfect.  The 
distinction,  in  question,  discriminates  between  nor¬ 
mal  and  abnormal  developments,  and  directs  atten¬ 
tion  to  the  fact,  that  the  total  history  of  man  upon 
the  globe  is  not  now  a  single  current ;  that  the 
stream  of  human  history,  originally  one,  was  parted 
in  the  garden  of  Eden,  and  became  two  fountain¬ 
heads,  which  have  flowed  on,  each  in  its  own 
channel  and  direction,  and  will  continue  to  do  so 
forevermore ;  and  that  there  are  now  two  king¬ 
doms,  two  courses  of  development,  two  histories,  in 
the  universal  history  of  man  on  the  globe, — viz.; 


DOCTRINAL  AND  EXTERNAL  HISTORY. 


25 


the  Sacred  and  the  Secular,  the  Church  and  the 
World.1 


§  7.  Relation  of  doctrinal  to  external  history . 

This  enunciation  of  the  idea  of  History  brings 
us  to  the  subject  matter  itself, — to  the  materials 
and  elements  of  Dogmatic  History.  Our  methodi¬ 
zing  must  now  mark  off  the  divisions  of  the  doc¬ 
trinal  history  of  the  Christian  Church,  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  actual  structure  of  the  subject,  and 
arrange  them  in  their  natural  order.  These  divi¬ 
sions  will  yield  the  topics  that  are  to  be  inves¬ 
tigated. 

But,  before  proceeding  to  our  analysis,  it  is 
worthy  of  notice,  that  although  the  external  and 
doctrinal  history  of  the  Church  can  be  distin¬ 
guished  from  each  other,  they  cannot  be  divided 
or  separated  from  each  other.  The  religious  ex¬ 
perience,  the  dogmatic  thinking,  and  all  the  work- 


^he  assertion,  “that  God  is 
in  History,”  is  sometimes  made 
in  such  a  manner  and  connection, 
as  to  obliterate  the  distinction  be¬ 
tween  sacred  and  secular  history, 
the  church  and  the  world.  God 
is  in  secular  history  by  his  provi¬ 
dence  only;  but  he  is  in  sacred 
history  by  an  inward  efficiency, 
the  supernatural  agency  of  his 
Spirit.  In  the  first  instance,  he 
is  the  controller  of  the  move¬ 
ment  ;  in  the  latter,  he  is  its  in¬ 
spiring  life,  and  actuating  energy. 


As  the  indwelling  author  of  up¬ 
right  purposes  and  righteous  de¬ 
signs,  God  is  not  in  the  history 
of  Babylon,  or  of  Rome,  or  of  any 
portion  of  unregenerate  human¬ 
ity.  Only  where  he  works  “  to 
will  and  to  do  of  his  good  pleas¬ 
ure,”  can  it  be  said  that  God  is  in 
the  process;  and  no  one,  surely, 
can  find  such  an  inward  agency 
as  this,  in  the  sensual  civilization 
of  Babylon,  or  the  ambitious  civ¬ 
ilization  of  Rome. 


26 


INTRODUCTION. 


ings  of  the  Christian  mind  and  heart,  exert  a 
direct  influence  upon  the  outward  aspects  of  Chris¬ 
tianity,  and  show  themselves  in  them.  Improve¬ 
ment  in  one  sphere  leads  to  improvement  in  the 
other ;  and  deterioration  in  the  one  leads  to  dete¬ 
rioration  in  the  other.  The  construction  of  a  creed 
oftentimes  shapes  the  whole  external  history  of  a 
people.  The  scientific  expansion  of  a  single  doc¬ 
trine  results  in  the  formation  of  a  particular  type 
of  Christian  morality,  or  piety  ;  which,  again,  shows 
itself  in  active  missionary  enterprises,  and  the 
spread  of  Christianity  through  great  masses  of 
heathen  population.  In  these  instances,  the  symbol 
and  the  dogma  become  the  most  practical  and  effec¬ 
tive  of  agencies,  and  tend  immediately  to  modify 
the  whole  structure  of  a  Church,  or  a  people, — nay 
of  entire  Christendom.  In  this  way,  the  doctrinal 
history  is  organically  connected  with  the  external, 
and  in  the  last  result,  with  the  whole  secular  his¬ 
tory  of  man.  Still,  it  is  plain  that  we  must  dis¬ 
tinguish  parts  of  a  subject,  in  order  to  discuss  it 
with  success.  He  who  should  attempt  to  grasp 
such  a  great  theme  as  Ecclesiastical  History,  all  at 
once,  and  to  treat  it  in  the  entire  comprehensive¬ 
ness  and  universality  with  which  it  is  acted  out, 
and  going  on,  would  attempt  a  task  too  great  for 
human  powers.  History  occurs  simultaneously,  in 
all  its  parts  and  elements.  Like  Wordsworth’s 
cloud,  “  it  moveth  all  together,  if  it  move  at  all.” 
But  although  the  history  of  an  age  is  going  on  all 


DOCTRINAL  AND  EXTERNAL  HISTORY. 


at  once,  it  cannot  be  written  all  at  once.  Mission¬ 
aries  are  proceeding  on  their  errands  of  love,  theo¬ 
logians  are  constructing  their  doctrinal  systems, 
persecutors  are  slaying  the  believer,  prelates  are 
seeking  for  supremacy,  kings  are  checking  the  ad¬ 
vance  of  the  churchman, — all  this,  and  an  infinitude 
of  detail,  is  going  on  in  one  and  the  very  same 
period  of  time ;  but  what  historian  can  represent 
this  whole  simultaneous  movement,  with  perfect 
success  ?  He  who  would  sketch  an  outline  of  such 
vast  proportions,  as  to  include  all  that  has  been 
thought,  felt,  and  done,  by  the  Christian  Church, 
would  make  a  sketch  which  no  single  human  mind 
can  fill  up.1 

The  great  whole,  therefore,  will  be  most  com¬ 
pletely  exhibited,  if  the  work  is  divided  among 
many  laborers,  and  each  portion  is  made  a  special, 
and  perhaps  life-long  object  of  attention,  by  a 
single  mind.  And  it  is  for  this  reason,  that  the 
student  must  not  rest  satisfied  with  perusing  a  gen¬ 
eral  history  of  the  Christian  religion  and  Church, 
however  excellently  composed.  He  must  also  study 
special  histories, — the  history  of  Doctrine,  both  gen¬ 
eral  and  special ;  the  history  of  Creeds ;  the  history 
of  Polities ;  the  history  of  Heresies ;  the  history 
of  Christian  Philosophy,  and  of  Christian  Art ;  the 


:  Niednek  has  attempted  to  do  last  part  of  his  great  work  is  not 
this,  in  his  manual.  We  can  see  equal,  in  thoroughness,  to  the 
the  embarrassing  effect  of  a  uni-  first,  particularly  in  the  dogmat- 
versal  outline,  in  Neandep..  The  ico-historical  section. 


28 


INTRODUCTION. 


history  of  Missions ;  Monographs,  or  sketches  of 
historic  individuals.  By  thus  examining  one  por¬ 
tion  of  the  great  subject,  at  a  time  and  by  itself, 
the  mind  obtains  a  more  complete  and  symmetri¬ 
cal  understanding  of  it,  than  is  possible,  in  case 
only  manuals  and  general  treatises  are  read.  Year 
after  year,  such  a  careful  and  discriminating  study 
of  special  parts  of  the  subject  builds  up  the  mind, 
in  very  much  the  same  gradual  mode  and  style,  in 
which  it  has  pleased  the  Head  of  the  Church  to 
spread  his  religion,  and  establish  his  kingdom  upon 
the  earth.  The  individual  repeats  in  his  own  cul¬ 
ture,  the  great  historic  process,  and  the  result  is  a 
deep  and  clear  apprehension  of  Christianity,  as  a 
kingdom  and  a  power  among  men. 

§  8.  Specification  of  the  Method  adopted . 

\ 

The  Doctrinal  History  of  the  Church,  in  the 
method  which  we  shall  adopt,  divides  into  the  fol¬ 
lowing  topics : 

I.  The  first  division  discusses  the  Influence  of 
Philosophical  Systems ,  upon  the  construction  of 
Christian  Doctrine. 

We  naturally  begin  the  account  of  the  internal 
history  of  Christianity,  with  the  exhibition  of  philo¬ 
sophical  opinions,  because  they  have  always  exerted 
%  powerful  influence  upon  the  modes  and  systems 
of  theological  speculation.  We  are  obliged  to  take 
this  influence  into  account,  because  we  find  it  at 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


29 


work  in  the  history  itself.  We  have  no  concern 
with  the  question,  whether  philosophy  ought  to 
exert  any  influence  upon  the  theological  mind,  in 
unfolding  revealed  truth.  The  settlement  of  this 
question  belongs  to  the  theologian,  and  not  to  the 
historian.  But  however  the  question  be  answered, 
it  is  a  fact,  that  human  speculation  has  exerted  a 
very  marked  influence  upon  the  interpretation  of 
Scripture,  and  particularly,  upon  the  construction 
of  doctrines  and  symbols ;  and  actual  fact  is  the 
legitimate  material,  the  true  staff  and  staple  of 
history. 

Moreover,  we  begin  with  considering  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  Philosophy  upon  Christianity,  because 
this  influence  shows  itself  at  the  very  beginning. 
The  human  mind  is  already  in  a  certain  philosoph¬ 
ical  condition,  before  it  receives  Christianity,  and 
even  before  Christianity  is  offered  to  it  by  the 
Divine  Mind.  In  the  history  of  man,  that  which 
is  human  precedes,  chronologically,  that  which  is 
divine.  “  That  was  not  first  which  is  spiritual : 
but  that  which  is  natural,  and  afterward  that  which 
is  spiritual  ”  (1  Cor.  xv.  46).  Men  are  sinners  be¬ 
fore  they  are  made  saints ;  and  they  are  philos¬ 
ophers  before  they  become  theologians.  When 
Christianity  was  revealed,  in  its  last  and  fullest 
form,  by  the  incarnation  of  the  Eternal  Word,  it 
found  the  human  mind  already  occupied  with  a 
human  philosophy.  Educated  men  were  Plato- 
nists,  or  Stoics,  or  Epicureans.  And  if  we  go  back 


30 


INTRODUCTION. 


to  tlie  time  of  the  Patriarchal  and  Jewish  revela 
tions  of  the  Old  Testament,  we  find  that  there 
was  in  the  minds  of  men,  an  existing  system  of 
natural  religion  and  ethics,  which  was  for  that 
elder  secular  world  what  those  Grecian  philoso¬ 
phies  were  for  the  cultivated  heathen  intellect  at 
the  advent  of  Christ.  A  natural  method  in  Dog¬ 
matic  History  must  therefore  commence  with  the 
influence  of  human  philosophy,  because  this  influ¬ 
ence  is  actually  existing  and  apparent  at  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  the  process.  Christianity  comes  down  from 
heaven  by  a  supernatural  revelation,  but  it  finds 
an  existing  state  of  human  culture,  into  which  it 
enters,  and  begins  to  exert  its  transforming  power. 
Usually  it  overmasters  that  culture,  but  in  some 
instances  it  is  temporarily  overmastered  by  it.  But 
the  existing  culture  of  a  people  is  more  the  product 
of  philosophy  than  of  any  other  department  of 
human  knowledge  ;  and  hence  the  necessity  of  com¬ 
mencing  the  account  of  the  doctrinal  development 
of  Christianity,  with  the  exhibition  of  the  influence 
of  Philosophical  Systems. 

II.  The  second  division,  in  the  method  we  have 
adopted,  comprises  the  History  of  Apologies,  or  De¬ 
fences  of  Christianity. 

We  are  naturally  led  to  consider  the  manner  in 
which  the  Christian  religion  has  been  maintained 
against  attacks  by  the  speculative  understanding  of 
man,  after  having  first  discussed  the  general  influ¬ 
ence  of  philosophy  upon  its  interpretation  and  state* 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


31 


ment.  For  this  second  division  is  supplementary 
to  the  first.  The  defence  of  Christianity  upon 
rational  grounds,  completes  the  philosophical  enun¬ 
ciation  of  it.  As  matter  of  fact,  we  find  that,  so 
soon  as  the  theologian  has  done  his  utmost  to  make 
a  logical  and  systematic  representation  of  revealed 
religion,  he  is  immediately  called  upon  by  the  skep¬ 
tic  to  defend  his  representation.  And  having  done 
this,  his  work  is  at  an  end. 

But  this  is  not  the  whole  truth.  For  the  rela¬ 
tion  between  these  two  divisions  is  also  that  of 
action  and  reaction.  The  endeavor  to  defend  Chris¬ 
tianity  very  often  elicits  a  more  profoundly  philo¬ 
sophic  statement  of  it.  The  defence  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity  against  Sabellian  and  Arian  objec¬ 
tions,  resulted  in  a  deeper  view  of  the  subject  than 
had  heretofore  prevailed.  The  subtle  objections, 
and  dangerous  half-truths  of  the  Tridentine  divines, 
were  the  occasion  of  a  more  accurate  statement  of 
the  doctrine  of  justification  by  faith  without  works, 
than  is  to  be  found  in  the  Ancient  Church.  In¬ 
deed,  a  clear,  coherent,  and  fundamental  presenta¬ 
tion  is  one  of  the  strongest  arguments.  Power  of 
statement  is  power  of  argument.  It  precludes  mis¬ 
representations.  It  corrects  misstatements.  Hence, 
we  find  that  the  Defences  of  Christianity  embody  a 
great  amount  of  philosophical  expansion  of  Scrip¬ 
ture  doctrine ;  so  that  the  history  of  Apologies  is 
oftentimes,  to  a  great  extent,  the  history  of  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  Philosophy  upon  Christianity.  In  this, 


32 


INTRODUCTION. 


as  we  sliall  frequently  have  occasion  to  observe,  we 
have  an  incidental,  and  therefore  strong  proof  of 
the  position,  that  history  is  organic  in  the  connec¬ 
tion  and  interaction  of  its  divisions  and  elements. 

Again,  we  see  the  propriety  of  discussing  the 
History  of  Defences  immediately  after  that  of  Philo¬ 
sophical  Influences,  from  the  fact,  that  both  divisions 
alike  involve  the  relation  of  reason  to  revelation. 
In  the  first  division,  reason  receives  and  states  the 
revealed  truth ;  in  the  second,  it  maintains  and 
defends  it.  But  neither  of  these  two  functions  can 
be  discharged,  without  either  expressly,  or  by  im¬ 
plication,  determining  what  is  the  true  relation  of 
the  finite  to  the  infinite  reason,  and  coming  to  some 
conclusion  respecting  the  distinctive  offices  of  each. 

III.  The  third  division,  in  our  general  method 
of  investigation,  comprises  the  History  of  individual 
Doctrines. 

Comparing  the  parts  of  the  plan  with  each 
other,  this  is  the  most  interesting  and  important 
of  all.  It  is  the  account  of  the  interpretation  and 
systematic  construction  of  Scripture  truth,  by  the 
oecumenical  Christian  Mind.  It  is  the  Bible  itself, 
as  intellectually  explored  and  apprehended  by  the 
Church  universal.1  It  is  the  result  of  the  scientific 


1  By  the  church  universal  is  doctrine ;  not  in  polity,  or  in  any 
meant,  all  in  every  age  who  agree,  merely  secondary  matter.  This 
in  finding  in  the  Scriptures  the  was  the  ground  taken  by  the  Re¬ 
doctrines  of  grace  and  redemp-  formers.  They  denied  that  the 
tion.  For  the  test  of  ecclesiasti-  Papal  Church  was  a  true  church, 
cal  catholicity  is  an  agreement  in  and  a  part,  consequently,  of  the 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


33 


reflection  of  representative  and  leading  theologians, 
of  every  age,  upon  the  meaning  and  contents  of 
revelation.  Such  is  the  general  nature  of  this 
branch  of  the  internal  history  of  the  church ;  but  it 
is  necessary  to  analyze  it  more  particularly. 

The  History  of  Doctrines  contains  two  subdivi¬ 
sions:  1.  General  Dogmatic  History  •  2.  Special 
Dogmatic  History . 

The  first  treats  of  the  general  tenor  and  direc¬ 
tion  of  dogmatic  investigation ;  and  is,  in  reality, 
an  introduction  to  the  second  part  of  the  subject. 
It  serves  to  characterize  the  several  stadia  in  the 
historic  march  and  movement,  and  to  periodize  the 
time  in  which  they  occur.  It  is  found  for  illustra¬ 
tion,  that  one  age,  or  one  church,  had  a  particular 
work  to  perform,  in  constructing  the  Christian  sys¬ 
tem  out  of  the  contents  of  revelation,  and  that  this 
imparted  a  particular  tendency  to  the  theological 
mind  of  that  age  or  church.  The  Greek  Church, 
during  the  first  four  centuries,  was  principally  en¬ 
gaged  wTith  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  and,  con- 


universal  catholic  church,  because 
Rome  had  falsified  the  truth,  and 
doctrine  of  God.  Thus,  Calvin 
remarks  (Instit.  IV.  ii.  12),  “While 
we  refuse  therefore  to  allow  the 
Papists  the  title  of  the  church, 
without  any  qualification  or  re¬ 
striction,  we  do  not  deny  that 
there  are  churches  among  them. 
We  only  contend  for  the  true 
»nd  legitimate  constitution  of  the 


church,  which  requires  not  only 
a  communion  in  the  sacraments, 
which  are  the  signs  of  a  Christian 
profession,  but  above  all,  an  agree¬ 
ment  in  doctrine.  Daniel  and 
Paul  had  predicted,  that  Anti¬ 
christ  would  sit  in  the  temple  of 
God.  The  head  of  that  accursed 
and  abominable  kingdom,  in  the 
Western  Church,  we  affirm  to  he 
the  Pope.” 


34 


INTRODUCTION. 


sequently,  the  general  drift  of  its  speculation  was 
trinitarian,  or  theological ,  in  the  narrower  sense  of 
the  term.  The  Latin  Church,  in  the  fifth  and  sixth 
centuries,  was  occupied  with  the  subject  of  sin,  in 
the  Pelagian  and  Semi-Pelagian  controversies,  and 
its  main  tendency  was  anthropological.  The  doc¬ 
trine  of  justification  by  faith  was  the  absorbing 
theme  for  the  Reformers,  and  the  general  tenor  of 
Protestant  speculation  was  soteriological.  The  spe¬ 
cification,  and  exhibition  of  this  particular  function 
and  work,  in  each  instance,  makes  up  the  matter 
of  General  Dogmatic  History. 

Special  Dogmatic  History  takes  the  doctrines 
one  by  one,  and  shows  how  they  were  formed,  and 
fixed,  by  the  controversies  in  the  church  and  out 
of  it,  or  by  the  private  study  of  theologians  with¬ 
out  reference  to  any  particular  controversy.  The 
doctrines  of  Christianity,  as  we  now  find  them 
stated  in  scientific  and  technical  terms,  were  con¬ 
structed  out  of  the  Scripture  phraseology  very 
gradually.  Sixteen  hundred  years  must  roll  by, 
before  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement  could  be  an¬ 
alytically  stated,  and  worded,  as  we  now  have  it. 
Other  doctrines  received  an  expansion,  and  a  sys¬ 
tematic  construction,  sooner  than  this;  but  each 
and  all  of  them  were  a  slow  and  gradual  formation. 
The  account  of  this  formative  process,  in  each  par¬ 
ticular  instance,  constitutes  Special  Dogmatic  His¬ 
tory. 

We  cannot  better  exhibit  the  nature  and  char- 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


acteristics  of  these  two  branches  of  Dogmatic  His¬ 
tory,  which  we  have  thus  briefly  discriminated, 
than  by  presenting  examples  of  some  of  the  meth¬ 
ods  that  have  been  employed  by  dogmatic  histo¬ 
rians. 

Hagenbach  finds  five  tendencies  in  doctrinal 
history  ;  and,  consequently,  five  periods,  in  the  sci¬ 
entific  development  of  revealed  truth.  They  are  as 
follows : 

1.  The  Age  of  Apologies ;  when  it  was  the 
main  endeavor  of  the  theological  mind,  to  defend 
Christianity  against  infidelity  from  without  the 
church.  It  extends  from  the  end  of  the  Apostolic 
Age,  to  the  death  of  Origen  :  A.  D.  70 — A.  D.  254. 

2.  The  Age  of  Polemics  or  Controversies  / 
when  it  was  the  main  endeavor  of  the  theological 
mind,  to  maintain  Christianity  against  heresy  from 
within  the  church.  It  extends  from  the  death  of 
Origen,  to  John  of  Damascus :  A.  D.  254 — A.  D. 
730. 

3.  The  Age  of  Systematizing  past  results,  or 
of  Scholasticism ,  in  the  widest  signification  of  the 
word.  It  extends  from  John  Damascene,  to  the 
Reformation:  A.  D.  730 — A.  D.  1517. 

4.  The  Age  of  Creed  Controversy  in  Germany . 
It  extends  from  the  Reformation,  to  the  time  of  the 
Leibnitz-Wolfian  Philosophy:  A.  D.  1517 — A.  D. 
1720. 

5  The  Age  of  Philosophizing  upon  Christian - 

ity .  This  period  is  characterized  by  criticism,  spec 


36 


INTRODUCTION. 


ulation,  the  reconciliation  of  faith  with  science,  phi¬ 
losophy  with  Christianity,  reason  with  revelation. 
It  extends  from  A.  D.  1720,  to  the  present  time.1 

Baumgarten-Crusius  finds  three  general  ten¬ 
dencies  in  doctrinal  history ;  but  each  one  involves 
two  special  tendencies,  so  that  the  entire  course 
of  development  presents  six  periods.  The  first  gen¬ 
eral  tendency  is  that  of  construction ;  the  second 
is  that  of  establishment  /  the  third  is  that  of  'puri¬ 
fication.  These  three  conceptions  of  constructing, 
establishing  as  authoritative,  and  purifying,  the  sys¬ 
tem  of  Christian  doctrine,  determine  and  rule  the 
three  principal  stages  which  Baumgarten-Crusius 
finds  in  dogmatic  history. 

Subdividing  each  tendency,  we  have  the  fol¬ 
lowing  six  periods : 

1.  First  Period :  Construction  of  the  system 
of  Christian  doctrine,  by  pure  thinking,  and  the 
influence  of  individual  opinions.  It  extends  to  the 
Nicene  council :  A.  D.  325. 

2.  Second  Period:  Construction  of  the  system 
of  Christian  doctrine,  through  the  influence  of  the 
church  represented  in  general  councils.  It  extends, 

1  The  fourth  and  fifth  of  these  to  his  national  feeling,  in  con- 
tendencies  are  not  sufficiently  structing  modern  history,  both 
general  to  constitute  historic  pe-  secular  and  sacred,  too  exclusively 
riods.  They  are  limited  very  in  its  relations  to  the  Teutonic 
much  to  the  German  Church,  race.  His  periodizing,  however, 
and  do  not  comprehend  the  spirit  for  the  Ancient  and  Mediaeval 
of  universal  Christendom  since  Church  is  excellent,  and  we  have 
the  Reformation.  Hagenhach,  like  adopted  it  to  some  extent, 
his  countrymen  generally,  yields 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


37 


from  the  council  of  Nice,  to  the  council  of  Chalce- 
don:  A.  D.  325 — A.  D.  451. 

3.  Third  Period :  Establishment  of  the  system 
of  Christian  doctrine,  as  authoritative,  through  the 
hierarchy.  It  extends,  from  the  council  of  Chal- 
cedon,  to  Gregory  VII:  A.  D.  451 — A.  D.  1073. 

4.  Fourth  Period :  Establishment  of  the  system 
of  Christian  doctrine,  through  the  church  philo¬ 
sophy  and  scholasticism.  It  extends,  from  Gregory 
VII  to  the  Reformation:  A.  D.  1073 — A.  D.  1517. 

5.  Fifth  Period :  Purification  of  the  system  of 
Christian  doctrine,  through  the  influence  of  ecclesi¬ 
astical  parties  and  controversies.  It  extends,  from 
A.  D.  1517— A.  E>.  1700. 

6.  Sixth  Period :  Purification  of  the  system  of 
Christian  doctrine,  through  the  influence  of  science 
and  speculation.  It  extends,  from  A.  D.  1700  to 
the  present. 

The  method  of  Rosenkranz  makes  three  pe¬ 
riods,  divided  with  reference  to  philosophical  cate¬ 
gories.  The  first  period  is  that  of  analysis ,  and  is 
represented  by  the  Greek  Church.  The  second 
period  is  that  of  synthesis ,  and  is  represented  by 
the  Latin  Church.  The  third  period  is  that  of 
systematizing ,  and  is  represented  by  the  Protestant 
Church. 

Engelhardt’s  method  finds  the  first  period,  to 
be  that  of  analytic  talent,  engaged  in  the  construc¬ 
tion  of  individual  doctrines,  and  extending  from  the 
Apostles  to  Scotus  Erigena :  A.  D.  50 — A.  D.  850 ; 


38 


INTRODUCTION. 


the  second  period,  that  of  synthetic  talent,  employed 
in  constructing  Christianity  as  a  universal  system, 
marked  by  two  tendencies,  the  scholastic  and  mys¬ 
tic,  and  extending  from  Scotus  Ermena  to  the  Ref- 
ormation :  A.  D.  850 — A.  I).  151 1 ;  and  the  third 
period  occupied  with  completing  the  three  doctrinal 
systems  of  the  Western  Church, — the  Lutheran, 
Papal,  and  Reformed, — and  returning  to  the  Bibli¬ 
cal  ideas,  and  elements,  which  had  been  neglected 
in  the  second  period. 

The  method  of  Kliefoth  is  a  combination  of 
several.  His  first  period  is  characterized  by  the 
construction  of  individual  doctrines,  by  the  Greek 
mind,  in  the  analytic  method,  and  with  a  prevailing 
theological  (trinitarian)  tendency.  His  second  pe¬ 
riod  is  characterized  by  the  construction  of  sym¬ 
bols  by  the  Roman  mind,  in  the  synthetic  method, 
and  with  a  prevailing  anthropological  tendency. 
His  third  period  is  marked  by  the  perfecting  of 
doctrines  and  symbols,  by  the  Protestant  mind,  in 
the  systematizing  method,  and  with  a  prevailing 
soteriological  tendency.  His  fourth  period  is  char¬ 
acterized  by  the  dissolution  of  doctrines  and  sym¬ 
bols,  confined  to  no  particular  church,  and  in  no 
special  method,  but  with  a  prevailing  ecclesiastical 
tendency.  The  following  table  presents  his  scheme, 
at  a  glance. 

1.  Construction  of  single  doctrines  :  Greek  :  Analytic  :  Theology. 

2.  Construction  of  symbols  :  Roman  :  Synthetic  :  Anthropology 

3.  Perfecting  of  doctrines  and  symbols  :  Protestant  :  Systematic  :  Soteriology, 

4.  Dissolution  of  doctrines  and  symbols  :  ?  :  ?  :  Church, 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


39 


It  will  readily  be  seen,  that  in  following  these 
main  tendencies,  which  appear  in  the  principal  aeras 
and  periods,  General  Dogmatic  History  finds  a  very 
rich  amount  of  material.  It  exhibits  the  genius  and 
spirit  of  particular  ages,  or  leading  churches ;  so 
that  that  monotony,  which  is  complained  of  in  some 
histories  of  the  Christian  Church,  is  entirely  ban¬ 
ished,  and  the  inquirer  finds  himself  in  a  region  of 
great  varied  currents,  and  streams  of  tendency. 
One  age  is  analytic  ;  another  is  synthetic  ;  another 
combines  analysis  and  synthesis.  Or,  one  age  de¬ 
fends  ;  another  defines  and  authorizes ;  another 
eliminates  and  purifies ;  another  is  destructive  and 
critical.  In  this  way,  the  history  presents  a  variety 
upon  a  grand  scale ;  and  the  student  who  follows 
these  courses  and  movements  of  the  Ecclesiastical 
Mind  feels  an  influence  from  the  great  whole,  like 
that  experienced  by  the  voyager  over  the  whole 
globe, — at  one  time,  floating  down  the  Amazon  ;  at 
another  opposing  the  mystic  currents  of  the  Nile ; 
at  another,  “  borne  by  equinoctial  winds,  stemming 
nightly  toward  the  pole.” 

In  respect  to  Special  Dogmatic  History,  there 
is  less  variety  in  the  methods  employed.  During 
each  of  these  periods  in  General  Dogmatic  History, 
— viz. :  the  Apologetic,  the  Polemic,  the  System¬ 
atizing,  etc., — the  theological  mind  also  traverses 
the  circle  of  individual  doctrines ;  commonly,  how¬ 
ever,  giving  most  attention  to  some  one  of  them, 
or  to  some  one  kindred  group  of  them.  Take,  for 


40 


INTRODUCTION. 


illustration,  tlie  Polemic  period,  in  Hagenbach’s 
method,  extending  from  the  death  of  Origen,  to 
the  time  of  John  of  Damascus, — the  principal  theo¬ 
logian  of  the  Greek  Church,  after  the  division  be¬ 
tween  the  Eastern  and  Western  Churches.  The 
general  tendency  of  this  period  was  polemic ;  yet 
most  of  the  fundamental  doctrines  of  Christianity 
were  more  or  less  didactically  investigated,  and  sys¬ 
tematically  constructed,  during  this  controversial 
age,  which  included  nearly  five  centuries  (A.  D. 
254 — A.  D.  730).  The  various  topics  in  Theology 
and  Christology :  viz.,  the  evidences  of  the  Divine 
existence,  the  unity  and  trinity  of  God,  the  two 
natures  in  the  one  person  of  Christ ;  in  Anthropol¬ 
ogy  :  viz.,  the  doctrines  of  sin,  freedom,  grace,  and 
predestination  ;  in  Soteriology  :  viz.,  atonement,  and 
justification  ;  and  in  Eschatology ,  together  with  the 
doctrines  of  the  Church  and  the  Sacraments, — all 
these  various,  and  varied,  single  topics  were  sub¬ 
jects  of  reflection  and  positive  construction,  during 
this  controversial  period.  Yet  not  all  to  an  equal 
degree,  and  extent.  The  two  divisions  of  Theology 
and  Anthropology  were  by  far  the  most  prominent ; 
that  of  Soteriology  being  least  considered.  Thus 
we  find  special  tendencies,  in  the  midst  of  the  great 
general  one ;  single  smaller  but  strong  currents,  in 
the  one  great  polemic  stream  that  was  pouring 
onward.  In  the  Greek  Church,  the  polemic  mind 
was  most  engaged  with  Theology.  The  doctrine 
of  the  trinity,  together  with  the  person  of  Christ, 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


41 


owes  its  systematic  form  to  the  subtle  profundity  of 
the  Greek  theologians.  In  the  Latin  Church,  An¬ 
thropology  excited  most  attention.  The  doctrines 
of  sin,  free  will,  and  grace,  awakened  in  the  Occi¬ 
dental  mind  a  preeminent  interest,  so  that  this 
anthropological  cast  characterizes  its  thinking. 

These  examples  will  suffice,  to  indicate  the  con¬ 
tents  of  the  third,  and  most  important  division,  in 
the  internal  history  of  the  church. 

IV.  The  fourth  division  in  the  method  adopted 
comprises  the  History  of  Symbols. 

The  ultimate  result  of  all  this  construction,  au¬ 
thorization,  and  purification  of  doctrines,  is  their 
combination  into  a  Creed,  to  constitute  the  doc¬ 
trinal  basis  of  a  particular  church.  It  is  not  enough 
to  eliminate  these  doctrines,  one  by  one,  out  of  scrip¬ 
ture,  defend  them  against  infidelity,  define  and 
establish  them  against  heresy,  and  expand  them 
into  their  widest  form,  and  then  leave  them  to 
stand,  each  for,  and  by  itself.  This  whole  process 
of  doctrinal  development,  though  it  has  its  origin 
partly  in  a  scientific  temper,  and  satisfies  an  intel¬ 
lectual  want,  is  nevertheless  intended  to  subserve 
practical  purposes,  in  the  end.  The  church  is  not 
scientific,  merely  for  the  sake  of  science.  It  is  not 
speculative  merely  for  the  sake  of  speculation.  It 
runs  through  these  stadia  of  Apologetics  and  Polem¬ 
ics,  in  order  that  it  may  reach  the  goal  of  universal 
influence,  and  triumph,  over  human  error  and  sin 
This  controversy,  and  toilsome  investigation  of  re 


INTRODUCTION. 


£2 

vealed  truth,  is  undergone,  in  order  that  the  church 
may  obtain  a  system  of  belief,  a  creed,  or  confession 
of  faith,  that  shall  withstand  the  attacks  of  infi¬ 
delity,  preclude  the  errors  of  heresy,  and  above  all 
furnish  a  form  of  sound  doctrine  which  shall  be 
employed  in  moulding  the  religious  experience  of 
the  individual  believer.  Personal  Christian  char¬ 
acter  is  the  object  ultimately  in  view,  in  the  forma¬ 
tion  of  doctrinal  statements,  and  the  construction 
of  symbols  of  faith. 

The  account  of  these  Confessions,  therefore, 
properly  follows  that  of  the  single  doctrines  of 
which  they  are  composed.  Symbolics ,  as  it  is 
termed,  is  coordinate  with  the  history  of  individual 
dogmas,  and  constitutes  a  general  summary  of  the 
total  results  of  theological  speculation.  It  describes 
the  origin  and  formation  of  those  principal  creeds 
which  have  been  constructed,  at  different  periods, 
by  the  universal  church  represented  in  a  general 
council,  or  by  the  church  of  a  particular  country, 
to  serve  as  the  expression  of  its  faith,  and  the  the¬ 
oretic  foundation  of  its  life  and  practice.  It  ex¬ 
hibits  the  history  of  such  symbols,  as  the  (so-called) 
Apostles?  Creed,  the  Augsburg  Confession,  the  Hel¬ 
vetic  Confession,  the  Thirty-Nine  Articles,  the 
creeds  of  Dort  and  Westminster,  the  Boston  Con¬ 
fession  of  1680,  the  Cambridge  and  Saybrook  Plat¬ 
forms. 

If  now  we  take  in,  at  one  glance,  the  whole  field 
of  investigation,  opened  before  us  in  the  third  and 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


43 


fourth  divisions  of  the  general  method  we  have 
adopted,  we  see  that  they  are  of  themselves  worthy 
of  the  undivided  study  of  a  lifetime.  To  trace 
the  rise  and  growth  of  each  of  the  great  tendencies 
in  dogmatic  history  ;  the  elaborate  formation  of 
each  and  every  one  of  the  particular  Christian  doc¬ 
trines,  under  the  influence  and  pressure  of  the  ruling 
spirit  of  the  period ;  and  then,  the  organization  of 
all  these  general  and  special  results,  into  creeds  and 
confessions  of  faith,  in  order  to  strengthen  and  con¬ 
solidate  the  individual  and  the  general  religious 
character :  to  do  all  this  with  profundity,  and  com¬ 
prehensiveness,  is  a  work  worthy  of  the  best  schol¬ 
arship,  the  deepest  reflection,  and  the  most  living 
enthusiasm  of  the  human  mind. 

V.  The  fifth  and  last  division,  in  the  method 
adopted,  includes  Biographic  History  as  related  to 
the  History  of  Doctrines. 

This  presents  sketches  of  those  historic  individ¬ 
uals,  who,  like  Athanasius,  Anselm,  and  Calvin, 
have  contributed  greatly  by  their  intellectual  in¬ 
fluence,  to  shape  either  the  single  doctrines,  or  the 
symbols  of  the  church,  and  who  are,  consequently, 
representatives  of  its  philosophical  and  theological 
tendencies.  A  historic  personage  is  one  in  whom 
the  spirit  of  an  age,  or  a  church,  is  more  concen¬ 
trated  and  powerful  than  in  the  average  of  individ¬ 
uals.  He  is  therefore  history  in  the  concrete ;  his¬ 
tory  in  a  single  mighty  and  passionate  personality. 

This  division,  it  is  easy  to  perceive,  contains  a 


44 


INTRODUCTION. 


greater  variety  of  features,  and  more  of  popular  and 
immediately  impressive  qualities,  tlian  either  of  the 
others.  Indeed,  if  one  were  to  choose  a  single  por¬ 
tion  of  the  wide  held  of  Ecclesiastical  History,  as 
that  in  which  he  could  labour  with  most  ease,  and 
exert  the  greatest  popular  influence,  it  would  be 
that  of  biography.  The  lights  and  shadows  play 
more  strikingly  and  variedly,  and  there  is  far  more 
opportunity  for  vivid  sketching,  brilliant  descrip¬ 
tion,  and  rapid  narration,  than  in  those  more  central 
parts  of  the  subject  which  we  have  been  describing. 
Biographic  history,  also,  permits  the  writer  to  pay 
more  regard  to  those  secular  characteristics,  which 
throw  a  grace,  and  impart  a  charm.  The  influence 
of  poetry,  of  art,  and  of  science,  in  moulding  and 
colouring  religious  character,  can  be  exhibited  far 
more  easily  while  sketching  the  life  of  an  individ¬ 
ual,  than  when  mining  in  the  depths  of  doctrinal 
development.  Biography  invites  and  induces  more 
flexibility  and  gracefulness  in  the  style,  than  is 
possible  in  the  slow  but  mighty  movement  of 
Christian  science. 

There  is  also  an  inexpressible  charm  in  the  bio¬ 
graphic  Monograph,  especially  when  passing  to  it 
from  the  severer  and  graver  portions  of  dogmatic 
history.  We  have  been  following  the  imper¬ 
sonal  spirit  of  the  age,  the  great  tendency  of  the 
period,  and  now  we  come  to  a  single  living  man, 
and  a  single  beating  heart.  The  forces  of  the  pe¬ 
riod  play  through  him,  and  that  which  had  begun 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


45 


to  appear  somewhat  rigid,  though  ever  impressive 
and  weighty,  is  now  felt  to  have  an  intensely 
human  interest,  and  a  vivid  vitality.  Pass,  for 
illustration,  from  the  contemplation  of  the  deep 
central  movement  of  Scholasticism,  to  the  study  of 
the  life  and  character  of  its  noblest  and  best  repre¬ 
sentative  Anselm,  and  observe  the  agreeable  relief, 
the  grateful  change.  All  this  science,  this  dialectic 
subtlety  and  exhaustive  analysis,  which,  contem¬ 
plated,  in  the  abstract,  had  begun  to  oppress  the 
mind,  while  it  astonished  it,  is  now  found  in  al¬ 
liance  with  a  piety  as  rapt  and  contemplative  as 
that  of  a  seraph,  a  simplicity  as  meek  as  that  of  a 
child,  an  individuality  as  marked  and  natural  as 
that  of  a  character  in  Shakspeare. 

The  biographic  Monograph  as  related  to  the 
history  of  Opinions,  constitutes,  therefore,  a  very 
appropriate  conclusion  to  the  doctrinal  history  of 
the  Christian  Church.1  It  serves  to  connect  the 
whole  department  with  those  active  and  practical 
aspects  of  Christianity,  which  are  the  immediate 
object  of  attention  for  the  preacher  and  pastor. 
Beginning  with  the  more  speculative  foundations 
of  historical  theology,  and  going  along  with  its 
scientific  development,  the  investigator  concludes 
with  its  concrete  and  practical  workings  in  the 


1  Such  thoroughly  wrought  selrn,  and  Henry’s  Calvin,  con- 
monogruphs,  for  example,  as  tain  rich  veins  of  information 
Redepenning’s  Origen,  Mon-  for  the  student  in  dogmatic  liis- 
ler’s  Athanasius,  Basse’s  An-  tory. 


46 


INTRODUCTION. 


mind  and  heart  of  those  great  men  who  have  been 
raised  up  by  Providence,  each  in  his  own  time 
and  place,  to  do  a  needed  work  in  the  church. 
And  while  he  is  not  to  set  up  any  one  of  them  as 
the  model  without  imperfection,  and  beyond  which 
no  man  can  go,  he  will  find  in  each  and  all  of  those 
who  are  worthy  to  be  called  historic  men,  some¬ 
thing  to  be  revered,  and  to  be  imitated ;  something 
that  serves  to  remind  him  of  that  only  perfect 
model,  the  great  Head  of  the  Church,  who  made 
them  what  they  were,  and  who  reflects  something 
of  His  own  eternal  wisdom  and  infinite  excellence, 
in  their  finite,  but  reuovated  natures. 

Such  men  were  Athanasius  and  Augustine  of  the 
Ancient  Church  ;  Anselm  and  Aquinas  of  the  Medi¬ 
aeval  Church ;  Luther  and  Calvin  of  the  Modern 
Church.  Each  pair  is  a  dual  man.  The  six  are 
three  representatives  of  the  three  great  general 
tendencies  in  ecclesiastical  history, — those  of  con¬ 
struction,  authorization,  and  purification.  But  we 
have  seen  that  there  are  tendencies  within  tenden¬ 
cies,  subordinate  movements  in  the  great  general 
movement,  the  river  Rhone  in  Lake  Geneva, 
These,  also,  have  their  representatives,  whose  career 
and  influence  belong  to  biographic  history.  Such 
are  Tertullian  and  Origen  of  the  Apologetic  period  ; 
Basil,  the  two  Gregories,  and  Chrysostom,  of  the 
Polemic  period ;  Scotus  Erigena  the  lonely  theolo¬ 
gian  of  one  of  the  darkest  ages  in  church  history, 
Abelard,  Bernard,  and  the  two  interesting  mystics 


SPECIFICATION  OF  THE  METHOD. 


47 


Richard  and  Hugh  St.  Victor,  of  the  Scholastic 
period ;  Melanchthon  and  Zuingle  of  the  Reforma¬ 
tory  period. 

Such,  it  is  conceived,  is  a  natural  Method  for 
the  investigation  of  the  internal  or  dogmatic  history 
of  the  Christian  Church.  And  in  closing  this  state¬ 
ment  of  the  Methodology  of  the  subject,  it  may  be 
remarked,  that  this  plan  for  a  written  volume  is 
also  a  plan  for  a  life-long  course  of  private  study 
and  investigation.  Upon  examination,  it  will  be 
perceived,  that  it  allows  of  indefinite  expansion  as 
a  whole,  and  in  each  of  its  parts.  The  entire  his¬ 
tory  in  its  general  aspects  may  be  investigated  wider 
and  wider,  and  deeper  and  deeper,  or  a  single  sec¬ 
tion  may  be  made  the  subject  of  study  for  years. 
The  history  of  an  individual  doctrine  may  be  se¬ 
lected,  and  the  student  find  matter  enough  in  it  to 
occupy  him  a  lifetime.  What  an  interest  would 
be  thrown  around  the  clerical  life  of  one,  who  in 
the  providence  of  God  is  separated  from  educated 
men  and  large  libraries,  by  collecting  about  him 
the  principal  works  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  atone¬ 
ment,  e.  g.,  from  the  patristic,  scholastic,  reformed, 
and  present  periods,  and  making  them  his  study  for 
a  few  hours  every  week.  What  a  varied,  yet  sub¬ 
stantially  identical  soteriology  would  pass  slowly, 
but  impressively,  before  his  continually  expanding 
and  strengthening  mind.  Carrying  him  back  con¬ 
tinually,  as  such  investigation  naturally  and  spon¬ 
taneously  would,  to  an  examination  of  the  scripture 


48 


INTRODUCTION. 


matter,  out  of  which  this  body  of  dogmatic  liter¬ 
ature  has  been  expanded,  what  a  determined 
strength,  and  broad  comprehensiveness  of  theo¬ 
logical  character  would  be  gradually  and  solidly 
built  up,  like  a  coral  isle,  in  that  man’s  mind. 

In  closing  this  statement  of  the  general  method, 
therefore,  may  it  not  be  recommended  as  the  basis 
of  one  important  part  of  that  life-long  course  of 
study,  which  every  clergyman  is  solemnly  bound  to 
begin  and  carry  along  ?  No  man,  in  any  depart¬ 
ment  of  literature,  or  in  any  profession  or  calling, 
ever  regrets  subjecting  himself  to  the  history  of  his 
department.  It  is  a  safe  and  generous  influence  that 
comes  off  upon  the  mind  from  History ;  and  there 
is  no  way  so  certain  to  secure  an  impression  ever 
deeper  and  purer  from  this  great  intellectual  do¬ 
main,  as  to  lay  down  in  the  outset  a  method  that 
is  natural,  organically  connected,  and  self-expand¬ 
ing.  Then,  the  inquirer  may  begin  in  any  section ; 
work  backwards,  or  forwards ;  contemplate  the 
whole,  or  only  a  part.  He  will  find  connections  all 
along  the  line,  and  be  in  communication  with  the 
great  whole,  at  each  and  every  point  of  his  investi¬ 
gation. 


BOOK  FIRST. 

- - 

HISTORY 


OF  THE 

INFLUENCE  OF  PPIILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS, 


UPON  THE 


CONSTRUCTION  OF  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE. 


LITERATURE. 


Augustinus  :  De  Civitate  Dei,  Lib.  VIII,  Cap.  iii — xii. 

Cud  worth  :  Intellectual  System  of  the  Universe. 

Gale  :  Court  of  the  Gentiles. 

Stillingfleet  :  Origines  Sacrae. 

Ritter  :  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy  ;  translated  by  Morrison. 
Ritter  :  Geschichte  der  Christlichen  Philosophic. 

Ackermann  :  The  Christian  element  in  Plato ;  translated  by  As* 
bury. 

Baur  :  Das  Christliche  des  Platonismus. 

Lewis  :  The  Platonic  Philosophy. 

Butler  :  Lectures  on  Ancient  Philosophy. 

Ullmann  :  Reformers  before  the  Reformation. 

Hampden  :  Lectures  upon  the  Scholastic  Philosophy. 

Haureau  :  De  la  Philosophic  Scolastique. 

Weewell  :  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences  (Mediaeval  Phi¬ 
losophy). 

Chalybaus  :  Historical  Survey  of  Speculative  Philosophy  from 
Kant  to  Hegel ;  translated  by  Tulk. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PHILOSOPHICAL  INFLUENCES  IN  THE  ANCIENT  CHURCH  s 

A.  D.  1— A.  D.  730. 


§  1.  General  features  of  Platonism  and  Aris- 

totelianism. 

In  investigating  the  influence  which  seculai 
Philosophy  has  exerted  upon  the  construction  of 
Christian  Doctrine,  the  limits  to  which  we  are  shut 
up  by  the  character  of  this  work  will  not  permit  an 
examination  of  the  great  multitude  of  schemes  of 
human  speculation,  that  have  made  themselves  felt 
in  the  intellectual  history  of  the  church.  We  shall, 

4/  S 

therefore,  confine  our  attention  to  those  two  sys¬ 
tems,  by  which  the  theoretical  apprehension  of  re¬ 
vealed  truth  has  been  the  most  decidedly  modified, 
and  for  the  geatest  length  of  time.  These  two  sys¬ 
tems  are  Platonism ,  and  Aristotelianism. 

Before  proceeding  to  the  discussion  of  the  sub¬ 
ject,  it  is  worthy  of  notice,  that  there  are  some 


52  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

advantages  in  being  limited  to  the  examination  of 
only  these  two  philosophies. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  they  have  exerted  more 
influence  upon  the  intellectual  methods  of  men, 
taking  in  the  whole  time  since  their  appearance, 
than  all  other  systems  combined.  They  certainly 
influenced  the  Greek  mind,  and  Grecian  culture, 
more  than  all  the  other  philosophical  systems. 
They  reappear  in  the  Roman  philosophy, — so  far 
as  Rome  had  any  philosophy.  We  shall  see  that 
Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Cicero,  exerted  more  influence 
than  all  other  philosophical  minds  united,  upon  the 
greatest  of  the  Christian  Fathers;  upon  the  great¬ 
est  of  the  Schoolmen ;  and  upon  the  theologians  of 
the  Reformation,  Calvin  and  Melancthon.  And  if 
we  look  at  European  philosophy,  as  it  has  been 
unfolded  in  England,  Germany,  and  France,  we 
shall  perceive  that  all  the  modern  theistic  schools 
have  discussed  the  standing  problems  of  human 
reason,  in  very  much  the  same  manner  in  which 
the  reason  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  discussed  them 
twenty-two  centuries  ago.  Bacon,  Des  Cartes, 
Leibnitz,  and  Kant,  so  far  as  the  first  principles  of 
intellectual  and  moral  philosophy  are  concerned, 
agree  with  their  Grecian  predecessors.  A  student 
who  has  mastered  the  two  systems  of  the  Academy 
and  Lycaeum  will  find  in  Modern  philosophy  (with 
the  exception  of  the  department  of  Natural  Science) 
very  little  that  is  true,  that  may  not  be  found  for 
substance,  and  germinally,  in  the  Greek  theism. 


PLATONISM  AND  AEISTOTELIANISM. 


53 


In  being  shut  up  to  these  systems  we  are,  therefore, 
subjected  to  no  great  disadvantage. 

2.  Secondly,  these  two  philosophies  contain 
more  of  truth  than  all  other  systems  that  do  not 
draw  from  them,  or  are  opposed  to  them.  They 
contain  a  representation  of  the  powers  and  func¬ 
tions,  the  laws,  operations,  and  relations,  of  the 
human  mind,  that  is  nearer  to  the  actual  matter  of 
fact,  than  can  be  found  in  other  alien  and  differing 
systems.  They  are  therefore  the  best  instrument 
to  be  employed  in  evoking  the  powers  of  the  hu¬ 
man  mind ;  in  forming  and  fixing  its  methods  of 
intellectual  inquiry ;  and  in  guiding  it  in  the  in¬ 
vestigation  of  the  legitimate  subjects  that  are  pre¬ 
sented  to  it.  We  are  speaking  only  comparative¬ 
ly,  it  will  be  noticed.  We  are  comparing  things 
human  with  things  human  ;  systems  of  finite  reason 
with  systems  of  finite  reason.  Neither  Platonism 
nor  Aristotelianism  is  free  from  grave  errors.  Plato, 
in  some  places,  certainly,  teaches  a  defective  theory 
of  moral  evil,  in  deriving  it  from  the  vXt],  and  re¬ 
garding  it  as  the  involuntary  imperfection  which 
necessarily  belongs  to  the  finite.1  Aristotle  indk 


1  “  The  relation  of  man  to  sin,” 
remarks  Ackermann  (Christian 
element  in  Plato,  p.  265),  “his 
subjection  to  its  power  and  do¬ 
minion,  is  with  Plato  not  so  much 
(as  according  to  the  Christian 
view)  one  made  by  himself  and 
proceeding  from  the  fjee  act  of 
his  will,  as  rather-one  founded  in 


the  constitution  of  nature  and  the 
world,  and  into  which  man  has 
fallen  merely  from  ignorance.” 
The  following  extracts  illustrate 
this.  “Almost  all  intemperance 
in  pleasure  and  disgraceful  con¬ 
duct  ( CLKparia  kcu  ovetboi)  is  not 
properly  blameworthy  like  vol- 
tintary  evil.  For  no  one  is  vol* 


54 


INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 


rectly  fosters  pantheism,  in  speculating  so  much 
more  upon  to  6 v  than  upon  6  cov,  and  in  denying 
the  immortality  of  the  individual  soul,  though  con- 


untarily  evil  (kokos  pev  yap  iicoov 
ovdeU-) ;  for  the  evil  man  becomes 
evil  through  a  kind  of  bad  habit  of 
body  (novrjpav  e£iv  Tiva  tov  (rdopa- 
roy),  and  an  ill-regulated  train¬ 
ing.”  Timaeus ,  86.  d.  “  He  who 
commends  justice  speaks  the 
truth,  but  he  who  disparages  it 
says  nothing  sound  and  salutary ; 
nor  does  he  disparage  intelligently 

what  he  disparages . Let 

us  then  mildly  persuade  him,  for 
he  does  not  willingly  err  (uv  yap 
eKcov  apapravd ).”  De  Republica, 
IX.  589.  d.  “  For  Simonides  was 
not  so  ill-informed  as  to  say  that 
he  praised  those  who  did  no  evil 
willingly  ;  as  if  there  were  those 
who  did  evil  willingly  (cos  ovt^v 
rivaiv  oi  eKovres  kukcl  noiovaiv). 

For  I  am  about  of  the  opinion 
that  no  wise  mar  supposes  that 
any  one  errs  wh  mgly  (enovra  e£a- 
papravav),  or  willingly  commits 
base  and  wicked  acts ;  but  that 
all  men  well  know  that  those 
who  commit  base  and  wicked  acts 
do  so  involuntarily  (ukovtcs  noi- 
Protagoras ,  345.  d.  At  the 
same  time,  it  is  needless  to  remind 
the  reader,  that  Plato’s  doctrine 
of  law  and  justice,  and  particu¬ 
larly  of  the  divine  vengeance  upon 
evil,  is  in  utter  contradiction  with 

such  representations  as  these. - 

Aristotle  alludes  to  this  view  of 
the  involuntariness  of  sinful  hab¬ 
its,  and  combats  it,  in  the  Nicoma- 


chean  Ethics,  (Book  III.  Chap.  v. 
Bohn’s  Ed.  p.  68).  “But  as  to  the 
saying,  that  ‘  no  person  is  willingly 
wicked,  nor  unwillingly  happy,’  it 
seems  partly  true  and  partly  false ; 
for  no  one  is  unwillingly  happy, 
but  vice  is  voluntary . Leg¬ 

islators  punish  people  even  for 
ignorance  itself,  if  they  appear  to 
be  the  cause  of  their  own  igno¬ 
rance  ;  just  as  the  punishment  is 
double  for  drunken  people ;  for 
the  principle  is  in  themselves, 
since  it  was  in  their  own  power 
not  to  get  drunk,  and  this  drunk¬ 
enness  is  the  cause  of  their  igno¬ 
rance.  And  they  punish  those 
who  are  ignorant  of  anything  in 
the  laws  which  they  ought  to 
know  ;  and  likewise  in  all  other 
cases  in  which  men  appear  to  be 
ignorant  through  negligence ;  up¬ 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  in  their 
own  power  not  to  be  ignorant ; 
for  they  had  it  in  their  own  power 

to  pay  attention  to  it . But 

if  any  one  by  an  uncompelled  ig¬ 
norance  does  unjust  acts,  he  is 
unjust  voluntarily ;  nevertheless 
he  will  not  be  able  to  leave  off 
being  unjust,  and  to  become  just 
whenever  he  pleases.  For  the 
sick  man  cannot  become  well  [by 
his  own  volition],  even  though  it 
so  happen  that  he  is  voluntarily 
ill,  owing  to  a  debauched  life, 
and  from  disobedience  to  physi¬ 
cians.  At  the  time,  therefore,  it 


PLATONISM  AND  ARISTOTELIANISM.  55 

ceding  it  to  mind  in  its  generic  nature.1  Yet  both 
of  these  systems,  taken  together  as  a  whole,  were 
antagonistic  to  the  atheism,  the  materialism,  and 
even  the  polytheism  of  the  pagan  world.  The 
Greek  theism,  as  represented  in  these  two  systems, 
notwithstanding  its  defects,  affirmed  the  existence  of 
god,  and  of  one  supreme  god,2  and  taught  a  spiritual 


was  in  his  own  power  not  to  be 
ill,  but  when  he  has  allowed  him¬ 
self  to  become  ill,  it  is  no  longer 
in  his  own  power  ;  just  as  it  is  no 
longer  in  the  power  of  a  man  who 
has  thrown  a  stone,  to  recover  it ; 
and  yet  the  throwing  and  casting 
it  was  in  his  own  power;  and 
thus  in  the  beginning  it  was  in 
the  power  of  the  unjust  and  the 
intemperate  man  not  to  become 
such ;  and  therefore  they  are  so 
voluntarily ;  but  when  they  have 
become  so,  it  is  no  longer  in  their 
own  power  to  avoid  being  so.” 
The  ethics  of  Aristotle  here  agree 
with  the  Augustinian  position  in 
the  Pelagian  controversy,  that 
power  having  been  given  by  crea¬ 
tion,  if  lost  by  apostasy  (which  is 
an  act  of  unforced  self-will),  the 
creature  is  still  under  obligation. 

1  It  is  the  opinion  of  Ritter 
(Ancient  Philosophy,  III.  648) 
that  Aristotle  differed  from  Plato, 
in  holding  that  the  soul  is  special 
or  individual  only  so  far  as  it  ex¬ 
ists  in  a  determinate  body,  and 
that,  therefore,  as  individual  it  is 
perishable.  The  early  Christian 
Fathers  supposed  that  Aristotle 
denied  the  immortality  of  the 


soul,  and  Mosheim  coincides  with 
them.  But  Cudworth  is  inclined 
to  explain  the  skeptical  phrase¬ 
ology  of  Aristotle  upon  this  point, 
by  referring  it  to  the  animal  soul, 
and  not  to  the  rational.  Yet,  he 
thinks  that  Aristotle  is  not  as  ex¬ 
plicit  as  Plato,  in  affirming  the 
soul’s  immortality.  (Intellectual 
System,  Book  I.  Ch.  xlv.,  and 
Mosheim’s  Note.) 

2  The  early  Fathers,  in  their  de¬ 
fences  of  Christianity  against  the 
pagan  opponent,  contend  that  the 
better  pagan  writers  themselves 
agree  with  the  new  religion  in 
teaching  that  there  is  one  Su¬ 
preme  Being.  Lactantius  (In- 
stitutiones,  I.  5),  after  quoting  the 
Orpliic  Poets,  Hesiod,  Virgil,  and 
Ovid,  in  proof  that  the  heathen 
poets  taught  the  unity  of  the  su¬ 
preme  deity,  affirms  that  the  bet¬ 
ter  pagan  philosophers  agree  with 
them  in  this.  “  Aristotle,”  he 
says,  “  although  he  disagrees  with 
himself,  and  says  many  things 
that  are  self- contradictory,  yet 
testifies  that  one  supreme  mind 
rules  over  the  world.  Plato,  who 
is  regarded  as  the  wisest  phil¬ 
osopher  of  them  all,  plainly  and 


56  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

theory  of  man  and  human  life.  Hence  we  are  justi¬ 
fied  in  saying  that  these  two  systems  are,  comparar 
tively,  the  best  which  the  unaided  reason  of  man 


openly  defends  the  doctrine  of 
a  divine  monarchy,  and  denom¬ 
inates  the  supreme  being,  not 
ether,  nor  reason,  nor  nature,  but 
as  he  is,  god  ;  and  asserts  that  by 
him  this  perfect  and  admirable 
world  was  made.  And  Cicero 
follows  Plato,  frequently  confess¬ 
ing  the  deity,  and  calls  him  the 
supreme  being,  in  his  treatise  on 
the  Laws.  Furthermore,  when 
he  discusses  the  nature  of  the 
gods,  he  argues  that  the  world  is 
governed  by  this  supreme  deity 
in  the  following  manner :  ‘  Noth¬ 
ing  is  more  excellent  than  god ; 
therefore  it  must  be  that  the 
world  is  governed  by  him.  Hence 
god  is  not  obedient  or  subject  to 
any  other  existence  of  any  kind  ; 
consequently,  he  governs  all  other 
existences.’  What  god  is,  he  thus 
defines  in  his  tract  On  Consola¬ 
tion  :  ‘  The  deity  whom  we  are 
speaking  of  cannot  be  defined 
otherwise  than  as  a  free  and  un¬ 
restrained  intelligence  (mens  so- 
luta  quaedam,  et  libera),  distinct 
from  all  mortal  concretion  or 
mixture,  perceiving  and  moving 
all  things.’  Seneca  also,  who  was 
the  most  zealous  of  even  the  Ro¬ 
man  stoics, — how  often  does  he 
praise  the  supreme  deity.  For 
when  he  is  speaking  of  premature 
death  he  says :  ‘Dost  thou  not 
perceive  the  authority  and  majes¬ 
ty  of  thy  judge,  the  ruler  of  the 


world,  the  god  of  heaven  and  of 
all  gods,  upon  whom  these  several 
single  divinities  whom  we  adore 
and  worship  are  dependent  ?  ’  ” 
Augustine  takes  the  same  ground 
(De  Civitate  Dei,  IV.  24,  25,  31 ; 
VII.  6.).  Plato  (Euthyphron,  6. 
b.  c)  represents  Socrates  as  asking 
Euthyphron:  “  Do  you  then  think 
that  there  is  in  reality  war  among 
the  gods  one  with  another,  and 
fierce  enmities  and  battles,  and 
many  other  things  of  the  kind, 
such  as  are  related  by  the  poets, 
and  with  representations  of  which 
by  good  painters  the  temples 
have  been  decorated  ?  Must  we 
say  that  these  things  are  true, 
Euthyphron  ?  ”  The  charge  of 
atheism  brought  against  Socrates 
was  probably  founded  upon  his 
denial  of  the  philosophic  and  real 
truthfulness  of  the  popular  poly¬ 
theism.  Plutarch  (De  sera  nu- 
minis  vindicta)  employs  the  ex¬ 
pressions  to  BaL/iomov,  npovota^  %e6s 
indifferently  in  the  singular  or 
plural.  He  also  speaks  of  the 
mythological  gods,  J upiter,  Apol¬ 
lo,  etc.,  as  subordinate  to  a  higher 
power,  and  not  as  sharing  a  di¬ 
vided  empire  over  the  world. 
For  a  full  account  of  the  differ¬ 
ence  between  the  monotheistic 
and  the  polytheistic  paganism, 
compare :  Cudworth’s  Intellec¬ 
tual  System,  I.  iv.  24,  et  passim; 
Howe’s  Living  Temple,  Part  I 


PLATONISM  AND  ARISTOTELIANISM. 


57 


has  constructed,  and  that  there  are  some  advan¬ 
tages  in  being  forced  to  pass  by  all  secondary  and 
opposing  systems,  when  discussing  the  influence  of 
philosophical  systems  upon  Christianity. 

3.  A  third  advantage  in  confining  our  attention 
to  these  two  systems,  is  found  in  their  essential 
agreement  with  each  other.  Platonism  and  Aris- 
totelianism  differ  only  in  form,  not  in  substance. 
This  is  evident  upon  testing  each  by  the  great 
standing  problems  of  philosophy.  In  reference  to 
the  principal  questions  and  topics,  both  give  the 
same  answers,  and  both  are  found  upon  the  same 
side  of  the  line  that  divides  all  philosophies  into  the 
material  and  the  spiritual,  the  pantheistic  and  the 
theistic.  There  is  a  substantial  agreement  between 
Plato  and  his  pupil  Aristotle,  respecting  the  ration¬ 
ality  and  immortality  of  the  mind  as  mind,  in  dis¬ 
tinction  from  matter ;  respecting  the  nature  and 
origin  of  ideas  ;  respecting  the  relative  position  and 
importance  of  the  senses,  and  of  knowledge  by  the 
senses.  But  these  are  subjects  which  immediately 
reveal  the  general  spirit  of  a  philosophic  system. 


Ch.  ii;  Stillingfleet’s  Origines 
Sacrae ;  Grotii  De  veritate  Chris- 
tianae  religionis  ;  Episcopii  Insti¬ 
tutions  ;  Horsley’s  Prophecies 
of  the  Messiah  dispersed  among 
the  heathen ;  IIaryey’s  Prelimi¬ 
nary  Essay  to  Irgnaeus ;  Glad¬ 
stone’s  Homer,  II.  1  sq. ;  Mor¬ 
gan’s  Trinity  of  Plato  and  Phi¬ 
lo,  p.  93  sq. ;  Nagelsbach’s  Ho- 


merische  Theologie.— — There  is 
nothing  of  a  saving  or  redemptive 
nature  in  the  mere  doctrine  of 
the  divine  unity.  The  devils  are 
monotheists  (James,  ii.  19.)  But 
there  is  great  condemning  power 
in  the  doctrine,  if,  as  was  the 
case  with  the  pagan  world,  “  when 
they  knew  God,  they  glorified 
him  not  as  God  ”  (Rom.  i.  21). 


58 


INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 


Let  any  one  read  the  ethical  treatises  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  and  he  will  see  that  both  held  the  same 
general  idea  of  the  deity  as  a  moral  governor ;  of 
moral  law ;  and  of  the  immutable  reality  of  right 
and  wrong.  The  political  writings  of  both,  teach 
that  man  possesses  an  innate  political  nature,  and 
both  breathe  the  same  political  spirit.  Noticing 
these  resemblances,  the  student  who  passes  from 
the  one  to  the  other  author  perceives  that  he  has 
not  passed  into  a  different  philosophical  division, 
but  is  all  the  while  upon  the  high  ground  of  theism 
and  spiritualism.1 


1  Ritter,  in  his  History  of  An¬ 
cient  Philosophy  (Vol.  Ill),  states 
the  coincidences  between  Plato 
and  Aristotle  as  follows:  (1)  Ar¬ 
istotle  adopts  Plato’s  divisions  in 
philosophy,  viz. :  Logic  (Aristo¬ 
tle,  Metaphysics),  Physics,  Ethics 
(Aristotle,  Politics)  ;  and  the  Pla¬ 
tonic  terminology  generally,  pp. 
15,  03.  (2)  Aristotle  like  Plato 

teaches  that  the  knowledge  of  the 
ultimate  ground  of  all  things, 
alone,  is  science,  and  that  this 
universal  principle  upon  which 
all  sciences  depend,  as  their  initi¬ 
ative  and  leading  clue,  [corres¬ 
ponding  to  Bacon’s  “  form  of  in¬ 
duction”]  is  necessary,  and  not 
hypothetical,  pp.  35,  39.  (3)  Pla¬ 
to  sought  this  necessary  first 
ground  or  principle,  in  the  idea 
of  God ;  Aristotle  sought  it  in 
the  idea  of  [necessary]  Being,  to 
oi>,  as  distinguished  from  [contin¬ 
gent]  matter, — [i.  e.  in  Spirit  as 


distinguished  from  Nature],  p. 
53.  (4)  Plato’s  “dialectic”  is  the 
same  as  Aristotle’s  “first  philo¬ 
sophy.”  p.  53.  (5)  Aristotle  uses 
Plato’s  arguments  against  the 
Eleatic  School,  which  asserted 
that  one  thing  is  as  true  as  anoth¬ 
er,  hence  that  there  is  no  absolute 
truth  at  all.  p.  75.  (6)  Aristotle 

generally ,  like  Plato,  carefully 
distinguishes  the  sensuous  repre¬ 
sentation,  and  whatever  belongs 
to  the  province  of  the  senses, 
from  rational  thought,  or  the 
ideas  of  reason, — which  latter  fac¬ 
ulty  is  indifferently  denominated 
vovs  or  diauoia  by  both  writers. 
Aristotle,  however,  does  not  make 
so  wide  a  separation  between 
sense  and  reason  as  Plato  does, 
p.  89. — “  The  disagreement,”  says 
Ritter  (p.  343),  “  between  Plato 
and  Aristotle  is  only  apparent,  or 
at  least  it  is  only  upon  matters 
of  subordinate  interest.  Upon  all 


PLATONISM  AND  ARISTOTELIANISM. 


59 


The  method  of  each  is  indeed  different,  though 
the  matter  remains  the  same.  And  inasmuch  as 
the  method  sometimes  exerts  even  more  influence 
than  the  matter  upon  the  mind  of  the  student,  it  is 
not  surprising,  if,  upon  looking  too  exclusively  at 
the  divergence  of  men  and  schools  at  the  end  of 
the  line,  and  after  this  difference  between  the  two 
methods  has  been  aggravated  and  exaggerated  by 
time  and  mental  temperaments,  he  is  strongly  in¬ 
clined  to  believe,  that  there  must  be  an  essential 
diversity  between  the  two  systems  themselves. 
The  synthesis  and  poetry  of  Plato,  for  illustration, 
at  one  extreme,  become  Gnosticism,  while  the  anal¬ 
ysis  and  logic  of  Aristotle,  at  the  other  extreme, 
become  extravagant  subtilty,  and  minute  Scholas¬ 
ticism.  And  inasmuch  as  but  little  resemblance 
can  be  traced  between  Gnosticism  and  Scholasti¬ 
cism,  it  is  hastily  concluded  that  there  can  be  no 
sameness  of  essential  matter,  and  oneness  of  funda¬ 
mental  principle,  between  the  original  systems  from 
which  they  sprang,  and  by  the  abuse  of  which  they 
came  into  existence.  For  we  shall  find  that  the 
evil  which  Christianity  has  suffered  from  these  phil¬ 
osophical  systems,  has  originated  from  an  exaggera- 


essential  points  there  is  unanim-  yet  so  much,  I  think,  may  be 
ity.”  With  this,  Cudworth  coin-  granted  to  those  reconcilers  (Por- 
cides.  “Though  the  genius  of  phyry,  Simplicius,  and  others) 
these  two  persons  was  very  differ-  that  the  main  essentials  of  their 
ent,  and  Aristotle  often  contra-  philosophies  are  the  same.”  (In- 
dicteth  Plato,  and  ready  dissents  tellectual  System,  I.  94.  Tegg’s 
from  him  in  several  particulars ;  Ed.) 


60  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

tion  of  one  particular  element  in  each,  and  its  sole 
employment  in  philosophizing  upon  Christianity, 
to  the  neglect  of  the  remaining  elements  of  the 
system.  Letting  go  of  the  sober  and  truthful  ideas 
of  the  system  itself,  which  served  to  fill  out  and 
substantiate  the  method,  the  speculator  held  on 
upon  the  mere  hollow  method  alone.  In  this  way, 
Platonism,  under  the  treatment  of  the  New-Platon- 
ics,  degenerated  into  an  imaginative  theosophy ; 
and  Aristotelianism,  in  the  handling  of  the  later 
Schoolmen,  became  mere  hair-splitting, — both  sys¬ 
tems,  in  this  way,  each  in  its  turn,  contributing  to 
the  corruption  of  Christianity. 

With  this  preliminary  account  of  the  relations 
of  Platonism  and  Aristotelianism  to  each  other,  we 
pass  to  consider  the  extent  to  which  these  philoso¬ 
phies  have  prevailed  in  the  church,  and  the  esti¬ 
mate  in  which  they  have  been  held. 

§  2.  Philosophy  at  the  time  of  the  Advent 

At  the  time  of  the  advent  of  Christ,  and  in  the 
age  immediately  preceding,  the  philosophical  world 
was  in  a  state  of  deep  decline,  and  of  growing  cor¬ 
ruption.  Philosophy,  like  all  other  departments  of 
human  inquiry,  as  well  as  the  general  intellectual 
condition  of  mankind,  was  at  the  lowest  point. 
The  system  most  extensively  prevalent  was  the  Epi¬ 
curean,  because  this  is  most  congenial  to  corrupt  hu¬ 
man  nature,  and  possessing  little  or  nothing  of  a  scien- 


PHILOSOPHY  AT  THE  ADVENT. 


61 


tific  character  is  more  easily  understood  and  received 
by  the  masses.  Epicureanism  is  the  most  natural 
and  spontaneous  philosophical  scheme  for  earthly 
minds,  and  hence  prevails  in  those  periods  when 
the  fallen  humanity  runs  its  career  with  greatest 
swiftness,  and  with  least  resistance,  from  religion, 
or  from  the  better  philosophical  systems. 

Yet,  at  the  time  when  the  Eternal  Word  became 
flesh,  and  dwelt  among  men,  the  system  that  ex¬ 
erted  most  influence  upon  the  nobler  class  of  minds 
was  Platonism.  The  Jewish  Philo,  and  the  Pagan 
Plutarch  and  Pliny,  are  representatives  of  a  class 
of  men  of  earnest  minds,  in  this  period,  who  could 
not  be  satisfied  with  the  prevailing  Epicureanism 
and  Sensualism  in  speculation.  We  cannot  call 
them  Platonists  in  the  strictest  use  of  the  term ; 
for  Philo  and  Plutarch  were  ISTew-Platonists,1  and 
Pliny  was  of  the  Stoic  school.  Still,  employing  the 
term  in  a  wide  signification,  to  denote  a  great 
philosophical  tendency  opposed  to  Epicureanism 
and  Sensualism,  these  men  belonged  to  one  and  the 
same  general  division  in  philosophy, — that  of  the 
Grecian  Theism.  For  New-Platonism,  though  a 
degenerate  type,  was  yet  tinctured  strongly  with 
the  characteristics  of  the  system  from  which  it  had 
degenerated ;  and  Stoicism  upon  the  side  of  ethics 
has  much  in  common  with  the  system  of  Aristotle. 

1  Cudworth  (Intellectual  Sys-  the  origin  of  evil ;  Mosheim  com- 
tem,  I.  332)  shows  that  Plutarch  hats  him,  but  ineffectually, 
adopted  dualism,  to  account  for 


62  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

We  find  then  the  fact  to  be,  that  in  the  century 
preceding  and  succeeding  the  advent  of  our  Lord, 
Platonism,  in  the  wide  acceptation  of  the  term,  was 
the  philosophy  that  was  moulding  the  minds  of  the 
most  thoughtful  and  earnest  men,  and  that  these 
men,  although  a  very  small  minority,  yet  like  such 
minorities  generally,  were  destined  to  exert  a 
greater  influence  upon  the  history  of  Opinions  than 
the  opposite  majority  of  Epicureans. 

§  3.  Philosophy  in  the  Apologetic  Period :  A.  D. 

10— A.  D.  254. 

Passing  into  the  Apologetic  period,  we  find  the 
facts  in  respect  to  the  philosophical  influences  op¬ 
erating  within  the  Christian  church  to  be  as  fol¬ 
lows  : 

Philosophy  is  nowr  within  the  church  itself.  In 
the  preceding  period,  it  was  outside  of  it.  The  Plu¬ 
tarch  s,  Pliny s,  and  Philos,  were  not  Christians  ;  and 
the  Apostolic  Church,  being  under  the  direct  guid¬ 
ance  of  the  Apostles,  had  little  or  nothing  to  do 
with  systems  of  human  speculation.  In  this  period, 
however,  we  find  that  philosophy  has  been  adopted 
by  the  Christian  as  distinguished  from  the  Pagan 
mind,  and  that  within  the  sphere  of  the  church  it 
is  now  more  successfully  cultivated,  and  more  legit¬ 
imately  employed,  than  in  the  sphere  of  the  world. 
The  secular  mind  now  employs  philosophy,  and 
even  ■  this  more  lofty  and  ethical  philosophy  of 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  APOLOGETIC  AGE. 


63 


which  we  are  speaking,  in  attacking  Christianity  ; 
while  the  ecclesiastical  mind  employs  it  to  repel 
their  attacks.  Lucian  was  indeed  an  avowed  Epi¬ 
curean  ;  but  Celsus  pretends  at  least  to  Platonism,1 
and  Porphyry  was  a  New-Platonist ;  and  the  sub- 
stance  of  the  attack  upon  Christianity,  in  this  pe¬ 
riod,  was  the  work  of  these  two  latter  minds. 
The  consequence  is,  that  the  Christian  apologist  is 
compelled  to  study,  and  employ  this  same  general 
system  of  speculation,  for  his  own  higher  purposes. 
He  perceives  that  a  system  of  philosophy  like  the 
Platonic  is  favourable  to  the  principles  of  ethics  and 
natural  religion ;  that  it  does  not,  like  the  Epicu¬ 
rean,  undermine  all  morality  and  religion ;  and 
therefore  insists,  and  with  right,  that  so  far  as  it 
can  properly  go,  it  is  not  unfriendly  to  the  system 
of  revealed  truth.2  Indeed,  the  controversy  between 
the  Platonic  infidels  Porphyry  and  Celsus,  and  the 


Meander  (I.  160)  regards  Ori- 
gen  as  mistaken,  in  attributing  the 
work  against  Christianity  to  Cel¬ 
sus  the  Epicurean,  the  friend  and 
contemporary  of  Lucian.  Cud- 
worth  (II.  340)  remarks  that 
“  though  Celsus  were  suspected 
by  Origen  to  have  been  indeed 
an  Epicurean,  yet  did  he  at  least 
personate  a  Platonist  too.  The 
reason  whereof  might  be,  not  only 
because  the  Platonic  and  Pyth- 
agoric  sect  was  the  divinest  of 
all  the  Pagans,  and  that  which 
approached  nearest  to  Christian¬ 
ity  and  the  truth  (however,  it 
might  by  accident  therefore  prove 


the  worst,  as  the  corruption  of  the 
best  thing),  and  by  that  means 
could  with  greatest  confidence 
hold  up  the  bucklers  against  Chris¬ 
tianity  and  encounter  it ;  but  also 
because  the  Platonic  principles,  as 
they  migh  t  be  understood,  would, 
of  all  others,  serve  most  plausibly 
to  defend  the  pagan  polytheism 
and  idolatry.” 

2  Justin  Martyr  and  Clement  of 
Alexandria  frequently  cite  the 
monotheistic  views  of  Plato,  re¬ 
specting  the  popular  divinities,  in 
proof  of  the  nothingness  of  the 
heathen  deities,  and  the  folly  of 
idolatry. 


64  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

Platonic  apologists  Justin  Martyr  and  Origen,  did 
not  relate  so  mucli  to  the  question  whether  Platon- 
ism  was  substantially  correct,  but  whether  it  was 
all  that  man  needed ;  not  whether  the  first  princi¬ 
ples  of  ethics  and  natural  religion  are  true  and 
valid,  but  whether  natural  religion  is  able  to  secure 
the  eternal  interests  of  mankind, — a  question  which 
is  constantly  recurring,  and  which  constitutes  the 
gist  of  the  controversy  between  skepticism  and 
Christianity  at  this  very  moment,  as  much  as  it 
did  in  the  first  ages  of  the  church. 

The  consequence  was,  that  this  system  of  hu¬ 
man  philosophy,  the  Greek  theism,  upon  being 
brought  into  the  church  and  employed  in  defending 
Christianity,  received  a  more  exact  definition,  and 
a  more  legitimate  application,  than  it  obtained 
while  employed  by  the  secular  and  skeptical  mind. 
It  thereby  came  nearer  to  the  original  form  in 
which  it  was  first  promulgated  by  Plato  and  Aris¬ 
totle.  Let  any  one  examine  the  philosophical  po¬ 
sitions  of  Justin,  Origen,  and  even  that  earnest  hater 
of  philosophy  Tertullian,  and  he  will  see  that 
there  is  a  much  closer  agreement  between  these 
Christian  Apologists  and  Plato  and  Aristotle,  than 
there  is  between  these  latter  and  the  New-Platonic 
skeptics.  For  the  New-Platonic  skeptics  did  not 
confine  Platonism  within  its  true  limits.  It  was 
their  desire  to  establish  human  philosophy  upon 
the  ruins  of  Christianity,  as  a  universal  religion,—* 
sufficient  to  meet  the  wants  of  humanity,  and  there* 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  APOLOGETIC  AGE. 


65 


fore,  rendering  the  revealed  system  superfluous. 
Hence  the  human  system  itself  was  enlarged  by 
deductions  that  were  illegitimate,  and  by  additions 
that  were  alien  to  its  true  meaning  and  substance; 
so  that  the  imaginative  New-Platonism  that  re¬ 
sulted  is  quite  different  from  the  more  sober  and 
circumscribed  philosophising  of  Socrates,  Plato,  and 
Aristotle.1 


1  The  difference  between  Pla¬ 
tonism  and  New-Platonism  lias 
been  often  overlooked,  notwith¬ 
standing  that  writers  of  high  au¬ 
thority  have  directed  attention  to 
it.  Brucker  (Historia  Philoso- 
phiae  II.  364,  De  Secta  Eclectica) 
remarks,  “  Totum  quoque  syste- 
ma  Platonicum  adulterandum,  et 
mutandum,  adjiciendum  et  ex  aliis 
systematibus  inserendum  erat,  quo 
factum  est,  ut  tota  fere  facie  a  Pla- 
tonis  imagine  deficisset.”  Nie¬ 
buhr  (Later  Roman  History,  Lec¬ 
tures  LXX.  and  LXXVIII.)  agrees 
with  this  in  saying,  that  “the 
[hostile]  relation  in  which  New- 
Platonism  placed  itself  towards 
Christianity  introduced  some¬ 
thing  downright  untrue  into  the 
Platonic  philosophy,  which  was 
now  made  to  prop  up  paganism.” 
Besides  this  motive  which  the 
New-Platonic  skeptic  found  in 
,  his  opposition  to  Christianity,  to 
adulterate  the  Socratic  Platonism, 
there  was  the  natural  tendency 
to  corruption  in  a  philosophical 
system  as  taught  by  the  disciple, 
who  is  always  an  inferior  mind 
compared  with  the  originator  of 


the  system.  Bacon  (Advance¬ 
ment  of  Learning,  Book  I.)  re¬ 
marks  the  tendency  in  the  disciplo 
to  falsify  and  injure  the  system 
of  the  master,  in  the  following 
terms.  “Hence  it  hath  come 
that  in  arts  mechanical  the  first 
deviser  comes  shortest,  and  time 
addeth  and  perfecteth ;  but  in  sci¬ 
ences  the  first  author  goeth  far¬ 
thest,  and  time  leaseth  and  cor- 
rupteth.  So,  we  see,  artillery, 
sailing,  printing,  and  the  like  were 
grossly  managed  at  the  first,  but 
by  time  accommodated  and  re¬ 
fined  :  but  contrariwise,  the  phi¬ 
losophies  and  sciences  of  Aristo¬ 
tle,  Plato,  Democritus,  Euclides, 
Archimedes,  of  most  vigor  at  the 
first,  and  by  time  degenerate  and 
embased ;  whereof  the  reason  is 
no  other,  but  that  in  the  former, 
many  wits  and  industries  have 
contributed  in  one ;  and  in  the 
latter,  many  wits  and  industries 
have  been  spent  about  the  wit 
of  some  one,  whom  many  times 
they  have  rather  depraved  than 

illustrated.” - The  opposition  of 

New-Platonism  to  Christianity, 
in  its  endeavor  to  establish  itself 


66 


INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 


The  fact  then,  in  relation  to  the  Apologetic 
period  is,  that  Platonism,  in  the  widest  acceptation, 
was  the  dominant  philosophy,  so  far  as  the  theolo- 
Vgian  made  any  use  of  human  speculation.  To  use 
the  summary  conclusion  of  Baumgarten-Crusius, 
.“the  church  adhered  to  Platonism,  notwithstanding 
all  the  varied  and  injurious  influences  that  were  ex¬ 
perienced  from  the  exaggerations  or  misapplications 
of  this  system,  as  that  philosophical  doctrine  or 
school  which  was  not  only  the  most  extensively 
prevalent,  but  appeared  to  be  most  akin,  in  its 
general  spirit  and  tendency,  to  Christianity.” 1 

It  ought,  however,  to  be  added,  that  at  the  close 
of  this  Apologetic  period,  Aristotelianism  began  to 
appear  in  a  more  distinct  and  independent  manner 
than  before,  so  that  the  dim  beginnings  of  that 
dialectic  spirit  which  did  not  attain  any  very  con¬ 
siderable  influence  till  the  great  outburst  of  Scholas- 


as  a  system  sufficient  to  meet  the 
wants  of  mankind,  showed  itself 
in  three  forms :  (1)  Open  attack, 
by  Porphyry,  Julian,  Proclus, 
and  Plotinus.  (2)  By  exaggerated 
sketches  of  distinguished  pagan 
philosophers  to  take  the  place  of 
the  gospel  narratives, — such  as 
Jamblichus’s  life  of  Pythagoras, 
Philostratus’s  life  of  Apollonius 
of  Tyana.  (3)  By  forged  writings 
containing  some  Biblical  ideas 
mixed  with  errors,  which  were  to 
be  disseminated  as  of  equal  au¬ 
thority  with  the  canonical  books. 
It  is  with  reference  to  this  latter 


class  of  writings  that  Coleridge 
(Works  Y.  267)  remarks  that, 
“  from  the  confounding  of  Plotin- 
ism  with  Platonism,  the  English 
Latitudinarian  divines  fell  into 
the  mistake  of  finding  in  the 
Greek  philosophy  many  anticipa¬ 
tions  of  the  Christian  faith,  which 
in  fact  were  but  its  echoes.  The 
inference  is  as  perilous  as  inevi¬ 
table,  namely,  that  even  the  mys¬ 
teries  of  Christianity  needed  no 
revelation,  having  been  previously 
discovered  and  set  forth  by  un¬ 
aided  reason.” 

1  Dogmengeschichte,  I.  §  13. 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  APOLOGETIC  AGE. 


67 


ticism,  may  be  traced  here  and  there.  It  was,  how¬ 
ever,  the  method,  rather  than  the  matter  of  this 
system  that  exerted  an  influence,  and  attracted  at¬ 
tention  at  this  time.  So  far  as  the  substance  of 
Aristotelianism  is  concerned,  it  was,  as  we  have 
shown,  one  with  Platonism,  and  therefore  really  at 
work  in  the  general  mind  of  this  period  ;  but  so  far 
as  its  logical  forms  are  concerned,  it  now  began  for 
the  first  time  to  exert  a  slight  influence,  which  was 
not  regarded  with  favour  by  the  leading  ecclesias¬ 
tical  minds.  The  school  of  Alexandria,  where  the 
Platonic  spirit  was  more  intense  and  extreme  than 
elsewhere,  were  particularly  opposed  to  Aristo¬ 
telianism,  as  it  had  then  appeared,  and  as  they 
understood  it.  But  the  writings  themselves  of 
Aristotle  were  not  much  known,  and  as  a  conse¬ 
quence  both  adherents  and  opponents  proceeded 
from  an  imperfect  apprehension  of  his  system. 
Baumgarten-Crusius  remarks,  that  in  the  church  of 
the  first  centuries  Aristotelianism  was  almost  sy¬ 
nonymous  with  sophistry,  and  hair-splitting.  Ire- 
naeus  says  that  “  minuteness  and  subtilty  about 
curious  questions  is  characteristic  of  Aristotelian¬ 
ism.”  1  Tertullian,  speaking  of  the  heretics  he  was 
opposing,  alludes  to  the  “  wretched  Aristotle,  who 
invented  their  logic  for  them.” 2  The  fact  seems 

1  Ad  versus  Haereses,  II.  14.  lem !  qui  illis  dialecticam  instituit, 
u  Minutiloquium,  et  subtilitas  circa  artificem  struendi  et  destruendi 
quaestiones,  Aristotelicum  est.”  versipellem, . omnia  re- 

u  De  praescriptionibus  haereti-  tractantem,  ne  quid  omnino  trac- 
corum,  vii.  “Miserum  Aristote-  taverit.” 


68  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

to  ha  Ye  been  that  Aristotelianism,  during  the  2d 
and  3d  centuries,  was  employed  chiefly  by  the  he¬ 
retical  mind,1  merely  as  an  acute  logical  method, 
and  almost  wholly  in  discussions  respecting  the  ori¬ 
gin  of  the  world,  and  the  nature  of  the  deity. 
Among  the  erroneous  doctrines  advanced  at  this 
time  in  connection  with  this  system,  was  that  of 
the  eternity  of  the  world. 


§  4.  Philosophy  in  the  Polemic  Period.  A.  D.  254 

—A.  D.  730. 

Passing  into  the  Polemic  period,  we  find  the 
same  Grecian  theism  to  be  the  dominant  philo¬ 
sophical  system.  As  the  ecclesiastical  mind  now 
became  more  scientific  than  in  the  Apologetic  age, 
it  was  natural  that  the  Platonic  philosophy  should 
be  still  better  understood,  so  that  we  find  the 
vagueness  and  fancifulness  of  New-Platonism  grad¬ 
ually  disappearing,  and  giving  place  to  a  more  cor¬ 
rect  apprehension  of  the  genuine  Socratic  Platon¬ 
ism  united  with  more  of  the  Aristotelian  element. 
The  attention  of  Augustine,  the  greatest  theologian 
of  this  important  period,  had  been  directed  to 


1  u  The  Artemonites  busied  them¬ 
selves  a  good  deal  with  mathe¬ 
matics,  dialectics,  and  criticism; 
with  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle, 

and  with  Theophrastus . 

We  perceive  here  the  different 
kinds  of  influence  exerted  by  the 


systems  of  philosophy ;  the  Pla¬ 
tonic  being  employed  to  defend 
the  doctrine  of  Christ’s  divinity, 
while  the  opposite  direction  of 
mind,  tending  to  combat  that  doc¬ 
trine,  leaned  to  the  side  of  Arte* 
monism.”  Neandek  I.  581. 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  POLEMIC  AGE. 


69 


Christianity  by  the  aspirations  awakened  during 
his  Platonic  studies,1  which,  he  discovered,  as  Plato 
himself  did,  could  not  be  realized  by  anything  hu¬ 
man.  u  In  Cicero  and  Plato  and  other  such  writers,” 
he  says,  “  I  meet  with  many  things  acutely  said, 
and  things  that  awaken  some  fervor  and  desire, 
but  in  none  of  them  do  I  find  the  words,  ‘  Come 
unto  me  all  ye  that  labor  and  are  heavy  laden,  and 
I  will  give  you  rest.’  ” 2  In  his  Confessions,  he 
speaks  of  the  broad  prospect  opened  before  him 
by  the  Platonic  writings,  but  of  their  utter  insuffi¬ 
ciency  to  empower  the  mind  to  reach  the  region 
thus  displayed, — of  the  immortal  longing  united 
with  the  eternal  hopelessness.  “  For  it  is  one 
thing,” — he  says,  in  that  deep-toned  eloquence  of 
his,  which  so  often  stirs  the  depths  of  our  being 
like  a  choral  anthem, — “  for  it  is  one  thing,  from 
the  mountain’s  shaggy  top  to  see  the  land  of  peace 
and  find  no  way  thither ;  and  in  vain  to  strive 
towards  it,  in  ways  beset  by  fugitives  and  deserters, 
and  opposed  by  their  captain,  the  lion  and  the 
dragon ;  and  another  thing,  to  keep  on  the  way 
thither,  guarded  by  the  hosts  of  the  heavenly  gen¬ 
eral.  These  things  did  wonderfully  sink  into  my 
soul,  while  I  read  the  least  of  thy  apostles,  and 

1  He  read  Plato  in  a  Latin  trans-  philosopher,  hut  not  that  of  the 
lation.  Confessions  VII.  ix.  incarnate  Logos ;  the  doctrine  that 

3  Augustine  (Confessions,  VII.  God  is  the  light  of  the  mind,  en- 
ix)  discriminates  very  clearly  he-  lightening  every  man  that  com- 
tween  the  teachings  of  Plato  and  eth  into  the  world  (John  i.  9), 
those  of  revelation.  He  finds  the  hut  not  that  God  in  the  flesh  died 
doctrine  of  the  Logos  in  the  Greek  for  the  ungodly. 


70  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

meditated  upon  tliy  word,  and  trembled  exceed¬ 
ingly.”  1 

The  influence  of  Platonism  is  also  very  apparent 
in  the  scientific,  as  well  as  practical  theology  of  the 
Polemic  period.  The  anthropological  views  called 
out  in  the  controversy  between  Augustine  and 
Pelagius  exhibit  unmistakable  signs  of  the  pre¬ 
valence  of  this  system.  The  Augustinian  view  of 
the  origin  and  nature  of  sin  is  closely  connected 
with  the  Platonic  view  of  the  nature  and  endow¬ 
ments  of  the  human  soul.  The  doctrine  of  innate 
ideas  harmonizes  with  that  of  innate  depravity.  In 
the  other  great  controversy  of  this  period, — that 
respecting  the  Trinity,- — those  theologians  who  ex¬ 
erted  most  influence  in  forming,  and  establishing 
the  final  creed-statement,  had  been  disciplined  by 
the  Greek  intellectual  methods.  Athanasius,  Basil, 
and  the  two  Gregories,  were  themselves  of  Greek 
extraction,  and  their  highly  metaphysical  intellects 
had  been  trained  in  Grecian  schools.  Athanasius 
was  a  reverent  student  of  Origen,  though  by  no 
means  a  servile  recipient  of  all  of  Origen’s  opinions ; 

1  Confessions,  VII.  xxi.  “  To  a  Christian,  as  I  had  heard),  had 
Simplicianus  then  I  went,  the  translated  into  Latin,  he  testified 
spiritual  father  of  Ambrose  (a  his  joy  that  I  had  not  fallen  upon 
bishop  now),  and  whom  Am-  the  writings  of  other  philosophers, 
brose  truly  loved  as  a  father.  To  full  of  fallacies  and  deceits  af- 
him  I  related  the  mazes  of  my  ter  the  rudiments  of  this  world, 
wanderings.  But  when  I  men-  whereas  the  Platonists  many 
tioned  that  I  had  read  certain  ways  lead  to  the  belief  in  God, 
books  of  the  Platonists,  which  and  His  Word.”  Confessions, 
Victorinus,  sometime  rhetoric  VIII.  ii.  f 

professor  at  Rome  (who  had  died 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  POLEMIC  AGE. 


71 


and  Basil,  Gregory  Nyssa,  and  Gregory  Nazianzen, 
were  thoroughly  versed  in  classical  antiquity.  Such 
a  discipline  as  this  would  naturally  introduce  these 
leading  minds  of  the  4th  century,  to  the  philosophy 
of  Plato,  whose  influence  was  felt  through  the  whole 
Hellenic  culture  of  the  period. 

But  as  we  pass  along  in  this  Polemic  age,  we 
find  that,  although  the  same  general  estimate  is  put 
upon  Platonism,  as  during  the  Apologetic  period, 
yet  the  theological  mind  is  forced  to  employ,  and 
does  imperceptibly  employ,  more  and  more  of  the 
logic  and  dialectics  of  Aristotle’s  system.1  In  con¬ 
structing  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  and  the  Person 
of  Christ,  the  mind  of  an  Athanasius  is  compelled 
to  an  analysis,  distinction,  limitation,  and  definition, 
which  has  perhaps  even  more  affinity  with  the 
dialectic  spirit  and  method  of  Aristotle,  than  with 
that  of  Plato.  Let  us  look  a  moment,  for  illustra¬ 
tion,  at  a  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity 
ascribed  to  Athanasius,  but  which  probably  pro¬ 
ceeded  from  the  school  of  Augustine, — commonly 
called  the  Symbolum  Quicumque.  A  few  positions 


’Dans  la  primitive  Eglise,  les 
plus  habiles  Auteurs  Chretiens 
s’accommodoient  des  pens6es  des 
Platoniciens,  qui  leur  revenoient 
le  plus,  et  qui  etoient  le  plus  en 
vogue  alors.  Peu  a  peu  Aristote 
prit  la  place  de  Platon,  lorsque  le 
go&t  des  Systemes  commenga  a 
r6gner,  et  lorsque  la  Theologie 
meme  devint  plus  systematique 


par  les  decisions  des  ConcilesG6n- 
6raux,  qui  fournissoient  des  For- 
mulaires  precis  et  positifs.  Leib¬ 
nitz  :  Theodicee,  Ed.  Erdmann, 

p.  481. - The  heretical  mind,  in 

this  period,  also  made  use  of  the 
Aristotelian  logic.  Aetius,  the 
Arian,  employed  the  categories  of 
Aristotle  in  defending  his  views. 
Socrates  :  Eccl.  Hist.  II.  xxxv. 


72  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

taken  from  it  will  suffice  to  show  that  the  theolog¬ 
ical  mind,  in  drawing  up  a  form  of  doctrine  that 
should  contain  all  the  Scripture  elements,  was  forced 
to  employ  that  niceness  of  discrimination,  and  sharp¬ 
ness  of  distinction,  which  is  so  characteristic  of  the 
Aristotelian  system.  “  This  is  the  catholic  faith  : 
that  we  worship  one  God  in  a  trinity,  and  a  trinity 
in  a  unity.  Neither  confounding  the  persons,  nor 
dividing  the  substance.”  Here  the  logical  concep¬ 
tions  of  “  confusion  ”  and  “  division  ”  are  carefully 
distinguished.  “  The  'person  of  the  Father  is  one; 
the  person  of  the  Son  is  one ;  the  person  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  one.”  Here,  the  conception  of  u  per¬ 
son  ”  is  discriminated  from  that  of  “  nature,”  or 
“  essence,”  by  the  affirmation  that  there  are  three 
persons.  “  But  of  the  Father,  and  of  the  Son,  and 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  divinity  is  one,  the  glory 
equal,  the  majesty  equal.  Such  as  is  the  Father, 
is  the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  Father  is  un¬ 
created,  the  Son  is  uncreated,  the  Spirit  is  uncreated. 
The  Father  is  infinite,  the  Son  is  infinite,  the  Spirit 
is  infinite.  The  Father  is  eternal,  the  Son  is  eternal, 
the  Holy  Spirit  is  eternal.”  Here  the  notion  of 
u  equality  ”  in  the  persons  is  enunciated.  “  And 
yet  there  are  not  three  eternal  beings ,  but  one  eter¬ 
nal  being  /  there  are  not  three  uncreated,  nor  three 
infinite  beings ,  but  one  uncreated  and  one  infinite 
being .”  Here,  the  conception  of  “  being  ”  or  “  es¬ 
sence  ”  is  discriminated  again  from  that  of  “  person,” 
by  the  affirmation  that  there  is  but  one  being. 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  POLEMIC  AGE.  73 

No  one  can  look,  for  a  moment,  at  these  state¬ 
ments  involving  such  logical  conceptions  as  “con¬ 
fusion,”  “  division,”  “  essence,”  “  person,”  etc.,  or  can 
follow  the  course  of  the  controversy  with  Sabellian- 
ism  on  the  one  side,  and  Arianism  on  the  other, 
without  perceiving  that  although  the  theological 
mind  had  not  derived  this  subtlety  from  the  study 
of  Aristotle  in  any  very  formal  manner,  it  had 
nevertheless  felt  the  influence  of  that  close  and 
powerful  method  which  is  to  be  seen  in  the  more 
dialectic  dialogues  of  Plato,  and  which  was  carried 
to  a  still  greater  energy  of  abstraction,  and  power 
of  analysis,  in  the  writings  of  his  successor.1 

In  this  manner,  we  think,  the  combined  system 
of  Platonico-Aristotelianism  may  be  said  to  have 
been  the  dominant  one  in  this  Polemic  period, 
when  the  scientific  statements  of  Scripture  truth 
were  forming.  We  do  not,  indeed,  find  that  the 
entire  works  of  Aristotle  were  translated,  com¬ 
mented  upon,  and  taught  by  distinguished  men  in 
the  church,  during  this  period,  as  we  shall  in  the 
next.  So  far  as  a  text  book  was  concerned,  Plato 
was  still  the  great  philosophical  authority.  Never¬ 
theless,  the  writings  of  Aristotle  were  beginning  to 
attract  the  attention  of  students,2  and  the  dim  be- 

1  We  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm,  2  Boethius,  in  the  5th  century, 
that  the  four  Orations  of  Athana-  translated  a  part  of  the  Organon, 
sius  against  the  Arians  contain  a  Cassiodorus,  in  the  6th  century, 
dialectics  as  sharp  and  penetra-  made  a  sketch  of  the  Aristote- 
ting,  and  a  metaphysics  as  tran-  lian  logic.  Augustine,  passing  in 
scendental  as  anything  in  Aristo-  review  his  early  studies,  and  con- 
tie  or  Hegel.  trasting  the  meagreness  and  in- 


74 


INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 


ginnings  of  that  formal  Anstotelianism  which 
reaches  its  height  of  influence  in  the  Scholastic  age, 
may  be  traced  in  all  the  more  acute  and  subtle 
workings  of  the  theological  mind  in  this  contro¬ 


versial  period. 

sufficiency  of  human  knowledge 
with  the  fulness  and  sufficiency 
of  revelation,  remarks  (Confes¬ 
sions,  IV.  xvi)  :  “  What  did  it 
profit  me,  that  scarce  twenty 
years  old,  a  book  of  Aristotle  call¬ 
ed  the  ten  Predicaments,  falling 
into  my  hands  (on  whose  very 
name  I  hung,  as  on  something 
great  and  divine,  so  my  rhetoric 
master  at  Carthage,  and  others  ac¬ 


counted  learned,  often  mouthed 
it  with  cheeks  bursting  with 
pride),  I  read  and  understood  it 
unaided  ?  ”  The  knowledge  of 
Aristotle’s  writings,  however,  was 
confined  to  his  logical  treatises. 
His  Morals,  his  Metaphysics,  his 
Physics  and  his  Natural  History, 
were  not  read  in  the  church 
until  the  Scholastic  age. 


CHAPTER  II. 

PHILOSOPHICAL  INFLUENCES  IN  THE  MEDIAEVAL  CHURCH  •„ 

A.  D.  730 — A.  D.  1617. 


§  1.  Platonism  of  the  Mystic  Theologians . 

Passing,  now,  into  the  Systematizing  Period, 
extending  from  John  Damascene  to  the  Reforma¬ 
tion,  we  enter  into  a  sphere  of  more  intense  philo¬ 
sophical  activity  than  any  in  the  history  of  the 
church.  Even  the  speculative  movement  of  the 
German  mind  for  the  last  half-century,  confined 
v  though  it  has  been  to  a  single  nationality,  and  not 
shared  by  the  church  at  large,  and  therefore  more 
likely  to  become  intense,  is  inferior  in  energy,  sub¬ 
tlety,  and  depth,  to  mediaeval  Scholasticism.  Prob¬ 
ably  the  church  will  never  again  see  a  period  in 
which  Scripture  and  theology  will  be  contemplated 
so  exclusively  from  a  philosophical  point  of  view ; 
in  which  the  desire  to  rationalize  Christianity  (in 
the  technical  sense  of  the  term),  to  evince  its  abso- 


76  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

lute  reasonableness,  will  be  so  strong  and  overmas¬ 
tering.  We  are,  therefore,  passing  into  the  most 
speculative  period  in  Church-History ;  and  hence  it 
is  well  denominated  the  period  of  Systematizing. 

In  the  outset  it  may  be  remarked,  as  it  was  in 
relation  to  the  two  preceding  periods,  that  the 
Greek  philosophy,  as  formed  and  fixed  by  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  was  the  prevalent  system.  We  shall 
indeed  find  here  and  there  tendencies  to  a  pan¬ 
theistic  philosophy  in  individual  minds ;  but  the 
weight  and  authority  of  both  intellectual  and  moral 
character  is  almost  entirely  upon  the  side  of  the 
Grecian  theism.  But  instead  of  the  collocation  em¬ 
ployed  in  speaking  of  the  two  previous  periods, 
we  must  now  change  the  position  of  the  two  philos¬ 
ophies,  and  say  that  the  general  philosophical  sys¬ 
tem  of  this  Scholastic  period  was  Aristotelo- Platon¬ 
ism,  instead  of  Platonico-Aristotelianism.  The  basis 
of  speculation  was  now  the  Aristotelian  analysis, 
with  more  or  less  of  the  Platonic  synthesis  super¬ 
induced  and  interfused ;  while  in  the  Apologetic 
and  Polemic  periods,  the  ground  form  was  the  Pla¬ 
tonic  idea,  more  or  less  analyzed  and  cleared  up  by 
the  Aristotelian  conception.  But  in  both  cases,  it 
was  the  one  general  system  of  theism  and  spiritual¬ 
ism,  as  opposed  to  the  general  system  of  pantheism, 
naturalism,  and  sensualism. 

We  have  less  difficulty  in  detecting  the  presence 
of  the  Platonic  element  during  this  Scholastic  age, 
than  we  had  in  detecting  the  Aristotelian  element 


PLATONISM  OF  THE  MYSTIC  THEOLOGIANS.  77 


in  the  preceding  periods.  For  we  find  it  formally 
and  distinctly  existing.  In  tlie  first  half  of  the 
Systematizing  period, — viz. :  from  John  of  Damas¬ 
cus  to  Anselm  (A.  D.  730 — A.  D.  1109) — the  phil¬ 
osophical  character  of  the  Polemic  time  is  still 
very  apparent,  though  beginning  to  wane  before 
the  growing  scholastic  tendency.  Platonism,  says 
Hagenbach,  constituted  the  red  morning  dawn  of 
the  mediaeval  philosophy,  and  was  not  entirely 
eclipsed  by  formal  and  established  Aristotelianism 
in  the  schools,  until  the  13th  century.  It  is,  re¬ 
marks  Ritter,  the  notion  of  ignorance  which  affirms 
that  in  the  Middle  Ages  men  were  given  up  solely  to 
the  Aristotelian  philosophy.  The  foundation  of  An¬ 
selm’s  mode  of  thinking,  says  Baumgarten-Crusius, 
was  a  free  Platonism  in  the  spirit  of  Augustine.1 

Platonism  in  the  Systematizing  period  displays 
itself  very  plainly  and  powerfully  in  the  Mystic 
Theology.  All  along  through  this  age  of  acute 
analysis  and  subtile  dialectics,  there  runs  a  vein  of 
devout  and  spiritual  contemplation,  which  stands 
out  in  striking  contrast  with  the  general  scholastic 
character  of  the  time.  It  appears  in  its  best  form 
in  the  Mystic  Scholastics.  This  was  a  class  of  men 
of  naturally  meditative  temper,  and  of  deep  religious 
devotion,  who  found  more  satisfaction  in  contem¬ 
plating  the  objects  of  faith  and  religion,  than  in 

1  Hagenbach  :  Dogmenge-  phie,  VII.  VO ;  Baumgarten- 
schichte,  §150;  Ritter:  Ge-  Crusitjs:  Dogmengeschichte,  I. 
achiclite  der  Christlichen  Philoso-  §  97.  1. 


78  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

philosophizing  upon  them, — especially  in  that  ex¬ 
tremely  analytic  manner  in  which  the  mind  of  the 
period  delighted.  Such  men  discovered  in  the 
writings  of  Plato, — and  more  particularly  in  the 
more  ethical  and  practical  portion  of  his  writings, 
— a  philosophy  that  harmonized  with  their  cast  of 
mind,  and  favoured  their  contemplative  disposition. 
But  although  they  were  predominantly  contem¬ 
plative,  they  must  carefully  be  distinguished  from 
that  small  circle  of  Mystics  who  appeared  in  the 
century  immediately  preceding  the  Reformation,  and 
who  possessed  far  less  of  that  systematic  and  scien¬ 
tific  spirit  which  must  ever  be  united  with  the  con¬ 
templative,  in  order  to  a  symmetrical  theological 
character.  These  Mystic  Scholastics  of  whom  we 
are  speaking,  and  whom  we  have  so  denominated 
because  they  were  Schoolmen  with  an  infusion  of 
mysticism,  felt  the  influences  of  the  time  in  which 
they  lived,  and  especially  of  the  Aristotelianism 
that  was  dominant  in  the  schools ;  so  that  while  by 
their  writings  and  teachings  they  helped  to  check 
the  excessive  subtilty  and  speculation  of  the  period, 
by  keeping  in  view  the  more  practical  and  contem¬ 
plative  aspects  of  Christianity,  they  were  them¬ 
selves  preserved  from  that  degenerate  mysticism 
which  ends  in  a  vague  and  feeble  pantheism  and 
naturalism,  because  it  neglects  the  scientific  aspects 
of  religion,  and  decries  all  creed-statements.1 

’“It  is  an  error  to  suppose  onist  of  Scholasticism  ;  the  Mys- 
Mysticism  as  the  perpetual  antag-  tics  were  often  severe  logicians ; 


PLATONISM  OF  THE  MYSTIC  THEOLOGIANS.  79 


For  it  is  important  to  discriminate  between  the 
two  species  of  Mysticism  which  appeared  not  only 
in  the  Middle  Ages,  but  appear  more  or  less  in 
every  age.  In  itself,  and  abstractly  considered, 
Mysticism  was  a  healthful  reaction  against  the  ex¬ 
tremely  speculative  character  of  Scholasticism.  It 
served  to  direct  attention  to  the  fact  that  religion  is 
a  life,  as  well  as  a  truth.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
Mysticism  was  sometimes  an  unhealthy  reaction 
against  a  moderate  Scholasticism.  It  forgot  that 
Christian  dogma  is  the  support  and  nutriment  of  all 
genuine  Christian  life ;  and  that  there  is  no  trust¬ 
worthy  religious  experience  that  is  not  grounded  in 
the  perception  of  religious  doctrine.  The  mystic 
of  this  species  disparaged  discriminating  and  ac¬ 
curate  statements  of  biblical  doctrine,  and  was  often 
the  violent  enemy  of  scientific  theology  and  church- 
symbols.  In  this  instance,  Mysticism  soon  run 
itself  out  into  positive  and  dangerous  errors. 

The  first  class  of  Mystics,  the  Mystic  Scholastics , 
were  those  who  held  the  hereditary  orthodoxy  of 
the  church,  and  sought  to  reach  the  meaning  of  the 
old  symbols  and  doctrines  by  a  contemplative  and 
practical  method;  yet  not  to  the  entire  exclusion 
of  the  speculative  and  scientific.  Such  men  were 
Bernard  (f  1153),  Hugh  St.  Victor  (f  1141),  Rich¬ 
ard  St.  Victor  (f  1173),  William  of  Champeaux 
(+H21),  Bonaventura  (f  1274). 

the  Scholastics  had  all  the  pas-  Latin  Christianity,  Book  XIV. 
sion  of  the  Mystics.”  Milman  :  Chap,  iii. 


80 


INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 


A  second  class  of  Mystics,  whom  we  denominate 
the  Heretical  Mystics ,  were  those  who  rejected,  in 
greater  or  less  degree,  the  historical  theology,  and 
sought  to  solve  the  mysteries  of  religion  either  by 
an  intensely  speculative,  or  a  vague  and  musing 
method.  Hence,  there  were  two  subdivisions  in 
this  class,  both  of  which  were  characterized  by  a 
common  undervaluation  of  the  church  orthodoxy. 
The  representative  of  the  first  subdivision  is  Scotus 
Erigena  (f  880), — a  theologian  who  diverged  from 
the  catholic  faith  into  pantheism,  by  the  use  of  a 
very  refined  and  subtile  dialectics,  and  who,  in  his 
treatise  De  Divisione  Naturae,  anticipates  some  of 
the  positions  of  Spinoza.  Representatives  of  the 
second  subdivision  are  Eckart  (f  1329),  and  Ruys- 
brock  (f  1384),  who  likewise  lapsed  into  panthe¬ 
istic  views  from  the  other  side,1  by  the  rejection  of 
all  logical  methods,  and  the  substitution  of  mere 
feelings  and  intuitions,  for  clear  discriminations  and 
conceptions. 

Between  the  Mystic  Scholastics  and  the  Heret¬ 
ical  Mystics,  there  stood  a  third  interesting  class, 
the  Latitudinarian  Mystics ,  who  partook  of  the 

1  Some  of  the  most  extreme  po-  naturae,  hoc  totum  proprium  est 
sitions  of  this  class  were  the  fol-  homini  justo  et  divino.  Propter 
lowing :  Quam  cito  deus  fuit,  tarn  hoc  iste  homo  operatur,  quidquid 
cito  mundum  creavit.  Deus  est  deus  operatur,  et  creavit  una  cum 
formaliter  omne  quod  est.  Nos  deo  coelurn  et  terram,  et  est 
transformamur  totaliter  in  deum  generator  V erbi  aeterni ;  et  deus 
et  convertimur  in  eum,  simili  sine  tali  homine  nesciret  quic- 
modo  sicut  in  sacramento  pa:ris  quam  facere.  Niednek:  Kirchen* 
convertitur  in  corpus  Christi. —  schichte,  505. 

Quidquid  proprium  est  divinae 


ARISTOTELIANISM  OF  THE  SCHOOLMEN. 


81 


characteristics  of  both.  They  agreed  with  the 
Mystic  Scholastics  in  holding  the  church  orthodoxy 
in  honor,  but  from  the  neglect  of  scientific  investiga¬ 
tion  lost  sight  of  some  parts  of  the  catholic  system. 
The  piacular  work  of  Christ  and  the  doctrine  of 
justification,  in  particular,  were  misconceived  and 
sometimes  overlooked.  The  best  representatives 
of  this  class  are  Yon  Colin  (f  1329),  Tauler 
(f  1361),  Suso  (f  1365),  Gerson  (f  1429),  Thomas 
a  Kempis  (f  1471),  and  the  author  of  the  work 
which  goes  under  the  title  of  “  Theologia  Ger- 
manica.”  These  writers,  though  the  harbingers  of 
the  Eeformation,  and  in  general  sympathy  with  the 
evangelical  system,  are  not  complete  representatives 
of  the  historical  orthodoxy.1 

§  2.  Aristotelianism  of  the  Scholastic  Theolo¬ 
gians . 

But  while  there  was  this  very  considerable 
amount  of  Platonism  in  the  Systematic  period, 
Aristotle’s  method  was  by  far  the  most  influential. 
The  Crusades  had  opened  a  communication  with  the 
East,  and  had  made  the  Western  Church  acquainted 
with  the  Arabic  translations  of  Aristotle,  and  com¬ 
mentaries  upon  him.  The  study  of  Aristotle  com¬ 
menced  with  great  vigor,  and  notwithstanding  the 
prohibition  of  the  church,  the  system  of  the  Stagirite 

^ee  Ullmann’s  Reformers  be-  feeioh’s  Christliche  Mystik ;  Like- 
fore  the  Reformation  ;  Vaughn’s  nee’s  Hugo  St.  Victor. 

Hours  with  the  Mystics  ;  Helf- 

6 


82  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

took  possession  of  all  the  principal  schools,  and 
of  all  the  leading  minds.  The  18th  century  ex¬ 
hibits  Scholasticism  in  its  finest  form.  Minds 
like  Alexander  Hales  (f  1245),  Albertus  Magnus 
(f  1280),  and  Thomas  Aquinas  (f  1274),  employ 
the  Aristotelian  analysis  in  the  defence  of  the  tra¬ 
ditional  orthodoxy  of  the  church.  Their  reverence 
for  the  faith  of  the  church  kept  them  from  devi¬ 
ating  into  those  errors  into  which  philosophy  is 
liable  to  fall,  when  it  is  not  restrained  and  guided  by 
revelation  ;  so  that  although  we  find  in  their  wri¬ 
tings  a  very  acute  and  intense  speculation,  we 
discern  in  them  nothing  of  pantheism  or  natural¬ 
ism.  The  fundamental  principles  of  ethics,  and 
Christian  theism,  have  found  no  more  powerful  de¬ 
fenders  than  the  great  Schoolmen  of  the  thirteenth 
century. 

But  this  moderation  in  the  use  of  Aristotle’s 
method  did  not  long  continue.  In  the  14th  cen¬ 
tury  and  onward,  we  find  a  class  of  Schoolmen  who 
are  characterized  by  more  or  less  of  departure  from 
the  doctrines  of  revelation,  and  an  extreme  subtil¬ 
izing  and  refinement  in  ratiocination.  It  is  from 
this  class  that  Scholasticism  has  too  often  obtained 
its  bad  reputation  in  modern  times.  Minds  like 
Duns  Scotus  (f  1808),  Occam  (f  1847),  and  Gabriel 
Biel  (f  1495), 1  not  content  with  analysing  truth 
down  to  its  ultimate  elements,  attempted  to  analyse 

1  Compare  the  brief  and  lively  by  Milman  :  Latin  Christianity, 
sketching  of  their  characteristics,  Book  XIV.  Ch.  iii. 


AKISTOTELIANISM  OF  THE  SCHOOLMEN. 


83 


these  ultimates  themselves ;  so  that  there  were  for 
them  no  strictly  first  principles,  but  everything 
must  undergo  division  and  subdivision  indefinitely.1 
Distinctions  without  differences,  innumerable  dis¬ 
tinctions  that  had  no  existence  in  the  real  nature  of 
things,  were  drawn,  and  Christian  philosophy  as 
well  as  theology  was  unsettled.  An  influx  of  bar¬ 
barous  terms  was  one  consequence ;  and  these  terms 
had  not  even  the  merit  which  often  atones  for  un¬ 
couthness  of  phrase — that  of  exactly  defining  a  real 
philosophic  idea,  or  discriminating  a  really  scien¬ 
tific  distinction.  Dialectic  ingenuity  was  expended 
in  the  attempt  to  answer  all  possible  questions. 
Such  queries  as  the  following  were  raised  :  “  Is  it  a 
possible  supposition  that  God  the  Father  can  hate 
God  the  Son  ?  Is  it  possible  for  God  to  substitute 
himself  (suppositare  se)  for  the  devil,  for  an  ass,  for 
a  gourd,  for  a  flint  ?  In  case  he  can,  then  in  what 
manner  would  the  gourd  preach,  work  miracles, 
or  be  affixed  to  the  cross  ?  ”  Then,  again,  “  there 
were,’’  says  Erasmus,  “  innumerable  quibblings 
about  notions,  and  relations,  and  formalitations, 
and  quiddities,  and  haecceities,  which  no  eye  could 

r 

1  “  The  main  principles  of  rea-  ‘  They  that  seek  a  reason  of  all 
son,”  remarks  Hooker  (Eccl.  Pol.  things  do  utterly  overthrow  rea- 
Book  I.  Chap,  viii),  “  are  in  them-  son.1  In  every  kind  of  knowledge 
selves  apparent ;  for  to  make  some  such  grounds  there  are,  as 
nothing  evident  of  itself  unto  that  being  proposed,  the  mind 
man’s  understanding  were  to  take  doth  presently  embrace  them  as 
away  all  possibility  of  knowing  free  from  all  possibility  of  er- 
anything.  And  herein  that  re-  ror,  clear  and  manifest  with- 
mark  of  Theophrastus  is  true :  out  proof.” 


84  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

follow  out  but  that  of  a  lynx,  which  is  said  to 
be  able,  in  the  thickest  darkness,  to  see  things 
that  have  no  existence.”  1 

The  14th  century  exhibits  Scholasticism  in  its 
most  extreme  forms.  The  Aristotelian  logic  and 
analysis  is  now  applied,  in  the  most  ingenious  and 
persistent  manner,  to  the  dogmas  of  the  Papal 
Church.  Most  of  these  not  only  afforded  oppor¬ 
tunity  for  the  display  of  acuteness  and  ingenuity, 
but  absolutely  required  it.  Such  doctrines  as  abso¬ 
lution  or  the  forgiveness  of  sins  by  the  Church,  the 
meritoriousness  of  works,  works  of  supererogation, 
refusal  of  the  cup  to  the  laity,  purgatory,  and  par¬ 
ticularly  transubstantiation,  elicited  all  the  intellec¬ 
tual  force  of  the  Schoolman.  In  his  reasoning,  he 
made  much  more  use  of  the  form,  than  of  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  Aristotelianism.  The  logic  of  Aristotle 
was  disconnected  from  both  his  metaphysics  and 
politics,  so  that  the  ideas  of  the  Stagirite  upon  all 
the  higher  problems  were  lost  sight  of,  and  only 
the  Aristotelian  categories  were  employed  to  make 
distinctions  which  the  discriminating  intellect  of  the 
Greek  never  would  have  made,  and  to  defend 
tenets  which,  had  he  lived  in  the  days  of  Duns 
Scotus,  his  sagacious  understanding  never  would 
have  defended.  Thus  we  find,  in  the  14th  century, 
the  system  of  Aristotle  employed  in  the  same  one¬ 
sided  and  merely  formal  manner  in  which  we  have 


1  Ebasmi  Stultitiae  Laus.  Bas.  1676.  p.  141  sq. 


REACTION  AGAINST  EXTREME  ARISTOTELIANISM.  85 


seen  that  of  Plato  employed  in  the  2d  and  3d 
centuries, — Scholasticism,  in  the  narrow  sense,  being 
the  result  in  the  former  instance,  and  Gnosticism  in 
the  latter. 

§  3.  Reaction  against  extreme  Aristotelianism ,  from 
the  Later  Mystics  and  the  revival  of  Greek 
Literature . 

But  this  extreme  tension  of  the  human  intellect, 
and  this  microscopic  division  and  subdivision,  could 
not  last,  and  the  reaction  came  on  apace.  Even  in 
the  14th  century,  while  the  highly  speculative  dis¬ 
pute  between  the  Thomists  and  Scotists  was  going 
on,  that  middle  division  of  the  mediaeval  Mystics 
of  which  we  have  spoken, — the  Latitudinarian  Mys¬ 
tics, — began  to  appear,  and  by  its  warm  devoutness 
and  musing  contemplativeness,  contributed  to  soften 
the  theoretic  hardness,  and  render  flexible  the  log¬ 
ical  rigidity  of  the  period.  Such  men  as  Yon 
Colin  ('f- 1 329),  Tauler  (f  1361),  and  Henry  Suso 
(f  1365),  with  much  less  of  that  scientific  spirit 
which  we  have  seen  to  have  coexisted  with  the  con¬ 
templative  tendency  in  the  Bernards  and  St.  Vic¬ 
tors,  and  hence  not  so  interesting  to  the  theologian, 
or  so  influential  upon  the  development  of  doctrine, 
nevertheless  exerted  considerable  practical  influence 
through  their  preaching,  and  works  of  devotional 
theology.  Sermons  like  those  of  Tauler,  and  tracts 
like  that  entitled  “  Theologia  Germanica,”  which 


86  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

Luther  praised  so  highly,  and  like  the  “  Imitation 
of  Christ  ”  by  a  Kempis,  were  composed  and  spread 
abroad,  during  the  close  of  the  14th  and  beginning 
of  the  15th  centuries.  We  begin  to  see  the  dawn 
of  the  Reformation,  in  this  inclination  toward  a 
more  contemplative  method,  and  a  more  devout  and 
practical  apprehension  and  use  of  Christian  doc¬ 
trine. 

This  tendency,  moreover,  was  strengthened  by 
the  revival  of  Greek  literature,  in  the  14th  and 
15th  centuries.  A  very  interesting  school  of  Pla- 
tonists  sprang  up  in  Italy,  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
15  th  century;  at  the  head  of  which  stood  Marsilius 
Ficinus  (f  1499),  who  translated  the  writings  of 
Plato  into  Latin,  and  Picus  Mirandola  (f  1494), 
who  awakened  a  wonderful  enthusiasm  by  his  lec¬ 
tures  and  commentaries  upon  the  philosophy  of  the 
Academy.  Though  the  influence  of  this  school  con¬ 
tributed  nothing  toward  the  revival  of  evangelical 
Christianity,  but  on  the  whole  tended  to  deism,  its 
intellectual  effects  were  favorable  to  a  spirit  of 
inquiry,  and  assisted  in  undermining  the  supersti¬ 
tions  of  the  Papal  system.1  The  Italian  literature 
of  the  14th  century  is  also  pervaded  with  Hellen- 


1  “  The  Platonic  Academy  es-  they  not  feared  the  charge  of 
tablished  at  Florence  by  Cosmo  heresy,  would  have  substituted 
de  Medici,  who  placed  Ficinus  at  the  natural  religion  of  the  best 
the  head  of  it,  was  much  involved  Pagan  theists  for  the  doctrine 
in  New-Platonism.  Its  appre-  of  Redemption.”  See  Haefokd’s 
hension  of  Christianity  was  very  Life  of  Angelo,  Yol.  I. 
inadequate,  and  its  leaders,  had 


REACTION  AGATNST  EXTREME  ARISTOTELIAN  ISM.  87 


ism.  Boccaccio  (f  1375),  and  Petrarch  (f  1874) 
his  friend  and  teacher,  show  everywhere  in  their 
writings  the  influence  of  Greek  culture,  and  also, 
what  is  more  noticeable  still,  a  veiled  but  deeply 
seated  opposition  to  the  Papacy.  It  is  from  the 
Italian  writers  of  the  14th  and  15th  centuries  that 
that  large  infusion  of  Platonism  flowed,  which 
came  into  the  English  literature  of  the  Elizabethan 
age.  Spenser,  Surrey,  Wyatt,  Sidney,  Herbert, 
Vaughn,  Shakspeare,  and  Milton,  all,  either  directly 
or  indirectly,  felt  the  influences  of  the  Italian  poets 
and  novelists,  and  borrowed  more  or  less  from 
them.  In  the  preceding  13th  century,  Dante 
(f  1321)  composed  a  poem  which  from  beginning 
to  end  is  luminous  and  distinct  with  the  meta¬ 
physics  of  Aquinas,  and  the  abstraction  of  Aristotle. 
This  poem  also,  like  the  writings  of  Boccaccio  and 
Petrarch,  breathes  a  spirit  of  opposition  to  the 
Papacy ;  but  the  utterance  is  much  more  unambig¬ 
uous  and  fearless. 

These  influences  began  to  be  felt  also  within  the 
Papal  church  itself,  long  before  the  Deformation 
of  the  16th  century.  The  English  Wickliffe 
(f  1384),  the  “morning  star”  of  Protestantism, 
had  been  trained  up  in  the  most  rigorous  scholas¬ 
ticism.  He  was  an  admirer  of  Occam,  one  of  the 
most  intense  dialecticians  of  the  14th  century. 
But  he  had  read  Aristotle  diligently  in  the  transla¬ 
tions  of  the  day,  and  had  become  somewhat  ac¬ 
quainted  with  the  Platonic  philosophy  through  the 


88 


INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 


writings  of  Augustine, — the  writings  of  Plato  him¬ 
self  not  being  current  in  his  time.  The  influence 
of  these  studies  is  apparent.  He  rejected  the  nom¬ 
inalism  of  Occam  and  the  century,  and  adopted 
the  theory  of  realism  in  philosophy.  From  the 
first  awakening  of  his  intellectual  and  religious  life, 
he  had  been  a  diligent  student  of  the  Scriptures, 
the  whole  of  which  he  translated  into  English.  He 
contended  for  the  rights  of  the  laity,  in  opposition 
to  the  claims  of  the  hierarchy  ;  and  labored  for  the 
promotion  of  the  political  and  educational  interests 
of  England,  in  opposition  to  the  aims  of  the  Pa¬ 
pacy.1  Contemporaneously  with  Wickliffe,  Chaucer 
(f  1400)  exerted  that  wonderfully  creative  and 
vivifying  influence  upon  the  English  mind,  lan¬ 
guage,  and  literature  which  they  have  not  yet 
lost,  although  this  most  original  writer  has  become 
obsolete  to  the  majority  of  his  countrymen.  And 
like  the  Italian  Dante,  the  whole  spirit  of  his  wri¬ 
tings  favored  the  downfall  of  the  Papal  superstition, 
and  prepared  the  way  for  Luther  and  the  Refor¬ 
mation. 

1  Baumgabten-Oeusius  :  Dogmengeschichte,  I.  §  115. 


CHAPTER  III. 


PHILOSOPHICAL  INFLUENCES  IN  THE  MODERN  CHURCH: 

A.  D.  1517— A.  D.  1860. 


§  1.  Philosophy  of  the  Peformers. 

We  have  arrived  now,  in  our  rapid  survey,  at 
the  age  of  the  Reformation,  and  shall  throw  into 
one  period  the  whole  time  since  1517  down  to  the 
present,  in  continuing  this  account  of  the  influence 
of  the  two  cognate  philosophical  systems  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  upon  Christian  theology. 

The  Reformers  were  Platonico- Aristotelian,  so 
far  as  they  employed  any  system  of  human  specu¬ 
lation.  In  this  age  we  find  the  basis  reversed  from 
what  it  was  during  the  Systematic  period,  and  per¬ 
ceive  the  same  general  order  and  proportion  of  the 
two  elements,  that  we  saw  in  the  Polemic  period. 
The  theological  mind  once  more  proceeds  from  the 
contemplative  and  practical  side  of  the  Grecian 
theism,  as  its  point  of  departure,  but  in  its  con- 


90  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

troversies,  especially,  employs  its  logic  and  analysis. 
Luther’s  mission  and  function  was  a  practical  rather 
than  a  scientific  one,  and  we  do  not  find  his  mind 
strongly  interested  in  any  portion  of  human  science. 
The  abuse  of  philosophy,  and  particularly  of  the 
Aristotelian,  by  the  Scotuses,  the  Occams,  and  the 
Biels,  and  still  more  the  employment  of  it  in  the 
defence  of  the  formalism  and  ungodliness  of  the 
Papacy,  excited  in  his  mind  such  a  strong  aversion 
to  Aristotle,  that  he  is  said,  with  exaggeration  prob¬ 
ably,  to  have  trembled  with  rage  at  the  sound  of 
his  name,  and  to  have  affirmed  that  if  the  Greek 
had  not  been  a  man,  he  should  have  taken  him  to 
be  the  devil  himself.  But  the  deep  and  real  senti¬ 
ment  of  Luther,  in  regard  to  philosophy,  as  well  as 
in  regard  to  revelation  itself,  must  be  derived  from 
a  comparison  of  all  his  views  and  statements,  and 
not  from  some  particular  sentiments  expressed  in 
certain  connections,  and  drawn  out  by  the  polemic 
temper  of  the  moment.  If  certain  isolated  expres¬ 
sions  are  to  be  taken  as  the  exponent  of  his  ulterior 
opinions  respecting  the  authority  of  Scripture,  the 
modern  rationalist,  who  insists  upon  subjecting  the 
inspired  Canon  to  the  tests  of  an  individual  opinion, 
really  is,  as  he  claims  to  be,  a  lineal  descendant  of 
that  bold  spirit  who  threw  the  Epistle  of  James 
out  of  the  Canon,  and  spake  violently  against  the 
Apocalypse. 

But  this  is  not  a  correct  view.  As  Luther  did 
undoubtedly,  in  his  inmost  soul,  completely  submit 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  REFORMERS. 


91 


his  reason  to  that  divine  revelation,  whose  normal 
authority  over  the  Church  and  tradition,  he  was 
such  a  mighty  instrument  of  restoring;  so  in  his 
sober  judgment  he  did  recognize  the  importance 
of  a  true  and  proper  science  of  theology,  and  of 
a  true  and  proper  science  of  the  human  mind,  to 
be  employed  in  building  it  up  out  of  the  matter  of 
revelation.  Even  in  reference  to  Scholasticism 
itself,  he  remarks  in  a  letter  to  Staupitz,  “I  read 
the  Scholastics  with  judgment,  not  with  closed 
eyes.  I  do  not  reject  everything  they  have  ad¬ 
vanced,  neither  do  I  approve  of  everything.”1 

Calvin  and  Melanchthon  were  the  theologians 
for  the  two  branches  of  the  Protestant  Church,  and 
in  these  minds  the  influence  of  Platonism  is  very 
visible  and  marked.  Melanchthon  was  one  of  the 
ripest  Grecians  of  his  time,  and  his  whole  intellectual, 
method  is  the  spontaneous  product  of  a  pure  and 
genial  sympathy  with  the  philosophy  of  the  Acade- 
my.  Calvin,  though  less  intensely  and  distinctive¬ 
ly  Platonic,  because  his  mind  was  naturally  more 
logical  and  dialectic,  and  this  tendency  had  been 
strengthened  by  his  early  legal  studies,  exhibits 
a  symmetrical  union  of  the  two  systems  whose 
influence  we  are  describing.  No  one  can  read  the 
first  five  chapters  of  the  first  book  of  the  Institutes, 
without  perceiving  plainly,  that  this  mind,  which 

*Ego  Scholasticos  cum  judicio,  nia  probo.  Luther’s  Works,  L 
non  clausis  ocnlis  lego,  ...  Non  402  (De  Wette’s  Ed.), 
rejicio  omnia  eorum,  sed  nec  om- 


92  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 


has  done  so  much  to  shape  and  mould  modern  sys¬ 
tematic  theology,  had  itself  been  formed  and 
moulded,  so  far  as  philosophical  opinions  and  meth¬ 
ods  are  concerned,  by  the  Grecian  Theism.1 


§  2.  Philosophy  of  the  English  and  Anglo- 

American  Churches . 

Respecting  the  prevalence  of  Platonism  and 
Aristotelianism  since  the  time  of  the  Reformation, 
our  limits  will  permit  only  a  very  concise  state¬ 
ment.  These  two  systems  exerted  upon  the  English 
theology  of  the  17th  century,  both  of  the  Estab¬ 
lished  Church  and  of  the  Nonconforming  divines, 
a  very  powerful  influence.  Selecting  Hooker  as 
the  representative  of  the  first,  and  Howe  of  the 
last,  we  see  that  the  Platonic  philosophy  never  in 
any  age  of  the  church  moulded  the  theological 
mind  more  pervasively  and  thoroughly,  than  in 
this  instance.  In  Baxter  and  Owen,  both  of  whom 
were  also  very  diligent  students  of  the  Schoolmen, 
we  perceive  more  of  the  influence  of  the  Aristotelian 
system.2  This  body  of  divinity,  which  without 


1  The  authors  most  quoted  are 
Plato,  Cicero,  Aristotle,  Plutarch, 
and  Xenophon  of  the  Pagans ;  and 
Augustine.  Lactantius,  and  Boe¬ 
thius  of  the  Ecclesiastical  writers. 
Simon  Grynaeus,  the  famous  Pla- 
tonist.  was  one  of  the  most  inti¬ 
mate  friends  and  associates  of 
Calvin. 


2  “Next  to  practical  divinity, 
no  books  so  suited  with  my 
disposition  as  Aquinas,  Scotus, 
Durandus,  Occam,  and  their  dis¬ 
ciples;  because  I  thought  they 
narrowly  searched  after  truth,  and 
brought  things  out  of  the  dark¬ 
ness  of  confusion.  For  I  could 
never  from  my  first  studies  en- 


ENGLISH  AND  ANGLO- AMEBIC  AN  PHILOSOPHY.  93 


question  is  the  most  profound  that  the  English 
mind  has  originated,  owes  its  systematic  form  and 
structure  to  the  Grecian  intellectual  methods.  Re¬ 
specting  the  influence  of  philosophy  upon  the  Eng¬ 
lish  and  Anglo-American  theologies  of  the  18th 
and  19th  centuries,  we  briefly  remark  the  following. 
The  system  of  Locke,  which  held  undisputed  sway 
in  both  countries  during  the  18th  century,  is  an¬ 
tagonistic  in  its  first  principle  to  the  Platonico- 
Aristotelian  system.  Its  primary  position  that  all 
knowledge  comes  from  sensation  and  reflection,  if 
rigorously  construed,  renders  it  a  sensuous  system, 
and  brings  it  into  affinity  with  those  ancient  Epicu¬ 
rean  and  materializing  schools  which  it  was  the  en¬ 
deavour  of  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle  to  over¬ 
throw.  The  French  philosophers  of  the  18th  cen¬ 
tury  put  this  strict  construction  upon  Locke’s  affir¬ 
mation  respecting  the  source  of  all  ideas,  and  built 
up  a  system  from  which  all  spiritual  'ideas  and 
truths  were  banished.  The  Scotch  philosophers, 


dure  confusion.  Till  equivocals 
were  explained,  and  definition 
and  distinction  led  the  way,  I  had 
rather  hold  my  tongue  than  speak; 
and  I  was  never  more  weary  of 
learned  men’s  discourses,  than 
when  I  heard  them  wrangling 
about  unexpounded  words  or 
things,  and  eagerly  disputing  be¬ 
fore  they  understood  each  other’s 
minds,  and  vehemently  asserting 
modes,  and  consequences,  and  ad¬ 
juncts,  before  they  considered  of 
the  Quod  sit ,  the  Quid  sit ,  or  the 


Quotuplex.  I  never  thought  I 
understood  anything  till  I  could 
anatomize  it,  and  see  the  parts 
distinctly,  and  the  conjunction  of 
the  parts,  as  they  make  up  the 
whole.  Distinction  and  method 
seemed  to  me  of  that  necessity, 
that  without  them  I  could  not  be 
said  to  know ;  and  the  disputes 
that  forsook  them,  or  abused 
them,  seemed  hut  as  incoherent 
dreams.”  Baxter’s  Narrative  of 
his  Life  and  Times. 


94  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

on  the  contrary,  put  a  loose  construction  upon 
Locke’s  dictum,  and  regarded  “reflection,”  in  dis¬ 
tinction  from  “sensation,”  as  the  source  of  that 
particular  class  of  ideas  which  are  the  foundation 
of  morals  and  religion,  and  which  cannot,  confess¬ 
edly,  be  derived  through  sensation.  The  system 
of  Locke,  as  interpreted  by  the  French  school,  run 
itself  out  into  sheer  materialism  and  atheism.  The 
system  of  Locke,  as  interpreted  by  the  Scotch 
mind,  was  brought  into  affinity  with  the  theism  of 
the  past, — though  only  by  elevating  the  function 
of  “reflection”  into  a  coordinate  rank  with  that 
of  “  sensation,”  and  making  it  a  second  and  inde¬ 
pendent  inlet  of  knowledge. 

The  English  and  American  theologies  of  the 
18th  and  19th  centuries  have  felt  the  influence  of 
the  Locke  philosophy,  in  the  modified  form  of  the 
Scotch  school ;  while  the  earnest  and  practical 
religious  spirit,  which  has  characterized  these 
churches,  has  tended  to  neutralize  the  materializing 
elements  that  still  remained  in  it.  During  the  last 
quarter  of  the  present  half-century,  both  countries 
have  felt  the  influence  of  a  revived  interest  in  that 
elder  system  whose  history  we  have  been  delinea¬ 
ting, — an  interest  that  is  growing  deeper  and 
stronger,  and  from  which,  if  not  allowed  to  become 
extreme  to  the  neglect  of  the  theological  and  prac¬ 
tical  religious  interests  of  the  church  and  the 
world,  the  best  results  for  Christian  science  may  be 
expected. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  GERMAN  CHURCH. 


95 


§  3.  Philosophy  of  the  German  Church. 

A  very  important  and  influential  movement  of 
the  theological  mind,  since  the  Reformation,  appears 
in  the  German  theology  of  the  last  half  of  the  18th 
and  the  first  half  of  the  19th  centuries.  We  are 
too  near  this,  in  time,  to  be  able  to  judge  of  it  in 
the  best  manner,  for  we  have  yet  to  see  its  final 
issue.  One  thing,  however,  is  certain,  that  so  far  as 
it  is  a  truthful  and  really  scientific  method  of  theo¬ 
logizing,  it  is  due  greatly  to  the  influence  of  the 
Grecian  masters  in  philosophy,  and  their  successors. 

The  Germanic  mind  has  been  influenced  during 
the  last  hundred  years,  by  two  entirely  antagonistic 
systems  of  human  speculation, — that  of  Theism,  and 
that  of  Pantheism.  The  former,  as  we  have  seen, 
has  come  down  from  Plato  and  Aristotle ;  the  lat¬ 
ter,  though  not  unknown  to  the  ancient  world,  yet 
received  its  first  scientific  construction  in  the  mind 
of  that  original  and  powerful  errorist,  Baruch  Spin¬ 
oza.  The  revival  of  the  interest  in  philosophy, 
which  began  as  soon  as  the  general  European  mind 
had  become  somewhat  tranquillized,  after  the  deep 
central  excitement  of  the  Reformation  and  of  the 
theological  controversies  which  followed  it  had  par¬ 
tially  abated,  showed  itself  in  the  rise  of  the  sys¬ 
tems  of  Des  Cartes,  Leibnitz,  Wolff,  and  Kant. 
All  these  systems  are  substantially  theistic.  They 
reject  the  doctrine  of  only  one  Substance,  and 


96  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

strongly  mark  the  distinction  between  finite  and  in¬ 
finite  Being.  They  are  all  of  them,  in  greater  or 
less  degree,  influenced  by  the  systems  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  and  are  in  the  same  general  line  of 
philosophical  speculation.  But  the  deep  and  solid 
foundation  for  pantheism  that  had  been  laid  by 
Spinoza,  and  the  imposing  architectural  superstruc¬ 
ture  which  he  himself  had  reared  upon  it,  gave 
origin  to  another,  and  totally  different  philosophical 
tendency  and  system  of  speculation.  For  although 
Des  Cartes,  Leibnitz,  and  Kant  differ  from  eafeh 
other,  and  upon  important  points,  yet  their  sys-. 
terns  are  all  theistic,  and  therefore  favorable  to  the 
principles  of  ethics  and  natural  religion.  The  sys¬ 
tems  of  Spinoza  and  his  successors  Schilling  and 
Hegel,  have,  on  the  other  hand,  had  a  more  uniform 
agreement  with  each  other.  They  are  fundamen¬ 
tally  and  systematically  pantheistic  ;  and  therefore 
are  destructive  of  the  first  principles  of  morals  and 
religion.  By  their  doctrine  of  only  one  Substance, 
only  one  Intelligence,  only  one  Being,  they  anni¬ 
hilate  all  the  fixed  lines  and  distinctions  of  theism, 

* — distinctions  like  those  which  imply  the  meta¬ 
physical  reality  of  an  uncreated  and  a  created 
essence  or  being,  and  lines  like  those  which  distin¬ 
guish  right  and  wrong,  free-will  and  fate,  from  each 
other,  as  absolute  contraries,  and  irreconcilable  op¬ 
posites. 

So  far  therefore  as  the  theological  mind  of  Ger¬ 
many  has  been  influenced  by  the  earlier  Germanic 


« 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  GERMAN  CHURCH.  97 

philosophy,  and  more  especially  so  far  as  it  has 
felt  the  influence  of  the  Platonic  and  Aristotelian 
systems  themselves,  it  has  adopted  the  historical 
theism,  and  its  philosophical  thinking  has  harmo¬ 
nized  with  that  of  the  church  from  the  begin¬ 
ning. 

It  is  true,  that  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the 
German  Church  was  largely  infected  with  rational¬ 
ism  and  deism ;  but  this  should  be  traced  primarily 
to  a  decline  of  the  religious  life  itself, — to  the 
absence  of  a  profound  consciousness  of  sin  and  re¬ 
demption.  The  existence  of  a  living,  and  practical 
experience  of  New  Testament  Christianity  in  the 
heart,  does  not  depend  ultimately  upon  a  system  *- 
of  philosophy,  good  or  bad,  though  it  is  undoubted¬ 
ly  favored  or  hindered  by  it,  but  upon  far  deeper 
and  more  practical  causes.  At  the  same  time .  it 
should  be  noticed,  that  if  the  church  must  make  * 
its  choice  between  two  such  evils,  as  an  arid  and 
frigid  deism,  or  an  imaginative  and  poetic  panthe¬ 
ism,  it  chooses  the  least  eyil,  in  electing  that  system 
which  does  not  annihilate  the  first  principles  of 
ethics  and  practical  morality,  and  which,  if  it  does 
not  accept  a  revealed  religion,  does  at  least  leave 
the  human  soul  the  truths  of  natural  religion. 
An  unevangelical,  though  serious-minded  Lord 
Herbert  of  Cherbury,  or  Immanuel  Kant,  who  in¬ 
sists  upon  the  absolute  validity  of  the  ideas’  of  God,, 
freedom,  and  immortality,  together  with*  the  im¬ 
mutable  reality  of  right  and  wrong,  is  a  less  danger- 
V 


9 


98 


INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 


ous  enemy  to  tlie  gospel,  than  an  nnevangelic  pan¬ 
theist,  who  denies  the  metaphysical  reality  of  each 
and  all  of  these  ideas,  as  apprehended  and  accepted 
by  the  common  human  mind,  and  destroys  the 
foundations  not  merely  of  revealed  religion,  but  of 
all  religion,  by  affirming  that  God  is  the  only  Sub¬ 
stance,  and  the  only  Being,  and  that  all  that  has 
been,  is,  and  ever  shall  be,  is  his  self-evolution  and 
manifestation.1 

On  looking  at  the  scientific  theology  of  Ger¬ 
many,  during  the  present  century,  we  find  it  modi¬ 
fied  by  both  of  these  two  great  philosopical  ten¬ 
dencies.  The  two  systems  of  theism  and  pantheism 
have  been  conflicting  in  this  highly  speculative 
country,  with  an  energy  and  intensity  unequalled 
in  the  history  of  philosophy ;  so  that  the  theological 
mind  of  Germany  exhibits  a  remarkable  diversity 
of  opinions  and  tendencies.  Even  in  the  anti- 


1  In  the  annual  report  of  the 
American  Board  of  Foreign  Mis¬ 
sions  for  1857,  a  missionary  to  In¬ 
dia  represents  the  passage  from 
the  Hindoo  pantheism  to  Chris¬ 
tianity,  as  sometimes  mediated 
and  facilitated  by  the  temporary 
reception  of  deistical  views  in  the 
place  of  pantheistic  ones.  “  Mr. 
Ballantine,”  says  the  Report, 
“  calls  attention  to  certain  facts 
which  are  instructive,  and,  for  the 
most  part,  encouraging.  (1.)  The 
progress  of  deistical  principles 
among  the  Hindoos.  This  is  great. 
It  is  an  effect  of  education,  and 
the  multiform  influence  of  Euro¬ 


pean  ideas  engrafted  into  the  na¬ 
tive  mind.  It  professes  to  he  the 
religion  of  nature,  admitting  the 
existence  of  one  God,  and  denying 
a  revelation  from  him.  The  num¬ 
ber  who  hold  these  sentiments  is 
so  large,  as  to  produce  a  percepti¬ 
ble  weakening  effect  on  the  power 
of  caste,  and  the  bondage  to  Hin- 
dooism  [pantheism].  It  is  not,  in 
general,  of  the  malignant  type  of 
infidelity  in  Christian  lands,  and 
to  a  certain  extent  is  auxiliary  to 
the  gospel ;  with  many,  it  is  a 
stepping-stone  from  Hindooism 
to  Christianity.” 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  GERMAN  CHURCH. 


99 


rationalistic  or  spiritual  school,  this  same  oppo¬ 
sition  between  the  historical  Theism  and  Spinozism 
is  to  be  seen.  The  theology  of  Schleiermacher, 
which  has  exerted  a  great  influence  upon  classes 
that  disagree  with  it — upon  the  Rationalist  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  Supernaturalist  on  the  other,  and 
upon  all  the  intermediates  between  these — is  char¬ 
acterized  by  a  singular  heterogeneity  of  elements. 
Its  founder  was  a  diligent  student  of  Plato,  and  an 
equally  diligent  student  of  Spinoza.  Hence,  while 
we  find  in  this  system,  a  glowing  and  devout  tem¬ 
per  that  is  favorable  to  a  living  theism,  and  a  vital 
Christianity,  we  also  find  principles  that  are  sub¬ 
versive  not  merely  of  revealed  but  of  natural  re¬ 
ligion.1  In  fact,  this  system  presents,  in  one  respect, 
the  most  remarkable  phenomenon  in  the  whole 


1  Schleiermacher’s  definition  of 
religion,  as  “the  feeling  of  de¬ 
pendence  upon  the  Infinite,”  does 
not  involve  theism,  unless  the  In¬ 
finite  is  defined  to  be  a  'person. 
But  in  a  correspondence  with  the 
elder  Sack,  published  posthumous¬ 
ly  in  the  Studien  and  Ivritiken, 
1850  (Heft  I.  158-9),  Schleierma¬ 
cher  expressly  asserts,  in  answer 
to  the  inquiry  of  his  correspond¬ 
ent,  that  the  existence  of  this  feel¬ 
ing  of  dependence  does  not  of  ne¬ 
cessity  require  that  the  Infinite 
should  be  personal.  Neudecker 
(Munscher — Von  Colin,  Dogmen- 
geschichte,  III.  §  28)  quotes  the 
following  from  Schleiermacher 
(Glaubenslehre,  I.  §  42),  in  proof 


that  he  held  the  theory  of  an 
eternal  creation  of  the  world. 
Speaking  of  the  Mosaic  account 
of  creation,  he  remarks:  “Jene 
ganze  FTage  setzt  einen  zeitlichen 
Anfang  der  Welt  schon  als  ents- 
chieden  voraus,  allein  unser  un- 
mittelbares  Abhangigkeitsgefiihl 
findet  in  dieser  Annahme  keine 
bestimmtere  Befriedigung  als  in 
einen  ewigen  Schopfung  der 
Welt.”  This  quotation  is  not  to 
be  found  in  the  Berlin  edition  of 
1852;  but  on  page  200  (Vol.  I.) 
it  is  remarked,  that  it  is  indiffer¬ 
ent  to  the  Abhangigkeitsgefiihl, 
whether  the  doctrine  of  a  tem¬ 
poral  or  an  eternal  creation  be 
adopted. 


100  INFLUENCE  OF  PHILOSOPHICAL  SYSTEMS. 

history  of  theology  and  philosophy , — the  phenome¬ 
non  of  a  system  mainly  pantheistic,  instrumental  at 
a  particular  crisis  in  the  history  of  a  national  mind, 
in  turning  its  attention  to  the  more  distinctively 
spiritual  and  evangelical  doctrines  of  Christianity. 
Having  served  this  purpose,  however,  its  work  is 
done,  and  it  cannot,  as  the  course  of  thinking  now 
going  on  in  Germany  itself  plainly  indicates,  con¬ 
tinue  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  the  theological  mind, 
but  must  either  be  adopted  in  all  its  logical  conse¬ 
quences,  and  thereby  become  the  destruction  of 
evangelical  religion,  or  else  be  rejected  and  left 
behind,  in  that  further  progress  towards,  and  ar¬ 
rival  at  Hew  Testament  Christianity,  which  it  was 
instrumental,  by  a  logical  inconsistency  however, 
in  initiating. 

The  final  judgment,  consequently,  in  respect  to 
the  real  worth  and  influence  of  the  philosophic  move¬ 
ment  of  the  German  mind,  must  be  held  in  reserve, 
until  the  final  issue  appears.  The  estimate  which 
the  future  historian  will  form  of  it,  will  be  deter¬ 
mined  according  as  the  German  Church  of  the  fu¬ 
ture  shall  draw  nearer  to  the  symbols  of  the  Refor¬ 
mation,  or  shall  recede  further  from  them.  But  the 
same  may  be  said  of  German  theologizing,  that  has 
been  remarked  of  theological  science  in  the  former 
periods,  and  in  other  countries, — viz  :  that  so  far  as 
it  has  been  influenced  by  the  Platonic  and  Aris¬ 
totelian  systems,  it  has  been  theistic  in  its  princi¬ 
ples  and  methods,  and  has  been  favorably  formed 
and  moulded. 


BOOK  SECOND 


♦♦♦ 


HISTORY 

OP 


APOLOGIES. 


LITERATURE. 


Fabricius  :  Delectus  argumentorum,  et  syllabus  scriptorum,  qui 
veritatem  religionis  Christianae  adversus  Atheos,  Naturalistas, 
etc.  asseruerunt. 

Tzschirner  :  Gescliiclite  der  Apologetik  (unfinished). 

Roszler  :  Bibliothek  der  Kirchen-Vater. 

Ritter  :  Geschichte  der  Christlichen  Philosophie,  I.  289-564. 

Ersch  und  Gruber  :  Encyklopiidie  (Artikel  Apologetik). 

Tholuck  :  Ueber  Apologetik  (Vermischte  Schriften,  I.  149-373). 

Kaye  :  Justin  Martyr,  Clement  of  Alexandria,  Tertullian. 

Bolton  :  Evidences  of  Christianity  as  exhibited  in  the  writings 
of  its  Apologists  down  to  Augustine. 

Lechler  :  Geschichte  des  Englischen  Deismua. 

Hagenbach  :  Kirchengescliichte  des  18  und  19  Jahrhunderts. 

Leland  :  View  of  the  principal  Deistical  Writers. 

Schlosser  :  History  of  the  Eighteenth  Century ;  translated  by 
Davison. 


CHAPTER  I. 


DEFENCES  OF  CHRISTIANITY  IN  THE  APOLOGETIC  PERIOD 

A.  D.  10 — A.  D.  254. 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements. 

The  History  of  Apologies  is  the  next  subject  to 
be  investigated,  in  our  course  through  the  internal 
history  of  the  Christian  Church.  As  we  proceed, 
we  shall  find  that  we  are  examining  the  workings 
of  the  Christian  Mind,  in  its  endeavour  to  har¬ 
monize  revelation  and  reason.  The  history  of  the 
Defences  of  Christianity  is,  therefore,  one  of  the 
best  sources  whence  to  derive  a  true  philosophy 
of  Christianity.  As  we  pass  along  through  this 
branch  of  Dogmatic  History,  we  shall  observe  that 
substantially  the  same  objections  are  urged  by  the 
skeptical  mind,  from  age  to  age,  and  that  substan¬ 
tially  the  same  replies  are  made.  Perhaps  in  no 
part  of  Church  History,  do  we  observe  so  striking 
verification  of  the  proverb  that  man  is  the  same 
being  in  every  age,  as  in  the  history  of  Apologies. 


104 


mSTOKY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


Infidelity  is  the  same  over  and  over  again ;  reap¬ 
pearing  in  new  forms,  it  is  true,  so  that  it  looks  to 
the  time  and  the  church  in  which  it  appears,  like 
a  new  thing  under  the  sun,  yet  ever  remaining 
identical  with  itself,  it  makes  very  much  the  same 
statements,  and  elicits  very  much  the  same  replies. 

At  the  same  time,  the  investigation  of  the  pro¬ 
cess  discloses  the  fact  of  a  diversity  in  the  unity. 
The  skepticism  of  one  period  is  not  a  mere  fac  simile 
of  a  preceding.  It  springs  up  out  of  the  peculiar 
culture  of  the  age,  and  takes  on  a  hue  by  which  it 
can  be  distinguished.  At  one  time  it  is  deistic  in¬ 
fidelity  ;  at  another  pantheistic.  At  one  time  an 
epicurean  naturalism  is  the  warm  and  steaming  soil, 
in  which  it  strikes  its  roots ;  at  another  a  frigid  and 
intellectual  rationalism.  And  the  same  variety  is 
seen  in  the  Apologies.  Like  meets  like.  Each 
form  of  errour  is  counteracted  by  a  correspondent 
form  of  truth,  and  thus  the  great  stream  of  debate 
and  conflict  rolls  onward. 

Commencing  with  the  Apologetic  period,  we 
find  that  this  first  age  of  the  church  is  very  proper¬ 
ly  denominated  the  Age  of  Apologies.  The  great 
work  to  be  performed  by  the  Christian  Mind  was 
to  repel  attacks.  Christianity,  during  the  whole 
of  this  period  of  two  centuries,  was  upon  the  de¬ 
fensive.  Less  opportunity,  consequently,  was  af¬ 
forded  for  constructing  the  positive  system  of  scrip¬ 
ture  truth,  so  that  the  theological  interests  of  the 
church  in  this  age  were  subordinated  to  its  apolo- 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


105 


getic  effort,  and  Christian  science  received  only  that 
indirect,  though  important  investigation,  which  is 
involved  in  the  discussion  of  the  relations  of  reason 
to  revelation. 

The  attacks  upon  Christianity  during  this  period, 
proceeded  from  two  general  sources :  Judaism  and 
Paganism .  Judaism  held  the  doctrine  of  a  special 
revelation,  in  common  with  Christianity,  and  conse¬ 
quently  the  objections  which  it  raised  were  of  a  dif¬ 
ferent  character  from  those  urged  by  a  Pagan  philos¬ 
ophy  which  did  not  acknowledge  any  special  and 
supernatural  communication  from  God.  The  attacks 
upon  Christianity  that  proceeded  from  the  Judaistic 
opposer  had  a  constant  and  immediate  reference  to 
the  Old  Testament,  as  he  understood  it.  He  did  not, 
like  the  pagan  skeptic,  attack  Christianity  because  it 
claimed  to  be  a  divine  revelation ;  but  because  it 
claimed  to  be  a  form  of  revelation  more  final  and 
conclusive  than  that  first  and  ancient  form  whose 
authority  he  believed  to  be  valid,  and  which  he  sup¬ 
posed  was  to  be  entirely  annihilated  by  the  new  re¬ 
ligion.  Hence  the  question  between  the  Judaistic 
skeptic  and  the  Christian  apologist  involved  the 
whole  subject  of  the  relation  of  the  New  to  the  Old 
Dispensation.  The  Pagan  opponent  of  Christianity, 
on  the  other  hand,  received  neither  the  Old  nor  the 
New  Testament  as  a  divine  revelation,  and  the 
objections  which  he  urged  related  to  the  possibility, 
and  reality  of  any  special  communication  from  the 
infinite  to  the  finite  mind. 


106 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


It  is  to  tliese  two  general  forms  of  skepticism, 
and  tlie  replies  that  were  made  by  the  Christian 
apologist,  that  we  now  turn  our  attention. 


§  2.  Ebionite  Skepticism,  and  Christian  replies . 


The  first  species  of  opposition  to  Christianity, 
from  the  direction  of  Judaism,  and  having  reference 
to  the  meaning  and  authority  of  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment,  was  Ebionitism . 

The  Ebionite,  judging  from  the  somewhat  con¬ 
flicting  statements  of  the  early  fathers,  was  the 
apostate  Jewish-Christian  of  the  2d  century.  The 
Jewish-Christian,  originally  evangelical,  had  by  this 
time  lapsed  down  to  a  humanitarian  position  re¬ 
specting  the  person  and  work  of  Christ,  and  the 
nature  of  Christianity.  He  rejected  the  doctrine 
of  Christ’s  deity,  and  of  his  miraculous  birth,  and 
held  him  to  be  the  son  of  Joseph  and  Mary.1  At  the 


1  'Efiicovcuoi  8e  opoXoyovcn  tou 
Kocrpov  vno  rov  ovtcds  Qeov  y*yove- 
vai ,  ra  8e  Trepl  tov  XpicrTov  opoioos  r (3 
K rjplv'icp  Ka\  KaprroKaaret  pvSevovcri. 

Irenaeus  :  Adv.  Haer.  I.  xxii.  Ed. 
Harvey.  There  seems  to  have  been 
some  variety  in  the  views  of  the 
Ebionites  respecting  the  grade  of 
Christ’s  being;  some  regarding 
him  as  a  much  more  exalted  crea¬ 
ture  than  others  did.  But  all  of 
them  agreed  in  denying  his  deity, 
and  his  place  in  the  trinity.  Euse¬ 
bius  (Eccl.  Hist.  III.  27)  describes 
the  Ebionites  as  holding  Christ 


to  be  a  common  man,  born  of  the 
virgin  Mary  by  ordinary  genera¬ 
tion.  Epiphanius  (Haer.  XXX. 
3)  represents  them  as  regarding 
him  to  be  an  exalted  spirit,  crea¬ 
ted  before  all  other  creatures. 
Origen  (Cont.  Celsum,V.  61)  dis¬ 
tinguishes  two  classes  of  Ebion¬ 
ites,  one  of  which  admitted  the 
supernatural  birth  of  Christ,  and 
the  other  denied  it ;  but  neither 
class  admitted  his  deity. — One 
portion,  and  that  probably  a  small 
one,  of  the  Ebionites  were  mysti¬ 
cal  rather  than  literal  in  their 


EBIONITE  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  107 

same  time,  however,  he  regarded  Jesus  as  the  Mes¬ 
siah  promised  in  the  Old  Testament ;  believing  that 
he  was  set  apart  for  his  work  by  the  inspiration  of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  at  the  time  of  his  baptism  by  John. 
He  made  use  of  a  Hebrew  gospel,  now  lost,  which 
was  probably  that  of  Matthew,  with  the  omission 
of  such  portions  of  it  as  teach  his  miraculous  birth, 
and  his  divine  nature.  The  remainder  of  the  New 
Testament  canon  he  rejected,  particularly  the  epistles 
of  Paul,  whom  he  regarded  as  the  corrupter  of 
genuine  Christianity. 

The  Ebionite  was  thus  pseudo- Jewish  in  all 
essential  particulars.  With  the  exception  that  he 
believed  the  Messiah  to  have  made  his  appearance, 
and  that  Christ  was  he,  he  stood  upon  the  same 
position  with  the  Pharisee  who  opposed  Christ  in 
the  days  of  his  flesh,  and  with  the  Jew  whom  Paul 
found  his  bitterest  enemy.  The  Messiah  of  the  Old 
Testament  was  not  a  divine  being  in  his  view ;  cir¬ 
cumcision  and  the  observance  of  the  Mosaic  ritual 
were  requisite  to  salvation ;  and  salvation  was  by 
the  works  of  the  law. 

Having  this  conception  of  the  Messiah,  and  of 

spirit.  Their  Judaism  was  min-  permitted  to  do,  by  the  Apostolic 
gled  with  theosophic  tendencies,  convention,  Acts  xv),  were  not 
and  they  herald  the  approaching  called  Ebionites  hut  Razarenes , 
Gnosticism.  The  Elcesaites  were  and  existed  down  to  the  close  of 
probably  a  branch  of  these.  Those  the  4th  century. — Compare  Ne- 
Jewish  Christians  who  accepted  ander  :  I.  341-366;  Guericke: 
the  evangelical  system,  and  at  the  §  43  ;  Olshausen  :  Commentary 
same  time  adhered  to  their  na-  on  Acts  xt.  1. 
tional  ceremonial  (as  they  were 


108 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


the  Old  Testament  dispensation  generally,  the  Ebi 
onite  could  see  no  affinity  between  the  Christianity 
of  the  catholic  Church,  and  Judaism.  On  the  con¬ 
trary,  he  saw  only  an  irreconcilable  opposition  be¬ 
tween  them ;  so  that  one  was  the  entire  extinction 
of  the  other,  to  its  inmost  substance  and  fibre.  He 
could  not,  to  use  the  fine  phrase  of  Augustine,  see 
the  New  Testament  in  the  Old,  and  of  course  he 
could  not  see  the  Old  Testament  in  the  New. 

This  preparatory  statement  will  now  enable  us 
to  understand  the  nature  of  the  objections  urged 
by  the  Ebionite  against  the  faith  of  the  Church, 
which  were  the  following  : 

(1.)  The  Christ  of  the  New  Testament,  as  the 
Church  received  and  interpreted  the  New  Testa¬ 
ment,1  was  contrary  to  the  representations  of  the 
Messiah  contained  in  the  Old.  The  portraitures  did 
not  agree.  The  person  depictured  in  the  four  ca¬ 
nonical  Gospels  was  not  the  person  described  in  the 
Jewish  Scriptures.  The  Old  Testament  Messiah, 
the  Ebionite  contended,  was  not  an  incarnation  of 
a  divine  Person,  but  only  a  supernaturally  born 
and  inspired  man. 

(2.)  The  Christ  of  the  catholic  Church,  the  Ebi¬ 
onite  asserted,  was  contradictory  to  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment  conception  of  God.  The  divinity  of  Christ, 
it  was  contended,  was  incompatible  with  the  mono- 

:  It  will  be  remembered  that  who  was  to  come ;  and  also  that 
the  Ebionite  professed  to  believe  he  accepted  a  part  of  the  New 
in  Christ  as  an  authorized  mes-  Testament, 
senger  from  God,  and  the  Messiah 


EBIONITE  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  109 

theism  of  the  Jewish  Scriptures,  and  was  a  species 
of  idolatry  and  polytheism. 

(3.)  The  Ebionite  affirmed  that  the  superseding, 
or  as  he  preferred  to  term  it,  the  annulling  of 
the  Old  Testament  law  by  the  catholic  Chris¬ 
tianity,  was  in  conflict  with  the  doctrine  of  the  di¬ 
vine  origin  of  the  law,  and  the  immutable  necessity 
of  its  observance. 

As  these  objections  proceeded  from  a  defective 
and  erroneous  apprehension  of  the  Jewish  religion, 
the  chief  labour  of  the  Christian  apologist  consisted 
in  imparting  more  correct  views  of  the  inward  and 
real  nature  of  the  Old  Testament  Dispensation,  and 
thereby  justifying  his  own  denial  of  these  positions 
of  the  Ebionite.  The  moment  the  spiritual  char¬ 
acter  of  Judaism,  as  portrayed  in  Moses’  and  espe¬ 
cially  in  the  Psalms  and  the  Prophets,  could  be 
seen,  its  essential  harmony  with  catholic  Chris¬ 
tianity  would  appear,  and  *  the  assertion  of  an  ir¬ 
reconcilable  hostility  between  the  two  systems 
would  fall  to  the  ground  of  itself.  Hence  the 
Christian  apologist  replied  as  follows  to  the  Ebio¬ 
nite  skeptic. 

(1.)  All  that  pertains  to  the  person  of  Christ, 
as  described  in  the  canonical  gospels,  is  essentially 
to  be  found  in  the  Old  Testament  prophecies  and 
types  concerning  the  Messiah.  The  apologist  was 
guided  to  this  counter-assertion,  and  upheld  in  it, 
by  such  sayings  of  Our  Lord  as  :  “  Search  the  [Old 
Testament]  Scriptures,  for  they  are  they  which 


no 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


testify  of  me .  Had  ye  believed  Moses,  ye  would 
have  believed  me ;  for  he  wrote  of  me .  But  if  ye 
believe  not  his  writings,  how  shall  ye  believe  my 
words”  (John  v.  39,  46,  47).  He  was  also  em¬ 
boldened  to  make  the  counter-assertion,  and  to  de¬ 
fend  it,  by  that  remarkable  example  set  by  Christ, 
when  in  his  last  conversation  upon  earth  with  his 
disciples,  “  beginning  at  Moses  and  all  the  Prophets, 
he  expounded  unto  them,  in  all  the  [Hebrew] 
Scriptures,  the  things  concerning  himself  ”  (Luke 
xxiv.  27). 

The  consequence  was,  that  the  Christian  Apol¬ 
ogist  first  of  all  took  issue  with  the  Ebionite  op¬ 
ponent,  in  respect  to  the  alleged  fact  itself,  of  a  con¬ 
tradiction  between  the  Messiah  of  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment  and  the  Christ  of  the  Gospels.  The  appeal 
was  made  directly  to  the  Jewish  Scriptures,  and 
particularly  to  the  prophecies  in  Isaiah  respecting 
the  supernatural  birth,  and  exalted  character,  of  the 
promised  Messiah.  The  divinity  of  the  Messiah 
being  proved  from  this  source,  the  Apologist  har¬ 
monized  it  with  monotheism  by  means  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  trinity,  though  he  made  little  attempt 
to  construct  this  difficult  doctrine. 

(2.)  The  second  and  further  reply  to  the  Ebio¬ 
nite  was,  that  the  Old  Testament  itself  teaches  and 
expects  the  future  superseding  of  Judaism  by 
Christianity, — not  however  by  annihilating  that 
which  was  permanent  and  spiritual  in  Judaism,  but 
by  unfolding  all  this  still  more  fully,  and  abro* 


EBIONITE  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  1  ]  1 


gating  only  that  which  was  national,  ceremonial, 
and  local  in  it.  The  promise  that  all  the  nations 
of  the  earth  should  be  blessed  in  the  seed  of  Abra¬ 
ham  ;  the  glowing  and  beautiful  description  in 
Isaiah  of  the  calling  of  the  Gentiles the  prayer 
for  the  conversion  of  the  whole  world,  as  in  Psalm 
lxvii ;  the  emphasis  laid  upon  a  tender  and  contrite 
heart  in  comparison  with  a  formal  and  hypocritical 
offering  of  sacrifice ;  and  the  repeated  assertion  of 
Christ  that  he  came  not  to  destroy,  but  to  fulfill  the 
Law  and  the  Prophets, — all  this  set  the  Apologist 
upon  the  track  of  discovering  the  true  relation  of 
the  two  dispensations  to  each  other,  and  imparted 
earnestness  and  confidence  to  the  tone  with  which 
he  made  the  counter-assertion. 

Furthermore,  the  terrible  and  unexpected  de¬ 
struction  of  Jerusalem,  so  fresh  in  the  experience 
of  the  Jewish  nation,  was  cited  by  the  Christian 
Apologist  to  prove  that  all  that  was  national  and 
external  in  Judaism,  was  destined  to  pass  away. 
This  was  an  argumentum  ad  hominem  that  had,  as 
such  arguments  generally  have,  even  more  weight 
than  those  which  were  drawn  from  a  deeper  source, 
and  are  of  more  value  for  all  time.  The  actual 
demolition  of  the  Jewish  temple  and  overthrow  of 
the  Jewish  cultus,  the  destruction  of  a  central 
point  where  the  nation  could  gather  itself  together 
and  maintain  its  religious  nationality,  and  its  dis^ 
persion  to  the  four  winds  of  heaven,  were  triumph¬ 
antly  cited  by  the  early  Christian  apologete,  as 


112 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


convincing  arguments  for  the  divinity  of  Christianity 
as  the  true  crown  and  completion  of  Judaism.1 


1  There  was  so  much  similarity 
between  the  Ebionite  and  the 
Jew,  that  in  the  absence  of  doc¬ 
uments  relating  to  Ebionitism, 
the  nature  of  the  Ebionite  objec¬ 
tions  to  Christianity,  and  of  the 
Apologists’  reply  to  them,  may  be 
seen  to  some  extent  from  the 
course  of  thought  in  a  portion  of 
Justin  Martyr’s  Dialogue  with  the 
Jew  Trypho.  The  following  par¬ 
ticulars  are  in  point :  (1)  Trypho 
urges  that  the  ceremonial  law  is 
the  ordinance  of  God,  and  there¬ 
fore  ought  still  to  be  observed. 
Justin  replies,  that  the  ceremonial 
law  was  given  to  the  Jews  on  ac¬ 
count  of  the  hardness  of  their 
hearts.  All  its  ordinances,  its 
sacrifices,  its  Sabbath,  the  prohi¬ 
bition  of  certain  kinds  of  food, 
were  designed  to  counteract  the 
inveterate  tendency  of  the  Jews 
to  fall  into  idolatry.  They  who 
lived  before  Abraham  were  not 
circumcised,  and  they  who  lived 
before  Moses  neither  observed  the 
Sabbath,  nor  offered  sacrifices, 
although  God  bore  testimony  to 
them  that  they  were  righteous. 
(2)  Trypho  quotes  Daniel  vii.  9 
to  prove  that  the  Messiah  was  to 
be  a  great  and  glorious  person¬ 
age  ;  whereas  the  Messiah  of  the 
Christians  was  unhonoured  and 
inglorious,  and  fell  under  the  ex¬ 
treme  curse  of  the  law.  Justin’s 
answer  is,  that  the  Scriptures  of 
the  Old  Testament  speak  of  two 


advents  of  the  Messiah ;  one  in 
humiliation,  and  the  other  in  glo¬ 
ry,  and  the  Jews,  blinded  by  pre¬ 
judice,  looked  only  at  those  pas¬ 
sages  which  foretold  the  latter. 
(3)  Trypho  objects  that  the  Chris¬ 
tian  doctrine  of  the  pre-existence 
and  divinity  of  Christ,  and  his 
subsequent  assumption  of  human¬ 
ity,  contradicted  the  Jewish  idea 
of  the  Messiah;  and  also  that 
Elias  was  to  be  the  precursor  of 
the  Messiah,  but  that  Elias  had 
not  yet  appeared.  To  this  Justin 
replies  by  referring  to  the  pro¬ 
phecy  of  Isaiah  (Chapter  vii),  in 
which  the  birth  of  the  Messiah 
from  a  Virgin  is  foretold;  and 
asserts  that  the  prophecies  re¬ 
specting  Elias  had,  with  respect 
to  Christ’s  first  coming,  been  ac¬ 
complished  in  John  the  Baptist ; 
and  that  before  Christ’s  second 
advent,  Elias  would  himself  ap¬ 
pear.  Furthermore,  Justin  con¬ 
tends  that  the  Messiah  must  have 
already  come,  because,  after  John 
the  Baptist,  no  prophet  had  arisen 
among  the  Jews;  and  they  had 
lost  their  national  independence 
agreeably  to  the  prediction  of  Ja¬ 
cob.  (4)  Trypho  calls  upon  Jus¬ 
tin  to  show,  that  in  the  Old 
Testament  mention*  is  ever  made 
of  another  God,  strictly  so  called, 
besides  the  Creator  of  the  uni¬ 
verse.  Justin  answers,  that  when¬ 
ever  in  Scripture  God  is  said  to 
appear  to  man,  we  must  under- 


GNOSTIC  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  113 


§  3.  Gnostic  Skepticism,  and  Christian  replies . 

The  second  form  of  opposition  to  Christianity, 
during  the  Apologetic  period,  which  a] so  like 
Ebionitism  involved  the  relation  of  the  New  to  the 


stand  the  appearance  to  be  of  the 
Son,  not  of  the  Father;  as  when 
God  appeared  to  Abraham  at  the 
oak  of  Mamre,  to  Lot,  to  Jacob, 
to  Moses  out  of  the  burniDg  bush, 
and  to  Joshua.  Justin  also  ap¬ 
peals  to  Ps.  cx  and  Ps.  xlv,  to 
show  that  David  speaks  of  anoth¬ 
er  Lord  and  God,  besides  the 
Creator  of  the  universe ;  and 
quotes  Proverbs  viii,  and  Gen.  i. 
26,  iii.  22,  to  prove  the  pre-exist¬ 
ence  of  Christ.  (5)  Trypho  as¬ 
serts,  that  although  Jesus  might 
he  recognized  as  the  Lord,  and 
the  Messiah,  and  God,  by  the 
Gentiles,  yet  the  Jews,  who  were 
the  worshippers  of  the  absolute 
God  who  made  him  (Christ)  as 
well  as  them  (the  Gentiles),  were 
not  bound  to  recognize  or  wor¬ 
ship  him.  Justin,  in  answer, 
quotes  Ps.  xcix  and  Ps.  lxxii,  to 
show  that  even  among  the  Jews 
they  who  obtained  salvation,  ob¬ 
tained  it  only  through  Christ. 
(6)  Trypho  asserts,  that  the  New 
Testament  accounts  respecting  the 
birth  of  Christ  could  only  he 
compared  to  the  fables  respecting 
the  birth  of  Perseus  from  Danae, 
and  the  descent  of  Jupiter  under 
the  appearance  of  a  shower  of 
gold.  It  would  be  better  at  once 

8 


to  say,  that  the  Messiah  was  a 
mere  man,  and  elected  to  the 
office  on  account  of  his  exact  com¬ 
pliance  with  the  Mosaic  law,  than 
to  hazard  the  incredible  assertion, 
that  God  himself  submitted  to  be 
born,  and  to  become  a  man.  Jus¬ 
tin,  in  answer,  again  quotes  Isaiah 
liii.  8,  to  prove  that  the  Messiah 
was  not  to  he  horn  after  the  or¬ 
dinary  manner  of  men ;  and  Isaiah 
xxv,  to  show  that  the  Messiah 
was  to  effect  miraculous  cures; 
and  Isaiah  vii,  which,  he  argues, 
could  not  apply  to  Hezekiah.  He 
also  charges  the  Jewish  teachers 
with  having  expunged  from  the 
Septuagint  version,  several  passa¬ 
ges  clearly  prophetic  of  the  Mes¬ 
siah.  (7)  Trypho  at  length  says  : 
“The  whole  Jewish  nation  ex¬ 
pects  the  Messiah.  I  also  admit 
that  the  passages  of  Scripture 
which  you  have  quoted  apply  to 
him ;  and  the  name  of  Jesus  or 
Joshua,  given  to  the  son  of  Nun, 
inclines  me  somewhat  to  the  opin¬ 
ion  that  your  Jesus  is  the  Messiah. 
The  Scriptures  moreover  mani¬ 
festly  predict  a  suffering  Messiah ; 
but  that  he  should  suffer  death 
upon  the  cross,  the  death  of  those 
who  are  pronounced  accursed  by 
the  law  fills  me  with  perplexity.11 


114 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


Old  Testament,  was  Gnosticism.  The  same  funda¬ 
mental  questions  were  agitated  in  the  controversy 
with  this  form  of  errour,  as  in  the  contest  with 
Ebionitism ;  and  in  reality  the  reply  to  the  Ebion- 
ite,  which  resulted  as  we  have  seen  in  the  clear 
exhibition  of  the  connection  between  Judaism  and 
Christianity,  was  a  reply  to  the  Gnostic. 

The  limits  of  this  work  do  not,  of  course,  permit 
a  detailed  account  of  that  amorphous  system  of 
speculation  which  sprang  up  in  the  second  and 


Justin  answers  that  the  curse  ap¬ 
plied  only  to  those  who  were 
crucified  on  account  of  their 
personal  transgressions;  whereas 
Christ  was  sinless,  and  submitted 
to  this  ignominious  death,  in  obe¬ 
dience  to  the  will  of  his  Father, 
in  order  that  he  might  rescue  the 
human  race  from  the  penalty  due 
to  their  sins.  Then,  after  quoting 
Ps.  iii.  5,  Is.  lxv.  2,  and  Is.  liii.  9, 
as  prophetic  of  the  Messiah’s  cru¬ 
cifixion,  Justin  shows  at  consid¬ 
erable  length  that  Ps.  xxii  is  de¬ 
scriptive  of  the  perfect  humanity, 
of  the  sufferings,  death,  and  res¬ 
urrection  of  the  Messiah.  (8)  Try- 
pho  inquires  of  Justin  whether 
he  really  believed  that  Jerusalem 
would  be  rebuilt,  and  that  all  the 
Gentiles  as  well  as  the  Jews  and 
Proselytes  would  be  collected 
there  under  the  government  of 
the  Messiah.  Justin,  in  answer, 
admits  that  this  belief  was  not 
universal  among  the  orthodox 
Christians;  but  that  he  himself 
held  that  the  dead  would  rise 


again  in  the  body,  and  live  for 
a  thousand  years  in  Jerusalem, 
which  would  be  rebuilt,  beau¬ 
tified,  and  enlarged.  He  appeals 
in  support  of  his  opinion  to  Isaiah, 
and  to  the  Apocalypse,  which  he 
ascribes  to  John,  one  of  Christ’s 
apostles.  (9)  Justin  finally  comes 
to  speak  of  the  conversion  of  the 
Gentiles;  and  contends  that  the 
Christians  are  the  true  people  of 
God,  inasmuch  as  they  fulfil  the 
spiritual  meaning  of  the  law,  and 
do  not  merely  conform,  like  the 
Jews,  to  the  letter.  They  have 
the  true  circumcision  of  the  heart ; 
they  are  the  true  race  of  priests, 
typified  by  Jesus  the  High  Priest 
in  the  prophecy  of  Zechariah ; 
they  offer  the  true  spiritual  sacri¬ 
fices  agreeably  to  the  prophecy 
of  Malachi ;  they  are  the  seed 
promised  to  Abraham,  because 
they  have  the  faith  of  Abraham; 
they  are,  in  a  word,  the  true  Is¬ 
rael.  See  Kaye’s  Justin  Martyr, 
p.  24  9q. 


GNOSTIC  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  115 

third  centuries,  with  an  ingenuity  of  speculation, 
and  a  perverse  perseverance  of  mental  power,  never 
excelled  in  the  history  of  human  errours.  Only 
the  most  general  characteristics  can  be  specified. 

The  Gnostics  claimed  to  be  in  possession  of  the 
true  philosophy  of  Christianity.  They  were  of  two 
classes :  Judaizing  and  Anti-Judaizing.  The  for¬ 
mer,  like  the  Ebionite,  acknowledged  the  authority 
of  the  Old  Testament,  but  unlike  him  was  not 
satisfied  with  a  literal  interpretation  of  its  teach¬ 
ings.  The  Judabing  Gnostic  recognized  the  dis¬ 
tinction  spoken  of  by  Paul  in  his  Epistle  to  the 
Romans,  and  employed  by  the  Christian  Apologist 
himself  against  the  Ebionite, — that,  viz.,  of  a  Jew 
outwardly  and  inwardly.  But  this  distinction  he 
entirely  misapprehended.  He  regarded  it  to  be 
the  same  as  that  found  in  all  Oriental  philosophies 
(by  which  his  own  intellectual  methods  had  been 
chiefly  formed)  between  the  esoteric  and  exoteric, 
the  initiated  and  uninitiated,  the  philosophic  and 
the  unphilosophic  mind.  The  consequence  was  a 
hyperspiritualizing  of  the  Old  Testament,  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  evacuate  ifc  of  all  its  practical  and 
salutary  truths,  and  the  introduction  of  a  system 
of  emanation,  which  was  not  only  directly  contrary 
to  the  Mosaic  doctrine  of  creation  de  nihilo  and  the 
spiritual  monotheism  of  the  Old  Testament,  but 
was  in  reality  a  system  of  polytheism,  resulting  in 
that  “  worshipping  of  angels  and  voluntary  (or 
gratuitous)  humility  ”  against  which  St.  Paul  warns 


116 


HISTOKY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


the  Colossians  as  early,  probably,  as  the  beginning 
of  the  seventh  decade  from  the  birth  of  Christ. 
This  class  of  Judaizing  Gnostics  were  originally 
Jews,  who  attempted  to  apply  the  doctrines  of  the 
Oriental  theosophies  in  connection  with  those  of 
New  Platonism,  to  the  interpretation  of  the  Hebrew 
Scriptures.  Hence  their  disposition  like  the  Ebion- 
ite  to  proceed  from  the  Old  Testament  as  a  point 
of  departure. 

The  Anti-Judaizing  Gnostics,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  originally  Pagan  philosophers  or  theoso¬ 
phers,  who  passed  over  to  a  nominal  Christianity 
directly,  and  not  through  Judaism,  and  hence  cher¬ 
ished  a  profound  contempt  for  the  whole  Old 
Testament  Dispensation.  They  tore  Judaism  out 
of  all  connection  with  Christianity,  and  regarded 
the  true  philosophic  apprehension  or  yvcoocg  of 
Christianity,  as  consisting  in  the  elimination  from  it 
of  everything  distinctively  Jewish  or  Mosaic.  The 
consequence  was,  that  those  two  doctrines  which 
are  the  life  and  life-blood  of  Christianity, — the 
doctrines  of  guilt  and  atonement, — were  thrown 
out  of  the  scheme  of  the  Anti- Judaizing  Gnostic. 
These  came  down  from  the  Old  Testament,  and  in 
reality  are  the  substance  of  pure  spiritual  Judaism. 
In  their  place  the  Gnostic  inserted  absurd  theories 
respecting  the  origin  of  the  universe  and  of  evil ; 
theories  by  which  creation  was  no  longer  the 
created,  and  sin  was  no  longer  sinful. 

It  is  plain  that  Gnosticism  in  both  of  itfe  forms, 


PAGAN  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  117 

like  Ebionitism,  was  to  be  met  most  successfully, 
and  overcome  most  triumphantly,  by  the  plain  and 
clear  enunciation  of  the  real  relation  of  Christianity 
to  Judaism.  All  three  of  these  errours  sprang  out 
of  a  false  conception,  and  were  therefore  to  be  over¬ 
come  only  by  furnishing  the  true  one.  The  thor¬ 
oughness  with  which  men  like  Irenaeus  (f  202), 
Tertullian  (f  220),  Clement  of  Alexandria  (f  212- 
220),  and  Origen  (f  254),1  investigated  the  Scrip¬ 
tures,  in  order  to  exhibit  Judaism  and  Christianity 
in  the  true  light,  and  in  their  mutual  connection 
and  harmony,  is  worthy  of  all  admiration,  and  it 
may  be  added  of  imitation  in  any  age.  For  every 
age  of  the  Church  is  somewhat  exposed  to  a  revival 
of  Anti-Judaistic  Gnosticism,  from  the  disposition 
among  men  of  a  speculative  turn  to  reject,  or  at 
least  to  neglect  the  Old  Testament ;  chiefly  upon 
the  ground  of  the  vividness  of  its  representations  of 
the  Divine  personality,  and  the  severe  spirituality 
of  its  conception  of  sin  and  atonement. 

§  4.  Pagan  Skepticism,  and  Christian  replies . 

While  the  Christian  apologist  of  this  period 
was  thus  called  to  defend  Christianity  against  ob¬ 
jections  that  originated  in  a  formal  and  unspiritual 
apprehension  of  Judaism  on  the  one  hand,  and  a 

1  Irenaeus  :  Adversns  Haereses.  Contra  Gnosticos  scorpiacum. 
Tertullianus  :  Adversus  Marcio-  Clemens  Alexandrinus  and  Or- 
nem ;  De  prescriptionibus  haeret-  igen,  passim, 
icorum  ;  Adversus  V alentinos  ; 


118  HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 

falsa  spiritualism  that  rejected  the  Old  Testament 
altogether  ou  the  other,  he  was  at  the  same  time 
compelled  to  meet  that  species  of  infidelity,  common 
to  every  age,  which  rejecting  revelation  altogether, 
contends  that  the  principles  of  natural  reason  and 
natural  religion  are  adequate  to  meet  the  religious 
wants  of  mankind,  and  affirms  that  the  Christian 
system  is  contradictory  to  them. 

We  have  therefore  to  consider  the  attacks  and 
defences  of  this  period,  so  far  as  concerns  the  purely 
Pagan  Opposition  to  Christianity .  These  attacks, 
unlike  those  of  Ebionitism  and  Gnosticism,  stood 
in  no  sort  of  connection  with  the  religion  of  the 
Jewish  nation,  but  were  founded  upon  those  views 
of  human  nature  and  of  God,  which  belonged  to  the 
entire  heathen  or  Gentile  world. 

The  principal  objections  urged  against  Chris¬ 
tianity  by  such  pagan  philosophers  and  speculatists 
as  Celsus  (150),  Porphyry  (f  304),  and  Hierocles 
(300),  were  the  following : 

(1.)  Christianity  they  asserted  was  irreligous 
and  unethical ;  because  it  was  founded  upon  an  an 
thropopathic  idea  of  God,  particularly  in  the  Old 
Testament,  and  contained  absurd  representations 
of  the  deity  that  were  unfavourable  to  religion, — 
for  example,  the  account  of  the  creation  and  fall  of 
man,  the  birth  of  Christ,  his  miracles,  his  death, 
and  especially  his  resurrection.  Porphyry  and  Cel¬ 
sus  compared  the  account  of  the  life  and  actions  of 
Christ  recorded  in  the  gospels,  with  the  popular 


PAGAN  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  119 


narrations  in  the  Greek  and  Roman  mythologies, 
and  placed  him  in  the  catalogue  of  the  pagan  heroes 
and  demi-gods.  They  did  not  deny  his  historical 
existence,  it  should  be  noticed,  but  asserted  that 
his  disciples  had  craftily  given  currency  to  an  ex¬ 
aggerated  and  false  picture  of  the  life  of  a  sincere 
and  good  man. 

(2.)  Christianity  claimed  to  be  a  supernaturally 
revealed  religion ;  but  revelation  of  this  species  is 
impossible  and  irrational.  The  pagan  skeptic 
would  concede  the  possibility  of  a  general  com¬ 
munication  from  *  the  deity,  such  as  appears  in  na¬ 
ture,  and  the  human  mind,  but  denied  the  reality 
of  such  a  special  and  written  revelation  as  the 
church  claimed  to  possess  in  the  canonical  Scrip* 
tures. 

The  first  of  these  objections  was  chiefly!  of  a 
practical  character,  and  hence  was  met  in  a  prac¬ 
tical  manner  by  the  apologist.  The  earliest  de¬ 
fenders  of  Christianity  against  the  heathen  skep 
ticism,  Justin  Martyr  (fl63),  Tatian  (f  174),  Ath 
enagoras  (f  177),1  laid  much  stress  upon  the  trans¬ 
forming  power  of  Christianity ;  upon  the  joyful 
deaths  of  Christians ;  and  upon  the  greater  safety 


JThe  apologists  who  replied 
with  most  effect  to  the  objections 
of  the  Pagan  skeptic  were :  Jus¬ 
tin  Martyr  :  Apologia  I  and  II ; 
Tatian  :  Aoyoy  npos  "EXX^i/a?  ; 
AthenAGORAS  :  npfer /3eia  7 repi 
XpLcmavaiv  ;  Clemens  Alexan- 
drinus  :  Coliortatio  ad  Gentes,  a 


searching  examination  of  the  pa¬ 
gan  mythologies ;  Origen  :  Con  * 
tra  Celsum  ;  Tertullian  :  Apo 
logeticus,  De  Idolatria  ;  Cyprian  • 
De  idolorum  vanitate  ;  Minucius 
Felix  :  Octavius.  See  Guericke: 
Church  History,  §§  29,  57-59. 


120 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


in  accepting  Christianity,  even  if  it  should  prove 
to  be  a  delusion. 

These  were  plain  facts  that  could  not  be  denied. 
The  charge  of  immorality,  which  originated  in  un¬ 
mixed  malice  and  falsehood,  and  which  Gibbon  has 
re-stated  with  that  minuteness  of  rhetorical  amplifi¬ 
cation  which  accompanies  a  desire  to  convey  an 
impression  without  daring  to  make  an  assertion, 
was  easily  refuted  by  a  stern  morality  in  the  early 
church,  that  carried  multitudes  to  the  stake,  or  the 
amphitheatre,  and  a  purity  of  life  that  was  in  daz¬ 
zling  contrast  with  the  morals  of  heathenism.  With 
respect  to  the  theological  representations  of  the 
Old  and  New  Testaments,  the  early  Christian  Apol¬ 
ogists  had  to  perform  a  labour  similar  to  that  in 
the  contest  with  the  Ebionite  and  Gnostic, — the 
labour,  viz.  of  bringing  out  to  view  the  whole  truth 
in  the  case.  The  objection  that  the  Biblical  repre¬ 
sentation  of  the  deity  is  anthropopathic  was  met 
by  directing  attention  to  the  fact,  overlooked  de¬ 
signedly  or  undesignedly  by  the  Pagan  skeptic, 
that  the  Jewish  religion  prohibited  idolatry,  and 
taught  the  unity  and  spirituality  of  the  deity,  at  a 
time  when  the  rest  of  the  world  was  polytheistic 
and  material  in  its  theological  conceptions,  and  em¬ 
ployed  these  anthropopathic  representations  in  a 
figurative  manner  only,  as  the  inadequate  but  best 
means  of  communicating  to  a  creature  of  time  and 
sense  the  great  spiritual  idea  with  which  it  was 
labouring.  Furthermore,  living,  as  the  first  Chris- 


PAGAN  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  121 


tian  Apologists  did,  so  near  to  the  age  in  which  the 
events  recorded  in  the  Evangelists  occurred,  the 
historical  argument  for  the  authenticity  and  genu¬ 
ineness  of  the  New  Testament  could  be  urged  with 
even  a  greater  confidence  and  success  than  it  has 
been,  or  could  be,  since.1 

The  answer  to  the  second  objection  of  the  Pa¬ 
gan  opponent,  viz.  that  revelation  is  contrary  to 
reason,  involved  a  much  deeper  examination  of  the 
whole  subject  upon  grounds  of  reason  and  philoso¬ 
phy.  This  is  the  great  standing  objection  of  skepti¬ 
cism  in  all  ages,  and  the  history  of  Apologies,  after 
the  Apologetic  period,  is  little  more  than  the  ac¬ 
count  of  the  endeavour  of  the  Christian  Mind  to  har¬ 
monize  faith  with  science,  religion  with  philosophy. 

So  far  as  concerns  the  defences  of  this  earliest 
period  in  Apologetic  History,  it  may  be  remarked, 
generally,  that  while  the  primitive  fathers  affirmed 
the  intrinsic  reasonableness  of  Christianity,  and 
made  some  attempts  to  defend  it  upon  philosophic 
grounds,  it  was  not  the  favourite  and  predominant 
method  with  them.  They  feared  philosophy  as 


1  “For  what  motive,”  says  Jus¬ 
tin  Maetye  (Apologia  I.  Oh.  53), 
“could  ever  possibly  have  per¬ 
suaded  us  to  believe  a  crucified 
man  to  be  the  first  begotten  of 
the  unbcgotten  God,  and  that  he 
should  hereafter  come  to  be  the 
judge  of  all  the  world,  had  we 
not  met  with  those  prophetic  tes¬ 
timonies  of  him  [in  the  Old  Tes¬ 


tament]  proclaimed  so  long  before 
his  incarnation?  Were  we  not 
eye-witnesses  to  the  fulfilling  of 
them  ?  Did  we  not  see  the  deso¬ 
lation  of  Judea,  and  men  out  of 
all  nations  proselyted  to  the  faith 
by  his  apostles,  and  renouncing 
the  ancient  errors  they  were 
brought  up  in?  ” 


122 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


taught  in  the  different  ancient  schools;  and  regarded 
the  various  and  conflicting  systems  as  the  sources 
of  heresy.1 

The  abuse  of  philosophy  by  the  Gnostics,  espe¬ 
cially,  made  them  cautious  in  employing  speculation 
in  defending  revealed  religion,  and  even  somewhat 


1  “  Heresies  themselves,”  says 
Tertullian  (De  praescriptionibus 
haereticorum,  Oh.  7.),  “  are  trick¬ 
ed  out  by  philosophy.  Hence  the 
‘  aeons,’  and  I  know  not  what  in¬ 
finite  ‘forms,’  and  ‘the  trinity 
of  man’  according  to  Valentinus: 
he  was  a  Platonist.  Hence  the 
god  of  Marcion,  more  excellent 
by  reason  of  his  indolence  :  he 
belonged  to  the  Stoics.  And  the 
doctrine  that  the  soul  dies  is 
maintained  by  the  Epicureans ; 
and  the  denial  of  the  resurrection 
of  the  body  is  taken  from  the 
united  school  of  all  the  philos¬ 
ophers  ;  and  where  matter  is 
made  equal  with  God,  there  is 
the  doctrine  of  Zeno ;  and  when 
aught  is  alleged  concerning  a  god 
consisting  of  fire,  there  comes  in 
Heraclitus.  The  same  matter  is 
turned  and  twisted  by  the  here¬ 
tics  and  by  the  philosophers; 
the  same  questions  are  involved : 
Whence  comes  evil  ?  and  where¬ 
fore?  and  whence  man?  and  how? 
and  (what  Valentinus  has  lately 
propounded),  whence  God?  to 
wit,  from  a  mental  evolution 
and  an  abortive  birth  (enthymesi 
et  ectromate).  Wretched  Aris¬ 
totle  I  who  has  taught  them  the 


dialectic  art,  cunning  in  building 
up  and  pulling  down,  using  many 
shifts  in  sentences,  making  forced 
guesses  at  truth,  stiff  in  argu¬ 
ments,  busy  in  raising  contentions, 
contrary  even  to  itself,  dealing 
backwards  and  forwards  with 
every  subject,  so  as,  really,  to  deal 

with  none . What  then  has 

Athens  to  do  with  Jerusalem? 
What  the  Academy  with  the 
Church  ?  What  heretics  with 
Christians  ?  Our  school  is  of 
the  porch  of  Solomon,  who  him¬ 
self  also  has  delivered  unto  us, 
that  we  must  in  simplicity  of 
heart  (Wisdom  i.  1)  seek  the 
Lord.  Away  with  those  who  have 
brought  forward  a  Stoic,  and  a 
Platonic,  and  a  Dialectic  Chris¬ 
tianity.”  Ackermann  (Christian 
Element  in  Plato,  p.  24)  remarks 
with  much  truth,  that  the  early 
fathers  favoured  or  feared  philoso¬ 
phy  according  as  it  claimed  to  be 
a  handmaid  to  Christianity,  or  a 
substitute  for  it ;  and  that  this 
explains  the  fact,  that  we  so  often 
find  in  the  same  church  fathers 
contradictory  expressions  con¬ 
cerning  Platonism  and  philosophy 
generally. 


«r 

PAGAN  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  123 

guarded  in  their  assertion  that  it  is  defensible  upon 
rational  principles.  They  preferred,  as  we  have 
seen,  to  employ  the  exegetical,  historical,  and  prac¬ 
tical  arguments  in  opposition  to  the  skeptic.  This 
is  true  particularly  of  the  defences  that  were  com¬ 
posed  in  the  second  century  by  the  Latin  Apolo¬ 
gists,  Tertullian  and  Minucius  Felix.1  They  defined 
and  defended  Christianity  more  with  reference  to 
its  practical  nature,  and  its  influence  upon  private 
and  public  life.  Still,  even  the  vehement  Tertul¬ 
lian,  whose  abhorrence  of  Gnosticism  led  him  to 
inveigh  with  a  bitterness  not  always  discriminating 
against  philosophy,  appeals  to  the  “testimonium 
animae  naturaliter  Christianae,” — to  the  witness  of 
that  real  and  true  human  nature  which  is  in  favour 
of  the  truth.  This  he  would  find,  previous  to  its 
corruption  and  sophistication  by  philosophy  falsely 
so  called,  in  the  spontaneous  expressions  of  man  in 
his  most  serious  and  honest  moments.  “Soul,”  he 
says,  “stand  thou  forth  in  the  midst, — whether  thou 
art  a  thing  divine  and  immortal  according  to  most 


1  Tektullian  (De  praescrip.  Ch. 
8)  remarks  that  one  part  of  the 
church  were  more  inclined  to 
philosophize  upon  Christianity 
than  the  other.  “  I  come,  there¬ 
fore,  to  that  point,  which  even 
our  own  brethren  put  forward  as 
a  reason  for  entering  upon  curious 
enquiry,  and  which  heretics  urge 
for  bringing  in  curious  doubt.  It 
is  written,  they  say,  ‘  seek  and  ye 
shall  find.’  Let  us  remember 


when  it  was  that  our  Lord  uttered 
this  saying :  in  the  first  beginning, 
I  think,  of  his  teaching,  when  it 
was  yet  doubted  by  all  men 
whether  He  were  the  Christ ; 
when  as  yet  not  even  Peter  had 
declared  him  to  be  the  Son  of 

God . With  good  cause 

therefore  was  it  then  said :  Seek 
and  ye  shall  find,  seeing  that  He 
was  yet  to  be  sought,  who  was 
not  yet  acknowledged.” 


124 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


philosophers,  and  therefore  the  less  able  to  speak 
falsely,  or  as  seems  to  Epicurus  alone,  whether  thou 
art  in  no  way  divine,  because  material  and  mortal, 
.  .  .  .  whether  thou  hadst  thy  beginning  with  the 
body,  or  art  sent  into  the  body  after  it  is  formed, — 
from  whatever  source,  and  in  whatever  manner  thou 
makest  man  a  rational  creature,  more  capable  than 
any  of  understanding  and  of  knowledge,  stand  thou 
forth  and  testify.  But  I  summon  thee  not  such  as 
when  formed  in  the  schools,  trained  in  the  libraries, 
nurtured  in  the  academies  and  porches  of  Athens, 
thou  utterest  thy  crude  wisdom.  I  address  thee  as 
simple,  and  rude,  and  unpolished,  and  unlearned; 
such  as  they  have  thee  who  have  nothing  but  thee ; 
the  very  and  entire  thing  that  thou  art  in  the  cross¬ 
roads,  in  the  public  squares ,  in  the  shops  of  the  arti¬ 
san}  I  have  need  of  thy  uncultivation  (imperitia), 
since  in  thy  cultivation  however  small  no  one  puts 
faith.  I  demand  of  thee  those  truths  which  thou 
carriest  with  thyself  into  man,  which  thou  hast 
learned  to  know  either  from  thyself,  or  from  the 
author  of  thy  being,  whoever  he  be.  Thou  art  not, 
I  know,  a  Christian  soul ;  for  thou  art  not  born  a 
Christian,  but  must  be  made  one.  Yet  now  the 
Christians  themselves  demand  a  testimony  from 


1  “  By  philosophy  I  mean  nei-  ness  and  devout  knowledge,  this 
ther  the  Stoic,  nor  the  Platonic,  whole  selection  I  call  philoso- 
nor  the  Epicurean  and  Aristo-  phy.”  Clemens  Alexandeinus  : 
telian.  But  whatever  things  have  Stromata,  Lib.  I.  p.  288.  Ed.  Paris, 
been  properly  said  by  each  of  1640. 
those  sects,  inculcating  righteous- 


PAGAN  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  125 

thee,  who  art  a  stranger,  against  thy  own  friends, 
that  they  may  blush  even  before  thee,  for  hating 
and  scoffing  at  us,  on  account  of  those  very  things 
which  now  detain  thee  as  a  party  against  them.”1 

This  eloquent  and  vehement  North  African 
father  appeals  in  the  same  way  to  the  spontaneous 
convictions  of  man,  in  proof  of  the  Divine  Existence. 
“  God,”  he  says,  u  proves  himself  to  be  God,  and 
the  one  only  God,  by  the  very  fact  that  he  is  known 
to  all  nations ;  for  the  existence  of  any  other  deity 
than  he  would  first  have  to  be  demonstrated.  The 
consciousness  of  God  is  the  original  dowry  of  the 
soul ;  the  same  and  differing  in  no  respect  in  Egypt, 
in  Syria,  and  in  Pontus ;  for  the  God  of  the  Jews  is 
the  one  whom  the  souls  of  men  call  their  god.  We 
worship  one  God,  the  one  whom  ye  all  naturally 
know,  at  whose  lightnings  and  thunders  ye  trenn 
ble,  at  whose  benefits  ye  rejoice.  Will  ye  that  we 
prove  the  divine  existence  by  the  witness  of  the 
soul  itself,  which  although  confined  by  the  prison 
of  the  body,  although  circumscribed  by  bad  train¬ 
ing,  although  enervated  by  lusts  and  passions,  al¬ 
though  made  the  servant  of  false  gods,  yet  when  it 
recovers  itself  as  from  a  surfeit,  as  from  a  slumber, 
as  from  some  infirmity,  and  is  in  its  proper  con¬ 
dition  of  soundness,  calls  God  by  this  name  only, 
because  it  is  the  proper  name  of  the  true  God.2 3 

1  Tertullian  :  De  testimonio  phisticated  condition  as  u  deus,” 

animae,  Ch.  1.  and  not  as  Jupiter,  or  Apollo,  or 

3  The  deity  is  addressed  by  the  by  any  other  name, 
pagan  in  this  “  sound 11  unso- 


126 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


4  Great  God,’  1  good  God,’  and  4  God  grant  ’  [deus 
not  dii]  are  words  in  every  mouth.  The  soul  also 
witnesses  that  He  is  its  judge,  when  it  says  ‘God 
sees,’  4 1  commend  to  God,’  4  God  shall  recompense 
me.’  O  testimony  of  a  soul  naturally  Christian ! 
[or  monotheistic].  Finally,  in  pronouncing  these 
words  it  looks  not  to  the  Roman  capitol  but  to 
heaven  ;  for  it  knows  the  dwelling  place  of  the  true 
God ;  from  him,  and  from  thence  it  descended.” 1 
These  are  the  affirmations  of  one  who  in  another 
place  denominates  philosophers  the  44  patriarchs  of 


1  Tertullian  :  Adversus  Mar- 
cionem,  I.  10;  Ad  Scapulam,  2  ; 
Apologeticus,  17. — The  following 
passages  from  pagan  writers  cor¬ 
roborate  these  affirmations  of  Ter- 
tullian :  “  There  is  a  god  (est  deus) 
in  heaven  who  hears  and  sees 
what  we  do.”  Plautus  :  Captivi. 
“Be  of  good  cheer,  my  child, 
there  is  a  great  god  (Zefr)  in 
heaven  who  beholds  and  rules  all 
things.”  Sophocles  :  Electra,  175. 
“  Alcibiades.  But  what  ought  I 
to  say?  Socrates.  If  God  will 
(on  eav  0eo?  cSeAi/).”  Plato  : 
Alcibiades  I.  135.  Minucius  Fe¬ 
lix  (Octavius,  18,  19)  maintains 
that  the  wiser  pagans  taught  the 
unity  of  God.  See  also  Augus¬ 
tine  (De  Civitate.  Lib.  VIII)  re¬ 
specting  the  opinions  of  Plato. 
Calvin  (Institutes  I.  10)  sums  up 
the  whole  of  this  view  in  the  fol¬ 
lowing  manner  :  “  In  almost  all 
ages,  religion  has  been  generally 
corrupted.  It  is  true  indeed,  that 
the  name  of  one  supreme  God  has 


been  universally  known  and  cele¬ 
brated.  For  those  who  used  to 
worship  a  multitude  of  deities, 
whenever  they  spake  according 
to  the  genuine  sense  of  nature, 
used  simply  the  name  of  God  in 
the  singular  number,  as  though 
they  were  contented  with  one 
God,  And  this  was  wisely  re¬ 
marked  by  Justin  Martyr,  who 
for  this  purpose  wrote  a  book 
‘On  the  Monarchy  of  God,’  in 
which  he  demonstrates,  from  nu¬ 
merous  testimonies,  that  the  unity 
of  God  was  a  principle  univer¬ 
sally  impressed  on  the  hearts  of 
men.  Tertullian  (De  Idolatria) 
also  proves  the  same  point  from 
the  common  phraseology.  But 
since  all  men  without  exception 
have  become  vain  in  their  under¬ 
standings,  all  their  natural  per¬ 
ception  of  the  Divine  unity  has 
only  served  to  render  them  inex¬ 
cusable.”  Compare  ante,  p.  55 
(Note). 


PAGAN  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  127 


heretics,”  and  Plato  himself  the  author  who  u  fur¬ 
nishes  the  sauce  and  seasoning  of  all  the  heretical 
speculations.” 1 

In  the  same  strain  of  reasoning,  Minucius  Felix 
argues.  He  speaks  of  the  natural  rationality  of 
man  in  which  Christianity  finds  a  corroboration, 
and  describes  it  as  a  power  of  apprehension  “  that 
is  not  produced  by  study,  but  is  generated  by  the 
very  make  and  structure  of  the  human  mind.”2 
This  writer,  also,  refers  to  the  partial  agreement 
of  the  heathen  philosophy  with  Christianity,  yet 
makes  a  violent  attack  upon  Socrates,  in  which  he 
speaks  of  him,  after  the  phrase  of  Zeno  probably, 
as  that  Attic  jester  (scurra  Atticus). 

Passing  to  the  Greek  Apologists  of  this  period, 
Justin,  Athenagoras,  and  Tatian,  we  find  philosophy 
much  more  identified  with  Christianity,  than  in  the 
Occidental  defences.  (The  distinction  between  nat¬ 
ural  and  revealed  religion  is  not  very  carefully 
made  by  them.8  They  were  somewhat  inclined  to 
regard  all  religious  truth  as  a  revelation  from  God, 
and  referred  it  partly  to  a  supernatural  communi¬ 
cation  from  the  Divine  mind,  and  partly  to  the 
light  of  nature.  Hence  they  did  not  always  dis- 

1  “  Philosophi  patriarchae  hae-  3  This  tendency  is  very  strong 
reticorum  ”  (De  Anima,  3,  and  in  Lactantius,  of  the  polemic 
Adv.  Hermogenem,  8).  “  Plato  period,  who  confounds  ‘  religio  ’ 

omnium  haereticorum  condimen-  with  1  sapientia  1  to  such  a  degree, 
tarius  ”  (De  Anima,  23).  as  to  result  in  latitudinarian  views 

auIngenium  quod  non  studio  of  the  gospel, 
paratur,  sed  cum  ipsa  mentis  for- 
matione  generatur”  (Octavius,  16). 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


128 


criminate  with  sufficient  care  between  that  which 
is  the  product  of  the  human  mind  left  to  its  spon¬ 
taneous  operations,  and  that  which  is  communicated 
to  it  by  a  special  revelation.  Sometimes  we  find 
the  same  mind  passing  from  one  view  to  the  <yther  ; 
at  first  blending  natural  and  revealed  religion  to 
gether,  and  afterwards  separating  them.  Justin 
Martyr  is  an  example  of  this.  In  his  earlier  apolo¬ 
gies,  addressed  to  the  Roman  emperor,  he  recog¬ 
nizes  the  resemblance  between  the  principles  of 
natural  religion  and  the  ethics  of  Christianity,  in 
order  to  render  the  philosophic  and  virtuous  Marcus 
Aurelius,  or  Antoninus  Pius,  indulgent  towards 
the  new  religion.1  But  in  his  later  work,  aimed 


1  “  To  lay  before  yon  [the  em¬ 
peror]  in  short,  what  we  expect, 
and  what  we  have  learned  from 
Christ,  and  what  we  teach  the 
world,  take  it  as  follows:  Plato 
and  we  are  both  alike  agreed  as 
to  a  future  judgment,  but  differ 
about  the  j udges ;  Rhadamanthus 
and  Minos  are  his  judges,  Christ 
ours.  And  moreover  we  say  that 
the  souls  of  the  wicked  being  re¬ 
united  to  the  same  bodies  shall 
be  consigned  over  to  eternal  tor¬ 
ments,  and  not  as  Plato  in  the 
Timaeus  will  have  it,  to  the  period 
of  a  thousand  years  only.  If  then 
we  hold  some  opinions  near  of 
kin  to  the  poets  and  philosophers 
in  greatest  repute  among  you,  and 
others  of  a  diviner  strain,  and  far 
above  out  of  their  sight,  and  have 
demonstrations  on  our  side  into 


the  bargain,  why  are  we  to  be 
thus  unjustly  hated,  and  to  stand 
distinguished  in  misery  above  the 
rest  of  mankind  ?  For  in  saying 
that  all  things  were  made  in  this 
beautiful  order  by  God,  what  do 
we  seem  to  say  more  than  Plato  ? 
When  we  teach  a  general  confla¬ 
gration,  what  do  we  teach  more 
than  the  Stoics  ?  When  we  assert 
departed  souls  to  be  in  a  state 
of  consciousness,  and  the  wicked 
to  be  in  torments,  but  the  good 
free  from  pain  and  in  a  blissful 
condition,  we  assert  no  more 
than  your  poets  and  philosophers. 
When  Plato  (Repub.  lib.  x)  said 
that  ‘  the  blame  lies  at  his  door 
who  wills  the  sin,  but  God  wills 
no  evil,’  he  borrowed  the  saying 
from  Moses.”  Justin  Martyr: 
Apol.  I.  Ch.  8,  18,  57.  The 


PAGAN  SKEPTICISM,  AND  CHRISTIAN  REPLIES.  129 

against  those  who  asserted  that  natural  religion  and 
ethics  were  adequate  to  meet  the  wants  of  man, 
and  could  therefore  supersede  Christianity,  he  takes 
the  ground  that  the  doctrines  of  a  Plato  and  a 
Socrates  had  come  to  the  Greeks  by  the  way  of  the 
Jews  through  Egypt.1 

The  Apologist  thought  himself  to  be  conducted 
to  this  view  of  the  homogeneity  of  reason  and  reve¬ 
lation,  by  certain  representations  in  Scripture,  par¬ 
ticularly  by  those  portions  of  the  writings  of  the 
Apostle  John  which  speak  of  the  Logos  as  enlight¬ 
ening  every  man  that  comes  into  the  world.  Some 
modern  writers  have  supposed  that  the  idea  of  the 
Logos,  or  the  manifested  Reason  of  God,  which  ap¬ 
pears  so  frequently  in  the  apologetic  writings  of  the 
primitive  fathers,  was  chiefly  derived  from  the  Pla¬ 
tonic  philosophy,  and  the  writings  of  the  Jewish 


1  Christian  ’  in  the  Octavius  of 
‘Minucius  Felix  says :  “I  have 
explained  the  opinions  of  almost 
all  the  philosophers,  whose  most 
illustrious  glory  it  is  that  they 
have  worshipped  one  God,  though 
under  various  names  ;  so  that  one 
might  suppose  either  that  the 
Christians  of  the  present  day  are 
philosophers,  or  that  the  philoso¬ 
phers  of  old  were  already  Chris¬ 
tians.” 

1  Cohortatio,  15,  in  Neander  : 
I.  666.  Theophilus  Gale’s  Court 
of  the  Gentiles,  and  Cudworth’s 
Intellectual  System,  contain  much 
to  favour  this  view.  Augustine 

9 


expresses  himself  doubtfully  :  De 
Civitate  Dei,  VIII.  11, 12.  Clem¬ 
ent  of  Alexandria  goes  so  far  as 
to  maintain  “  that  the  Greeks  de¬ 
rived  even  their  strategical  skill 
from  the  Jews;  and  that  Milti- 
ades,  in  his  night  march  against 
the  Persians,  imitated  the  tactics 
of  Moses  in  conducting  the  chil¬ 
dren  of  Israel  out  of  Egypt.”  He 
also  “traces  the  first  idolatrous 
columns  of  the  ancients  to  their 
hearing  of  the  fiery  and  cloudy 
pillar  that  went  before  the  people 
of  God.”  Bolton  :  Evidences,  pp. 
82,  118,  123. 


130 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


Philo.  But  it  is  the  remark  of  Baumgarten-Crusius, 
who  is  not  led  to  it  by  any  merely  theological 
interest  or  feeling,  that  the  Logos-idea  of  the  New 
Testament  was  more  influential  in  forming  the  gen¬ 
eral  philosophical  notions  of  the  church  at  this 
time,  than  was  the  department  of  secular  philoso¬ 
phy  itself.  Clement  of  Alexandria,  and  the  school 
of  Origen  generally,  attribute  the  better  religious 
knowledge  of  the  heathen  world,  at  one  time  to  the 
Logos,  and  at  another  to  the  scriptures,1  because 
they  held  that  it  was  one  and  the  same  Supreme 
Reason  that  communicated  the  knowledge  in  both 
forms.  They  are  however  careful  to  observe  that 


1  Respecting  the  source  whence 
St.  John  derived  the  idea  of  the 
Logos,  Neandek  (I.  575)  remarks 
as  follows:  “The  title  ‘  Word  of 
God,’  employed  to  designate  the 
idea  of  the  Divine  self-manifesta¬ 
tion,  the  Apostle  John  could  have 
arrived  at  within  himself,  inde¬ 
pendent  of  any  outward  tradition; 
and  he  would  not  have  appro¬ 
priated  to  his  own  purpose  this 
title,  which  had  been  previously 
current  in  certain  circles,  had  it 
not  offered  itself  to  him,  as  the 
befitting  form  of  expression  for 
that  which  filled  his  own  soul. 
But  this  word  itself  is  certainly 
not  derived,  any  more  than  the 
idea  originally  expressed  in  it, 
from  the  Platonic  philosophy, 
which  could  furnish  no  occasion 
whatever  for  the  enoice  of  this 
particular  expression.  The  Pla¬ 


tonic  philosophy  led  rather  to  the 
employment  of  the  term  vovs ,  as 
a  designation  of  the  mediating 
principle  in  the  deity.  It  is, 
rather,  the  translation  of  the  Old 
Testament  term  “inn ;  and  it  was 
this  Old  Testament  conception, 
moreover,  which  led  to  the  New 
Testament  idea  of  the  Logos.  An 
intermediate  step  is  formed  by 
what  is  said  in  the  epistle  to 
the  Hebrews  concerning  a  Divine 
Word  (See  Bleeck’s  Commenta¬ 
ry);  and  thus  we  find  in  the 
latest  epistles  of  Paul  from  the 
first  epistle  to  the  Corinthians 
and  onward,  in  the  epistle  to  the 
Hebrews,  and  in  the  gospel  of 
John,  a  well  constituted  series  of 
links  in  the  progressive  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  apostolic  Logos-doc¬ 
trine.” 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY. 


131 


the  unwritten  revelation  is  imperfect,  sporadic,  and 
inadequate  to  meet  all  the  religious  wants  of  a  sin¬ 
ful  race,  while  the  written  word  is  perfect,  full,  and 
sufficient.1 


§  5.  Recapitulatory  Survey, 

Having  thus  sketched  the  course  of  apoi  ^getic 
thinking  during  the  second  and  first  half  of  the 
third  centuries,  we  bring  the  results  into  the  fol¬ 
lowing  recapitulation. 

The  scientific  mind  of  the  Church,  so  far  as  it 
contended  with  Ebionitism  and  Gnosticism,  was 
occupied  chiefly  with  a  clear  and  consistent  ex¬ 
hibition  of  the  real  nature  of  Judaism,  and  of  its 
essential  agreement  and  oneness  with  Christianity. 
This  correct  apprehension  of  the  first  form  of  special 
revelation  was  of  itself  a  refutation  of  those  argu¬ 
ments  which  attempted  to  prove,  either  that  Chris¬ 
tianity  was  in  hostility  to  all  preceding  special 
revelations  from  God,  and  that  therefore  it  must  be 
rejected,  or  else  that  there  had  been  no  preceding 
special  revelations,  and  that  therefore  it  must  expel 
and  annihilate  every  element  of  Judaism  from 
itself. 

And  so  far  as  the  Church  had  to  contend  with 
Pagan  philosophy,  which  derived  its  arguments 
wholly  from  the  operations  of  the  human  mind,  and 
rejected  both  of  the  special  revelations,  the  sub- 


1  The  unwritten  word  is  termed  pepos  rov  \6yov  crneppariKos  \6yos. 


132 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


stance  of  its  counter-argument  was,  that  even  if  the 
principles  of  natural  religion  should  be  regarded  as 
the  pure  efflux  of  the  unassisted  human  mind,  they 
did  not  run  counter  to  the  doctrines  of  Christianity, 
but  really  required  them,  in  order  to  their  own 
spread  and  efficiency  among  men ;  that  the  human 
mind,  when  its  real  and  deep  convictions  were  re¬ 
vealed,  was  monotheistic,  or  naturally  Christian,  as 
Tertullian  states  it ;  but  that,  more  than  all,  it  was 
most  probable  that  this  natural  religion  itself  was 
the  remains  of  a  primitive  revelation,  which  had 
been  made  to  the  race  in  the  earliest  ages  of  its 
existence,  and  which  had  been  waning  and  growing 
dimmer  and  dimmer,  as  the  process  of  corrupt  hu¬ 
man  development  went  on. 


CHAPTEE  II. 

DEFENCES  OF  CHRISTIANITY  IN  THE  POLEMIC  PERIOD: 

A.  D.  254— A.  D.  730. 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements . 

We  pass  now,  in  the  history  of  the  Defences  of 
Christianity,  into  the  Polemic  Period.  In  this  age 
we  shall  find  Apologetics  assuming  a  more  pro¬ 
found  and  scientific  character,  than  it  has  hitherto 
borne.  We  perceive  the  beginning  of  that  great 
methodical  conflict  between  religion  and  philosophy, 
faith  and  science,  which  is  renewed  in  every  age, 
and  in  some  form  or  other  will  probably  continue 
to  the  end  of  human  history. 

Even  in  the  last  part  of  the  Apologetic  period, 
the  distinctions  between  natural  and  revealed  re¬ 
ligion,  faith  and  science,  the  supernatural  and  the 
natural,  began  to  be  drawn  with  more  clearness. 
The  controversy  between  Origen  and  Celsus,  the 
ablest  upon  both  sides  of  the  great  question  that 


134 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


occurred  in  these  first  centuries,  brought  out  these 
distinctions  somewhat,  from  the  latent  state  in 
which  for  the  most  paid  they  had  existed  in  the 
earlier  defences,  and  compelled  both  parties  to  see 
that  nothing  but  a  more  precise  and  scientific  dis¬ 
cussion  of  the  contradictions  between  Christianity 
aDd  skepticism  could  settle  the  questions  at  issue. 
Religion  in  the  first  two  centuries  had  existed 
mainly  in  the  form  of  feeling.  It  was  now  to  take 
on  the  form  of  scientific  cognition ;  and  the  com¬ 
mencement  of  the  change,  not  in  the  matter  of 
Christianity,  for  this  remains  the  same  in  all  ages, 
but,  in  the  form  of  apprehending  it,  is  seen  first 
of  all  in  the  altered  manner  of  defending  it  against 
the  skeptic.  In  the  school  of  Alexandria,  with 
Origen  at  its  head,  the  apologetic  science  of  the 
first  period  set  with  a  splendour  that  was  the  her¬ 
ald  of  a  yet  more  glorious  dawn  in  the  Polemic 
age  that  was  to  follow.1 

As  the  dogmatic  material  now  becomes  more 
abundant  and  various,  and  the  defences  more  sys¬ 
tematic  and  elaborate,  it  will  facilitate  the  investiga¬ 
tion  of  the  apologetic  history  of  this  period,  to  dis¬ 
tribute  it  under  the  following  principles  of  classi¬ 
fication  :  (1.)  The  distinction  between  revelation 
and  reason.  (2.)  The  distinction  between  faith  and 

1  The  principal  apologetic  work  confidence  of  victory,  and  with  a 
of  the  first  period  is  that  of  Origen  most  comprehensive  knowledge 
against  Celsus,  “  composed,”  says  of  the  nature  and  history  of  Chris- 
Baumgarten-Crusius  (Dogmen-  tianity,  as  well  as  of  the  skepti- 
geschichte,  I.  §  21),  “  with  the  cism  of  its  opponents.” 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


135 


science.  (3.)  Tlie  distinction  between  the  natural 
and  the  supernatural.  In  exhibiting  the  mode  in 
which  the  Apologetic  Mind  of  this  period  appre¬ 
hended  these  distinctions,  and  stated  the  relation 
of  each  idea  to  the  other,  we  shall  bring  to  view  the 
whole  course  of  doctrinal  developement.  For  the 
ideas  of  revelation  and  reason,  faith  and  science, 
the  miraculous  and  the  natural,  were  the  leading 
ones  in  the  controversy  with  the  skeptic,  and  the 
whole  dispute  took  form  and  character  from  them.1 

§  2.  Mutual  relations  of  Revelation  and  Reason . 

1.  In  considering  the  manner  in  which  the  re¬ 
ciprocal  relations  of  revelation  and  reason  were 
conceived  of  in  the  Apologetic  History  of  this 
period,  the  first  characteristic  that  meets  us  is  the 
fact,  that  the  line  between  the  two  was  now  more 
strictly  and  firmly  drawn,  than  it  had  been.  The 
preceding  age,  as  has  been  observed,  referred  every¬ 
thing  to  God,  because  its  religious  consciousness 
was  of  that  warm  and  glowing  character  which  is 
disinclined  to  distinguish,  in  a  scientific  manner, 
what  proceeds  from  a  supernatural  and  what  from 
a  natural  source.  All  truth,  provided  it  was  truth, 
was  conceived  as  coming  from  God,  in  some  form 
or  other.  This  view  was  sometimes  expressed, 
even  by  the  Christian  apologist,  in  such  a  strong 

1  For  this  rubric,  together  with  indebted  to  the  very  excellent 
a  portion  of  the  materials,  we  are  manual  of  Baumgarten-Crusiub. 


136 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


and  unguarded  manner  as  to  expose  Christianity 
to  the  charge  of  being  but  little  superior  to  natural 
religion,  if  not  identical  with  it.  Justin  Martyr, 
in  his  Apology  addressed  to  the  Roman  emperor, 
expresses  himself  as  follows :  “  They  who  live 

according  to  reason  are  Christians,  even  though 
they  are  regarded  as  godless  (a&toi)  ;  such  for 
example  were  Socrates  and  Heraclitus  among  the 
Greeks.”  1  He  probably  ventured  upon  such  an  as¬ 
sertion  from  a  partial  understanding  of  correspond¬ 
ing  ones  in  the  scriptures.  Paul  (Rom.  ii.  14)  re¬ 
marks  that,  “  whenever  ( orav  with  subj.  nong)  the 
Gentiles,  which  have  not  the  law,  do  by  nature  the 
things  contained  in  the  law,  they  are  a  law  unto 
themselves.”  Peter  (Acts  x.  35)  affirms  that,  “  in 
every  nation  he  that  feareth  God  and  worketh 
righteousness  is  accepted  with  him.”  Overlooking 
the  fact  that  these  are  both  of  them  hypothetical 
statements  introduced  for  the  sake  of  an  argument, 
and  that  whenever  there  is  any  categorical  affirma¬ 
tion  made  in  the  scriptures  respecting  the  actual 
fact  of  sinless  obedience,  the  pagan  man  is  repre¬ 
sented  as  being  disobedient  to  the  law  written  on 
the  heart,  and  that  therefore  every  mouth  must  be 
stopped,  and  the  whole  world  become  guilty  before 
God  (Rom.  iii.  19,  20), — overlooking  the  concessive 
nature  of  the  hypothesis,  the  apologist  in  this  in¬ 
stance  affirms  what  he  could  not  know,  that  in  the 
instances  of  Socrates  and  Heraclitus  there  had  been 


1  Apologia  I.  46. 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


137 


a  perfect  obedience  of  the  law  of  reason  and  right¬ 
eousness. 

Hence  it  became  necessary  to  distinguish  be¬ 
tween  those  spontaneous  workings  of  the  human 
mind  which  are  to  be  seen  in  the  Pagan  philosophy 
and  theology,  and  those  higher  phenomena  of  the 
human  soul  which  appear  only  after  it  has  felt  the 
influence  of  a  higher  manifestation  of  truth  and  spir¬ 
itual  influences.  This  naturally  led  to  a  technical 
distinction  between  natural  and  revealed  religion, 
and  to  a  demarcation  of  that  which  issues  from  man 
left  to  himself,  from  that  which  proceeds  in  a 
special  and  peculiar  manner  from  the  Divine  Mind.1 
As  the  Christian  apologist  was  compelled  to  a  still 
more  close  and  rigorous  defence,  by  an  increas¬ 
ingly  close  and  rigorous  attack,  he  found  it  neces¬ 
sary  to  draw  some  lines  that  had  not  been  drawn 
before,  and  to  score  more  deeply  some  lines  that 
had  been  but  faintly  described.  Revelation  now  be¬ 
gan  to  be  taken  in  its  stricter  and  narrower  significa¬ 
tion,  to  denote  that  communication  of  truth,  by  direct 
inspiration,  which  had  been  recorded  in  the  Jewish 
scriptures,  and  in  the  New  Testament  canon, — 
which  latter  had  by  the  beginning  of  the  Polemic 
period  been  determined  and  fixed  by  the  authority 
of  the  Church.  The  application  of  the  term  in  its 
widest  signification  begins  now  to  disappear,  so  that 
the  contest  between  the  Christian  and  the  skeptic, 

1  Upon  the  use  of  the  term  special  sense,  see  Twesten  :  Dog- 
revelation”  in  a  general  and  a  matik,  I.  320  (Note). 


138 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


became,  what  it  has  been  ever  since,  the  conflict  be¬ 
tween  scripture  on  the  one  hand,  and  speculation 
on  the  other. 

2.  A  second  characteristic  in  the  Apologetic 
History  of  this  period  is,  that  the  question  respect¬ 
ing  the  possibility  of  a  revelation,  in  the  generic 
meaning  of  communication  between  the  human  and 
the  Divine,  was  not  raised  by  the  skeptic,  and  of 
course  not  by  the  apologist.  This  question,  which 
enters  so  largely  into  the  conflict  between  Chris¬ 
tianity  and  infidelity  in  modern  times,  is  wholly  a 
modern  one.  The  denial  of  the  possibility  of  any 
revelation  from  God  to  man  began  with  Spinoza, 
one  of  the  most  original  and  powerful  of  skeptics, 
and  has  been  followed  with  more  vigour  and  acute¬ 
ness  by  Hume,  than  by  any  other  succeeding  mind,  i 

But  in  this  age  of  the  Church,  both  parties  ac¬ 
knowledged  the  possibility  and  reality  of  a  revela¬ 
tion  of  some  sort.  The  testimony  of  the  Greek 
philosophers,  particularly  Plato,  to  the  need  of  a 
divine  communication  in  order  that  the  darkness 
overhanging  human  life  and  prospects  might  be 
cleared  away,  was  frequently  cited  by  the  Chris¬ 
tian  apologist,  and  admitted  by  the  skeptical  op¬ 
ponent.  The  confession  of  Plato  in  the  Timaeus,1 
“  to  find  the  maker  and  father  of  all  this  universe 

.  1  Toj/  ptv  ov v  TToirjTrjv  Kai  narepa  pears  now  to  be  really  the  fact, 
Tovde  rov  7 tcivtos  (vpel v  re  epyov,  Ka\  that  it  is  not  possible  for  any 
fvpuvrci ,  ftr  7 Tcivras  dfivvarov  Aeyeii/.  excepting  a  very  few  men  to 
Timaeus,  28  c.  Ed.  Steph.  “What  be  perfectly  happy  and  blessed.” 
we  asserted  at  the  beginning  ap-  Epinomis,  Ch.  13. 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


139 


of  existence,  is  a  difficult  work,  and  when  he  is 
found,  it  is  impossible  to  describe  him  to  the  mass 
of  mankind,”  was  a  classical  passage,  and  often 
cited  by  the  early  fathers.  Origen1  quotes  the 
Platonic  passage  in  which  it  is  said :  “  human  na¬ 
ture  is  not  competent  to  seek  out  God  and  find  him 
in  his  pure  reality,  unless  the  being  seeking  is  as¬ 
sisted  by  the  being  sought  ”  /3ot]{^^tloa  vno 

TOV  ^rjTOVpSVOV). 

So  far  therefore  as  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
need  and  'possibility  of  a  revelation  is  concerned,  the 
apologist  of  this  period  was  not  required  to  elab¬ 
orate  a  defence  in  this  reference.  His  great  labour 
was  to  convince  the  skeptic  that  those  more  general 
forms  of  revelation  in  nature,  and  in  providence, 
were  not  sufficient  to  meet  the  wants  of  sinful  man. 
A  certain  and  reliable  knowledge  was  craved  by 
the  human  soul  respecting  some  subjects  about 
which  the  human  mind  of  a  Socrates  or  a  Plato 
could  give  only  conjectures  and  express  strong 
hopes.2  The  apologist  contended  that  the  doctrines 


1  Contra  Celsum,  VII.  xlii. 

’Plato’s  belief  in  the  immor¬ 
tality  of  the  soul  and  the  reality 
of  a  future  life  was  accompanied 
with  more  or  less  of  doubt  at 
times,  to  which  he  gives  frank 
utterance.  “  To  affirm  positively, 
indeed,  that  these  things  are  ex¬ 
actly  as  I  have  described  them, 
does  not  become  a  man  of  sense. 
But  that,  either  this,  or  something 
of  the  kind,  takes  place  with  re¬ 


spect  to  our  souls  and  their  hab¬ 
itations, — seeing  that  the  soul 
seems  to  be  immortal  (ene'nvep 
aSavarov  ye  r]  yjsvxr/  (fiaiverai  oucra), 
— appears  to  me  most  fitting  to 
be  believed,  and  worthy  the  haz¬ 
ard  for  one  who  trusts  in  the  re¬ 
ality.  For  the  hazard  is  noble 
(/caAoi  yap  6  Kivbvvos),  and  it  is 
right  to  allure  ourselves  with  such 
views  as  with  enchantments  (eVa- 
Sai/).”  Phaedo,  114.  c.  Ed.  Steph. 


140 


HISTOKY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


of  tlie  soul’s  immortality,  and  of  a  future  state  of 
rewards  and  punishments,  though  dimly  appearing 
in  the  pagan  philosophy,  could  be  made  an  abso¬ 
lutely  clear  and  certain  knowledge,  only  by  the 
testimony  of  one  who  like  Christ  came  out  from 
eternity,  and  went  back  into  it ;  who  came  from 
God  and  went  to  God;  who  actually  died,  rose 
from  the  dead,  re-appeared  on  earth  for  a  season, 
and  then  ascended  up  where  he  was  before.  Hence 
the  Christian  apologist  of  this  period  made  great 
use  of  the  facts  of  Christ’s  incarnation  and  resurrec¬ 
tion,  to  corroborate  the  truths  of  natural  religion  and 
make  them  absolutely  certain, — a  species  of  proof 
which  the  modern  church  does  not  emphasize  with 
such  energy  as  did  the  ancient,  to  the  diminution  of 
its  faith,  and  lively  realizing  of  invisible  things. 

But,  more  than  this,  the  apologist  contended 
that  a  knowledge  was  required  by  the  human 
soul  respecting  still  other  subjects,  about  which 
natural  religion  was  totally  silent.  Whether  the 
deity  could  pardon  sin ;  whether  he  would,  and, 
if  so,  the  method  in  which ;  whether  the  human 
race  was  to  continue  on  from  century  to  century  in 
sin  and  sorrow  and  suffering,  as  it  had  for  centuries 
and  ages  before,  or  whether  any  remedial  system 
would  be  introduced,  to  interrupt  this  natural  de- 
velopement  downward,  and  start  a  new  order  of  ages, 
and  begin  a  new  species  of  history, — about  such 
questions  as  these,  which  were  far  more  vital  and 
important  than  any  others,  the  Christian  apologist 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


141 


contended,  and  with  truth,  that  human  reason,  and 
the  general  teachings  of  nature  and  providence 
were  totally  silent.  Unless,  therefore,  a  special 
communication  should  be  made,  man  must  be  left 
without  any  answer  to  the  most  anxious  and  im¬ 
portant  of  his  questions.  Such  a  special  answer  to 
such  special  questions  had  been  made.  It  was  con¬ 
tained  in  the  scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New  Testa¬ 
ments,  to  which  the  term  revelation  in  the  high  and 
strict  sense  was  now  applied  and  confined. 

3.  A  third  characteristic  of  the  Apologetics  of 
this  period  is  the  insisting  upon  revelation,  in  this 
strict  sense,  as  an  infallible  authority  for  the  human 
mind.  The  idea  of  an  infallible  norm  or  rule  of 
faith,  though  not  a  new  one,  by  any  means,  in  the 
mind  of  the  church,  now  begins  to  be  more  clearly 
enunciated.  The  conception  of  a  special  and  pecu¬ 
liar  revelation  led  to  that  of  infallibility.  Revela¬ 
tion,  in  the  broad  and  loose  signification  in  which, 
we  have  seen,  it  was  sometimes  employed  by  the 
earlier  apologists,  and  acknowledged  by  their  hea¬ 
then  opponents,  leaves  room  and  play  for  errour 
and  misconception.  That  general  communication 
of  truth  which  God  makes  to  the  human  mind, 
through  its  own  constitution  and  through  the  works 
of  creation  and  providence,  though  reliable  to  a 
certain  extent,  is  not  reliable  beyond  the  possibility 
of  errour ;  though  true,  is  not  infallibly  true.  For 
this  species  of  revelation  is  mixed  with  human  cor¬ 
ruption,  and  darkened  by  human  blindness.  It  is 


i 


142 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


not  as  pure  and  accurate  as  it  was  in  the  beginnings 
because,  as  St.  Paul  teaches  (Rom.  i.  18-25),  that 
which  may  be  known  of  God  in  a  natural  manner 
and  by  natural  reason  has  not  been  retained  in  its 
original  simplicity  and  genuineness.  While  there¬ 
fore  the  Christian  apologist  was  disposed  to  give 
human  reason  its  due,  and  to  make  use  of  all  the 
statements  of  the  pagan  philosophers  respecting  the 
general  truthfulness  of  man’s  natural  intuitions,  he 
at  the  same  time  insisted  that  natural  religion  could 
not  be  construed  into  a  divine  authority ,  and  an  in¬ 
fallible  norm  or  rule.  Being  bat  a  form  of  human 
consciousness,  it  was  liable  to  all  the  fluctuations  of 
consciousness,  and  to  all  the  deteriorations  of  con¬ 
sciousness, — at  one  time  being  considerably  free 
from  foreign  and  contradictory  elements,  as  in  the 
instance  of  a  Plato  or  a  Plutarch  ;  at  another  mixed 
and  mingled  with  the  most  crude  and  absurd  no¬ 
tions  and  opinions,  as  in  the  vagaries  of  New-Pla- 
tonism,  and  the  fanciful  dreams  of  the  Gnostic  phi¬ 
losophers.  Hence  the  apologist  maintained  that 
a  further  and  peculiar  species  of  revelation  was 
needed,  that  should  not  only  answer  questions  and 
supply  wants  that  were  unanswered  and  unsupplied 
by  natural  religion,  but  should  also  be  fixed  in  a 
written  form.  In  this  way,  it  would  be  exempt 
from  liability  to  corruption  and  alteration  from  the 
fluctuations  of  human  consciousness,  and  would  go 
down  from  age  to  age  unchangeable  amidst  the 
changeable,  and  infallible  amidst  the  fallible. 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


143 


The  Western  Church,  particularly,  under  the 
guidance  of  Augustine,  urged  the  necessity  of  an 
infallible  authority  in  matters  of  doctrine  and  prac¬ 
tice.  This  necessity  was  affirmed  in  connection  with 
the  doctrine  of  human  apostacy  and  sinfulness.  It 
was  therefore  a  relative  necessity.  Had  man  con¬ 
tinued  in  his  primitive  state,  he  would  have  re¬ 
mained  in  such  a  close  and  living  union  with  his 
Creator  that  no  special  and  written  revelation 
would  have  been  needed,  but  the  spontaneous  oper¬ 
ations  of  his  mind,  and  the  holy  communion  of  his 
heart  with  God,  would  have  afforded  all  the  relig¬ 
ious  knowledge  necessary.  But  inasmuch  as  he  had 
apostatized,  and  no  longer  enjoyed  that  original 
intercourse  with  his  Creator,  a  special  interposition 
was  called  for,  to  clear  up  and  rectify  liis  now  only 
imperfectly  correct  natural  conceptions,  and  still 
more  to  impart  an  additional  knowledge,  respecting 
the  possibility  and  method  of  his  restoration  to  the 
Divine  likeness  and  favour. 

This  attribute  of  authority ,  which  was  now  as¬ 
serted  of  revelation,  was  emphasized  all  the  more 
from  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  the  Church  was  now 
a  more  definite  and  influential  one  than  it  had  been. 
The  infallibility  of  the  scriptures  was  urged  in 
connection  with  the  growing  authority  of  the  one 
only  catholic  Church,  as  opposed  to  schismatical  and 
heretical  sects.1  This  connection  we  shall  find  in 

1  Tertuxlian  (De  praescript.  traces  the  doctrine  of  the  one 
Ch.  36.),  in  the  preceding  period,  catholic  church  to  revelation  as 


144 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


the  next  period  to  have  become  so  close  as  to  be 
converted  into  identity,  and  tradition  together  with 
ecclesiastical  decrees  takes  the  place  of  scripture. 
The  beginnings  of  this  may  be  seen  in  the  last  half 
of  the  Polemic  period,  but  not  in  the  first  half. 
The  theology  of  the  4th  and  5th  centuries  was  too 
much  controlled  by  Augustine  to  allow  of  the  co¬ 
equality  of  tradition  with  revelation.1  Much  as 
that  powerful  mind  was  inclined  to  quote  the  gen- 
eral  opinion  of  the  Church,  respecting  the  meaning 
of  scripture,  in  opposition  to  the  heretical  parties 
with  which  he  was  in  continued  conflict,  he  never 
attributed  infallibility  to  any  human  opinion.  A 
saying  of  his  which  occurs  in  his  controversy  with 
the  Manichaeans  has  been  frequently  quoted  by 
Roman  Catholic  writers,  to  prove  his  substantial 
agreement  with  the  Papal  theory  of  the  relation  of 
biblical  to  ecclesiastical  authority.  It  is  this.  “  I 
should  not  believe  (have  believed)  the  gospel,  un¬ 
less  the  authority  of  the  catholic  Church  moved 
(had  moved)  me  to.” 2  Calvin,  Bucer,  and  the  elder 
Protestant  writers  generally,  construe  the  imperfect 


its  source.  “  The  church  ac¬ 
knowledges  one  God,  the  Lord, 
the  Creator  of  the  universe,  and 
Christ  Jesus  the  Son  of  God  the 
Creator,  born  of  the  virgin  Mary, 
and  the  resurrection  of  the  flesh. 
She  joins  the  law  and  the  proph¬ 
ets  with  the  writings  of  the  evan¬ 
gelists  and  apostles,  and  thence 
drinks  in  her  faith.” 

*  “  Titubabit  fides,  si  scriptura- 


rum  sacrarum  vacillet  auctoritas.” 
Augustine:  De  doctrina  Christi¬ 
ana,  I.  xxxvii. 

2  “  Evangelio  non  crederem,  nisi 
me  ecclesiae  catholicae  commo- 
veret  auctoritas.”  Augustine  : 
Contra  Epistolam  Fundamenti, 
Ch.  v.  (Ed.  Migne,  VIII.  176). 
Compare  also,  Tertullian  :  De 
praescriptionibus,  Ch.  28. 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


145 


as  the  pluperfect  in  this  passage,  and  interpret  Au¬ 
gustine  as  affirming  that  when  he  was  w  an  alien 
from  the  Christian  faith,  he  could  not  be  prevailed 
upon  to  embrace  the  gospel  as  the  infallible  truth 
of  God,  till  he  was  convinced  by  the  authority  of 
the  Church.’11  In  other  words,  if  when  examining 
into  the  claims  of  Christianity  to  be  the  abso¬ 
lute  religion,  he  had  found  the  Christian  Church 
disputing  within  itself  respecting  the  canon  of 
scripture  upon  which  this  religion  professed  to  be 
founded,  and  also  in  respect  to  the  cardinal  doc¬ 
trines  of  Christianity  contained  in  this  canon,  he  as 
a  pagan  should  have  stood  in  doubt  of  the  whole 
matter,  and  would  not  have  received  a  book,  and  a 
system,  respecting  which  those  who  professed  to 
adopt  it  were  constantly  wrangling.  But  the  entire 
unanimity  of  the  Church  respecting  the  authenticity 
and  authority  of  the  canonical  scriptures  deter¬ 
mined  him  in  their  favour.  Had  he  found  the  same 
diversity  of  opinion  in  the  Church,  that  he  saw 
among  the  heretical  parties,  respecting  the  written 
revelation,  he  should  not  have  found  rest  in  it.  The 


Calvin:  Institutes,  I.  vii.  3. 
Luther  (Table  Talk,  “  Of  the 
Fathers  ”)  remarks  in  his  charac¬ 
teristic  manner  that  “  the  Pope  to 
serve  his  own  turn,  took  hold  on 
St.  Augustine’s  sentence,  where 
he  says,  evangelio  non  crederem , 
&c.  The  asses  could  not  see  what 
occasioned  Augustine  to  utter  that 
sentence,  whereas  he  spoke  it 
10 


against  the  Manichaeans ;  as  much 
as  to  say :  ‘  I  believe  not  you ,  for 
ye  are  damned  heretics,  but  I  be¬ 
lieve  and  hold  with  the  Church, 
the  spouse  of  Christ.’  ”  See  al¬ 
so,  the  explanation  of  this  senti¬ 
ment  of  Augustine  by  Stilling- 
fleet  :  Grounds  of  the  Protestant 
Religion,  Pt.  I.  Ch.  vii 


146 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


passage  read  in  its  connections  in  the  argument, 
and  interpreted  in  the  light  of  that  stricter  view  of 
revelation  which,  we  have  seen,  Augustine  did  so 
much  towards  establishing,  merely  affirms,  in  the 
words  of  Hagen  bach,1  “  a  subjective  dependence  of 
the  believer  upon  the  authority  of  the  Church  uni¬ 
versal,  but  not  an  objective  subordination  of  the 
Bible  itself  to  this  authority.”  The  individual,  in 
the  opinion  of  Augustine,  is  to  respect  the  authority 
of  the  Church  in  seeking  an  answer  to  the  ques¬ 
tions:  What  books  are  canonical,  and  what  apoc¬ 
ryphal?  and  what  is  the  doctrinal  system  con¬ 
tained  in  them  ?  In  answering  these  questions,  he 
contended,  that  the  Church  universal  had  an  au¬ 
thority  higher  than  that  of  any  one  member ;  and 
higher,  particularly,  than  a  man  like  Manichaeus 
who  claimed  to  be  an  inspired  apostle.2  When 
therefore,  a  single  individual,  or  a  particular  party 
like  the  Manichaeans,  insisted  that  they  were  right 
in  rejecting  certain  portions  of  the  canon  that 
had  been,  and  still  were,  deemed  canonical  by  the 
Church  at  large,8  and  in  deriving  from  the  portions 

1  Dogmengeschichte,  §  119.  bus,  c.  17,  38,  39)  remarks  that, 

3  He  began  his  treatise  thus :  “  heresy  does  not  receive  certain 

“Manichaeus  apostolus  Jesu  Chris-  of  the  scriptures,  and  whatever  it 
ti,  providentia  Dei  Patris.  Haec  does  receive,  it  twists  about  ac- 
sunt  salutaria  verba  de  perenni  et  cording  to  its  own  plan  and 
vivo  fonte.”  Augustine:  Cont.  purpose,  by  adding  to  it  and  sub- 
Ep.  Fundamenti,  c.  5.  tracting  from  it.  And  if  to  a 

3  Respecting  the  alterations  of  certain  extent  it  accepts  the  scrip- 
scripture  by  heretical  parties,  see  tures  entire,  nevertheless  by  de- 
Eusebius,  V.  28 ;  Neander  I.  582.  vising  different  expositions  it  per- 
Tertullian  (De  praescriptioni-  verts  them.  An  adulteration  by 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


147 


of  it  which  they  acknowledged  to  be  of  divine 
authority,  a  set  of  doctrines  respecting  the  origin 
and  nature  of  evil,  such  as  the  apostolic  and  catho¬ 
lic  Church  did  not  find  in  the  scriptures, — when 
the  individual,  and  the  heretical  party,  in  this  way 
opposed  their  private  judgment  to  the  catholic 
judgment,  Augustine  denies  the  reasonableness  of 
the  procedure.  He  affirms  the  greater  probability 
of  the  correctness  of  the  Catholic  Mind,  in  compar¬ 
ison  with  the  Heretical  or  Schismatic  Mind,  and 
thereby  the  authority  of  the  Church  in  relation  to 
the  individual,  without  dreaming  however  of  affirm¬ 
ing  its  absolute  infallibility , — an  attribute  which 
he  confines  to  the  written  revelation. 

The  position  which  the  Church  sustains  to  the 
individual  is  indicated,  remarks  Augustine,  in  the 
words  of  the  Samaritans  to  the  Samaritan  woman : 
“  Now  we  believe,  not  because  of  thy  saying,  for 
we  have  heard  him  ourselves,  and  know  that  this 
is  indeed  the  Christ,  the  Saviour  of  the  world” 
(John  iv.  42).  The  individual  first  hears  the  con¬ 
current  testimony  of  the  great  body  of  believers  in 


imposing  a  false  sense  is  as  much 
opposed  to  the  truth,  as  a  corrup¬ 
tion  by  the  pen.”  Clemens  Alex- 
andrinus  (Stromata,  VII.  xvi) 
makes  the  same  charge.  “  But 
if  some  of  those  who  follow  after 
heresies  venture  to  employ  the 
prophetical  writings,  in  the  first 
place,  they  do  not  employ  all  of 
them;  and  in  the  second  place, 
they  do  not  employ  them  as  a 


consistent  whole,  according  to  the 
substance  and  context.  But  se¬ 
lecting  what  is  spoken  ambigu¬ 
ously,  they  conform  this  to  their 
own  theory,  besprinkling  here  and 
there  a  few  texts,  not  regarding 
their  meaning,  but  employing  the 
bare  letter.”  Compare  also,  Ire- 
naeus:  Adversus  Haereses,  IL 
x.  1. 


148 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


every  age,  and  then  verifies  it  for  himself.  He 
finds  a  general  unanimity  in  the  Church  catholic 
respecting  the  canonical  and  apocryphal  books, 
and  also  respecting  their  meaning  and  doctrinal 
contents.  He  goes  to  the  examination  with  the 
natural  expectation  of  finding  that  the  general  judg¬ 
ment  is  a  correct  one,  and  in  so  far,  he  comes  under 
the  influence  of  traditional  or  catholic  opinions. 
This  is  the  “ecclesiastical  authority”  which  has 
weight  with  him.  At  the  same  time  he  exercises 
the  right  of  private  judgment;  the  right  namely  to 
examine  the  general  judgment  and  to  perceive  its 
correctness  with  his  own  eyes.  The  Samaritans  put 
confidence  in  the  testimony  of  the  woman,  but  at 
the  same  time  they  went  and  saw,  and  heard  for 
themselves.  They  came  into  agreement  with  her 
by  an  active,  and  not  by  a  passive  method.  In 
employing  this  illustration,  Augustine  adopts  the 
Protestant,  and  opposes  the  Papal  theory  of  tradi¬ 
tion  and  authority.  The  Papist’s  method  of  agree¬ 
ing  with  the  catholic  judgment  is  passive.  He 
denies  that  the  individual  may  intelligently  verify 
the  position  of  the  Church  for  himself,  because  the 
Church  is  infallible ,  and  consequently  there  is  no 
possibility  of  its  being  in  error.  The  individual  is 
therefore  shut  up  to  a  mechanical  and  passive  recep¬ 
tion  of  the  catholic  decision.  The  Protestant,  on 
the  other  hand,  though  affirming  the  high  proba¬ 
bility  that  the  general  judgment  is  correct,  does  not 
assert  the  infallible  certainty  that  it  is.  It  is  con- 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


149 


ceivable  and  possible  that  the  Church  may  err. 
Hence  the  duty  of  the  individual,  while  cherishing 
an  antecedent  confidence  in  the  decisions  of  the 
Church,  to  examine  these  decisions  in  the  light  of 
the  written  word,  and  convert  this  presumption 
into  an  intelligent  perception,  or  else  demonstrate 
their  falsity  beyond  dispute.  u  Neither  ought  I  to 
bring  forward  the  authority  of  the  Nicene  Council,” 
says  Augustine  (Contra  Maximianum  Arianum  II. 
xiv.  3),  “  nor  you  that  of  Ariminum,  in  order  to 
prejudge  the  case.  I  ought  not  to  be  bound  (de- 
tentum)  by  the  authority  of  the  latter,  nor  you  by 
that  of  the  former.  Under  the  authority  of  the 
Scriptures,1  not  those  received  by  particular  sects, 
but  those  received  by  all  in  common,2  let  the  dis¬ 
putation  be  carried  on,  in  respect  to  each  and  every 
particular.” 


1  Gieseler  (History, Vol.  I.  §  90) 
remarks,  that  down  to  the  coun¬ 
cil  of  Chalcedon,  in  451,  “in  an¬ 
swering  opponents  men  did  not 
endeavour  to  prove  [merely]  that 
the  council  was  oecumenical,  hut 
[also]  that  its  decision  was  true 
according  to  scripture  and  tra¬ 
dition.” 

2  Augustine’s  mind,  while  he 
was  inquiring  and  doubting,  and 
before  he  attained  to  Christian 
faith,  was  much  influenced  by  the 
fact  that  the  scriptures  and  the 
Christian  system  were  the  faith 
of  the  world.  He  argued  that 
God  would  not  have  permitted  a 
system  of  error  to  have  obtained 


such  universal  currency,  and  so 
wide-spread  influence.  “  Since  we 
are  too  weak  to  find  out  truth  by 
abstract  reasonings,  and  for  this 
very  cause  need  the  authority  of 
Holy  Writ,  I  began  to  believe  that 
Thou  wouldest  never  have  given 
such  excellency  of  authority  to 
Scripture  in  all  lands,  hadst  Thou 
not  willed  thereby  to  be  sought 

and  believed  in . It  is  no 

vain  and  empty  thing,  that  the 
excellent  dignity  of  the  authority 
of  the  Christian  faith  hath  over¬ 
spread  the  whole  world.”  Con¬ 
fessions,  VI.  v.  xi.  Tertullian  : 
(De  praescriptionibus,  c.  28,  29) 
employs  the  same  reasoning.  “I* 


150 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


Chiefly  then  through  the  stricter  definition  and 
limitation  of  the  idea  of  Revelation,  and  partly 
through  the  need  felt,  in  the  controversies  with  the 
heretical  and  separating  mind,  of  some  infallible 
standard  of  appeal,  did  the  authoritative  character 
of  the  Scriptures  come  to  be  urged  and  established 
by  the  apologist  of  this  Polemic  period.  Ever 
since  this  time,  the  Church  has  recognized  the 
canonical  books  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments  as 
the  only  infallible  source  of  religious  knowledge ; 
ever  refusing  to  attribute  this  characteristic  to  any 
other  form  of  knowledge,  however  true  and  valid  in 
its  own  province.  The  only  exception  to  this  is 
found  in  that  portion  of  the  history  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church  in  which  tradition  and  ecclesiastical 
authority  are  placed  upon  an  equality  with  Scrip¬ 
ture.  But  this  portion  of  Church  History  is  the 
history  of  a  corruption.  For  the  doctrine  of  the 
infallibility  of  the  Church  is  of  the  same  nature, 
with  that  of  the  infallibility  of  the  Pope.  Both 
doctrines  alike  imply  an  absolute  exemption  from 


it  possible  that  so  many  churches, 
and  so  great  ones,  should  have 
gone  astray  into  the  same  errone¬ 
ous  belief?  Never  is  there  one 
result  among  many  chances.  In 
case  the  doctrinal  system  of  the 
churches  were  error  there  must 
have  been  variety  in  its  forms  and 
statements.  But  where  one  and 
the  same  thing  is  found  amongst 
many,  this  is  not  error  hut  cath¬ 


olic  tradition . Is  it  probable 

that  a  gospel  of  error  was  preach¬ 
ed  through  the  whole  earth ;  that 
all  mankind  erroneously  believed 
it;  that  so  many  thousands  of 
thousands  were  baptized  into  er¬ 
ror  ;  that  so  many  works  of  faith 
and  miracles  were  wrought  by 
error ;  and  finally  that  so  many 
martyrdoms  in  behalf  of  error 
were  erroneously  crowned  ?  ” 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


151 


error,  on  the  part  of  the  finite  mind, — a  doctrine 
which  belongs  to  the  history  of  heresies. 

4.  A  fourth  characteristic  of  the  Apologetic 
History  of  the  period  is  the  fact,  that  the  Church 
did  not  array  Revelation  and  Reason  in  hostility  to 
each  other.  Careful  and  firm  as  the  apologist  was, 
in  distinguishing  revealed  from  natural  religion,  and 
scripture  from  the  spontaneous  teachings  and  ope¬ 
rations  of  the  human  mind,  he  steadily  refused  to 
concede  the  position  of  his  skeptical  opponent,  that 
Christianity  is  intrinsically  irrational.  It  was  one 
great  aim  of  the  skepticism  of  this  age,  as  it  has 
been  in  every  age  since,  to  establish  if  possible  the 
fact  of  an  inherent  and  necessary  contradiction  be¬ 
tween  the  special  revelation  from  God  contained  in 
the  canonical  scriptures,  and  those  first  principles 
of  all  reasoning  which  are  involved  in  the  rational 
understanding  of  man ;  and  that  consequently  the 
alternative  was  either  to  accept  Biblical  Christianity 
in  the  face  of  all  rational  principles,  or  of  rational 
principles  in  the  face  of  Christianity.  This  alter¬ 
native  was  not  admitted.  Neither  horn  of  this 
dilemma  was  accepted  by  the  Apologist.  He  de¬ 
nied  that  there  is  any  inward  and  necessary  contra* 
diction  between  revelation  and  reason,  or  that  the 
adoption  of  the  evangelical  system  involves  the 
rejection  either  of  the  first  principles  of  ethics  and 
natural  religion,  or  of  true  philosophy.  On  the  con¬ 
trary  he  affirmed  an  inward  harmony  betwen  the 
two,  and  bent  the  best  energies  of  his  intellect  to 


152 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


demonstrate  it.  The  Church  by  this  time  had  a 
philosophy  of  its  own ;  and  henceforward  we  find 
the  most  rational  and  truthful  philosophical  systems 
originating  not  in  Heathendom  but  in  Christendom. 
The  cultivation  of  theological  science  proceeded 
along  with  that  of  philosophy ;  and  down  to  the 
present  day  the  Christian  Apologist  contends  that 
any  system  of  philosophy  that  is  anti-Christian  is 
ipso  facto  irrational, — an  affirmation  that  implies  an 
essential  agreement  between  revelation  and  reason, 
and  which  cannot  be  made  good  without  evincing 
this  agreement.  The  assertion  that  whatever  is 
contradictory  to  Christianity  is  irrational,  necessa¬ 
rily  implies  that  Christianity  itself  is  reasonable. 

Single  passages  may  be  quoted  from  the  Fathers 
to  show  the  carefulness  with  which  they  strove  to 
identify  the  interests  of  theology  with  philosophy, 
and  vice  versa.  Gregory  of  Nyssa  and  Epiphanius 
speak  of  a  truth  corroborated  by  the  holy  scrip¬ 
tures  and  right  reason.  Augustine  denounces  an 
error  as  unsupported  by  either  the  authority  of 
scripture  or  the  reasonableness  of  truth.1  Single 
passages  may  also  be  quoted  to  prove  that  the 
Christian  apologist  disparaged  reason  and  rep- 


1  Gregorius  Nyssa  (Contra  Eu-  entia  deus  est,  per  quern  facta  snnt 
nomium,  I.  p.  63.  Ed.  Par.) :  ’A™  omnia,  sicnt  divina  auctoritas  ver- 
Setaff  (j)(i)vrjs  ...  e<  Xoyur/i.a>v  a/coXov-  itasque  monstravit,  verus  philoso- 
3iai\  Augustinus  (Gen.  ad  lit.  plius  est  amator  dei.  Epiphanius 
VII.  xxiv) :  Nulla  scripturae  auc-  (Haer.  LXX.  iii) :  ’Ek  3euov  ypu(f)(ov 
toritas  vel  veritatis  ratio ;  (De  kcu  op%ov  Xoynr/ioO. 

Civitate,  VIII.  i):  Porro  si  sapi- 


REVELATION  AND  REASON. 


153 


resented  it  as  inimical  to  revelation.  But  such 
passages  must  be  read  in  their  connection  in  the 
treatise,  or  the  argument.  Such  expressions,  dis¬ 
paraging  the  use  of  reason  in  religion,  Baumgarten- 
Crusius  remarks  may  be  put  into  three  classes: 
(1)  Those  in  which  reason  is  taken  in  its  least  ex¬ 
tensive  sense,  to  denote  the  reason  of  a  particular 
system,  party  or  school ;  (2)  Those  in  which  reason 
is  taken  in  the  sense  of  an  arrogant  private  opinion 
which  sets  itself  up  against  public  sentiments,  his¬ 
torical  opinions,  and  authority  generally  ;  (3)  Those 
in  which  reason  is  taken  in  the  sense  of  a  one-sided 
speculative  disposition  that  is  devoid  of  any  pro¬ 
found  religious  feeling  or  want.1  It  is  against  reason 
in  this  narrow  and  inadequate  signification,  against 
which  it  is  as  much  the  interest  of  philosophy  to  in¬ 
veigh  as  it  is  of  revelation,  that  the  disparaging 
remarks  frequently  found  in  Tertullian  of  the  Apol¬ 
ogetic  period,  and  in  Athanasius  and  Augustine  of 
the  Polemic,  are  leveled.  But  against  the  common 
reason  of  mankind,  the  unbiassed  spontaneous  con¬ 
victions  of  the  race,  no  such  remarks  are  aimed. 
On  the  contrary,  a  confident  appeal  is  made  to  them 
by  these  very  Apologists  ; 2  while  those  systems  of 
philosophy,  and  those  intellectual  methods  that  flow 
most  legitimately  and  purely  from  them,  are  em¬ 
ployed  by  the  Christian  Mind  in  developing  and 
establishing  the  truths  of  revelation. 

1  Baumgaeten-Ceusius  :  Dog-  2  Compare  Tertullian ’s  appeal, 

mengeschichte,  II.  §  15.  ante ,  p.  124. 


154 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


The  most  powerful  and  grandest  endeavour  of 
the  Apologetic  Mind  of  this  period  to  evince  the 
harmony  of  revelation  and  reason  is  seen  in  the  De 
Civitate  Dei  of  Augustine.  This  is  a  treatise  con¬ 
sisting  of  twenty-two  books ;  the  first  ten  of  which 
contain  a  searching  and  extended  critique  of  poly- 
theism,  in  its  principles  and  their  influence,  and  the 
last  twelve  treat  of  Christianity  as  supernatural, 
and  destined  as  the  realized  kingdom  or  city  of  God 
to  overthrow  all  secular  and  earthly  kingdoms  and 
powers.1  It  is  a  work  which  merits  the  study  of 
the  modern  theologian  perhaps  more  than  any  other 
single  treatise  of  the  Ancient  Church ;  whether  we 
consider  the  range  and  variety  of  its  contents,  the 
depth  and  clearness  of  its  views,  and  especially  the 
thoroughly  supernatural  point  of  view  from  which 
everything  is  looked  at. 

§  3.  Mutual  relations  of  Faith  and  Science. 

We  pass  now  to  the  second  distinction  which 
presents  itself  in  the  Apologetic  History  of  the 
Polemic  period, — the  distinction,  namely,  between 
Faith  and  Scientific  Knowledge. 

In  the  Pagan  world,  faith  was  merely  candour 
of  mind,  or  a  willingness  to  be  convinced  of  the 
truth.  In  this  sense,  Aristotle  remarks  that,  “  it  is 
necessary  for  one  to  believe,  in  order  that  he  may 

1  See  a  synopsis  of  it  in  Milman  :  History  of  Christianity,  III.  x ;  and 
Fleury:  XXXIII. 


FAITH  AND  SCIENCE. 


155 


learn.” 1  This  form  of  faith,  though  indispensable 
to  the  scholar,  and  the  condition  of  all  genuine 
intellectual  culture,  is  very  far  from  coming  up  to 
the  Biblical  idea  of  this  grace.  Faith,  in  the  Chris¬ 
tian  system,  is  a  positive  and  certain  conviction .  It 
differs  from  the  Pagan  conception  by  being  more 
than  a  merely  negative  readiness  to  be  convinced. 
It  is  an  actual  assurance  of  the  mind;  an  inward 
certitude.  Faith  is  the  substance  of  things  hoped 
for,  the  evidence  of  things  not  seen  (Heb.  xi.  1).  It 
differs  again  from  the  inquiring  temper  of  the  sec¬ 
ular  mind  by  being  accompanied  with  humility, — a 
virtue  which  was  unknown  to  the  Pagan  ethics,  and 
which  is  so  generally  expelled  from  the  human 
mind  by  the  conscious  increase  of  knowledge,  whose 
tendency  it  is  to  u  puff  up.”  In  the  scriptures, 
moreover,  faith  is  described  as  a  matter  of  the  heart 
and  will,  of  life  and  feeling.  It  is  a  practical,  and 
not  a  speculative  act  of  the  mind.  And  this  view 
of  it  was  taken  by  the  apologist  of  this  period,  and 
we  may  add  of  all  periods. 

During  this  Polemic  age,  the  Church  laid  much 
stress  upon  the  definition  of  faith  given  in  Hebrews, 
xi.  1. :  u  Faith  is  the  substance  of  things  hoped  for, 
the  evidence  of  things  not  seen?  It  is  an  immove¬ 
able  belief  in  the  reality  and  paramount  importance 
of  the  future ,  the  invisible ,  and  the  supernatural. 
Says  Augustine,  “  quod  est  tides,  nisi  credere  quod 


*  Aft  nicrreveiv  rov  navSavovra.  Soph.  El.  I.  ii. 


156 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


non  vides.”1  The  object  of  faith  is  not  cognizable 
by  the  senses ;  for  this  is  the  meaning  of  “  invis¬ 
ible  ”  in  this  connection.  The  eternal  world  with 
all  its  realities  stands  in  no  sort  of  relation  to  a  sen¬ 
suous  organism,  and  is  therefore  inapprehensible  by 
any  or  all  of  the  physical  media  of  knowledge. 
Faith  therefore  is  the  direct  contrary  of  infidelity, 
which  tests  everything  by  a  sensuous  experience, 
and  does  not  believe  at  all  except  upon  a  sensuous 
knowledge  of  objects.  Faith  is  not  a  sensuous  but 
an  intellectual  act,  and  as  the  etymology  denotes,  is 
fidelity  to  the  future  and  eternal ;  fealty  to  the  in¬ 
visible,  the  spiritual,  and  the  supernatural.  It  is  the 
positive  certainty  that  these  are  the  most  real  and 
important  of  all  objects,  notwithstanding  that  they 
do  not  come  within  the  sphere  of  sensuous  obser¬ 
vation. 

But  while  the  Christian  apologist  of  this  period 
thus  regarded  faith  as  different  in  kind  both  from 
the  cold  and  speculative  belief  of  the  intellect,  and 
the  warm  but  low  certainty  of  the  five  senses,  he 
maintained  that  it  is  a  rational  act  and  state  of  the 
soul.  This  is  the  second  characteristic  to  be  noticed. 
We  find  in  this,  as  in  the' former  instance,  the  same 
disposition  on  the  part  of  the  defender  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  to  contend  for  the  intrinsic  reasonableness 
of  revealed  religion  in  all  its  parts  and  departments. 
This  believing  state  of  the  soul,  which  Christianity 
insists  so  much  upon,  and  which  constitutes  the 


1  Tractatus  XL.  in  Joannem,  Cap.  ix. 


FAITH  AND  SCIENCE. 


157 


very  life  and  heart  of  this  religion,  is  not  the 
credulity  of  an  ignorant  and  unthinking  devotee. 
Hence  the  apologist  sometimes  represents  faith  as 
the  most  natural  state  of  the  soul.  It  is  the  foun¬ 
dation  of  human  society,  argues  Augustine ;  we 
are  born  in  faith,  and  shut  up  to  it.1  Origen  pre¬ 
sents  the  same  view  in  his  argument  against  the 
skepticism  of  Celsus.2  Polycarp,  in  the  very  twi¬ 
light  of  the  controversy  between  faith  and  unbelief, 
calls  faith  “the  mother  of  us  all.'’13  Nonnus,  in 
similar  phraseology,  terms  faith  “the  boundless 
mother  of  the  world.” 4  These  expressions  relate,  it 
will  of  course  be  understood,  to  faith  in  its  most 
general  signification.  They  were  not  made  with 
any  direct  reference  to  that  more  restricted  and 
peculiar  act  of  the  soul  by  which  the  justifying 
work  of  the  Redeemer  is  appropriated ;  though,  it 
deserves  to  be  noticed,  they  are  not  without  a  valid 
application  to  the  doctrine  of  justifying  faith  itself. 
But  these  and  similar  statements  of  the  defender  of 
Christianity  were  intended  to  specify  the  nature  of 
that  general  attitude  of  the  mind  towards  revealed 
truth,  and  invisible  things,  which  is  required  of  man, 
in  order  that  he  may  apprehend  them.  The  apol¬ 
ogist  claimed  that  this  recumbency  of  the  soul  upon 
the  supernatural,  the  invisible,  the  specially  revealed, 
was  a  most  reasonable,  and,  in  one  sense  of  the 

1  De  utilitate  credendi,  I.  xii.  xiv.  4  Ad  Joann,  i.  7:  ’A reppova  prjre- 

a  Contra  Celsum,  IV.  i.  ii.  pa  Koapov. 

*  Epist.  Ill :  ‘H  nicrris  prjrrjp 
navroiv  rjpcov. 


158 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


word,  as  Augustine  teaches,  a  natural  act  and  state 
of  the  human  mind.  Employing  the  term  “nat¬ 
ural”  to  denote  what  belongs  to  man’s  original, 
created  nature, — to  what  belongs  to  his  first  un¬ 
fallen  nature,  in  distinction  from  his  second  apostate 
nature, — the  Apologete  maintained,  in  opposition 
to  the  skeptic,  that  Christian  faith  does  no  violence 
to  the  constitution  of  a  rational  spirit,  but  on  the 
contrary  falls  in  with  its  deepest  wants  and  necessi¬ 
ties,  and  is  therefore  a  natural  act  and  condition.1 
Faith,  he  said,  corresponds  to  and  satisfies  the  orig¬ 
inal  needs  of  man  and  human  society.  It  is  the 
only  safe  and  tranquil  mental  state  for  a  creature 
who  like  man  has  not  yet  entered  the  eternal  and 
invisible  world,  and  who  therefore  must  take  eter¬ 
nal  things  for  the  present  upon  trust.  And  as 
matter  of  fact,  so  affirmed  the  defender  of  faith, 
we  begin  to  exercise  faith  in  some  form  or  other,  as 
soon  as  we  begin  to  exist,  either  physically  or  mor¬ 
ally.  The  child  is  the  exhibitor  and  the  symbol  of 
this  characteristic  (Matt,  xviii.  2-4)  ;  and  in  ma¬ 
ture  life  those  who  cease  from  the  trusting  repose 
and  faith  of  childhood,  and  become  unbelieving  and 
infidel,  run  counter  to  the  convictions  of  the  ma¬ 
jority  of  mankind.  In  this  sense,  and  by  such  and 
similar  tokens,  faith  is  perceived  to  be  natural,  and 
unbelief  unnatural.  The  former  consequently  is 

^similar  use  of  “nature”  and  in  Calvin’s  Institutes,  I.  xv.  1, 
“natural,”  in  the  sense  of  the  and  II.  i.  11. 
created  and  normal,  may  be  seen 


FAITH  AND  SCIENCE. 


159 


rational,  the  latter  irrational ;  so  that  the  apparent 
contrariety  between  faith  and  reason  disappears,  as 
soon  as  a  central  point  of  view  is  attained.1 

The  distinction  itself  between  Faith  and  Science 
had  already  been  formally  made  in  the  preceding 
Apologetic  period,  by  the  Alexandrine  school. 
The  great  founder  and  head  of  this  school,  Origen, 
though  one  of  the  most  speculative  minds  previous 
to  the  Schoolmen,  was  careful  to  lay  down  the  po¬ 
sition  that  faith  precedes  scientific  knowledge  in 
the  order  of  nature.  Though  distinguishing  so 
sharply  between  niorig  and  yvcoOig  as  to  lay  the 
foundation  for  an  exoteric  and  an  esoteric  know¬ 
ledge  in  the  Christian  Church,  thereby  doing  vio¬ 
lence  to  the  spirit  of  Christianity,  which  has  no 
room  within  its  communion,  like  the  pagan  philoso¬ 
phies,  for  a  class  of  initiated  persons, — though  dis¬ 
posed  to  render  to  science  its  dues  and  more  than 
its  dues, — Origen  steadfastly  taught  that  the  Spec¬ 
ulative  is  grounded  in  the  Practical,  and  not  vice 
versa,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  build  up  Christian 
science  out  of  any  other  materials  than  those  which 
are  furnished  by  revealed  truth  wrought  into  the 
Christian  consciousness.  Hence  evangelical  faith  in 
the  heart  must  precede  the  philosophic  cognition 
of  Christianity.  It  does  not  exist  prior  to  any  and 
every  species  of  knowledge,  but  prior  to  scientific 

1  "We  find  this  same  defence  of  osophical  systems.  See  Pascal, 
faith,  in  substance,  in  all  the  more  Jacobi,  and  Coleridge,  e.  g.  pas- 
contemplative  and  religious  phil-  sim. 


160 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


knowledge.  Faith  is  an  intelligent  act,  but  not  a 
scientific  act.  The  statements  of  the  Alexandrine 
school  upon  this  subject  are  very  clear  and  positive. 
“  Faith,”  says  Clement  of  Alexandria,  “  is  more 
elementary  than  scientific  knowledge ;  it  is  the 
foundation  and  rudimental  material  of  science.”  In 
another  place,  according  to  the  well-known  Aristo¬ 
telian  dictum  he  terms  it  “  the  test  and  criterion 
of  science.”1  And,  on  the  other  hand,  science  is 
represented  by  these  highly  adventurous  and  specu¬ 
lating  Alexandrines  as  merely  the  developement  and 
expansion  of  faith, — as  the  exact  and  logical  open¬ 
ing  up  of  what  is  contained  potentially  in  the  prac¬ 
tical  and  living  confidence  of  the  mind  in  revealed 
truth  and  supernatural  realities. 

With  these  positions  of  Origen  and  his  school, 
Augustine  agreed  entirely,  as  did  the  church  gen¬ 
erally,  during  the  Polemic  period.  The  same  order 
of  arrangement  and  degree  of  relative  importance 
was  affirmed  to  exist  between  faith  and  science, 
while  there  was  far  less  of  that  disposition  to  extend 
the  limits  of  Christian  speculation  beyond  the  pow¬ 
ers  and  capacities  of  the  finite  mind  which  we  per¬ 
ceive  in  Origen,  and  which  in  his  pupils  to  a  great 
degree,  and  in  himself  to  no  small  degree,  resulted 
in  crude  and  irrational  theories  respecting  the  origin 

1  Clemens  Alexandrines  (Stro-  VII.  x.):  K pirrjpiov  rrjs  eVio-r^s 
mata,  II.  vi.)  :  SroixeicoSeo-re/xt  .  .  .  avuTo/xos  yvaxris.  ORIGEN  :  (In  Jo- 
tcov  ap-qroov  rrjs  yucaaecos  rj  tticttls  annem,  Tom.  XIII.  lii ;  XIX.  i) 
....  Kpr]n\s  aXrj^eias ;  (Stromata,  presents  the  same  view. 


FAITH  AND  SCIENCE. 


161 


of  the  universe,  the  nature  of  matter,  and  above  all 
the  nature  and  origin  of  moral  evil.  Super  natural¬ 
ism,  says  Hagenbach,  in  its  most  definite  and  intel¬ 
ligent  opposition  to  rationalism,  finds  its  ablest  and 
most  eloquent  defender  in  Augustine.  He  post¬ 
pones  scientific  knowledge  to  faith,  and  recognizes  in 
Christianity  the  only  absolute  religion  for  mankind, 
to  which  he  requires  the  human  mind  to  submit 
itself;  for  faith  in  the  object  precedes  the  scientific  A 
cognition  of  the  object.  Reason,  he  says,  would 
never  have  delivered  man  from  darkness  and  cor¬ 
ruption,  if  God  had  not  accommodated  himself  to 
the  finite,  and  “cum  populari  quadam  dementia” 
humbled  the  Divine  intellect  even  to  the  human 
nature  and  the  human  body.1 

The  following  extracts  from  the  great  leader  of 
opinions  in  the  Western  Church  in  this  and  suc¬ 
ceeding  ages,  show  the  attitude  of  his  mind  towards 
the  problems  of  faith  and  reason,  and  sound  the 
key  note  to  the  harmony  of  philosophy  and  religion. 

“  It  cannot  be  that  God  hates  that  characteristic  of 
reason  in  us,  in  respect  to  which  he  created  us  su¬ 
perior  to  the  other  animals.  It  cannot  be,  that  we 
are  to  believe,  in  such  a  way  as  to  preclude  all  use 
of  our  rational  faculty.  For  we  could  not  believe 
at  all  unless  we  had  rational  minds.  It  is  therefore 
a  reasonable  act,  when,  in  matters  pertaining  to 
salvation,  which  we  are  not  able  to  completely  un¬ 
derstand  as  yet,  but  which  we  shall  be  able  to 


11 


1  Dogmengesclriclite,  §  116. 


162 


HISTOEY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


understand  some  time  or  other,  our  faith  precedes 
our  reason,  and  so  purifies  the  heart  that  we  become 
capable  of  the  light  of  the  perfect  and  supreme 
Reason.  Thus  it  is  reasonably  said  by  the  prophet 
(Is.  vii.  9,  Sept.  Ver.) :  ‘Unless  ye  believe  ye  shall 
not  understand.’  Without  doubt  he  distinguishes 
here  two  things,  faith  and  reason,  and  counsels  us 
first  to  believe,  that  we  may  then  be  able  to  under¬ 
stand  what  we  believe . Faith  should  precede 

philosophic  intelligence  (Fides  intellectum  prece- 
dere  debet).  Man  as  a  believer  should  first  inquire 
into  the  hidden  and  secret  things  of  the  kingdom 
of  God,  in  order  that  he  may  understanding^  per¬ 
form  them.  ¥  or  faith  is  a  species  of  intelligence  ; 
but  scientific  intelligence  is  the  reward  of  faith  (Fi¬ 
des  enim  gradus  est  intelligendi ;  intellectus  autem 
meritum  fidei).  The  prophet  plainly  says  this  to 
all  who  hastily  and  prematurely  require  science  and 
neglect  faith.  For  he  says  :  4  Unless  ye  believe  ye 
shall  not  understand’  (Is.  vii.  9,  Sept.  Ver.).  Ye 
desire  to  ascend,  but  overlook  the  steps  by  which  it 
is  to  be  done.  How  perverse  is  this  !  If,  O  man,  I 
were  able  to  show  you  here  upon  earth  what  is 

invisible,  I  should  not  exhort  you  to  believe . 

Although  unless  a  man  have  some  knowledge  of 
God,  he  cannot  believe  in  him,  yet  by  this  very 
faith  itself  his  understanding  is  invigorated,  so  that 
it  can  obtain  still  more  knowledge.  For  there  are 
some  things  which  we  cannot  believe  in  unless  we 
understand  them ;  and  there  are  some  things  which 


FAITH  AND  SCIENCE. 


1G3 


we  cannot  understand  unless  we  believe  in  them. 
For  unless  there  are  some  things  which  we  cannot 
understand  antecedent  to  belief,  the  prophet  (Is.  vii. 
9,  Sept.  Yer.)  would  not  say  :  c  Unless  ye  believe 
ye  shall  not  understand,’  Our  intellect,  therefore, 
is  of  use  for  understanding  what  it  believes,  and 
faith  is  of  use  in  believing  what  it  understands.”1 

Whether  faith  is  prior  or  posterior,  in  the  order 
of  nature,  to  science  is  the  test  question  that  de¬ 
termines  the  character  of  all  philosophizing  upon 
Christianity.  If  faith,  in  the  phrase  of  Clement,  be 
regarded  as  elementary,  the  test  and  epitome  of 
science,  there  is  little  danger  that  the  substance  of 
scriptural  Christianity  will  be  evaporated  in  the 
endeavour  to  exhibit  its  reasonableness.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  order  is  reversed,  and  scientific 
knowledge  is  made  to  precede  belief;  if  the  dictum 
is  laid  down,  as  it  was  by  Abelard  in  the  next 
period,  that  there  is  no  believing  antecedent  to 
scientific  understanding,  and  consequently  that  the 
degree  of  posterior  faith  depends  upon  the  degree 
of  anterior  science ;  then  the  all-comprehending 
mystery  and  depth  of  revealed  religion  will  be  lost 
out  of  sight,  and  the  whole  grand  system  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  will  be  reduced  down  to  that  “  simple  ” 
religion  desired  by  the  French  Director,  which 
consists  of  “  a  couple  of  doctrines,” — viz :  the  exist¬ 
ence  of  a  God,  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  As 

Augustine  :  Epistolarum  Sermonum  OXXYI.  (Ed.  Migne, 
OXX.  3  (Ed.  Migne,  II.  453);  V.  698);  Ennarratio  in  Ps.  cxviii. 


1G4 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


we  follow  tlie  history  of  Apologies  down  to  the 
present  day,  we  perceive  that  leading  minds  have 
been  supernaturalists  or  rationalists  in  their  methods 
of  defending  and  philosophizing  upon  Christianity, 
according  as  they  have  adopted  or  rejected  the  dic¬ 
tum  first  announced  by  Origen,  repeated  by  Augus¬ 
tine,  and  most  thoroughly  expanded  and  established 
by  Anselm, — the  dictum,  fides  precedit  intellectum . 
In  the  former  class,  we  find  the  names  of  Origen, 
Augustine,  Anselm,  Calvin,  Pascal.  In  the  latter, 
the  names  of  men  like  Scotus  Erigena,  Abelard, 
Raymund  Lully,  in  whom  the  speculative  energy 
overmastered  the  contemplative,  and  whose  intuition 
and  construction  of  Christian  Doctrine  was  inade¬ 
quate,  and  in  some  instances,  certainly,  fatally  de¬ 
fective. 

§  4.  Mutual  relations  of  tlie  Supernatural  and  the 

Natural. 

The  third  distinction,  by  which  we  are  aided  in 
exhibiting  the  Apologetic  History  of  this  period,  is 
that  between  the  Supernatural  and  the  Natural. 

The  same  process  went  on  in  respect  to  this 
important  distinction  which  we  found  took  place  in 
respect  to  the  distinction  between  Revelation  and 
Reason.  The  distinction  became  more  clear  and 
firm.  The  line  that  marked  off  the  miracle  from 
the  ordinary  course  of  nature  grew  more  and  more 
sharp,  and  distinguishing.  In  proportion  as  the 
Apologist  insisted  upon  a  special  and  peculiar  rev- 


THE  SUPERNATURAL  AND  THE  NATURAL. 


165 


elation  from  the  Divine  Mind,  was  he  led  naturally 
to  insist  upon  a  special  and  peculiar  working  of  the 
Divine  Power.  Indeed,  all  these  fundamental  dis¬ 
tinctions  by  which  we  are  examining  and  exhausting 
the  doctrinal  history  of  this  period  are  so  connected 
and  sympathetic  with  each  other,  that  the  historic 
process  is  the  same  in  reference  to  them  all.  Pre¬ 
cision,  science,  and  genuine  developement  affects  them 
all  alike  ;  while  looseness  of  conception,  and  hetero¬ 
dox  or  rationalizing  notions  are  equally  injurious  to 
each  and  all  of  them. 

The  mind  of  the  Church  now  insists  that  the 
Supernatural  is  so  distinctive  and  peculiar,  that  it 
cannot  be  accounted  for  upon  merely  Natural  prin¬ 
ciples.  The  miracle  is  not  the  common  and  ordi¬ 
nary  working  of  the  Deity,  but  his  extraordinary 
and  strange  work.  The  miraculous  is  an  interven¬ 
tion  of  Omnipotence  into  the  sphere  of  the  finite, 
precisely  like  the  act  of  original  creation  ;  and  not 
an  evolution  out  of  germes  already  in  existence. 
The  Apologist,  looking  at  the  subject  from  this 
point  of  view,  set  the  Supernatural  over  against  the 
Natural  in  the  sharpest  antithesis,  and  steadfastly 
refused  to  identify  them  as  one  and  the  same  mode 
of  the  Divine  Working.  Each  is  a  distinct  and 
peculiar  mode  of  the  Divine  efficiency,  and  neither 
one  can  be  resolved  or  explained  into  the  other. 
So  positive  and  clear  was  the  belief  of  the  Christian 
Mind  of  this  period,  not  only  in  the  possibility  but 
the  reality  of  supernatural  agency  in  the  course  of 


166 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


sacred  history,  that  men  like  Ambrose  and  Augus¬ 
tine  did  not  hesitate  to  affirm  the  continuance  of 
such  agency ;  though  they  were  careful  to  distin¬ 
guish  between  biblical  and  ecclesiastical  miracles.1 
In  this  respect,  the  church  of  this  period  differed 
from  the  later  Roman  Church,  which  greatly  mul¬ 
tiplied  the  number  of  supposed  miraculous  occur¬ 
rences  in  the  lives  of  the  saints,  and  what  was  of 
still  more  importance  attributed  a  worth  and  au¬ 
thority  to  them  greater  than  it  attached  to  the 
scriptural  supernaturalism  itself.2 

On  the  other  side  of  the  subject,  we  see  in  this 
instance,  as  we  did  in  treating  of  the  distinction 
between  Revelation  and  Reason,  the  same  dispo¬ 
sition  to  connect  the  Supernatural  with  the  Natural, 
so  that  the  miracle  shall  not  appear  whimsical,  but 
adapted  to  the  end  for  which  it  is  wrought ;  so  that 
it  shall  not  look  like  the  arbitrary,  capricious  work 
of  a  merely  magical  agency.3  The  same  God  is  the 


1  Upon  ecclesiastical  miracles, 
see  Middleton’s  Inquiry,  Camp¬ 
bell  On  Miracles,  Douglass  On 
Miracles,  Newman’s  Essay,  and 
Geotius  on  Mark  xvi. 

2  Protestant  writers  have  some¬ 
times  cherished  the  belief  in  a 
continued  supernatural  agency. 

Says  LuTnEE  (Works  XI.  p.  1339, 
Ed.  Walch),  “  how  often  has  it 
happened,  and  still  does ,  that  dev¬ 
ils  have  been  driven  out  in  the 
name  of  Christ ;  also  by  the  calling 
of  his  name,  and  prayer,  that  the 


sick  have  been  healed.”  Quen- 
stedt  (Theol.  did.  polem.  Pt.  I. 
p.  472)  remarks :  “  Nolim  negare 
Jesuitas  in  India  et  Japonica  vera 
quaedam  miracula  edidisse.” 

3  Among  modern  theologians, 
no  one  has  been  more  successful 
than  Twesten  in  constructing  a 
philosophy  of  miracles  that  pre¬ 
serves  the  strictest  supernatural¬ 
ism  in  union  and  fusion  with  the 
laws  and  elements  of  nature.  See 
his  Dogmatik,  §  24. 


THE  SUPERNATURAL  AND  THE  NATURAL.  16? 


author  of  the  Supernatural  and  the  Natural,  and 
hence  the  desire  to  exhibit  the  relation  between  the 
two,  and  to  show  the  point  of  contact  between  both, 
without  however  annihilating  the  distinction  be¬ 
tween  them  that  had  been  seen,  and  firmly  main¬ 
tained.  Hence  the  assertion,  which  is  sometimes 
repeated  in  the  Christian  science  of  the  present  day, 
that  the  miracle  is  not  contrary  to  all  nature  but 
only  to  nature  as  known  to  us,  was  made  by  the 
Apologist  of  this  Polemic  period.  Says  Augustine : 
“  We  are  wont  to  say  that  all  miracles  and  wonders 
are  contrary  to  nature ;  but  they  are  not.  For 
how  can  that  which  occurs  by  the  will  of  God  be 
contrary  to  nature,  when  the  will  of  God  itself 
constitutes  the  nature  of  everything  that  exists? 
The  miracle,  consequently,  does  not  take  place 
contrary  to  universal  nature,  but  contrary  only 
to  nature  so  far  as  it  is  known  to  us  ;  although, 
even  those  things  which  occur  in  nature  as  known 
to  us  are  not  less  wonderful,  and  stupendous,  to 
those  who  would  carefully  consider  them,  were  it 
not  that  men  are  accustomed  to  wonder  only  at 
things  that  are  infrequent  and  rare . That  mir¬ 

acle  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  by  which  he  made 
the  water  wine,  is  not  wonderful  to  those  who  know 
that  it  was  God  who  performed  it.  For  He  who 
made  wine  on  that  marriage  day,  in  those  six  water- 
pots  which  he  commanded  to  be*  filled  with  water, 
makes  wine  the  whole  year  round  in  the  grape  vines . 
But  this  latter  we  do  not  wonder  at,  because  it 


168 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


occurs  all  the  year  round.  By  reason  of  the  uni¬ 
formity  we  lose  our  wonder.” 1 

The  Apologist  could  safely  take  this  ground, 
and  not  run  the  hazard  of  explaining  away  the  Su¬ 
pernatural  into  the  Natural,  because  he  had  started 
from  the  position  of  super  naturalism.  Had  he,  as 
has  been  done  in  some  later  periods,  made  the  Nat¬ 
ural  the  first,  and  from  this  as  a  point  of  departure 
endeavoured  to  construct  a  philosophy  of  miracles,  he 
would  have  been  likely  to  end  with  the  annihilation 
of  all  that  is  truly  and  distinctively  Supernatural. 
As  in  the  former  instance  in  which  the  relations 
of  Revelation  and  Reason  were  concerned,  so  in  re¬ 
gard  to  this  distinction  between  the  Supernatural 
and  the  Natural,  all  depends  upon  the  point  of 
departure.  The  truth  is  reached,  and  a  genuine 
harmony  is  evinced  between  the  Natural  and  the 
Miraculous,  both  of  which  are  equally  modes  of  the 


1  Augustine  :  De  Civitate  Dei, 
XXI.  viii ;  Tractatus  VIII.  in  Jo- 
annem  (Ed.  Migne,  p.  1450).— This 
way  of  looking  at  miracles  seems 
to  be  natural  to  the  human  mind. 
De.  Johnson,  a  profound  believer 
in  miracles,  and  even  inclined  to 
credulity  as  the  story  of  the  Cock 
Lane  ghost  evinces,  thus  expresses 
himself  in  his  life  of  Sir  Thomas 
Brown :  “  There  is  a  sense  un¬ 
doubtedly  in  which  all  life  is  mi¬ 
raculous,  as  it  is  an  union  of 
powers  of  which  we  can  image 
no  connection  ;  a  succession  of 
motions  of  which  the  first  cause 
must  he  supernatural.”  This  is 


not  said  from  the  position  of 
science,  for  Johnson  was  no 
metaphysician,  but  it  is  a  view 
that  spontaneously  suggests  itself. 
Cowper  gives  expression  to  the 
same  thought,  in  “  The  Task.” 
Book  YI. 

. . “  Should  God  again, 

As  once  in  Gibeon,  interrupt  the  race 
Of  the  undeviating  and  punctual  sun, 

How  would  the  world  admire  I  but  speaks 
it  less 

An  agency  divine,  to  make  him  know 
His  moment  when  to  sink,  and  when  t# 
rise, 

Age  after  age,  than  to  arrest  his  course  9 
All  we  behold  is  miracle  ;  but ,  seen 
So  duly ,  all  is  miracle  in  vain.'* 


THE  SUPERNATURAL  AND  T1IE  NATURAL. 


169 


Divine  efficiency,  by  first  of  all  holding  with  firm¬ 
ness,  and  without  any  equivocation  or  mental  reser¬ 
vation,  to  the  possibility  and  the  reality  of  a  direct 
interference  of  the  Deity  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
natural  phenomena,  by  which  the  old  every-day 
course  of  events  is  sometimes  stopped  short  off, 
sometimes  wonderfully  altered  and  modified,  but  in 
every  instance  a  perfect  domination  and  control 
over  the  laws  and  processes  of  the  natural  world  is 
evinced  and  exercised.  When  the  mind  is  con¬ 
vinced  of  the  reasonableness  of  an  extraordinary 
divine  efficiency,  it  then  becomes  comparatively 
easy  for  it  to  detect  that  point  of  contact  between 
the  miracle  and  the  common  course  of  nature  where 
both  join  together,  and  both  co-operate  towards  the 
accomplishment  of  the  end  proposed  by  that  Divine 
Being  who  is  the  author  of  both.  The  Christian 
apologist  of  this  period  was  thus  thoroughly  con¬ 
vinced  of  the  reality  of  the  Divine  supernatural 
intervention  ;  so  much  so,  that,  as  we  have  noticed 
above,  he  did  not  regard  the  age  of  supernaturalism 
as  entirely  past ;  and  hence  his  attempts  at  a  phi¬ 
losophy  of  Miracles  were  upon  the  whole  as  suc¬ 
cessful  as  any  that  are  to  be  found  in  the  history  of 
Apologies. 

It  is  deserving  of  notice  however,  that  the  con¬ 
troversy  with  the  skeptic,  in  regard  to  miracles,  did 
not  reach  its  height  of  vehemence  and  acuteness 
until  modern  times.  It  was  not  until  modern  Deism 
made  its  appearance,  that  the  Christian  Apologist 


170 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


was  compelled  to  his  most  elaborate  defences  in  this 
respect.  The  Ancient  World  seems  to  have  found 
it  more  easy  than  the  Modern,  to  believe  in  the 
immediate  operation  of  the  deity  in  the  course  of 
nature ;  perhaps  because  it  was  two  thousand  years 
nearer  the  creative  fiat,  not  very  far  off  in  time  from 
such  awfully  miraculous  displays  as  the  deluge,  and 
quite  near  to  that  continued  series  of  supernatural 
events  and  agencies  which  accompanied  the  advent 
and  ministry,  the  death,  resurrection,  and  ascension 
of  the  Son  of  God.  As  a  consequence,  the  ancient 
Apologete  found  a  less  unbelieving  temper  to  con¬ 
tend  with  than  his  modern  coadjutor  does,  in  an 
age  of  the  world  which  perhaps  more  than  any 
other  is  inclined  to  that  mere  naturalism  which 
puts  the  question  :  u  Where  is  the  promise  of  his 
coming  ?  for  since  the  fathers  fell  asleep,  all  things 
continue  as  they  were  from  the  beginning  of  the 
creation,”  (2  Pet.  iii.  4). 

§  5.  Recapitulatory  Survey . 

A  brief  and  rapid  recapitulation  will  serve  to 
report  the  progress  which  has  been  made  by  the 
Church,  in  these  apologetic  endeavours  of  the  Po¬ 
lemic  age.  We  shall  perceive  that  during  this  pe¬ 
riod  of  five  centuries,  the  Ecclesiastical  Mind  gained 
a  clearer  understanding  of  certain  subjects  funda¬ 
mental  to  the  establishment  and  defence  of  Christb 
anity,  than  it  possessed  during  the  Apologetic  period. 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY.  17 1 

1.  In  the  first  place,  a  more  distinct  and  profound 
knowledge  of  the  relation  which  exists  between 
human  Reason  and  divine  Revelation  was  the  con¬ 
sequence  of  the  very  great  intellectual  activity  of 
this  period.  The  difficulties  and  objections  urged 
by  the  skeptic  and  the  heretic  compelled  the  Apol¬ 
ogist  to  reflect  more  deeply,  and  to  speak  more  pre¬ 
cisely  respecting  the  nature  and  functions  of  both 
of  these  correlated  objects.  That  somewhat  vague 
idea  of  revelation,  which  obtained  in  the  Apologies 
of  Justin  Martyr,  which  left  too  little  room  for  the 
distinction  between  natural  and  revealed  religion, 
was  now  displaced  by  a  more  precise  and  scientific 
one,  in  which  that  which  is  attainable  by  the  exer¬ 
cise  of  the  unassisted  finite  faculty  is  distinguished 
from  the  products  of  the  Supreme  Reason.  Here 
certainly  is  progress.  It  was  a  true  and  legitimate 
advance  in  Christian  science  to  distinguish  things 
that  differ;  to  bring  out  into  the  clear  light  of 
knowledge,  the  exact  difference  there  is  between 
Revelation  and  Reason,  and  to  state  it  in  accurate 
and  plain  terms.  It  is  not  enough  merely  not  to 
deny  a  fundamental  distinction.  Genuine  science, 
be  it  Christian  or  secular,  must  positively  affirm  and 
establish  fundamental  distinctions.  The  earlier  de¬ 
fenders  of  Christianity  never  denied  the  difference 
in  kind  between  Revelation  and  Reason  ;  but  they 
did  not  discriminate  and  enunciate  it  with  that 
scientific  exactitude  which  is  the  result  of  sharp 
controversy.  The  peculiar  form  of  infidelity  which 


172 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


they  were  called  upon  to  combat  did  not  lead  them 
to  do  so,  but  on  the  contrary  inclined  them  some¬ 
what  in  the  other  direction.  For  the  chief  accusa¬ 
tion  brought  against  Christianity  in  the  first  two 
centuries  was,  that  it  was  altogether  alien  to  hu¬ 
manity,  a  new  and  peculiar  religion  wholly  foreign 
and  antagonistic  to  all  that  the  world  had  heretofore 
known,  and  aiming  to  operate  upon  the  mind  and 
heart  of  man  with  a  merely  magical  influence,  and 
with  no  appeal  to  his  reason.  It  was  therefore  the 
task  of  the  Apologist  of  this  period,  to  exhibit  the 
affinities  of  Christianity  with  human  nature ;  to 
show  the  point  of  contact  between  the  human  and 
Divine  minds.  He  was  led,  consequently,  to  em¬ 
phasize  the  resemblance  that  could  be  found  in  nat¬ 
ural  religion,  as  this  had  unfolded  in  the  various 
systems  of  pagan  philosophy  and  ethics,  with  the 
doctrines  of  Christianity,  in  order  to  win  the  atten¬ 
tion  and  favour  of  the  thoughtful  and  serious-minded 
pagan. 

But  when  this  ceased  to  be  the  state  of  the  con¬ 
troversy,  and  the  unbeliever  now  passed  over  to  the 
opposite  extreme,  and  asserted  that  Christianity 
contained  nothing  new  or  distinctively  its  own,1  and 

^e,,  also,”  says  Celsus  quot-  gods;  for  with  the  belief  in  the 
ed  by  Obigen  (Cont.  Celsum,  lib.  gods  worshipped  in  every  land 
VII),  “can  place  a  Supreme  Be-  and  by  every  people  harmonizes 
ing  above  the  world,  and  above  the  belief  in  a  Primal  Being,  a 
all  human  things,  and  approve  of  Supreme  God,  wTho  has  given  to 
and  sympathize  in  whatever  may  every  land  its  guardian,  to  every 
be  taught  of  a  spiritual,  rather  people  its  presiding  deity.  The 
than  material  adoration  of  the  unity  of  the  Supreme  Being,  and 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY. 


173 

that  all  the  truth  necessary  for  man  to  know  could 
be  developed  out  of  natural  religion  and  ethics,  it 
became  necessary  for  the  Christian  philosopher  to 
take  another  step,  and  while  not  denying  the  affin¬ 
ities  between  natural  and  revealed  religion,  exhibit 
the  additional  features,  the  divine  and  supernatural 


elements  which  the  latter 

the  consequent  unity  of  the  design 
of  the  universe,  remains,  even  if 
it  be  admitted  that  each  people 
has  its  own  gods,  whom  it  must 
worship  in  a  peculiar  manner,  ac¬ 
cording  to  their  peculiar  charac¬ 
ter  ;  the  worship  of  all  these  dif¬ 
ferent  deities  is  reflected  back  to 
the  Supreme  God,  who  has  ap¬ 
pointed  them  as  it  were  his  dele¬ 
gates  and  representatives.  Those 
who  argue  that  men  ought  not  to 
serve  many  masters  impute  hu¬ 
man  weakness  to  God.  God  is 
not  jealous  of  the  adoration  paid 
to  subordinate  deities ;  he  is  su¬ 
perior  in  his  nature  to  degradation 
and  insult.  Reason  itself  might 
justify  the  belief  in  the  inferior 
deities,  which  are  the  objects  of 
the  established  worship.  For, 
since  the  Supreme  God  can  pro¬ 
duce  only  that  which  is  immortal 
and  imperishable,  the  existence 
of  mortal  beings  cannot  be  ex¬ 
plained,  unless  we  distinguish 
from  him  those  inferior  deities, 
and  assert  them  to  be  the  creators 
of  mortal  beings  and  of  perishable 
things.”  Compare  upon  this  point 
Milman’s  History  of  Christianity, 
Book  II.  Chap.  viii. 


contained.1  But  in  doing 

1  This  same  adroit  method  of 
the  ancient  skeptic  was  repeated 
by  the  English  Deists  of  the  17th 
century.  Says  Leland  (Deistical 
Writers,  Letter  III),  “It  is  to  be 
observed  that  the  learned  writers 
who  opposed  Mr.  Hobbs  did  not 
so  much  apply  themselves  to  vin¬ 
dicate  revealed  religion,  or  the 
Christian  system,  as  to  establish 
the  great  principles  of  all  religion 
and  morality,  which  his  scheme 
tended  to  subvert ;  and  to  show 
that  they  had  a  real  foundation 
in  reason  and  nature.  In  this 
they  certainly  did  good  service  to 
religion ;  yet  some  of  the  enemies 
of  revelation  endeavored  to  take 
advantage  of  it,  as  if  this  showed 
that  there  is  no  other  religion  but 
the  law  of  nature,  and  that  any 
extraordinary  revelation  is  need¬ 
less  and  useless.  Thus,  on  every 
supposition,  these  gentlemen  re¬ 
solved  to  carry  their  cause  against 
Christianity.  If  there  be  no  law 
of  nature,  no  real  difference  in  the 
nature  of  things  between  moral 
good  and  evil,  virtue  and  vice, 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  religion 
at  all.  and,  consequently,  no  Chris¬ 
tian  religion.  On  the  other  hand, 


174  HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 

this,  the  Apologist  unfolded  the  system  of  revealed 
truth  more  fully  than  had  been  done  before.  He 
traced  the  fundamental  distinction  between  ethics 
and  the  gospel  more  profoundly  and  nearer  to  the 
centre,  and  thereby  made  a  positive  advance  upon 
his  less  exact  and  scientific  predecessors. 

2.  In  the  second  place,  the  relation  of  Faith  to 
Science  was  better  understood  and  defined  than  it 
had  been  in  the  preceding  period.  The  church  had 
now  wrought  out  a  sounder  philosophy  of  Chris¬ 
tianity.  The  mind  of  Augustine  manages  the  argu¬ 
ment  with  the  philosophical  skeptic  or  the  acute 
heretic,  more  successfully  than  had  been  done  by 
the  mind  of  Irenaeus,  or  even  the  mind  of  Origen. 
The  apologetic  writings  of  this  period  furnish  more 
that  can  be  used  with  advantage  by  the  modern 
theologian,  in  the  ever  new  and  ever  old  conflict 
with  infidelity,  than  he  can  derive  from  the  more 
ardent  and  glowing,  but  less  self-consistent  and  pro¬ 
found  defences  of  Justin  Martyr  and  Tertullian. 
Infidelity  and  heresy  had  now  made  themselves  felt 
in  their  more  acute  and  skilful  forms  of  attack,  and 
the  defence  and  repulse  evoked  from  the  Church,  a 
depth  of  reflection,  and  a  power  of  logic  which  it 
had  never  before  exhibited. 


if  it  be  proved  that  there  is  such  this  alone  is  sufficient,  and  that 
a  thing  as  the  religion  and  law  of  it  is  clear  and  obvious  to  all  man- 
nature,  which  is  founded  in  the  kind,  and  therefore  they  need  no 
very  nature  and  relations  of  revelation  to  instruct  them  in  it, 
things,  and  agreeable  to  right  or  assure  them  of  it.” 
reason,  then  it  is  concluded  that 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY.  I7fl 

3.  And  lastly,  this  same  progress  in  the  direction 
of  a  rational  defence  of  Christianity  brought  along 
with  it  a  clearer  intuition  of  the  difference  in  kind 
between  the  Supernatural  and  the  Natural.  This 
fundamental  distinction,  which  had  indeed  been 
recognized  in  the  Apologetic  period,  but  which  had 
not  been  reflected  upon  with  that  thoroughness  of 
analysis  and  abstraction,  which  alone  carries  the 
mind  to  the  inmost  centre  of  an  idea, — this  distinc¬ 
tion  was  now  seen  in  its  fulness  of  meaning,  and 
asserted  with  a  positiveness  which  all  after  Apol¬ 
ogetics  has  only  reiterated  and  heightened. 

We  perceive  then,  that  during  this  second  pe¬ 
riod  in  Apologetic  History,  the  principal  topics 
which  constitute  the  subject-matter  of  Apologet¬ 
ics  were  discussed,  and  satisfactory  positions  were 
established  respecting  each  of  them.  During  the 
first  seven  centuries,  skepticism  from  without,  and 
heresy  from  within  the  church,  had  been  instrumen¬ 
tal  in  forming  and  fixing  those  fundamental  dis¬ 
tinctions  upon  which  all  successful  defences  of 
Christianity  must  ultimately  rest.  We  shall  not 
find  very  great  advance  upon  the  Apologetics  of 
the  Ancient  Church,  so  far  as  the  foundations  of 
Christian  evidences  are  concerned.  That  portion 
of  the  department,  which  consists  of  the  evidences 
from  physical  nature,  has  indeed  made  great  prog¬ 
ress  since  this  period.  But  this  progress  has  oc¬ 
curred  mostly  within  the  last  two  centuries ;  inas¬ 
much  as  it  is  the  natural  consequence  of  the  remark- 


176 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


able  advance  which  during  this  time  has  been  made 
in  the  whole  department  of  natural  science.  If 
then,  we  except  the  physico-moral  argument,  we 
may  say  as  the  conclusion  of  our  survey  that  the 
evidences  for  the  reasonableness  of  Christianity  were 
in  substance,  enunciated  and  established  during  the 
Apologetic  and  Polemic  periods. 


CHAPTER  III. 


MEDIAEVAL  DEFENCES  OF  CHRISTIANITY:  A.  D.  730— A.  D.  1517* 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements . 

The  Mediaeval  period,  which  includes  800  years 
from  the  first  part  of  the  8th  to  the  first  part  of  the 
16th  century,  was  engaged  chiefly  in  reducing  the 
past  results  of  theological  investigation  and  contro¬ 
versy  to  a  systematic  form,  and  a  scientific  unity. 
Of  this  period,  however,  not  more  than  four  cen¬ 
turies  witnessed  any  very  great  activity  of  the 
theological  mind.  Scotus  Erigena,  during  the  9th 
century,  shows  signs  of  acute  intellectual  life,  and 
by  reason  of  his  active  and  inquiring  spirit  becomes 
a  striking  object  in  that  age  of  growing  superstition 
and  ignorance.  Alcuin,  the  brightest  ornament  of 
the  court  of  Charlemagne,  and  the  soundest  thinker 
between  J ohn  of  Damascus  and  Anselm,  also  throws 
a  pure  and  serene  ray  into  the  darkness  of  the  dark 
ages.  It  is  not  however  until  Scholasticism  appears, 


178 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


that  we  perceive  in  the  Church  the  reappearance 
of  that  same  deep  reflection  which  in  Augustine 
settled  the  principal  questions  in  Anthropology,  and 
that  same  subtle  analysis  which  in  Athanasius  con¬ 
structed  the  Nicene  Symbol.  For  two  centuries, 
extending  from  Anselm  to  Aquinas  (1075-1275), 
we  find  the  theologians  of  the  Church  collectively 
endeavoring  to  rationalize  Christianity  and  con¬ 
struct  a  philosophy  of  religion,  with  an  energy  and 
intensity  of  thinking  that  is  remarkable.  We  shall 
mention  only  the  more  general  tendencies  and  re¬ 
sults  of  this  mediaeval  speculation,  in  their  relation 
to  the  History  of  Apologies. 

The  old  attacks  upon  Christianity  by  the  Jews 
and  Pagans  had  now  ceased.  Mohammedanism, 
which  had  come  into  existence,  although  it  boasted 
of  some  learning,  and  made  some  few  literary  at¬ 
tacks  upon  Christianity,  was  far  more  formidable 
with  the  sword  than  with  the  pen.  Defences  were 
now  called  out  mainly  against  skepticism  and  doubts 
within  the  Church  itself.  This  skepticism  was  some¬ 
times  open  and  sometimes  concealed ;  sometimes  it 
was  conscious  and  intended,  and  sometimes  it  was 
unconscious  and  unintentional.  This  latter  species 
of  skepticism,  which  is  a  very  interesting  form  of 
unbelief,  and  exists  more  generally  than  appears  at 
first  sight  in  all  ages  of  the  church,  springs  out  of  an 
unsuccessful  endeavour  to  fathom  the  depths  of 
theology,  and  to  construct  a  true  philosophy  of 
Christianity.  The  thinker  sometimes  supposes  him* 


ANSELM,  AQUINAS,  AND  BERNARD. 


179 


self  to  have  solved  the  problem,  when  he  has  in 
reality  only  undermined  the  doctrine.  In  attempt¬ 
ing  with  perfect  seriousness  and  good  faith  to  ra¬ 
tionalize  religion,  he  has  in  reality  annihilated  it. 

Some  of  the  Schoolmen  are  a  striking  example 
of  this.  Minds  like  Amalrich  of  Bena,  and  David 
of  Dinanto,  in  attempting  to  discover  and  exhibit 
the  true  nature  of  the  deity,  and  the  relation  be¬ 
tween  creation  and  the  creator,  in  reality  enunciated 
a  pantheistic  theory  of  God  and  the  universe.  These 
men  however  were  in  and  of  the  visible  Church, 
and  supposed  that  they  were  promoting  the  scien¬ 
tific  interests  of  Christianity.  There  is  reason  to 
believe  that  they  were  sincere  in  this  belief.  They 
were  unconsciously  skeptical.  Seeking  to  establish 
Christianity  upon  an  absolutely  scientific  basis,  they 
dug  up  the  very  lowest  and  most  solid  stratum 
upon  which  the  entire  structure  rests, — the  stratum 
of  theism.  On  the  other  hand,  Schoolmen  like 
Anselm,  Bernard,  and  Aquinas,  more  profound 
students  of  revealed  truth,  and  possessing  a  deeper 
Christian  experience,  continued  the  defence  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  upon  substantially  the  same  grounds,  and  by 
the  same  methods,  that  we  have  seen  to  have  been 
prevalent  in  the  Ancient  Church. 

§  2.  Apologetics  of  Anselm,  Aquinas ,  and  Bernard. 

Anselm’s  view  of  the  relation  of  reason  to  faith 
agrees  thoroughly  with  that  of  Augustine,  and  was 


180 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


unquestionably  somewhat  shaped  by  it.  His  two 
tracts,  the  Monologium  and  Proslogion,  indirectly 
exhibit  his  opinions  upon  this  subject  with  great 
clearness  and  power,  and  defend  the  supernaturalism 
of  Christianity  with  a  metaphysical  taient  that  has 
never  been  excelled.  In  the  Proslogion,  he  says, 
“I  desire  certainly  to  [scientifically]  understand 
that  truth  which  my  heart  believes  and  loves;  yet 
I  do  not  seek  to  understand  that  I  may  believe,  but 
I  believe  that  I  may  understand.  For  I  believe 
the  truth,  because  if  I  am  unbelieving  I  cannot  [phi¬ 
losophically]  apprehend.”  Again  he  remarks,  that 
“  he  who  does  not  believe  can  have  no  experience, 
and  he  who  has  no  experience  cannot  understand.”1 
Unless  there  be  a  consciousness,  there  can  be  no 
scientific  analysis  of  consciousness  or  philosophical 
construction  of  its  contents ;  and  there  can  be  no 
consciousness  without  faith  in  the  object  of  con¬ 
sciousness.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  Anselm  is  as 
careful  as  was  Augustine  to  insist  upon  the  intrinsic 


'“Non  tento,  Domine,  pene- 
trare  altitudinem  tuam ;  quia  nul- 
latenus  comparo  illi  intellectual 
meum,  sed  desidero  aliquatenus 
intelligere  veritatem  tuam,  quam 
credit  et  ainat  cor  meum.  Neque 
enim  quaero  intelligere,  ut  cre- 
dam ;  sed  credo,  ut  intelligam. 
Nam  et  hoc  credo  quia  nisi  cre- 
didero,  non  intelligam.”  Proslo¬ 
gion,  Cap.  i.  “  Nimirum  hoc  ipsum 
quod  dico,  qui  non  crediderit,  non 
intelliget.  Nam  qui  non  credi¬ 


derit,  non  experietur ;  et  qui  ex- 
pertus  non  fuerit,  non  intelliget. 
Nam  quantum  rei  auditum  superat 
experientia,  tantum  vincit  audi- 
entis  cognitionem  experientis  sci- 
entia:  et  non  solum  ad  intelli- 
gendum  altiora  proliibitur  mens 
ascendere  sine  fide  et  mandatorum 
Dei  obedientia,  sed  etiam  aliquan- 
do  datus  intellectus  subtrahitur, 
et  tides  ipsa  subvertitur,  neglecta 
bona  conscientia.”  De  fide  Trin- 
itatis,  Cap.  ii. 


ANSELM,  AQUINAS,  AND  BERNARD. 


181 


rationality  of  Christianity,  and  to  recommend  the 
endeavour  after  a  philosophical  faith.  In  his  tract 
upon  the  atonement,  he  assents  to  the  assertion  of 
his  pupil  Boso,  that  although  the  right  order  re¬ 
quires  that  we  believe  the  profound  mysteries  of 
the  Christian  faith  before  we  presume  to  discuss 
them  upon  grounds  of  reason,  yet  it  is  a  neglect  of 
duty,  if  after  we  are  confirmed  in  our  belief  we  do 
not  study  to  understand  what  we  believe.1  If  after 
we  have  obtained  the  inward  experience  and  con¬ 
sciousness  we  do  not  then  strive  to  interpret  our 
own  experience,  and  comprehend  our  own  Christian 
consciousness,  we  are  guilty  of  an  indifference  to¬ 
wards  the  truth  that  has  in  it  far  more  of  indolence 
than  of  grace,  was  the  opinion  of  both  Augustine 
and  Anselm. 

Aquinas  takes  the  same  general  view  of  the  re¬ 
lation  of  faith  to  scientific  knowledge,  though  his 
intellectual  tendency  was  more  speculative  than 
that  of  Anselm,  and  his  theology  has  more  of  the 
Romish  tone  and  spirit.  He  recognizes  the  fact 
that  there  are  differences  in  the  doctrines,  some  be¬ 
ing  more  apprehensible  than  others,  and  in  refer¬ 
ence  to  such  transcendent  truths  as  the  trinity, 
employs  the  phraseology  so  familiar  in  modern 
Apologetics,  that  though  the  Christian  mysteries 

1  Sicut  rectus  ordo  exigit  ut  pro-  videtur,  si  postquam  confirraati 
funda  Christianae  fidei  credamus,  sumus  in  fide,  non  studemus  quod 
priusquam  ea  praesumamus  rati-  credimus  intelligere.”  Our  Deus 
one  discutere,  ita  negligentia  mihi  Homo,  Lib.  I.  Cap.  ii. 


182 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


are  above  reason,  they  are  not  against  reason.  In 
his  defence  of  the  catholic  faith  against  the  infidel,1 
he  remarks,  that  u  there  are  two  classes  of  truths 
in  the  Christian  system,  respecting  the  being  of  God. 
First,  those  truths  which  transcend  the  entire  power 
of  human  reason ;  such  as  that  God  is  three  and 
one.  Secondly,  those  which  even  natural  reason 
can  attain  to  ;  such  as  that  God  is  one,  is  infinite,  is 
eternal,  and  such  like,  which  even  pagan  philoso¬ 
phers  have  proved  demonstratively,  under  the  guid¬ 
ing  light  of  natural  reason.”  Yet  even  these  latter 
truths,  he  says,  need  the  corroboration  and  fuller 
unfolding  of  revelation,  because  this  natural  knowl¬ 
edge  of  God,  when  unaccompanied  with  the  diffusing 
and  realizing  power  of  a  supernatural  dispensation 
gradually  departs  from  the  popular  mind,  and  be¬ 
comes  confined  to  the  schools  of  a  fewr  philosophers 
and  sages;  and  because,  furthermore,  this  philo¬ 
sophic  knowledge  in  its  best  form  is  mixed  with 
more  or  less  of  error. 

That  school  of  contemplative  theologians,  whom 
we  have  alluded  to  in  a  previous  section  under  the 
designation  of  the  Mystic  Scholastics,  also  maintain 
the  same  view  of  the  relation  of  faith  to  science, 
only  with  less  regard  for  the  scientific  side.  These 
men,  because  they  were  somewhat  mystical  in  their 
intuition,  were  less  inclined  than  the  more  scientific 


1  Summa  catholicae  fidei  con-  non  est  contra  rationem,  sed  sm 
tra  Gentiles.  Lib.  I.  Cap.  iii.  Hil-  pra  rationem.” 
debeet,  Tractatus  viii :  “  Fides 


ANSELM,  AQUINAS,  AND  BERNARD. 


183 


Anselm  and  Aquinas  to  care  for  the  interests  of 
reason  and  philosophy,  though  they  by  no  means 
disregarded  or  overlooked  them,  as  does  the  Mystic 
in  the  restricted  signification  of  the  term. 

Bernard  is  the  greatest  and  noblest  representa¬ 
tive  of  this  class  of  minds ;  and  an  extract  or  two 
from  him  will  serve  to  show  his  attitude  towards 
Christian  science  in  its  relations  to  Christian  faith. 
“  Science,”  says  St.  Bernard,  “  reposes  upon  reason ; 
faith  upon  authority.  Both,  however,  are  in  pos¬ 
session  of  a  sure  and  valid  truth  ;  but  faith  possesses 
the  truth  in  a  close  and  involuted  form,  while  sci¬ 
ence  possesses  it  in  an  open  and  expanded  one. 
Scientific  cognition  not  only  possesses  the  truth,  but 
the  distinct  comprehension  of  it.  Faith  is  a  sort  of 
sure  and  instinctive  (voluntaria)  intimation  [Ger- 
manice,  Ahnung]  of  truth  that  is  not  yet  opened  up 
before  the  mind  in  clear  analysis  and  outline.  How 
then  does  faith  differ  from  science  ?  In  this,  namely, 
that  although  faith  is  not  in  possession  of  an  uncer¬ 
tain  or  an  invalid  truth  any  more  than  science  is, 
yet  it  is  in  possession  of  an  undeveloped  truth,  while 
science  has  the  truth  in  an  unfolded  form.  Science 
does  not  desire  to  contradict  faith ;  but  it  desires  to 
cognize  with  plainness  what  faith  knows  with  cer¬ 
tainty.”  1  Hence,  in  another  place,  Bernard  remarks 

1  “  Intellects  rationi  innititur,  voluntaria  quaedam  et  certa  prae- 
fides  authoritati.  Habentilla  duo  libatio  necdum  propalatae  verita- 
certam  veritatem,  sed  fides  clau-  tis.  Intellects  est  rei  cujuscunque 
sam  et  involutam,  intelligentia  nu-  invisibilis  certa  et  manifesta  no¬ 
dam  et  manifestam.  .  .  .  Fides  est  titia  ....  Fides  ambiguum  non 


184 


HIST0EY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


of  invisible  and  divine  things,  that  u  not  disputation 
but  holiness  comprehends  them.” 

Perhaps  the  relations  of  reason  and  faith  have 
never  been  more  concisely  and  accurately  stated 
than  in  the  pregnant  and  epigrammatic  Latin  of 
Anselm  and  Bernard.  The  practical  belief  of  the 
truths  of  Christianity,  according  to  these  apologists, 
contains  much  that  is  latent  and  undeveloped.  The 
Christian  is  wiser  than  he  knows.  The  moment  he 
begins  to  examine  the  implications  and  involutions 
of  his  own  personal  and  certain  consciousness,  he 
finds  that  they  contain  the  entire  rudimental  matter 
of  Christian  science.  Faith,  in  the  phrase  of  Clem¬ 
ent  of  Alexandria,  furnishes  the  aroL/ua,  the  ele¬ 
mentary  materials,  of  rational  knowledge.  The 

Christian,  for  illustration,  believes  in  the  one  living 

_  • 

and  personal  God.  He  possesses  the  idea  of  the 
deity  by  virtue  of  his  creation  and  rational  consti¬ 
tution.  His  faith  holds  it  in  its  unexpanded  form. 
But  the  instant  he  commences  the  analysis  of  this 
idea  of  ideas,  he  discovers  its  profound  capacity  and 
its  immense  involution.  Again  he  believes  in  God 
incarnate.  But  when  he  endeavors  to  scientifically 

habet:  aut  si  habet,  fides nonest,  extract  employs  the  word  “  vol- 
sed  opinio.  Quid  igitur  distat  ab  untary,”  as  the  earlier  English 
intellectu  ?  ISTempe  quod  etsi  non  writers  often  do,  in  the  sense  of 
habet  incertum  non  magis  quam  “  spontaneous,” — as  Milton,  e.  g. 
intellectus,  habet  tamen  involu-  does  when  he  defines  poetry  to  be 
turn ,  quod  non  intellectus.”  De  “thoughts  that  voluntary  [spon- 
Consideratione,  Lib.  Y.  Cap.  iii.  taneously]  move  harmonious  num- 
Bernardi  :  Opera,  p.  894.  (Ed.  bers.” 

Par.  1632). — Bernard  in  the  above 


ANSELM,  AQUINAS,  AND  BERNARD. 


185 


analyse  and  comprehend  what  is  contained  in  this 
doctrine  and  historical  fact,  he  is  overwhelmed  by 
the  multitude  of  its  relations  and  the  richness  of 
its  contents.  His  faith  has  actually  and  positively 
grasped  these  ideas  of  God  and  the  God-Man.  He 
is  as  certain  of  their  validity  as  he  is  of  any  truth 
whatever.  But  his  faith  has  grasped  them,  in  the 
phrase  of  St.  Bernard,  in  their  undeveloped  and 
pregnant  form.  If  now,  he  would  convert  faith  into 
science,  and  would  pass  from  religion  to  philosophy, 
he  has  only  to  reflect  upon  the  intrinsic  meaning 
and  substance  of  these  ideas,  until  they  open  along 
the  lines  of  their  structure,  and  are  apprehended 
philosophically,  though  not  exhaustively.  But  in 
this  process,  faith  itself  is  reinforced  and  deepened 
by  a  reflex  action,  while  at  the  same  time,  the  intel¬ 
lect  is  preserved  reverent  and  vigilant,  because  the 
cognition,  though  positive  and  correct  as  far  as  it 
reaches,  is  not  exhaustive  and  complete,  only  by 
reason  of  the  immensity  and  infinitude  of  the  object.1 


1  The  distinction  between  ^pos¬ 
itive  and  an  exhaustive  conception 
has  been  overlooked  in  the  recent 
discussions  respecting  the  possi¬ 
bility  of  man’s  possessing  a  pos¬ 
itive  conception  of  the  infinite.  If 
by  a  positive  knowledge  is  meant 
an  infinite  or  perfect  knowledge 
that  exhausts  all  the  mystery  of 
an  object,  then  man  cannot  have 
a  positive  knowledge  of  even  any 
finite  thing.  But  if  by  positive 
is  meant  true  and  valid  as  far  as 
the  cognition  reaches,— if  the  term 


relates  to  quality  and  not  to  quan¬ 
tity, — then  man’s  knowledge  of 
the  infinite  is  as  positive  as  his 
knowledge  of  the  finite.  In  this 
latter  and  only  proper  use  of  the 
term,  man’s  conception  of  eternity 
is  as  positive  as  his  conception  of 
time,  and  his  apprehension  of  di¬ 
vine  justice  is  no  more  a  negation 
than  his  apprehension  of  human 
justice.  Man’s  knowledge  of  God, 
like  his  knowledge  of  the  ocean, 
is  a  positive  perception,  as  far  as 
it  extends.  He  does  not  exhaust/ 


186 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


§  3.  Apologetics  of  Abelard. 

In  this  scholastic  and  systematizing  period,  as 
we  have  before  remarked,  the  priority  of  faith 
in  the  order  was  not  acknowledged  by  all  minds. 
Men  of  a  speculative  and  rationalistic  tendency  like 
Abelard  and  Raymund  Lully  regarded  the  intellec¬ 
tual  comprehension  of  the  truths  of  Christianity  as 
necessarily  antecedent  to  all  belief  in  them.  The 
dictum  of  Abelard  (Intr.  ii.  3),  “  non  credendum, 
nisi  prius  intellectum,”  is  the  exact  reverse  of  An¬ 
selm’s  u  credo  ut  intelligam.”  It  ought  however  to  be 
observed  that  Abelard,  in  the  outset,  endeavoured 
to  provide  for  the  interests  and  claims  of  faith 
by  giving  a  somewhat  wide  meaning  to  the  term 
u  knowledge,”  or  u  intelligence.”  It  is  undoubtedly 
true,  as  Bernard  himself  concedes  in  describing  the 
difference  between  the  knowledge  of  faith  and  the 
knowledge  of  philosophy  (ante,  p.  183),  that  the  hu¬ 
man  mind  cannot  believe  a  truth  or  a  fact  of  which 
it  has  no  species  of  apprehension  whatsoever.  Some 
degree  of  knowledge  must  ever  be  assumed,  as 
simultaneous  with  the  exercise  of  belief  The  mind 
must  at  first  know  the  object  of  its  faith,  by  feeling 


ively  comprehend  the  ocean,  but  exhaustive  or  infinite  knowledge 
this  does  not  render  his  knowl-  of  either  the  finite  or  the  infinite, 
edge  of  the  ocean,  as  to  its  quali-  He  finds  it  as  impossible  to  give 
ty ,  a  mere  negation.  But  it  is  an  all- comprehending  definition 
the  quality  and  not  the  quantity  of  time  as  he  does  of  eternity,  of 
of  a  cognition  that  determines  its  an  atom  of  matter  as  of  the  es- 
validity.  There  is  for  man  no  sence  of  God. 


APOLOGETICS  OE  ABELARD. 


187 


(anticipatio,  praelibatio),  in  distinction  from  con¬ 
ception  ;  otherwise  the  object  of  faith  is  a  nonentity 
for  it.  Had  Abelard  recognized  this  distinction, 
and  thus  guarded  his  statement  that  u  knowledge 
is  prior  to  faith,”  he  might  have  come  into  agree¬ 
ment  with  his  opponents.  But,  laying  down  his 
dictum  as  he  did  in  terms  exactly  contrary  to  those 
of  Origen,  Augustine,  Anselm,  and  Bernard,  all 
qualifications  were  certain  to  be  overborne  by 
the  logical  proposition  upon  which  he  founded  his 
method,  and  his  school.  The  formal  and  theoretical 
precedence  instead  of  postponement  of  knowledge 
to  faith  tended  to  rationalism  in  theology,  and  ac¬ 
tually  resulted  in  it.  A  position  though  erroneous, 
when  held  with  moderation  and  qualifications,  by 
its  first  author,  may  not  be  very  injurious  to  the 
cause  of  truth.  The  element  of  truth  which  it  con¬ 
tains  may  be  prominent  in  the  first  stages  of  its  his¬ 
tory,  while  the  elements  of  error  recede  from  view 
and  influence.  But  the  tendency  of  the  principle, 
after  all,  is  to  error,  and  as  the  course  of  its  devel¬ 
opment  goes  on,  the  little  truth  that  is  contained  in 
it  is  overborne,  the  principle  itself  is  grasped  more 
boldly  and  applied  by  a  less  moderate  mind,  until 
in  the  end  it  shows  its  real  nature  in  the  overthrow 
of  all  truth  and  belief.  The  class  of  men  of  whom 
we  are  speaking  is  an  example.  Abelard  himself 
became  more  and  more  rationalistic  in  his  views, 
until  he  passed  the  line  that  separates  faith  from 
unbelief,  and  the  church,  chiefly  through  the  rep- 


188 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


resentations  and  arguments  of  the  mild  and  tolerant, 
but  devout  and  evangelical  Bernard,  formally  con¬ 
demned  his  philosophical  and  theological  opinions.1 

The  most  serious  defect  in  the  Apologetics  of 
this  Mediaeval  period  sprang  from  the  growing  in - 
jluence  of  traditional  theology ,  at  the  expense  of 
inspiration .  Even  devout  and  spiritual  theologians 
like  Anselm  and  Bernard,  whose  views  of  truth, 
with  the  exception  of  their  Mariolatry,  were  sub¬ 
stantially  scriptural,  and  whose  religious  experience 
had  been  formed  and  established  by  revelation, 
attributed  too  much  weight  to  the  opinions  of  dis¬ 
tinguished  church  fathers,  and  to  the  decisions  of 
Councils,  in  comparison  with  the  infallible  authority 
of  Scripture .  They  by  no  means  denied  the  para¬ 
mount  authority  of  revelation,  and  both  in  practical 
and  theoretical  respects  are  at  a  great  distance  from 
that  distinctively  Papal  theology  which  received  its 
first  definite  form  and  statement  in  the  articles  of 
the  Council  of  Trent ;  yet  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
their  minds  were  not  altogether  unaffected  by  the 
influences  of  their  time,  and  of  their  ecclesiastical 
connections.  That  direct  and  emphatic  appeal  to 
Scripture  first  of  all,  and  only  afterwards  to  author¬ 
ity,  which  is  the  characteristic  of  the  Protestant 
theologian,  and  that  constant  renewal  and  revivifi¬ 
cation  of  scientific  theology  by  fresh  draughts  at 
the  fountain  of  theological  knowledge,  which  has 

1  Abelard  was  condemned  in  at  Soissons  in  1121,  and  at  Sena 
nineteen  articles  of  specification,  in  1140. 


APOLOGETICS  OF  ABELARD. 


189 


rendered  Protestant  science  so  vital  and  vigorous,  is 
found  in  a  too  low  degree  in  these  men,  who  were 
yet  the  greatest  and  best  minds  of  this  systematizing 
period.  In  their  successors,  this  tendency  to  exalt 
tradition  increased  with  great  rapidity,  until  error 
by  its  very  excess  brought  about  a  reaction,  and 
Protestantism  once  more  set  tradition  and  inspira¬ 
tion,  historical  theology  and  biblical  doctrine,  in 
right  relations  to  each  other. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

MODERN  DEFENCES  OF  CHRISTIANITY:  A.  D.  1517— A.  D.  1850 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements. 

The  Reformers  themselves  were  too  much  occu¬ 
pied  with  stating  and  defending  the  Christian  sys¬ 
tem  in  opposition  to  the  corrupted  theology  of  the 
Papal  Church,  to  enter  into  a  defence  of  it  against 
the  objections  of  skepticism.  Hence  the  Reform¬ 
atory  age  yields  but  little  material  of  an  apologetic 
character,  and  we  pass  directly  to  the  most  import¬ 
ant  section  in  the  history  of  modern  Apologetics, 
that,  namely  which  relates  to  the  English  Deism 
of  the  17  th  and  18th  centuries. 

The  latter  half  of  the  17th  century  was  marked 
by  great  excitability  and  fermentation,  both  in  the 
political  and  the  religious  world.  England  was 
passing  through  those  revolutions  which  resulted  in 
the  restriction  of  the  royal  prerogative,  the  strength¬ 
ening  of  the  commonalty,  and  the  settlement  of  the 


PRELIMIN ART  STATEMENTS. 


191 


government  in  1688  upon  the  basis  of  the  Bill  of 
Bights.  Continental  Europe  was  witnessing  -  the 
great  struggle  by  which  the  predominance  of  polit¬ 
ical  power  passed  from  the  Southern  to  the  Central 
nations, — from  the  Papal  to  the  Protestant  powers. 
Corresponding  movements  were  occurring  in  the 
ecclesiastical  world.  The  Lutheran  church,  at  the 
close  of  the  17th  century,  was  feeling  an  exciting 
influence  of  two  very  different  kinds.  The  Pietists 
under  the  lead  of  Spener  and  Francke  were  infus¬ 
ing  into  the  Old  Lutheran  orthodoxy  some  of  the 
warmth  and  life  that  glowed  in  the  Moravian 
Brethren ;  while,  on  another  side,  fanatical  preach¬ 
ers  and  sectaries  were  breaking  in  upon  the  unity 
of  the  ancient  ecclesiastical  organization  that  had 
come  down  from  the  days  of  Luther.  In  the  Be- 
formed  Church  there  was  more  or  less  reaction 
against  the  strict  Calvinistic  symbols ;  while  in  the 
Papal  Church  the  Jansenists  were  attempting  to 
revive  the  Augustinian  orthodoxy  which  the  council 
of  Trent  had  covertly  rejected,  though  pretending 
to  receive  it.  Contemporaneously  with  this  general 
excitement  in  the  political  and  ecclesiastical  world, 
there  arose  in  England  a  class  of  minds,  who  with 
greater  or  less  decision  and  bitterness  rejected  the 
Old  and  New  Testaments  as  a  revelation  from  God, 
and  stood  upon  the  principles  of  natural  religion, 
though  in  some  instances  lapsing  down  from  this 
position  into  that  of  sensualism  and  atheism. 


192 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


§  2.  Intellectual  Deism  of  Herbert  of  Gherbury. 

Deism ,  the  name  given  to  the  system  of  these 
men,  is  the  general  belief  in  a  God,  coupled  with 
the  disbelief  in  a  written  revelation,  and  of  all  those 
particular  views  of  God  and  man  which  are  taught 
in  the  Scriptures.  In  its  best  form  it  would,  there¬ 
fore,  include  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  existence, 
of  the  divine  unity,  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
and  of  indefinite  rewards  and  punishments  here¬ 
after  ;  and  it  would  reject  the  doctrines  of  the  trin¬ 
ity,  of  the  deity  and  incarnation  of  the  Son,  of  the 
apostasy  of  man,  of  redemption,  and  of  endless 
rewards  and  punishments.  Deism  appears  in  this 
highest  form  in  the  system  of  Lord  Herbert  of 
Cherbury  (f  1648),  who  may  be  regarded  as  the 
founder  of  the  school  of  English  Deists,  though 
holding  a  much  more  elevated  skepticism  than  any 
of  his  successors.  After  a  survey  of  the  various 
religions  that  have  appeared,  he  reduces  them  to 
one  universal  religion,  which  he  maintains  is  ade¬ 
quate  to  meet  all  the  religious  wants  of  mankind. 
This  universal  system  consists  of  five  articles:  1. 
That  there  is  one  supreme  God.  2.  That  he  is  to  be 
worshipped.  3.  That  piety  and  virtue  are  the  prin¬ 
cipal  part  of  his  worship.  4.  That  man  should  re¬ 
pent  of  sin,  and  that  if  he  does  so,  God  will  pardon 
it.  5.  That  there  are  rewards  for  the  good,  and 
punishments  for  the  evil,  partly  in  this  life,  and 


INTELLECTUAL  DEISM. 


193 


partly  in  a  future  state.1  These  articles  Lord  Her¬ 
bert  represents  as  sentiments  inscribed  by  God  on 
the  minds  of  all  men,  and  attempts  to  show  that  they 
have  been  universally  acknowledged  in  all  nations. 

It  is  obvious,  at  the  first  glance,  that  this  sys¬ 
tem  is  much  in  advance  of  the  later  forms  of 
English  infidelity.  It  contains  a  mixture  of  truth 
and  error,  so  far  as  natural  religion  is  concerned; 
but  is  erroneous  so  far  as  relates  to  revealed  religion. 
That  there  is  one  Supreme  Being,  that  he  is  to  be 
worshipped,  and  that  there  are  future  rewards  and 
punishments,  are,  indeed,  truths  that  belong  to  the 
constitution  of  the  human  mind.  But  they  have 
not  been  so  generally  acknowledged  by  all  classes 
in  all  nations,  as  Lord  Herbert  represents.  On  the 
contrary,  the  recognition  of  these  first  truths  of  nat¬ 
ural  religion,  like  the  recognition  of  the  first  truths 
of  geometry,  has  been  confined  to  a  portion  of  man¬ 
kind.  They  have  been  distinctly  taught  by  only  a 
few  of  the  more  thoughtful  pagan  philosophers,  in 
different  nations,  and  have  constituted  an  esoteric 
system  for  particular  schools.  The  great  masses  of 
the  pagan  world,  on  the  contrary,  have  adopted  the 
mythological  religions,  in  which  these  theistic  teach¬ 
ings  of  natural  reason  and  conscience  glimmer  only 
here  and  there,  and  even  these  are  contradicted 
or  neutralized  by  polytheistic  views  and  represen¬ 
tations.  With  respect  to  the  specific  nature  and 
extent  of  future  rewards  and  punishments,  there  is 

1  Herbert:  De  religione  Gentilium,  Caput  I.  Ed.  Amstel.  1700. 

13 


194 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


indefmiteness  in  the  views  of  many  of  the  pagan 
writers ;  although,  in .  some  instances,  as  in  that  of 
Plutarch,  there  is  great  decision  in  the  assertion  of 
a  fearful  and  awful  vengeance  upon  the  guilty.1 
And  this  indefiniteness  appears  in  the  representa¬ 
tions  of  Lord  Herbert  himself,  upon  this  important 
point. 

The  fourth  tenet  in  Herbert’s  scheme,  that  of 
pardon  upon  repentance,  is  taught  neither  by  nat¬ 
ural  nor  revealed  religion.  For  the  light  of  nature 
gives  no  assurance  that  the  deity  will  ever  act  upon 
any  principles  but  those  of  justice.  Hence  the  pa¬ 
gan  religions  were  full  of  devices  to  propitiate  jus¬ 
tice  ;  and  yet  they  could  never  make  it  certain  that 
justice  had  really  been  propitiated.  With  yet  more 
emphasis  than  the  inspired  writer  asserts  it  of  the 
Jewish  sacrifices,  can  it  be  said  of  all  Pagan  obla¬ 
tions,  that  they  can  never,  though  offered  year  by 
year  continually,  make  the  comers  thereunto  perfect 
in  things  pertaining  to  conscience  (Heb.  x.  1).  The 


According  to  Plutarch  (De 
sera  numinis  vindicta)  there  are 
three  subordinate  ministers  of  jus¬ 
tice,  under  Nemesis  the  chief. 
The  first,  Poena ,  executes  her  of¬ 
fice  mainly  in  the  present  life, 
and  is  the  author  of  the  pains  and 
penalties  which  are  the  more  im¬ 
mediate  effects  of  guilt.  The  sec¬ 
ond  is  Dike  (At /a?),  who  punishes 
in  the  future  world  those  who 
have  been  hut  partially  punished 
by  Poena  in  this.  Her  inflictions 


are  severer  than  those  of  Poena, 
and  their  duration  depends  upon 
the  degree  of  guiltiness.  The  last 
and  most  terrible  minister  of  Ne¬ 
mesis  is  Erinnys ,  or  Fury ,  who 
punishes  those  who  remain  incor¬ 
rigible  after  the  other  means  have 
failed.  She  scourges  her  victims 
from  place  to  place,  and  finally 
plunges  them  headlong  into  an 
abyss  whose  horrors  no  language 
can  describe. 


INTELLECTUAL  DEISM. 


195 


u  universal  consent  ”  of  mankind  makes  against  the 
fourth  article  in  Lord  Herbert’s  creed  rather  than 
for  it.  The  whole  system  of  sacrifices  in  the  pagan 
world,  as  well  as  the  reasoning  of  some  of  the  pagan 
philosophers,  and  particularly  of  the  earlier  Grecian 
poets,  goes  to  prove  that  the  pagan  mind  felt  the 
natural  incompatibility  of  pardon  with  justice,  and 
by  implication  acknowledged  the  need  of  an  atone¬ 
ment  in  order  to  its  exercise. 

The  possibility  of  a  special  revelation  from  God 
Lord  Herbert  denies,  except  in  its  immediate  form 
to  each  individual.  This  form  he  very  singularly 
concedes,  and  claims  for  himself  in  the  following 
remarkable  passage  from  his  very  interesting  Auto¬ 
biography.  Hesitating  whether  he  should  publish 
or  suppress  his  principal  work  he  says :  u  Being 
thus  doubtful,  in  my  chamber,  one  fair  day  in  the 
summer,  my  casement  being  open  towards  the  south, 
the  sun  shining  clear,  and  no  wind  stirring,  I  took 
my  book  De  Veritate  in  my  hands,  and  kneeling  on 
my  knees,  devoutly  said  these  words :  c  O  thou 
eternal  God,  author  of  this  light  which  now  shines 
upon  me,  and  giver  of  all  inward  illuminations,  I  do 
beseech  thee,  of  thine  infinite  goodness,  to  pardon  a 
greater  request  than  a  sinner  ought  to  make :  I  am 
not  satisfied  enough,  whether  I  shall  publish  this 
book ;  if  it  be  for  thy  glory,  I  beseech  thee  give 
some  sign  from  heaven ;  if  not  I  shall  suppress  it.’ 
I  had  no  sooner  spoken  these  words,  but  a  loud, 
though  yet  gentle  noise,  came  forth  from  the  heav- 


196 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


ens  (for  it  was  like  nothing  on  earth)  ;  which  did 
so  cheer  and  comfort  me,  that  I  took  my  petition  as 
granted,  and  that  I  had  the  sign  demanded ;  where¬ 
upon  also  I  resolved  to  print  my  book.  This,  how 
strange  soever  it  may  seem,  I  protest  before  the 
eternal  God,  is  true ;  neither  am  I  any  way  super- 
stitiously  deceived  herein ;  since  I  did  not  only 
clearly  hear  the  noise,  but  in  the  serenest  sky  that 
ever  I  saw,  being  without  all  cloud,  did,  to  my 
thinking,  see  the  place  whence  it  came.” 

The  deism  of  Lord  Herbert  was  evidently  some¬ 
what  spiritualized  by  the  Christianity  in  the  midst 
of  which  it  sprung  up.  He  himself  was  the  brother 
of  the  saintly  George  Herbert,  whose  religious  po¬ 
etry  is  among  the  purest  expressions  that  have  yet 
been  made  of  the  emotions  and  feelings  of  the  pen¬ 
itent  heart.  And  although  the  principles  of  his 
scheme,  when  logically  carried  out,  conduct  to  the 
same  conclusions  to  which  the  Tindals  and  Shaftes- 
burys  afterwards  arrived,  yet  there  is  a  serious  and 
humane  tone  in  the  writings  of  Lord  Herbert  that 
elevates  them  much  above  the  general  level  of  deism. 

§  3.  Materialistic  and  Sensual  Deism . 

Disbelief  in  revealed  religion,  and  reliance  upon 
natural  religion  as  sufficient  to  meet  the  necessities 
of  human  nature,  showed  themselves  most  energet¬ 
ically  in  that  political  and  religious  reaction  which 
followed  the  Cromwellian  period.  Deism  in  its 
most  extreme  forms  now  arises,  and  is  characterized 


MATERIALISTIC  AND  SENSUAL  DEISM.  197 


by  bitter  hatred  of  the  church,  both  Established 
and  Nonconforming,  of  the  clergy,  of  theological 
science,  and  of  the  Scriptures  as  the  source  and  sup¬ 
port  of  all  these.  And  inasmuch  as  the  church  in 
England  was  closely  connected  with  the  state,  and 
the  clergy  were  identified  with  the  existing  govern¬ 
ment,  Deism  was  frequently  found  in  alliance  with 
the  democratic,  and  sometimes  the  revolutionary, 
tendencies  in  the  nation. 

This  was  not  always  the  case  however.  Thomas 
Hobbes  (f  1679)  was  a  most  servile  advocate  of 
kingly  authority,  and  of  the  right  of  the  state  to 
coerce  individual  opinions.  He  is  somewhat  guard¬ 
ed  in  his  treatment  of  the  Scriptures,  because  the 
English  state  and  church  were  founded  upon  them. 
Yet  he  expressly  teaches  that  “we  have  no  assur¬ 
ance  of  the  certainty  of  scripture  but  by  the  author¬ 
ity  of  the  church,  and  this  he  resolves  into  the 
authority  of  the  commonwealth.”  Hobbes  declares 
that  until  the  sovereign  ruler  has  prescribed  them, 
“  the  precepts  of  scripture  are  not  obligatory  laws, 
but  only  counsel  and  advice”;  Christians,  he  holds, 
are  bound  in  conscience  to  obey  the  laws  of  an  infi¬ 
del  king  in  matters  of  religion ;  “  thought  is  free ; 
but  when  it  comes  to  confession  of  faith,  the  private 
reason  must  submit  to  the  public,  that  is  to  say  to 
God’s  lieutenant.”  Hence  the  subject,  if  commanded 
by  the  sovereign,  may  allowably  deny  Christ  in 
words,  if  holding  firmly  in  his  heart  the  faith  of 
Christ ;  for  in  that  case  “  it  is  not  he  that  denieth 


198 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES, 


Christ  before  men,  but  his  governor  and  the  laws 
of  his  country.” 

Hobbes  acknowledges  the  existence  of  God,  but 
denies  that  we  know  any  more  of  him  than  that  he 
exists ;  denies  free  will  to  man,  and  asserts  that  he 
is  by  creation  a  necessitated  agent ;  asserts  the 
materiality  and  mortality  of  the  human  soul,  and 
represents  the  distinction  between  soul  and  body  as 
an  error  contracted  from  the  demonology  of  the 
Greeks ;  teaches  that  the  belief  in  a  future  state  is 
merely  “  a  belief  grounded  upon  other  men’s  saying, 
that  they  knew  it  supernaturally,  or  that  they  knew 
those,  that  knew  them,  that  knew  others,  that  knew 
it  supernaturally.” 1  Thus  in  the  general  principles 
of  his  system,  Hobbes  falls  far  below  Lord  Her¬ 
bert.  Herbert  is  serious  in  maintaining  the  more 
important  truths  of  natural  religion,  though  reject¬ 
ing  revealed  religion  altogether,  while  Hobbes  lays 
down  positions  that  result  in  sheer  materialism  and 
atheism.  And  such  in  fact  was  the  practical  result 
of  Hobbism.  The  licentious  age  of  the  second 
Charles  was  characterized  by  a  large  class  of  minds 
who  had  no  belief  in  God,  or  in  man’s  accountability.2 

From  Hobbes  downward,  English  Deism  grows 
more  and  more  materialistic  and  sensual ;  for  error 
like  truth  runs  its  own  natural  course  of  develope- 
ment,  and  expands  by  its  own  internal  law  into 
more  and  more  extreme  forms.  Shaftesbury  (f  1713), 

^eland:  Deistical  Writers,  3  Macaulay:  History  of  Eng- 
Letter  III.  land,  Chap.  III. 


MATERIALISTIC  AND  SENSUAL  DEISM. 


199 


«iv 


in  liis  work  entitled  u  Characteristics  of  Man,  Man¬ 
ners,  Opinions,  and  Times,”  sets  up  ridicule  as  the 
test  of  truth,  and  labors  hard  to  show  the  pernicious 
influence  upon  mankind  of  a  belief  in  the  doctrine 
of  a  future  state,  and  of  future  rewards  and  punish¬ 
ments.  Toland  (f  1722),  a  native  of  Ireland,  in  some 
of  his  works  adopts  the  pantheism  of  Spinoza,  and 
in  others  attempts  to  disprove  the  genuineness  of 
the  canonical  scriptures  by  arguments  built  upon 
the  apocryphal  gospels  and  the  forged  writings  of 
the  first  centuries.  Collins  (f  1729)  combats  the 
proof  for  Christianity  derived  from  the  prophecies, 
which  he  represents  as  a  species  of  mystical  alle¬ 
gorizing  peculiar  to  the  Jewish  mind.  Woolston 
(f  1733)  seizes  upon  the  allegorical  method  of  inter¬ 
preting  the  gospel  narratives  which  many  Christian 
writers  had  employed,  and  uses  it  as  a  medium  of  a 
coarse  and  ribald  attack  upon  the  person  and  char¬ 
acter  of  Christ.  Tindal  (f  1733)  composed  a  work 
in  which  he  argues  against  the  very  idea  and  possi¬ 
bility  of  revelation, — the  earliest  work  of  the  kind, 
and  written  with  more  than  ordinary  ability  and 
thoroughness.  Tindal  rejects  from  the  Scriptures 
all  that  relates  to  man’s  apostasy  and  redemption, 
and  regards  the  remainder  as  only  the  teachings  of 
natural  reason ;  so  that  “  Christianity  ”  is  “  as  old 
as  the  creation,”  and  the  u  Gospel  ”  is  only  u  a  re¬ 
publication  of  the  law  of  nature.”1  The  scheme  of 

1  His  work  is  entitled  :  Chris-  the  Gospel  a  Eepublication  of  tho 
tianity  as  old  as  the  Creation,  or  Law  of  Nature. 


200 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


Tindal  bears  a  close  resemblance  to  that  of  Herbert. 
Morgan  (f  1743)  follows  Tindal  in  respect  to  his 
general  principles,  but  devotes  his  attention  mainly 
to  an  attack  upon  the  Old  Testament  and  the  re¬ 
ligion  of  Moses.  Chubb  (f  1747)  also  takes  the 
same  position  with  Tindal  and  Morgan,  so  far  as 
natural  religion  is  concerned,  and  labors  strenuously 
to  show  that  true  Christianity  has  been  entirely 
misapprehended,  and  that  it  needs  to  be  cleared  of 
a  class  of  doctrines  which  are  foreign  to  it.  In  this 
reconstruction,  or  “True  Gospel  asserted,”  as  he 
entitles  his  work,  Chubb,  as  would  be  expected,  re¬ 
duces  Christianity  to  Deism.  Bolingbroke  (f  1751) 
constructed  a  scheme  of  which  the  following  are  the 
principal  features :  1.  There  is  one  Supreme  Being 
of  almighty  power  and  skill,  but  possessing  no  moral 
attributes  distinct  from  his  physical.  He  has  no 
holiness,  justice,  or  goodness,  nor  anything  equiv¬ 
alent  to  these  qualities  as  they  exist  in  man  ;  and  to 
deduce  moral  obligations  from  these  attributes,  or 
to  speak  of  imitating  God  in  his  moral  attributes,  is 
enthusiasm  or  blasphemy.  2.  God  made  the  world 
and  established  the  laws  of  nature  at  the  beginning ; 
but  he  does  not  concern  himself  with  the  affairs  of 
men,  or  at  most,  if  he  does,  his  providence  extends 
only  to  collective  bodies  and  not  to  individuals. 
3.  The  soul  is  not  a  distinct  substance  from  the 
body,  and  the  whole  man  is  dissolved  at  death. 
The  doctrine  of  future  rewards  and  punishments  is 
a  fiction,  though  a  useful  one  to  mankind.  4.  The 


MATERIALISTIC  AND  SENSUAL  DEISM. 


201 


law  of  nature  is  sufficient,  and  therefore  there  is  no 
need  of  a  special  revelation,  and  none  has  been  made. 
5.  The  Old  Testament  history  is  false  and  incredible, 
and  the  religion  taught  in  it  unworthy  of  God,  and 
repugnant  to  his  perfections.  The  New  Testament 
contains  two  different  systems  contradictory  to  each 
other, — that  of  Christ,  and  that  of  Paul.  Only 
the  first  is  genuine  Christianity,  and  may  be  re¬ 
garded  as  a  republication  of  the  law  of  nature,  or 
rather  of  the  theology  of  Plato.  Yet  that  portion 
of  Christ’s  teaching  which  relates  to  the  redemption 
of  mankind  by  his  own  death,  and  to  future  rewards 
and  punishments,  is  absurd  and  contrary  to  the 
attributes  of  God.1 

The  sentiments  of  these  Deists  penetrated  the 
English  literature  of  the  18tli  century  to  some 
extent,  and  exerted  some  indirect  influence  upon 
English  theology  itself.  Alexander  Pope,  whose 
speculative  opinions  were  very  much  shaped  by 
Bolingbroke,  his  “guide,  philosopher,  and  friend,” 
has  set  forth  natural  religion  and  omitted  revealed, 
in  the  most  brilliant  and  polished  poetry  that  has 
yet  been  composed.  Jonathan  Swift,  a  member  of 
the  ecclesiastical  establishment,  though  opposed  to 
Deism  because  Deism  was  opposed  to  the  English 
church  and  state,  has  yet  left  nothing  in  his  religious 
or  theological  writings  that  betokens  any  sympathy 
with  New  Testament  Christianity.  In  these  in- 

Compare  Leland:  Deistical  Writers ;  andLEOHLEE:  Englisches 
Deismus. 


202 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


stances,  it  would  not  be  correct  to  charge  an  avowed 
adoption  of  deisti-cal  sentiments  ;  for  there  was  none 
in  either.  But  the  leaven  of  unbelief  in  the  dis¬ 
tinctively  evangelical  truths  of  Christianity,  and  the 
disposition  to  regard  natural  religion  and  ethics  as 
sufficient  for  the  religious  necessities  of  mankind, 
had  imperceptibly  penetrated  both  the  poet  and 
the  divine.1 

The  skepticism  of  England  reached  its  full  de- 
velopement  in  the  system  of  David  Hume  (f  1776). 
The  views  of  this  writer  are  too  generally  known 
to  need  stating.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  respecting 
the  speculation  of  Hume,  that  it  is  a  system  of  uni¬ 
versal  doubt,  like  that  of  the  Greek  Pyrrho.  As  a 
consequence,  the  truths  of  natural  religion,  as  well 
as  of  revealed,  are  invalidated.  Hume  concludes 
his  “Natural  History  of  Religion”  with  the  remark: 
u  The  whole  subject  [of  religion]  is  a  riddle  and  an 
inexplicable  mystery;  doubt,  uncertainty,  suspen¬ 
sion  of  the  judgment,  are  the  sole  result  of  our 
close  investigation  of  this  subject.”  Deism  could  not 
continue  to  stand  upon  the  comparatively  elevated 
position  of  its  English  founder,  Lord  Herbert  of 
Cherbury.  It  deteriorates  by  its  own  law  of  evo- 

J  Hallam  (Literature  of  Europe,  morality,  not  only  as  the  basis  of 
II.  967,  Harper’s  Ed.)  remarks  this  all  revelation,  without  a  depend- 
same  tendency  in  as  influential  a  ence  upon  which  it  cannot  he  be- 
divine,  as  archbishop  Tillotson.  lieved,  hut  as  nearly  coincident 
“  What  is  most  remarkable  in  Til-  with  Christianity  in  its  extent , — 
lotson  is  his  strong  assertion,  in  a  length  to  which  few  at  present 
almost  all  his  sermons,  of  the  would  be  ready  to  follow  him.” 
principles  of  natural  religion  and 


REPLIES  TO  ENGLISH  DEISM. 


203 


lution,  as  the  latent  elements  are  elicited  one  by 
one,  and  in  its  final  form  contains  not  even  that 
small  element  of  truth  which  is  to  be  found  in  its 
earlier  forms,  and  by  means  of  which  alone  it  could 
obtain  any  credence  or  acceptance  among  men. 
Had  English  infidelity  made  its  first  appearance  in 
its  last  form ;  had  the  Pyrrhonism  of  David  Hume, 
or  the  sensuality  of  Mandeville,1  instead  of  the 
comparatively  elevated  and  ethical  system  of  Lord 
Herbert  or  Matthew  Tindal,  been  the  first  form  of 
English  Deism,  the  national  mind  would  have 
started  back  in  alarm  and  disgust.  But  the  process 
was  a  gradual  one.  The  English  infidel  himself  was 
prepared  for  the  invalidation  and  rejection  of  all 
religion,  only  by  the  slow  movement  of  more  than 
a  hundred  years. 


§  4.  Replies  to  English  Deism. 

A  brief  sketch  of  the  principal  Apologetic  Trea¬ 
tises  composed  in  opposition  to  English  Deism ,  will 
properly  follow  this  account  of  the  English  deistical 
writers.2 

The  views  of  Lord  Herbert  did  not  attract  much 


'Mandeville  (f  1733)  publish-  first  attempt  to  found  vice  upon 
ed  a  treatise  entitled  “  Private  the  principles  of  political  econo- 
Vices  Public  Benefits,”  in  which  my,  and  justify  it  by  a  reference 
he  maintains  that  the  luxury  and  to  the  general  welfare, 
voluptuousness  of  one  class  in  so-  2  Compare  Lechler  :  Englisches 
ciety  give  employment  and  sup-  Deismus,  pp.  54,  sq. 
port  to  another  class.  It  is  the 


204 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


attention  in  his  own  century.  Cudworth  and  Locke 
merely  allude  to  him  as  a  writer  of  learning  and 
talent,  but  enter  upon  no  criticism  of  his  religious 
system.  Richard  Baxter,  in  his  apologetic  treatise 
entitled  u  More  reasons  for  the  Christian  religion, 
and  no  reason  against  it,”  cites  some  positions  from 
Lord  Herbert’s  work  De  Veritate ,  and  controverts 
them.  Baxter  speaks  with  respect  of  Lord  Herbert, 
and  concedes  that  there  is  truth  in  what  he  says 
respecting  the  necessary  nature  of  the  doctrines  of 
natural  religion.  The  remark  which  Baxter  makes, 
that  he  has  replied  to  the  positions  of  Herbert, 
lest  “  never  having  been  answered,  they  might  be 
thought  unanswerable,”  would  indicate  that  the 
writings  of  Lord  Herbert  had  attracted  but  little 
attention. 

The  scheme  of  Herbert  next  received  a  criticism 
and  reply  from  Thomas  Halyburton,  a  professor  in 
the  Scotch  university  of  St.  Andrews.  His  work 
entitled  “  Natural  religion  insufficient,  and  revealed 
necessary  to  man’s  happiness,”  was  published  in 
1714,  and  contains  a  detailed  refutation  of  Herbert’s 
sentiments.  The  following  are  Halyburton’s  prin¬ 
cipal  positions :  1.  Lord  Herbert’s  five  articles  are 
not  so  universally  acknowledged  as  he  represents. 
2.  The  clearness  with  which  some  pagans  have  per¬ 
ceived  the  truths  of  natural  religion  is  not  due  solely 
to  the  workings  of  their  own  reason,  but  in  part  to 
the  remnants  of  a  primitive  revelation.  3.  Natural 
religion  is  not  sufficient  to  secure  the  eternal  welfare 


REPLIES  TO  ENGLISH  DEISM. 


205. 


of  man,  because  of  man’s  apostasy  and  sinfulness. 
Human  corruption  is  too  deep  and  inveterate  to  be 
overcome  by  merely  ethical  principles.  It  requires 
a  redemptive  power  and  agency. 

A  learned  and  profound  defence  of  the  truths 
of  natural  religion,  in  opposition  to  the  system  of 
Hobbes,  was  made  by  two  distinguished  Plato- 
nists  connected  with  the  university  of  Cambridge ; 
namety,  Henry  More  (f  1678),  and  Ralph  Cudworth 
(f  1688).  The  first-mentioned,  in  his  “Antidote 
against  Atheism,”  and  tract  upon  the  “  Immortality 
of  the  Soul,”  presents  both  the  a  priori  and  a  pos¬ 
teriori  arguments  for  the  divine  existence,  and  the 
immateriality  of  the  human  mind,  with  great  clear¬ 
ness  and  ingenuity.  The  “  Intellectual  System  of 
the  Universe,”  by  Cudworth,  aims  to  establish  the 
doctrine  of  the  divine  existence,  and  the  reality  and 
immutability  of  the  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong  upon  an  impregnable  position  ;  and  in  accom¬ 
plishing  this  aim,  the  resources  of  a  vastly  learned, 
as  well  as  profoundly  contemplative  intellect,  are 
brought  into  requisition.  The  tenets  of  Hobbes 
and  others  are  refuted,  among  other  methods,  by  a 
most  exhaustive  citation  of  the  views  of  pagan  an¬ 
tiquity.  The  primary  origin  and  source  of  natural 
religion  was  investigated  by  the  learned  Puritan, 
Theophilus  Gale,  in  his  work  published  1669-1677 
entitled,  “  The  Court  of  the  Gentiles.”  By  a  very 
extensive  and  minute  examination  of  all  the  theism 
of  the  pagan  world,  he  endeavours  to  show  that  what 


206 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


was  correct  in  the  religions  of  paganism  sprang  from 
sporadic  portions  of  the  Patriarchal  and  Jewish 
revelations, — that  “  Pythagoras’s  College,  Plato’s 
Academy,  Aristotle’s  Peripatum,  Zeno’s  Stoa,  and 
Epicurus’s  Gardens  were  all  watered  with  rivulets, 
which  though  in  themselves  corrupt  were  originally 
derived  from  the  sacred  fountain  of  Siloam ;  ”  and 
that  u  there  was  none  that  opened  a  more  effectual 
door  for  the  propagating  of  philosophical  principle 
and  light,  than  Moses,  who  laid  the  main  foundations 
of  all  that  philosophy,  which  first  the  Phenicians 
and  Egyptians,  and  from  them  the  Grecians,  were 
masters  of.” 1 


1  It  is  noteworthy  that  this  ref¬ 
erence  of  the  theism  of  the  elder 
pagan  world  to  Hebrew  sources 
has  also  been  adopted  by  one  of 
the  most  profound  modern  inves¬ 
tigators  of  the  philosophy  of  my¬ 
thology.  Schelling,  in  his  Gott- 
heiten  von  Samothrace,  takes  the 
following  positions  :  1.  The  names 
of  the  deities  of  Samothrace,  as 
well  as  of  the  priests  (who  were 
named  after  the  gods  they  served) 
were  Phoenician,  which  language 
was  substantially  that  of  the  He¬ 
brews.  Regard  therefore  must  be 
had  to  the  Hebrew  archives  and 
language,  in  investigating  the  Ca- 
biric  mysteries.  2.  The  esoteric 
religious  system  of  the  Greeks  ex¬ 
hibits  fragments  of  a  system  older 
than  any  that  is  to  be  found  in 
the  historical  memorials  of  [pa¬ 
gan]  antiquity,  even  the  most  an- 
«ient,  and  these  fragments  are 


not  to  be  regarded  as  opening  a 
fountain  of  knowledge  absolutely 
new,  but  as  parts  of  an  earlier 
knowledge  confined  to  a  definite 
portion  of  the  race ,  and  a  particu¬ 
lar  locality.  This  esoteric  reli¬ 
gious  system  of  the  Greeks  must, 
therefore,  be  traced  back  to  high¬ 
er  sources  than  Egyptian  or  In¬ 
dian  systems ;  and  was  drawn 
from  a  point  nearer  the  original 
source  of  all  religion,  than  the 
Egyptian,  and  Indian  theogonies. 
3.  This  esoteric  doctrine,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  Greeks  themselves, 
came  to  them  from  the  “  barba¬ 
rians;”  but  not  necessarily  from 
Egypt  (nicht  gerade  eben  aus 
Aegypten).  This  statement  was 
in  part  only  the  tradition  of  the 
priests  of  Dodona,  and  in  part  a 
private  opinion  of  Herodotus ;  and 
besides,  many  of  the  names  in  the 
Grecian  religion  can  be  explained 


REPLIES  TO  ENGLISH  DEISM. 


207 


The  celebrated  natural  philosopher  Robert  Boyle 
(t  1691)  left  in  his  will  a  provision  for  an  annual 
series  of  lectures,  the  object  of  which  should  be  to 
defend  the  truth  of  the  Christian  religion  against 
unbelievers  of  all  kinds,  viz :  Atheists,  Deists,  Pa¬ 
gans,  Jews,  and  Mohammedans.  The  first  preacher 
upon  this  foundation  was  the  renowned  classical 
scholar  Richard  Bentley,  who  endeavoured  to  show 
the  “  Folly  and  Unreasonableness  of  Atheism,” 
from  the  marks  of  design  everywhere  visible  in  the 
natural  world.  Bentley  aimed  more  particularly  at 
the  sentiments  of  Hobbes.  In  the  years  1704  and 
1705,  Samuel  Clarke  preached  the  Boylean  lectures, 
and  bent  the  whole  force  of  his  metaphysical  mind 
and  close  logic,  to  a  demonstration  of  the  existence 
of  God  by  the  a  priori  method.  In  connection 
with  this  argument,  he  also  endeavoured  to  demon¬ 
strate  the  immutable  validity  of  the  truths  of 
natural  religion,  and  the  truth  and  certainty  of 
Christianity.  These  arguments  of  Clarke  enter  as 
deeply  into  the  first  principles  of  all  religion,  as  any 
that  were  called  out  by  the  English  infidelity  of  the 
17th  and  18th  centuries. 

No  portion  of  the  English  Deism,  on  the  whole, 

far  more  easily  from  the  Hebrew  the  seriousness  of  the  esoteric 
than  the  Egyptian  language.  4.  doctrine  is  to  restore  everything 

If  the  poet,  particularly  Homer,  to  its  true  relations  again. - 

in  the  naive  and  childlike  play  of  Creuzer,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
the  poet’s  fancy,  presents  a  my-  his  Symbolik,  traces  this  mono- 
thological  world  of  divinities,  he  theism  of  the  elder  world  to  Egyp- 
nevertheless  does  it  with  the  res-  tian  and  Oriental  sources, 
ervation  and  understanding  that 


208 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


gave  tlie  Christian  Apologist  more  trouble  and  taxed 
his  resources  more,  than  did  those  productions 
which  earnestly  asserted  the  validity  of  natural  re¬ 
ligion,  but  just  as  earnestly  affirmed  that  revealed 
religion  is  for  this  very  reason  unnecessary.  The 
position  of  Tindal, — that  the  religion  of  nature  is 
absolutely  valid  and  cannot  be  dispensed  with,  but 
that  the  Gospel  is  only  a  republication  of  the  law 
of  nature,  and  that  Christianity  is  therefore  as  old 
as  creation  and  the  mind  of  man, — made  it  neces¬ 
sary  for  the  Apologist  to  show,  first,  precisely  what 
is  the  difference  between  natural  and  revealed  re¬ 
ligion,  and,  secondly,  that  the  additional  truths  of 
the  latter  are  not  a  mere  expansion  of  data  and 
elements  contained  in  the  former.  Among  the 
most  successful  treatises  upon  this  subject,  is  that 
of  John  Conybeare,1  in  reply  to  the  treatise  of  Tin¬ 
dal.  It  is  characterized,  says  Lechler,  by  a  distinct¬ 
ness  in  conception,  a  simplicity  in  the  mode  of 
presenting  the  subject,  and  a  logical  cogency  in 
union  with  a  dignified  polemic  attitude  and  a  broad 
philosophic  culture,  that  render  it  a  masterly  per¬ 
formance. 

Conybeare,  in  the  outset,  directs  attention  to 
the  two  significations  which  the  term  “  natural  ” 
may  have,  in  the  phrases  “natural  reason”  and 
“natural  religion.”  It  may  denote,  first,  that  which 

1 A  Defence  of  Revealed  Reli-  Christianity  as  old  as  the  Crea* 
gion  against  the  exceptions  of  a  tion.  London,  1732. 
late  writer  in  his  book  entituled : 


REPLIES  TO  ENGLISH  DEISM. 


209 


is  founded  in  the  nature  and  reason  of  things,  or, 
secondly,  that  which  is  discoverable  by  the  use  of 
man’s  natural  powers  of  mind.1  It  is  by  confound¬ 
ing  the  two  significations,  and  passing  from  one  to 
the  other,  that  Tindal,  he  shows,  is  led  to  attribute 
“absolute  perfection”  to  natural  religion.  Truth, 
as  a  matter  of  course,  is  absolutely  perfect,  but 
man’s  perception  of  it  is  not  necessarily  so.  Hence 
Conybeare  concedes  a  relative  perfection,  but  not 
“  absolute  ”  perfection,  to  that  body  of  truth  which 
is  reached  by  the  natural  operations  of  the  human 
mind,  and  which  goes  under  the  name  of  natural 
religion.  For  the  law  of  nature,  or  natural  religion, 
in  this  sense  of  the  word  “  natural,”  cannot  be  more 
perfect  than  the  human  mind  is.  But  the  human 


1  “  This  gentleman  begins  his 
second  chapter  with  an  explica¬ 
tion  of  what  he  means  by  the 
religion  of  nature.  ‘By  natural 
religion,’  saith  he,  ‘  I  understand 
the  belief  of  the  existence  of  a 
God,  and  the  sense  and  practice  of 
those  duties  which  result  from 
the  knowledge  we  by  our  reason 
have  of  him  and  his  perfections.’ 
According  to  this  account,  natural 
religion  can  reach  no  further  than 
natural  light  and  reason  can  carry 
us.  For  it  comprehends  under 
it  those  duties  only,  which  result 
from  the  knowledge  we  by  our 
reason  have  of  God. 

“Yet  notwithstanding  this  plain 
expression  of  his  meaning,  he  im¬ 
mediately  subjoins :  ‘  So  that  the 
religion  of  nature  takes  in  ever y¬ 

14 


thing  that  is  founded  in  the  reason 
and  nature  of  things.’  What ! 
doth  the  religion  of  nature  take 
in  everything  that  is  founded  in 
the  reason  and  nature  of  things, 
when,  according  to  this  gentle¬ 
man’s  own  account  it  reaches  no 
further  than  we  by  our  reason 
are  able  to  carry  it  ?  And  if  it 
reaches  no  further  than  we  by 
our  reason  can  carry  it,  doth  it 
therefore  follow,  that  it  takes  in 
everything  which  is  founded  in 
the  nature  and  reason  of  things  ? 
I  know  but  one  way  to  get  over 
this  difficulty:  viz.  by  asserting 
roundly  that  human  reason  is 
commensurate  to  all  truth.”  Co¬ 
nybeare  :  Defence  of  Revealed 
Religion,  p.  12. 


210 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


mind  is  not  absolutely  perfect,  since  in  this  case  it 
would  be  infallible  and  incapable  of  error.  Natural 
religion,  consequently,  however  much  validity  may 
be  attached  to  it,  cannot  claim  to  be  an  infallible 
religion,  inasmuch  as  it  is  liable  to  be  vitiated  by 
the  medium  through  which  it  is  apprehended, — viz : 
the  powers  of  the  human  mind.  Moreover,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  this  apprehension  is  itself  only 
gradual  and  approximate.  For  we  must  distinguish 
between  human  reason  as  it  is  shared  by  all  man¬ 
kind,  and  human  reason  as  it  exists  in  single 
individuals.  No  individual,  even  of  the  highest 
capacities,  has  ever  completely  exhausted  a  single 
art  or  a  single  science.  The  same  is  true  in  morals. 
No  merely  human  individual  has  ever  yet  published 
a  perfect  and  complete  code  of  morality,  or  com¬ 
pletely  fathomed  the  sphere  of  ethics.  It  is  only 
through  the  successi  ve  and  collective  endeavours  of 
many  wise  men,  that  even  an  approximate  ap¬ 
prehension  of  the  truths  of  natural  religion  is 
attained, — -a  completely  exhaustive  one  being  im¬ 
possible. 

In  the  second  place,  says  Conybeare,  there  is 
required  in  order  to  the  absolute  perfection  of  a 
law,  or  a  religion,  perfect  clearness  and  certainty  in 
its  sanctions ;  but  in  this  respect  the  law  of  nature, 
or  natural  religion,  is  manifestly  deficient.  The 
effective  power  of  law  lies  in  the  definite  reward,  or 
the  definite  penalty  affixed  to  certain  acts ;  in  the 
good  or  evil  consequences  attending  them.  But  in 


REPLIES  TO  ENGLISH  DEISM. 


211 


the  actual  course  of  events  in  this  life,  it  often  hap¬ 
pens  that  the  good  are  not  rewarded,  and  the  evil 
go  unpunished.  It  was  for  this  reason  that  the 
pagan  philosophers  postulated  a  retribution  after 
death,  to  balance  the  scales  of  justice  left  unbalanced 
upon  earth.  With  regard,  however,  to  the  manner 
and  amount  of  this  future  punishment,  natural 
religion  could  give  no  authentic  and  infallible  in¬ 
formation  from  the  Supreme  Judge  who  appoints  it. 
That  absolute  sanction  of  the  moral  law  which  con¬ 
sists  in  a  precise  statement  of  the  nature  and  quan¬ 
tity  of  the  penalty  affixed  to  it  by  its  Author,  the 
unassisted  human  mind  is  unable  to  specify,  however 
bold  and  impressive  may  be  its  intimations  and  ex¬ 
pectations  of  such  a  sanction. 

In  the  third  place,  Conybeare  directs  attention 
to  the  fact  of  human  apostasy  as  bringing  man  into 
a  condition  of  guilt  and  corruption,  and  necessitating 
a  species  of  knowledge  for  which  natural  religion 
makes  no  provision,  because  natural  religion  is 
adapted  only  to  a  state  of  innocency  and  holiness. 
Man  is  a  transgressor,  is  obnoxious  to  penalty,  and 
needs  assurance  of  pardon  on  the  one  hand,  and  of 
purification  on  the  other.  The  law  of  nature,  or 
natural  religion,  can  give  him  no  assurance  of  mercy, 
but  only  of  stark  rigid  justice  ;  and  the  mere  im¬ 
peratives  of  conscience  cannot  subdue  the  will,  or 
cleanse  the  heart. 

In  reference,  then,  to  these  three  particulars, — 
an  imperfect  perception  upon  the  part  of  the  human 


212 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


mind,  an  imperfect  sanction  of  the  moral  law,  and 
the  lack  of  provision  for  human  apostasy, — Cony- 
beare  argues,  in  opposition  to  Tindal,  that  natural 
religion  is  inadequate,  and  needs  to  be  supplemented 
and  perfected  by  revealed.  The  Scriptures  impart 
an  “  absolutely  perfect  ”  religion,  because  their  con¬ 
tents  are  the  teachings  of  the  Supreme  Mind,  and 
are  not  liable  to  those  vitiating  influences  from  sense 
and  earth,  which  so  often,  as  the  history  of  human 
opinions  shows,  modify  and  pervert  even  the  best 
natural  intuitions  of  the  human  intelligence.  Rev¬ 
elation  also  imparts  an  absolute  validity  to  the 
sanctions  of  natural  religion,  by  authoritatively  an¬ 
nouncing  in  distinct  and  definite  terms  an  endless 
penalty,  or  reward,  and  a  final  adjudication  in  the 
day  of  doom.  And,  lastly,  the  written  revelation 
alone  makes  known  a  remedial  plan  adapted  to  that 
fallen  and  guilty  condition  of  mankind,  for  which 
the  “  light  of  nature  ”  has  no  remedy. 

Nearly  contemporaneously  with  the  appearance 
of  this  vigorous  and  logical  treatise  of  Conybeare, 
Joseph  Butler  (fl752)  published  his  “Analogy 
of  Religion,  Natural  and  Revealed,”  in  which  he 
answers  the  objections  of  infidelity  to  revealed  re¬ 
ligion,  by  the  negative  method  of  pointing  out  equal 
or  greater  difficulties  in  natural  religion.  The,  ar¬ 
gument  is  handled  with  great  skill  and  fairness,  and 
the  work  has  had  a  more  extensive  circulation,  and 
exerted  a  greater  influence  than  any  other  apologetic 
treatise  of  the  Modern  Church.  It  supposes  how* 


REPLIES  TO  ENGLISH  DEISM. 


213 


ever  that  the  objector  concedes  the  truths  of  ethics 
and  natural  religion,  and  therefore  is  less  effective 
as  a  reply  to  universal  skepticism,  or  to  such  ma¬ 
terialistic  systems  as  those  of  Hobbes  and  Boling- 
broke,  than  the  work  of  Conybeare.  The  purely 
defensive  attitude,  moreover,  which  it  assumes,  in 
being  content  with  merely  showing  that  the  same 
difficulty  besets  the  religion  of  nature  that  lies 
against  the  religion  of  the  Bible,  imparts  something 
of  a  cautious  and  timid  tone  to  the  work,  though 
rendering  it  an  exceedingly  difficult  one  to  be  re¬ 
plied  to. 

The  success  with  which  the  Christian  Apologete 
conducted  the  controversy  with  the  Deist  depended 
very  much  upon  the  clearness  and  comprehensive¬ 
ness  of  his  views  of  revealed  religion.  In  case  he 
grasped  with  power  the  doctrines  of  the  trinity, 
incarnation,  apostasy,  and  redemption,  it  was  a  very 
easy  task  to  show  that  revealed  religion  contains 
elements  that  are  not  to  be  found  in  natural  religion, 
and  ministers  to  moral  wants  for  which  natural 
religion  has  no  supply.  The  assertion  of  the  Deist, 
that  Christianity  is  merely  the  republication  of  the 
law  of  nature,  was  easily  disposed  of  by  one  who 
held,  and  could  prove,  that  New  Testament  Chris¬ 
tianity  presupposes  the  fact  of  sin  and  guilt,  and 
that  its  chief  function  is  to  provide  an  expiation  for 
the  one,  and  cleanse  away  the  other.  But  if,  as 
was  the  case  sometimes,  the  Apologist  himself 
adopted  an  inadequate  and  defective  anthropology 


214 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


and  soteriology,  and  his  view  of  Christianity  was 
such  as  to  reduce  it  almost  to  the  level  of  natural 
religion,  it  then  became  very  difficult  for  him  to 
show  that  it  contains  any  additional  elements,  and 
thus  to  refute  the  most  specious  and  subtle  of  all 
the  positions  of  the  skeptic.  The  18th  century  was 
characterized  by  a  low  evangelical  feeling  within 
the  English  Church,  and  an  indistinct  apprehension 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  cross.  It  is  not  surprising, 
consequently,  that  some  of  the  defences  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  that  were  made  at  this  time  should  possess 
but  little  value,  so  far  as  concerns  the  distinctive 
doctrines  of  revelation,  inasmuch  as  they  are  occu¬ 
pied  almost  entirely  with  those  truths  which  reve¬ 
lation  presupposes  indeed,  but  with  which  it  by  no 
means  stops.  Moreover,  in  being  thus  silent  upon 
the  distinguishing  truths,  there  was  an  implication 
that  these  do  not  constitute  the  essence  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  ;  and  in  this  way,  while  professing  to  defend 
Christianity,  the  Apologist  was  in  fact  merely  de¬ 
fending  natural  religion,  and  conceding  the  position 
of  one  class  of  skeptics,  that  the  law  of  nature  and 
Christianity  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  As  an 
example  of  an  Apologist  of  this  class,  may  be  men¬ 
tioned  Thomas  Sherlock,  who  in  a  “  Sermon  before 
the  Society  for  propagating  the  Gospel  ”  took  the 
ground,  “  that  Christ  came  into  the  world  not 
merely  to  restore  the  religion  of  nature,  but  to 
adapt  it  to  the  state  and  condition  of  man ;  and  to 
supply  the  defects,  not  of  religion,  which  continuated 


REPLIES  TO  ENGLISH  DEISM. 


215 


in  its  first  purity  and  perfection,  but  of  nature.” 
This  u  adaptation  ”  or  reconstruction  of  the  religion 
of  nature,  by  the  Author  of  Christianity,  consisted 
according  to  the  representations  of  this  class  of 
Apologists  in  a  clearer  statement  of  the  doctrine 
of  immortality,  and  of  future  rewards  and  punish¬ 
ments,  together  with  the  announcement  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  resurrection  from  the  dead.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  see  how  upon  this  ground,  and  in  this 
mode  of  defending  Christianity,  the  intellectual  and 
serious  deist  of  Lord  Herbert’s  school  might  come 
to  fraternize  with  the  Christian  divine. 

The  attacks  of  some  of  the  English  Deists  upon 
the  authenticity  and  genuineness  of  the  Scripture 
Canon  elicited  replies  from  some  of  the  Apologists. 
The  English  infidel  criticism  of  the  18th  century, 
however,  falls  far  behind  the  infidel  criticism  of 
Germany  in  the  19th,  in  respect  to  learning  and 
ingenuity.  Toland  is  perhaps  the  most  learned  of 
these  critics,  but  his  ignorance  and  mistakes  were 
clearly  exposed  by  Samuel  Clarke,  and  Nathaniel 
Lardner.  The  latter,  in  his  work  entitled,  “The 
Credibility  of  the  Gospel  History,”  evinces  the 
genuineness  of  the  New  Testament  Canon,  and  the 
spuriousness  of  the  Apocryphal  writings  with  which 
Toland  had  attempted  to  associate  the  received 
canonical  scriptures,  by  a  careful  and  learned  ex¬ 
hibition  of  all  the  citations  and  references  from  the 
earliest  authorities.  Collins,  in  his  “  Discourse  of 
Free  Thinking,”  ventured,  in  one  portion  of  it,  upon 


216 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


a  line  of  criticism  upon  the  Canon,  which  called  out 
a  reply  from  Richard  Bentley,  in  a  tractate  entitled 
u  Remarks  upon  a  late  discourse  of  Free  Thinking, 
by  Phileleutherus  Lipsiensis.”  This  treatise  of  Bent¬ 
ley  is  a  complete  reply  to  the  various  positions  of 
Collins,  in  his  defence  of  skeptical  thinking.  The 
immensity  and  accuracy  of  the  learning,  the  search¬ 
ing  thoroughness  of  the  analysis,  the  keenness  and 
brilliancy  of  the  retort,  and  the  calm  and  conscious 
mastery  of  the  whole  ground,  render  this  little  work 
of  the  Master  of  Trinity  College  and  the  first  class¬ 
ical  scholar  of  his  century,  one  of  the  most  striking 
and  effective  in  apologetic  literature. 

§  5.  French  Fncyclopaedism ,  and  German 

Rationalism . 

The  Deism  of  England  lies  at  the  root  of  the 
Continental  infidelity,  and  having  examined  the 
former  with  some  particularity,  a  very  rapid  survey 
of  the  course  of  skeptical  thought  in  France  and 
Germany  will  be  all  that  will  be  attempted. 

The  materialistic  philosophy  of  Bolingbroke  had 
more  affinity  with,  and  exerted  more  influence  upon 
the  French  mind,  than  any  other  one  of  the  English 
skeptical  theories.  But  upon  passing  into  the  less 
thoughtful  French  nation,  this  type  of  infidelity 
immediately  assumed  an  extremely  superficial,  but 
striking  and  brilliant  form.  Helvetius  (f  1771), 
and  Condillac  (f  1780)  were  the  philosophers  for  the 


encyclopaedist:,  and  eationalism.  217 

party,  and  Voltaire  (f  1778),  and  Rousseau  (f  1778) 
were  its  litterateurs.  The  “  Systeme  de  la  Nature  ” 
published  by  Holbach  in  1770  exhibits  materialism 
in  its  grossest  form.  The  distinction  between  mind 
and  matter  is  annihilated ;  all  intellectual  and  spir¬ 
itual  processes  are  represented  as  purely  sensational, 
or,  in  the  phrase  of  a  stern  critic  of  the  theory, 
u  as  the  liver  secretes  bile  so  the  brain  secretes 
thought.”  God  is  only  a  name  for  nature,  and  na¬ 
ture  is  a  concourse  of  material  atoms. 

The  application  of  these  principles  to  social  and 
political  life,  and  the  attempt  to  give  them  popular 
currency,  was  the  task  undertaken  by  the  so-called 
Encyclopaedists,  the  chief  of  whom  were  d’Alembert 
(f  1788),  and  Diderot  (f  1784).  The  “  Encyclope¬ 
dic  ou  Dictionnaire  Universel,”  published  in  1751 
and  onward,  is  an  endeavour  to  construct  a  compen¬ 
dium  of  universal  knowledge  by  the  theories  of 
materialism  and  atheism,  and  thereby  to  inject 
infidel  ideas  into  all  the  history  and  products  of  the 
past.  The  literary  treatment  and  decoration  of  this 
scheme  fell  into  the  hands  of  Rousseau  and  Vol¬ 
taire  ;  the  former  of  whom  by  his  fascinating  sen¬ 
timentality  invested  it  with  a  strange  charm  for 
the  young  and  dreaming  visionary,  while  the  lat¬ 
ter,  by  the  gayest  of  wit,  and  the  sharpest  and 
most  biting  of  sarcasm,  insinuated  it  into  the  hard 
and  frivolous  man  of  fashion,  and  man  of  the 
world. 

This  form  of  infidelity  elicited  hardly  any  reply 


218 


HISTOKY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


from  the  Christian  Church.  The  old  defences  pro¬ 
duced  in  the  preceding  century  in  England  were 
the  principal  reliance,  so  far  as  a  literary  answer 
was  concerned  ;  but  the  great  and  stunning  reply 
was  in  the  utter  demoralization  of  social  and  polit¬ 
ical  life,  and  the  chaotic  horrors  of  the  French 
Revolution. 

The  skeptical  direction  which  the  German  mind 
took  in  the  last  half  of  the  18th  and  first  half  of  the 
19th  century  is  a  much  more  important  phenom¬ 
enon  than  the  infidelity  of  France.  Taken  as  a 
whole,  German  Rationalism  has  been  learned  and 
serious,  comparing  it  with  ancient  and  modern  skep¬ 
ticism  generally.  In  the  philosopher  Kant  (f  1804), 
it  resembles  the  deism  of  the  school  of  Herbert.  In 
such  theologians  as  Ammon  (f  1850),  Wegsch  eider 
(f  1848),  Rohr  (f  1848),  and  Paulus  (f  1851),  we 
observe  the  influence  of  Biblical  education,  and  eccle¬ 
siastical  connections  in  restraining  the  theorist,  and 
holding  him  back  from  all  the  logical  consequences 
of  his  principles.  Yet  this  intellectual  and  ethical 
unbelief  operated  for  a  season  all  the  more  disas¬ 
trously  upon  the  interests  of  Christianity,  from  the 
very  fact  that,  while  it  rejected  the  doctrines  of 
sin  and  grace,  and  by  a  learned  criticism  attacked 
the  canonical  Scriptures,  it  maintained  so  loftily 
the  ideas  of  God,  freedom,  and  immortality,  and 
urged  so  strenuously  the  imperatives  of  duty  and 
the  moral  law.  Had  it  taught  the  bald  and  sensual 
theories  of  Bolingbroke  or  Holbach,  the  popular 


ENCYCLOPAEDISM,  AND  RATIONALISM.  219 

mind  of  one  of  the  most  naturally  devout  and  re¬ 
ligious  races  would  have  revolted.  But  the  sub¬ 
stitution  of  an  elevated  ethics  for  the  doctrine  of 
Redemption  was  temporarily  successful,  by  reason 
of  the  appeal  that  was  made  to  conscience,  and  the 
higher  religious  aspirations.  The  secret  of  its  final 
failure  lay  in  the  utter  impotence  of  the  human  will 
to  realize  these  ideas  of  the  moral  reason,  which 
were  so  earnestly  set  forth  as  the  only  religion 
necessary  for  man.  A  system  like  Rationalism 
which  holds  up  before  mankind  the  ideal  of  virtue, 
while  it  rejects  the  only  power  by  which  that  ideal 
can  be  made  actual  in  character  and  life,  is  a  min¬ 
istry  of  condemnation.  The  principles  of  ethics  and 
natural  religion  can  become  inward  impulses  of 
thought  and  action  in  the  human  soul,  only  through 
the  regenerating  influences  of  revealed  religion. 
The  serious  and  thoughtful  Schiller,  whose  “  muse 
was  conscience  ”  in  the  phrase  of  De  Stael,  and  who 
presents  one  of  the  finest  examples  of  a  lofty  and 
cultivated  Rationalism,  seems  to  have  learned  this 
truth  after  years  of  futile  moral  endeavour.  In  a 
letter  to  Goethe  he  thus  enunciates  the  difference 
between  morality  and  religion,  ethics  and  the  gos¬ 
pel  :  u  The  distinguishing  characteristic  of  Chris¬ 
tianity,  by  which  it  is  differentiated  from  all  other 
monotheistic  systems,  lies  in  th’e  fact  that  it  does 
away  with  the  law ,  the  Kantean  imperative,  and  in 
the  place  of  it  substitutes  a  free  and  spontaneous 


220 


HISTORY  OF  APOLOGIES. 


inclination  of  the  heart,” 1 — a  sentiment  coincident 
with  the  Pauline  affirmation,  that  the  Christian,  as 
distinguished  from  the  moralist,  is  u  not  under  the 
law  but  under  grace”  (Rom.  vi.  15). 

^agenbach:  Kirch  engeschichte  des  18  und  19  Jahrhunderts, 
II.  120. 


BOOK  THIRD. 


HISTORY 

OF 

THEOLOGY  (TRINITARI ANISM) 

AND 

OHEISTOLOGY. 

- *♦« - 


“  0  blessed  glorious  Trinity, 

Bones  to  philosophy,  but  milk  to  faith, 

Which  as  wise  serpents,  diversly, 

Most  slipperiness,  yet  most  entanglings  hath.” 

Donne  :  The  Trinity. 


LITERATURE. 


Athanasius  :  Orationes  contra  Arianos,  and  Defensio  fidei  Nicae- 
nae ;  translated  in  the  Oxford  Library  of  the  Fathers. 

Hilarius  :  De  Trinitate. 

Augustinus  :  De  Trinitate ;  Contra  Maximinum  Haereticum. 

Anselmus  :  De  Trinitate  et  Incamatione  ;  De  processione  Spiritus 
Sancti. 

Petavius  :  De  Theologicis  Dogmatibus,  Tomus  II. 

Bull  :  Defensio  fidei  Nicaenae ;  translated  in  the  Oxford  Library 
of  Anglo  Catholic  Theology. 

Pearson  :  Exposition  of  the  Apostles’  Creed. 

Waterland  :  First  and  Second  Defences,  and  Sermons. 

Horsley  :  Belief  of  the  first  Ages  in  our  Lord’s  Divinity. 

Burton  :  Testimonies  of  the  Ante-Nicene  Fathers  to  the  Divinity 
of  Christ. 

Harvey  :  The  Three  Creeds. 

Baur  :  Lehre  von  der  Dreieinigkeit. 

Dorner  :  Person  Christi ;  translated  in  Clark’s  Foreign  Theo¬ 
logical  Library. 

Meier:  Trinitatslehre. 


CHAPTER  I. 


GENERAL  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  DIVINE  EXISTENCE. 


§  1.  Name  of  the  Deity . 

Preliminary  to  the  history  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity,  we  shall  cast  a  rapid  glance  at  the  doctrine 
of  the  Divine  Existence  in  its  more  general  aspects. 
Five  topics  will  claim  attention  under  this  intro¬ 
ductory  division :  viz.,  the  name  of  the  Deity ;  the 
amount  of  pantheism  and  dualism  that  has  prevailed 
in  connection  with  the  development  of  the  Christian 
doctrine  of  God ;  the  species  of  arguments  that  have 
been  employed  by  Christian  theologians  to  prove 
the  Divine  Existence ;  the  doctrine  of  the  attributes ; 
and  the  Pagan  trinity. 

In  respect  to  the  name  of  the  Deity,  as  well  as 
in  respect  to  particular  definitions  of  Him,  the  Chris¬ 
tian  church  has  always  been  distinguished  by  free¬ 
dom  of  views  and  conceptions.  In  the  Pagan  world 
we  find  a  superstitious  feeling  which  led  men  to 


224 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


attach  a  magical  meaning  and  power  to  certain 
names  of  the  Deity,  and  a  disposition  to  cling  to 
some  particular  one.  Christianity,  on  the  contrary, 
has  ever  been  free  to  adopt  as  the  name  of  the  Su¬ 
preme  Being  that  particular  one  which  it  found  in 
current  use  in  the  nation  to  which  it  came  ;  thereby 
indicating  its  belief  that  there  is  no  particular  virtue 
in  a  name,  and  still  more  that  no  single  term  is 
sufficiently  comprehensive  to  describe  the  infinite 
plenitude  of  being  and  of  excellence  that  is  con¬ 
tained  in  God.1  The  latest  missionary  like  the  first 
takes  the  terms  of  the  new  language,  and  conse¬ 
crates  them  to  the  higher  meaning  which  he  brings 
to  the  nation. 

At  the  same  time,  however,  it  should  be  re¬ 
marked  that  Christianity,  on  account  of  its  connec¬ 
tion  with  Judaism,  prefers,  and  adopts  when  it  can, 
that  conception  of  the  Godhead  which  denotes  his 
necessary  and  absolute  existence.  The  Hebrew 
Jehovah  was  translated  in  two  ways  in  the  Greek 
version  of  the  Old  Testament :  6  cov,  and  to  ov. 
The  personal  and  the  impersonal  forms  were  both 
employed ;  the  former  to  denote  the  divine  person¬ 
ality  in  opposition  to  pantheistic  conceptions,  the 
latter  to  denote  an  absolute  and  necessary  being 
( ovoia ),  in  contradistinction  to  a  conditioned  and 
dependent  ysvtats,  or  emanation.  So  far,  conse- 

*The  Graeco-Roman,  or  clas-  dens, is  from  Ti'Styfu,  to  dispose.  The 
sical  name  of  the  deity  is  derived  Gothic  name  comes  from  a  moral 
from  a  natural  attribute  ;  3eor,  attribute  ;  God  signifies  the  good. 


PANTHEISM  AND  DUALISM. 


225 


quently,  as  the  Church  gave  currency  to  the  Old 
Testament  name  of  God,  through  the  medium  of 
the  Alexandrine  Greek,  it  made  use  of  the  same 
idea  and  name  of  the  Deity  that  were  employed  by 
the  Deity  himself  in  his  self-manifestation  to  his 
chosen  people. 

§  2.  Pantheism  and  Dualism  in  the  Church. 

Respecting  the  amount  and  species  of  Pantheism 
that  appears  in  connection  with  the  development  of 
the  Christian  doctrine  of  God,  we  remark  the  fol¬ 
lowing. 

The  Church  was  not  disturbed  by  any  formal 
and  elaborated  Pantheism  during  the  first  eight 
centuries.  Phraseology  was,  however,  sometimes 
employed  by  orthodox  teachers  themselves,  that 
would  be  pantheistic  if  employed  by  an  acknowl¬ 
edged  pantheist.  Tatian,  a  convert  and  disciple  of 
Justin  Martyr,  and  one  of  the  early  Apologists, 
speaks  of  God  as  vnoaraacg  ndvrcov.  Hilary  uses 
the  phrase,  “  deus  anima  mundi.”  Some  of  the 
hymns  of  Synesius  are  decidedly  pantheistic  in  their 
strain.  Hippolytus  addresses  the  Christian  as  fol¬ 
lows,  in  his  Confession  of  Faith.  u  Thou  wilt  have 
an  immortal  body  together  with  an  imperishable 
soul,  and  wilt  receive  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  Hav¬ 
ing  lived  on  earth,  and  having  known  the  Heavenly 
King,  thou  wilt  be  a  companion  of  God,  and  a  fel¬ 
low-heir  with  Christ,  not  subject  to  lust,  or  passion, 
15 


226 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


or  sickness.  For  thou  hast  become  God  (  ysyovceg 
yaq  d'tog ).  For  whatever  hardships  thou  hadst 
to  suffer  when  a  man,  He  gave  them  to  thee  because 
thou  wast  a  man  ;  but  that  which  is  proper  to  God 
[ naQaxo'kov&tl ,  what  pertains  to  God’s  state  and 
condition],  God  has  declared  he  will  give  thee  when 
thou  shalt  be  deified  ( otccv  &tonoir}{)'r}g),  being  born 
again  an  immortal.” 1  Yet  such  expressions  as  these 
should  be  interpreted  in  connection  with  the  ac¬ 
knowledged  theistic  and  Christian  character  of  their 
authors,  and  are  to  be  attributed  to  an  unguarded 
mode  of  expression,  and  not  to  a  deliberate  and 
theoretical  belief.2 

In  the  ninth  century  Scotus  Erigena,  the  most 
acute  mind  of  his  time,  in  his  speculations  upon 
the  mutual  relations  of  the  world  and  God,  unfolded 
a  system  that  is  indisputably  pantheistic.3  A  ten¬ 
dency  to  pantheism  is  also  traceable  in  the  scholas¬ 
tic  age,  in  both  the  analytic  and  the  mystical  mind. 


1  Bunsen  :  Hippolytus,  1. 184. — 
It  is  evident  from  Hippolytus’s 
own  statement,  that  lie  does  not 
mean  to  teach  pantheism  in  these 
bold  expressions,  for  the  Christian 
is  to  have  a  “  body  together  with 
an  imperishable  soul.”  The  de¬ 
vout  Cowper  says : 

. “  there  lives  and  works 

A.  soul  in  all  things,  and  that  soul  is  God.” 

— The  Task,  Book  vi. 

3  The  charge  of  pantheism  was 
made  by  some  of  the  fathers 
against  the  Sabellian  doctrine  of 
the  trinity.  It  is  noticeable  that 


in  the  Modern  Church  the  rejec¬ 
tion  of  the  hypostatical,  and  adop¬ 
tion  of  the  modal  trinity  is  some¬ 
times  found  in  alliance  with  a 
pantheistic  tendency.  The  trin- 
itarianism  of  Schleiermacher  is  an 
example  of  this. 

3  It  is  contained  in  his  work  De 
divisione  Naturae,  Ed.  Gale,  Ox¬ 
ford  1681.  For  an  account  of  the 
Mediaeval  Pantheism,  see  Engel- 
hardt’s  Dogmengeschichte,  II. 
iii ;  and  Ritter’s  Geschichte  der 
Christlichen  Philosophie,  HI.  206 
-296. 


PANTHEISM  AND  DUALISM. 


227 


Rationalizing  intellects  like  Duns  Scotus  and  Oc¬ 
cam  prepared  the  way  for  it,  though  their  own 
speculations  are  not  strictly  chargeable  with  pan¬ 
theism.  But  in  Amalrich  of  Bena,  and  his  disciple 
David  of  Dinanto,  we  perceive  an  arid  and  scho¬ 
lastic  pantheism  distinctly  enunciated ;  while  imagi¬ 
native  and  mystical  minds  like  Eckart  and  Silesius 
exhibit  this  system  in  a  glowing  and  poetical  form. 
Pantheism,  however,  was  firmly  opposed  by  the 
great  body  of  the  Schoolmen,  and  was  condemned 
by  councils  of  the  Church,  and  bulls  of  the  Pope. 

The  most  profound  and  influential  form  of  this 
species  of  infidelity  appears  in  the  Modern  Church. 
It  began  with  Spinoza’s  doctrine  of  “  substantia  una 
et  unica,”  and  ended  with  Schelling  and  Hegel’s 
so-called  “philosophy  of  identity,”  in  which  Spi- 
nozism  received  new  forms,  but  no  new  matter. 
Spinoza  precluded  the  possibility  of  a  secondary 
substance  created  de  nihilo,  by  his  fundamental  pos¬ 
tulate  that  there  is  only  one  substance  endowed 
with  two  attributes,  extension  and  thought.  All 
material  things  are  this  substance,  in  the  mode  of 
extension ;  all  immaterial  things  are  this  same 
substance,  in  the  mode  of  cogitation.  The  first 
modification  of  the  one  only  substance  yields  the 
physical  world ;  the  second,  the  mental  world. 
There  is  but  one  Substance,  Essence,  or  Being,  ulti¬ 
mately;  and  this  Being  is  both  cause  and  effect, 
agent  and  patient,  in  all  evil  and  in  all  good,  both 
physical  and  moral.  Schelling’s  system  is  Spinozism 


228 


IIISTOEY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


with  a  prevailing  attention  to  the  one  only  Sub¬ 
stance  as  extended  ;  i.  e.,  to  physical  pantheism. 
Hegel’s  system  is  engaged  with  the  one  only  Sub¬ 
stance  as  cogitative,  and  yields  intellectual  pan¬ 
theism. 

The  theology  of  Germany,  since  the  middle  of 
the  18th  century,  has  been  influenced  by  this  sys¬ 
tem,  to  an  extent  unparalleled  in  the  previous  his¬ 
tory  of  the  Church  ;  and  from  the  effects  of  it,  it 
has  not  yet  recovered.  Too  many  of  the  modes  of 
contemplating  the  Deity,  and  of  apprehending  his 
relations  to  the  universe,  current  in  Germany,  are 
rendered  vague  by  the  failure  to  draw  the  lines  of 
theism  with  firmness  and  strength.  The  personality 
of  God  is  not  sufficiently  clear  and  impressive  for 
classes  of  theologians  who  yet  ought  not  to  be  de¬ 
nominated  pantheists ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  open 
and  avowed  pantheists  have  held  position  within 
the  pale  of  the  Lutheran  Church.  The  English  and 
American  theologies  have  been  comparatively  little 
influenced  by  this  form  of  error,  so  that  the  most 
consistent  theism  for  the  last  century  must  be  sought 
for  within  these  churches. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Divine  Nature  has  expe¬ 
rienced  but  little  modification  and  corruption  from 
Dualism.  This  is  the  opposite  error  to  Pantheism. 
All  deviations  from  the  true  idea  of  the  Deity  ter¬ 
minate  either  in  a  unity  which  identifies  God  and 
the  universe  in  one  essence,  or  a  duality  which  so 
separates  the  universe  from  God  as  to  render  it 


EVIDENCES  OF  THE  DIVINE  EXISTENCE.  229 

either  independent  of  him,  or  eternally  hostile  to 
him.  But  it  was  only  the  Ancient  Church  that  was 
called  to  combat  this  latter  form  of  error.1  During  the 
prevalence  of  the  Manichaean  and  Gnostic  systems, 
dualistic  views  were  current,  but  since  their  disap¬ 
pearance,  the  Biblical  doctrine  of  the  Godhead  has 
had  to  contend  chiefly  with  the  pantheistic  deviation. 

§  3.  Evidences  of  the  Divine  Existence . 

The  Ancient  Church  laid  more  stress  upon  faith, 
the  Modern  upon  demonstration,  in  establishing  the 
fact  of  the  Divine  Existence.  This  is  the  natural 
consequence  of  the  increasing  cultivation  of  philos¬ 
ophy.  In  proportion  as  science  is  developed,  the 
mind  is  more  inclined  to  syllogistic  reasoning. 

The  Patristic  arguments  for  the  Divine  Exist¬ 
ence  rest  mainly  upon  the  innate  consciousness  of 
the  human  mind.  They  magnify  the  internal  evi¬ 
dence  for  this  doctrine.  Common  terms  to  denote 
the  species  of  knowledge  which  the  soul  has  of  God, 
and  the  kind  of  evidence  of  his  existence  which  it 
possesses,  are  t^cpwov  (Clemens  Alex.),  and  ingen- 
itum  (Arnobius).  Tertullian  employs  the  phrase, 
“  anima  naturaliter  sibi  conscia  Dei.”  The  influence 
of  the  Platonic  philosophy  is  apparent  in  these 
conceptions.  They  imply  innate  ideas ;  something 
kindred  to  Deity  in  the  reason  of  man.  The  doc- 


1  Compare  Athanasius’s  Oratio  men  of  vigorous  reasoning  against 
sontra  Gentes,  §  1-9,  for  a  speci-  the  dualistic  theory  of  evil. 


230 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


trine  of  the  Logos,  derived  and  expanded  from  the 
gospel  of  John,  strengthened  the  Early  Fathers  in 
this  general  view  of  God.  God  was  conceived  as 
directly  manifesting  himself  to  the  moral  sense, 
through  that  Divine  Word  or  Reason  who  in  their 
phraseology  was  the  manifested  Deity.  In  their 
view,  God  proved  his  existence  by  his  presence  to 
the  mind.  In  the  Western  Church,  particularly, 
this  immediate  manifestation  and  consequent  proof 
of  the  Divine  Existence  was  much  insisted  upon. 
Augustine  in  his  Confessions  implies  that  the  Deity 
evinces  his  being  and  attributes  by  a  direct  opera¬ 
tion, — an  impinging  as  it  were  of  himself,  upon  the 
rational  soul  of  his  creatures.  “  Pereulisti  cor,  verbo 
tuo  ”  is  one  of  his  expressions.1 

But  whenever  a  formal  demonstration  was  at¬ 
tempted  in  the  Patristic  period,  the  a  posteriori  was 
the  method  employed.  The  physico-theological 
argument,  derived  from  the  harmony  visible  in  the 
works  of  creation,  was  used  by  Irenaeus  to  prove 
the  doctrine  of  the  unity  and  simplicity  of  the 
Divine  Nature,  in  opposition  to  Polytheism  and 
Gnosticism, — the  former  of  which  held  to  a  mul¬ 
titude  of  gods,  and  the  latter  to  a  multitude  of 
aeons.  The  teleological  argument,  derived  from  the 
universal  presence  of  a  design  in  creation,  was  like¬ 
wise  employed  in  the  Patristic  theology. 

1  Confessions,  X.  vi.  See  Ne-  of  the  Early  Fathers  in  handling 
ander’s  Denkwiirdigkeiten,  I.  276  the  innate  idea  of  the  deity. 

-280,  for  a  sketch  of  the  method 


EVIDENCES  OF  THE  DIVINE  EXISTENCE.  231 


The  ontological  argument,  which  derives  its  force 
from  the  definition  of  an  absolutely  Perfect  Being, 
was  not  formed  and  stated  until  the  Scholastic  age. 
It  then  received  a  construction  and  statement  by 
Anselm,  in  his  Monologium,  and  more  particularly 
in  his  Proslogion,  which  has  never  been  surpassed. 
It  is  no  disparagement  to  the  powerful  a  priori  ar¬ 
guments  that  have  characterized  modern  Protestant 
theology,  to  say,  that  the  argument  from  the  neces¬ 
sary  nature  of  the  Deity,  is  unfolded  in  these  tracts 
of  Anselm  with  a  depth  of  reflection,  and  a  subtlety 
of  metaphysical  acumen,  that  places  them  among 
the  finest  pieces  of  Christian  speculation. 

The  substance  of  the  Anselmic  argument  is  to 
be  found  in  the  following  positions  taken  in  the 
Proslogion.1 

The  human  mind  possesses  the  idea  of  the  most 
perfect  Being  conceivable.  But  such  a  Being  is 
necessarily  existent ;  because  a  being  whose  exist¬ 
ence  is  contingent,  who  may  or  may  not  exist,  is 
not  the  most  perfect  that  we  can  conceive  of.  But 
a  necessarily  existent  Being  is  one  that  cannot  be 
conceived  of  as  non-existent,  and  therefore  is  an  ac¬ 
tually  existent  Being.  Necessary  existence  implies 


1  Cap.  2,  and  4. — The  Proslo-  by  Bouchette.  Compare  Rit- 
gion,  and  the  objections  of  Gaunilo  tee’s  Geschichte  der  Christlichen 
with  Anselm’s  reply,  have  been  Philosophie,  Th.  Ill,  334  sq.,  and 
translated  by  Maginnis,  in  the  Batje’s  Dreieinigkeitslehre,  II. 
Bibliotheca  Sacra,  1851.  Both  374  sq.,  for  a  critique  of  Anselm’s 
the  Monologium  and  Proslogion  argument, 
have  been  translated  into  French 


232 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


actual  existence.  In  conceiving,  therefore,  of  a  Be* 
ing  who  is  more  perfect  than  all  others,  the  mind 
inevitably  conceives  of  a  real  and  not  an  imaginary 
being ;  in  the  same  manner  as  in  conceiving  of  a 
figure  having  three  sides,  it  inevitably  conceives  of 
a  figure  having  three  angles. 

The  force  of  this  argument  depends  entirely 
upon  the  characteristic  of  “  necessity  of  existence.” 1 
This  is  an  integral  part  of  the  idea  of  the  most  per¬ 
fect  Being,  and  does  not  enter  into  the  idea  of  any 
other  being.  All  other  beings  may  or  may  not  ex¬ 
ist,  because  they  are  not  the  most  perfect  conceiv¬ 
able.  Their  existence  is  contingent ;  but  that  of  the 
First  Perfect  is  necessary.  Hence  the  idea  of  God 
is  a  wholly  unique  idea,  and  an  argument  can  be 
constructed  out  of  it,  such  as  cannot  be  constructed 
out  of  the  idea  of  any  other  being.  And  one  of  its 
peculiarities  is,  that  it  must  have  an  objective  cor¬ 
respondent  to  itself.  This  is  not  the  case  with  any 
other  idea.  When,  for  example,  the  mind  has  the 
idea  of  a  man,  of  an  angel,  of  a  tree,  or  of  anything 
that  is  not  God ,  or  the  most  perfect  Being,  there  is 


1  “  I  am  not  unapprehensive  that 
I  might  here  indeed,  following 
great  examples,  have  proceeded 
in  another  method  than  that 
which  I  now  choose ;  and  because 
we  can  have  no  true,  appropriate, 
or  distinguishing  idea  or  concep¬ 
tion  of  deity  which  doth  not  in¬ 
clude  necessity  of  existence  in  it, 
have  gone  that  shorter  way,  im¬ 


mediately  to  have  concluded  the 
existence  of  God,  from  his  idea 
itself.  And  I  see  not  but  treading 
those  wary  steps  which  the  in¬ 
comparable  Dr.  Cudworth,  in  his 
Intellectual  System,  hath  done, 
that  argument  admits,  in  spite  of 
cavil,  of  being  managed  with 
demonstrative  evidence.”  Howe  . 
Living  Temple,  Pt.  I.  Ch.  ii,  §8. 


EVIDENCES  OF  THE  DIVINE  EXISTENCE. 


233 


no  certainty  that  there  is  a  real  man,  angel,  or  tree 
corresponding  to  it.  It  may  be  a  wholly  subjective 
idea;  a  thought  in  the  mind,  without  a  thing  in 
nature  agreeing  with  it.  And  this,  because  the  idea 
of  a  man,  an  angel,  or  a  tree  does  not  involve  neces¬ 
sity  of  existence.  In  the  instance,  then,  of  any  other 
idea  but  that  of  God,  the  mere  idea  in  the  mind  is  not 
sufficient  to  evince  the  actual  reality  of  the  object. 
But  in  the  instance  of  the  solitary  and  totally  unique 
idea  of  the  absolutely  Perfect,  the  mere  idea  is  suffi¬ 
cient  for  this,  because  it  contains  the  element  of  ne¬ 
cessity  of  existence.  If  therefore,  argues  Anselm, 
we  concede  as  we  must  that  the  mind  possesses  the 
idea  of  the  most  perfect  Being  conceivable,  and  also, 
that  perfection  of  being  involves  necessity  of  being, 
and  yet,  at  the  same  time,  treat  it  as  we  do  our 
ideas  of  contingent  and  imperfect  existences,  and 
say  that  it  may  or  may  not  have  an  objective  cor¬ 
respondent,  we  contradict  ourselves.  “  Surely,”  re¬ 
marks  Anselm,1  “  that,  than  which  a  greater  cannot 
be  conceived,  cannot  exist  merely  in  the  mind  alone. 
For  if  we  suppose  that  it  exists  only  subjectively  in 
the  intellect,  and  not  objectively  in  fact,  then  we  can 
conceive  of  something  greater ;  we  can  conceive  of 
a  being  who  exists  objectively,  and  this  is  greater 
than  a  merely  mental  existence.  If,  therefore,  that 
than  which  a  greater  cannot  be  conceived  exists 
only  in  the  conception  or  intelligence,  and  not  out¬ 
wardly  in  fact,  then  that  very  thing  than  which  a 


1  Proslogion,  Cap.  2. 


234 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


greater  cannot  be  conceived  is  something  than  which 
a  greater  can  be  conceived, — which  is  self-contra¬ 
dictory.  There  exists,  therefore,  beyond  doubt, 
both  in  the  mind,  and  in  reality,  a  Being  than  which 
a  greater  cannot  be  conceived.” 

Anselm  goes  a  step  further,  and  argues  that  the 
mind  cannot  conceive  of  the  non-existence  of  God , 
without  a  logical  contradiction.1  Here,  again,  the 
difference  between  the  idea  of  the  Supreme  Being, 
and  that  of  all  other  beings  is  apparent.  There  is 
nothing  self-contradictory  in  supposing  the  non¬ 
existence  of  man,  of  angels,  of  trees,  or  of  matter 
universally,  because  their  definition  does  not  imply 
that  they  must  exist  of  necessity.  But  to  suppose 
that  a  Being  who  is  in  his  nature  necessarily  exist¬ 
ent  is  not  in  existence  is  absurd.  We  can,  there¬ 
fore,  think  the  creation  out  of  existence,  but  we 
cannot  even  in  thought  annihilate  the  Creator.  In 
the  fourth  chapter  of  the  Proslogion,  Anselm  argues 
this  point  in  the  following  manner.  “  A  thing  is 
conceived,  in  one  sense,  when  the  mere  words  that 
designate  it  are  conceived ;  in  another  sense,  when 
the  thing  itself  is  in  its  own  nature  understood  and 
comprehended.  In  the  former  sense,  God  can  be 
conceived  not  to  exist ;  in  the  latter  sense  he  cannot 
be.  For  no  one  who  understands  what  fire  is,  and 

1  Anselm  maintains  that  any  “  Et  quod  incipit  a  non  esse,  et 
being  who  can  logically  be  con-  potest  cogitari  non  esse  ....  id 
ceived  as  non-existent  is  by  this  non  estproprie  et  absolute.”  Pros* 
very  fact  proved  not  to  be  the  logion,  c.  22. 
most  perfect  being  conceivable. 


EVIDENCES  OF  THE  DIVINE  EXISTENCE.  235 


what  water  is,  can  conceive  that  fire  is  water; 
though  he  may  conceive  this  as  to  the  mere  sound 
and  meaning  of  the  words.  In  like  manner,  no  one 
who  understands  what  God  is,  and  clearly  compre¬ 
hends  that  he  is  a  necessarily  existent  Being,  can 
conceive  that  God  is  non-existent, — although,  like 
the  Psalmist’s  fool,  he  may  say  in  his  heart  the 
words,  4  There  is  no  God.’  For  God  is  that,  than 
which  a  greater  cannot  be  conceived.  He  who 
properly  understands  this,  understands  therefore 
that  this  something  exists  in  such  a  mode,  that  it 
cannot  even  be  conceived  of  as  non-existent.  He 
therefore  who  understands  that  God  exists  as  the 
most  perfect  Being  conceivable,  cannot  conceive  of 
him  as  a  non-entity.  Thanks  be  to  Thee,  O  Lord, 
thanks  be  to  Thee,  that  what  I  at  first  believed 
through  thine  own  endowment,  I  now  understand 
through  thine  illumination ;  so  that  even  if  I  were 
unwilling  to  believe  that  thou  art,  I  cannot  remain 
ignorant  of  thine  existence.” 

Anselm’s  argument  was  assailed  by  a  monk  Gau- 
nilo,  in  a  little  work  entitled,  Liber  'pro  insipiente 
(A  plea  for  the  fool)  ;  in  allusion  to  Anselm’s  quo¬ 
tation  from  the  Psalms  :  4  The  fool  hath  said  in  his 
heart,  there  is  no  God.’  His  principal  objection  is, 
that  the  existence  of  the  idea  of  a  thing  does  not 
prove  the  existence  of  the  thing.  44  Suppose,”  he 
says,1  “that  we  have  the  idea  of  an  island  more 
perfect  than  any  other  portion  of  the  earth  ;  it  does 

1  Liber  pro  insipiente,  in  Anselmi  Opera,  Ed.  Migne,  I.  246. 


236 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


not  follow  that  because  this  island  exists  in  the 
mind,  it  therefore  exists  in  reality.”  This  objection 
started  by  Gaunilo  has  been  frequently  urged  since. 
The  mere  idea  of  a  griffin,  or  of  a  chimaera,  it 
has  been  said,  does  not  evince  the  actual  existence 
of  a  griffin  or  a  chimaera.  But  an  objection  of  this 
kind  fails  to  invalidate  Anselm’s  argument,  because 
there  is  no  logical  parallelism  between  the  two  spe¬ 
cies  of  ideas.  It  overlooks  the  fact  that  the  idea  of 
the  Deity  is  wholly  solitary  and  unique ;  there  is 
no  second  idea  like  it.  As  Anselm  remarks  in  his 
reply  to  Gaunilo,  if  the  island  abovementioned  were 
the  most  perfect  thing  conceivable ,  then  he  would 
insist  that  the  existence  of  the  idea  in  the  mind 
would  be  evidence  of  the  existence  of  the  island 
itself.1  But  the  idea  of  the  island  does  not,  like  the 
idea  of  God,  contain  the  elements  of  absolute  perfec¬ 
tion  of  being,  and  necessity  of  being.  And  the  same 
is  true  of  the  idea  of  a  griffin,  or  of  a  chimaera,  or 
of  any  imaginary  or  contingent  existence  whatever. 
The  idea  of  a  man,  or  an  angel,  does  not  carry  with 
it  that  the  man,  or  the  angel,  cannot  but  exist,  and 
that  his  non-existence  is  inconceivable.  But  the 
idea  of  God,  as  a  Being  totally  different  from  all 
created  and  contingent  beings,  does  carry  with  it 
the  property  of  necessary  existence ;  and  therefore 

1  “  Fidens  loquor ;  quia  si  quis  hujus  meae  argumentation^,  in- 
invenerit  mihi  aliquid  aut  reipsa,  veniam,  et  dabo  illi  perditam  in- 
aut  sola  cogitatione  existens,  prae-  sulam  amplius  non  perdendam .,T 
ter  quo  majus  cogitari  non  possit,  Anselmi  Opera,  Ed.  Migne,  I 
cui  aptare  valeat  connexionem  252. 


EVIDENCES  OF  THE  DIVINE  EXISTENCE.  237 


an  objection  like  that  of  Gaunilo,  drawn  from  the 
province  of  contingent  existences,  does  not  hold.  It 
is  an  instance  of  what  Aristotle  denominates  (Liard - 
ficcoig  tig  dhXo  yevog, — a  transfer  of  what  is  true  of 
one  species  to  a  species  of  totally  different  nature. 
As  if  one  should  transfer  what  is  true  of  the  idea 
of  matter,  to  the  idea  of  mind  ;  or  should  argue  that 
because  a  solid  cube  is  capable  of  being  measured 
and  weighed,  therefore  the  invisible  soul  of  man 
can  be  also.  According  to  Anselm,  the  idea  of  God 
is  wholly  unique.  It  is  the  only  idea  of  the  species. 
No  other  idea,  consequently,  can  be  a  logical  parallel 
to  it;  and  therefore  all  these  arguments  from  anal¬ 
ogy  fail.  The  idea  of  every  other  being  but  God 
contains  the  element  of  contingent  existence,  and 
therefore  can  afford  no  logical  basis  upon  which  to 
found  an  argument  against  an  ontological  demonstra¬ 
tion  that  rests  upon  the  element  of  necessary  exist¬ 
ence  contained  in  the  idea  of  the  most  perfect 
Being,  who  of  course  must  be  the  only  being  of  the 
kind.1 


1  The  nature  of  this  argument 
of  Anselm  may  be  seen  by  throw¬ 
ing  it  into  the  following  dialogue. 
“  Anselm.  I  have  the  idea  of  the 
most  perfect  being  conceivable. 
Oaunilo.  True :  but  it  is  a  mere 
idea,  and  there  is  no  being  cor¬ 
responding  to  it.  Anselm.  But  if 
there  is  no  being  answering  to 
my  idea,  then  my  idea  of  the 
most  perfect  being  conceivable  is 
that  of  an  imaginary  being;  but 


an  imaginary  being  is  not  the 
most  perfect  being  that  I  can  con¬ 
ceive  of.  The  being  who  corre¬ 
sponds  to  my  idea  must  be  a  real 
being.  If  therefore  you  grant 
me  my  postulate,  namely,  that  I 
have  the  idea  of  the  most  perfect 
being  conceivable,  you  concede 
the  existence  of  an  actual  being 
correspondent  to  it.” 

Another  a  priori  argument  for 
the  Divine  Existence  might  be 


238 


HISTOKY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


The  a  priori  mode  of  proving  the  Divine  Ex¬ 
istence  was  the  favorite  one  in  the  Scholastic  age, 
for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  it  harmonized 
most  with  the  metaphysical  bent  of  the  time,  and 
afforded  more  scope  for  subtle  thinking,  and  close 
reasoning.  In  the  second  place,  the  low  state  of 
natural  science,  and  the  very  slight  knowledge  which 
men  had  of  the  created  universe,  left  them  almost 
destitute  of  the  materials  of  a  posteriori  arguments. 
Arguments  from  the  order,  harmony,  and  design  in 


constructed  in  Anselm’s  method 
by  selecting  actuality  of  existence, 
instead  of  necessity  of  existence,  as 
an  element  in  the  idea  of  the  most 
perfect  Being.  Thus :  “  I  have 
the  idea  of  the  most  perfect  being 
conceivable ;  but  the  most  perfect 
being  conceivable  cannot  be  an 
imaginary  one.  The  idea  of  an 
absolutely  perfect  being  implies 
an  objective  correspondent,  as 
necessarily  as  the  idea  of  a  figure 
bounded  by  three  straight  lines 
implies  a  figure  containing  three 
angles.  Three-sidedness  in  a  figure 
implies  triangularity  of  necessity. 
In  like  manner,  if  the  idea  of  the 
most  perfect  being  conceivable  be 
granted,  then  that  of  an  actually 
existent  being  is  conceded  by 
necessary  implication,  because  the 
perfection  of  being  must  be  an 

actual  being. - Two  objections, 

not  urged  by  Anselm’s  opponents 
in  his  own  day,  but  by  modern 
critics  of  his  argument,  are  wor¬ 
thy  of  notice.  The  first  is,  that 


the  argument  makes  mere  exist¬ 
ence  an  attribute  of  the  most  per¬ 
fect  being,  when  in  fact  it  is  being 
ifself.  But  this  is  an  error.  An¬ 
selm  does  not  build  his  argument 
upon  the  notion  of  mere  exist¬ 
ence,  but  of  necessity  of  existence. 
And  this  is  an  attribute  or  char¬ 
acteristic  quality,  as  truly  as  con¬ 
tingency  of  existence.  The  second 
objection  is,  that  Anselm’s  argu¬ 
ment  amounts  only  to  the  hypo¬ 
thetical  proposition :  “  If  there  be 
a  necessarily  existent  being,  of 
course  there  is  an  actually  exist¬ 
ent  one.”  But  as  the  most  per¬ 
fect  being  conceivable  is  one  who 
cannot  be  conceived  of  as  existing 
contingently,  it  is  as  illogical  to 
employ  the  subjunctive  mode  in 
reference  to  him,  and  speak  of 
him  as  possibly  non-existent,  as 
to  employ  the  hypothetical  mode 
in  reference  to  the  mathematical 
proposition  that  two  and  two 
make  four.  More  :  Atheism,  I. 
viii.  ;  Leibnitz  :  Demonstration 
Cartesienne. 


EVIDENCES  OF  THE  DIVINE  EXISTENCE.  239 


the  universe,  cannot  be  successfully  constructed,  un¬ 
less  that  order,  harmony,  and  design  are  apparent. 
But  this  was  impossible  in  an  age  when  the  Ptole¬ 
maic  astronomy  was  the  received  system, — the  earth 
being  the  centre  of  the  solar  system,  and  the  starry 
heavens,  in  Milton’s  phrase, 

“  With  centric  and  eccentric  scribbled  o’er, 

Cycle  and  epicycle,  orb  in  orb.” 

The  moral  argument  for  the  Di  vine  Existence  is 
found  in  its  simplest  form,  in  the  very  earliest 
periods  in  the  Church.  God  is  known  by  being 
loved  ;  love  then,  or  a  right  state  of  the  heart,  im¬ 
plies  and  contains  a  proof  of  the  reality  of  the 
Divine  Being  that  is  incontrovertible  certainly  to 
the  subject  of  the  affection.  The  more  elaborate 
form  of  this  argument  is  not  found  until  the  time 
of  Kant,  who  elevated  it  in  his  system  to  a  high 
degree  of  importance. 

In  the  modern  Protestant  theology,  both  the 
a  priori  and  a  posteriori  methods  of  demonstrating 
the  divine  existence  have  been  employed.  The 
progressive  development'  has  been  confined  mostly 
to  the  a  posteriori  arguments.  The  cultivation  and 
advancement  of  natural  science  has  furnished  both 
matter  and  impulse  to  the  evidences  from  design, 
order,  and  harmony  in  creation.  Progress  in  the 
a  priori  argument  depends  so  much  upon  purely 
metaphysical  acumen,  while  the  scope  for  variety  in 
the  construction  and  statement  of  the  demonstration 


240 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


is  so  very  limited,  that  the  ontological  argument  re« 
mains  very  nearly  as  it  was  when  Anselm  formed  it. 


§  4.  The  doctrine  of  the  Attributes . 

The  Church  early  recognized  the  distinction  be¬ 
tween  the  essence  and  the  attributes  of  the  Deity. 
The  former,  in  and  by  itself,  was  regarded  as  un¬ 
knowable  by  the  finite  mind.  The  theologians  of  the 
first  two  centuries  sometimes  distinguished  between 
the  unrevealed  and  the  revealed  Deity.  By  the 
former,  they  meant  the  simple  substance  of  the 
Godhead  apart  from  the  attributes,  of  which  it  was 
impossible  to  affirm  anything,  and  which  conse¬ 
quently  was  beyond  the  ken  of  the  human  mind. 
They  intended  to  keep  clear  of  that  vague  idea  of 
an  abstract  Monad  without  predicates,  which  figures 
in  the  Gnostic  systems  under  the  name  of  the  Abyss 
(Bv&og),  and  which  has  re-appeared  in  the  modern 
systems  of  Schelling  and  Hegel,  under  the  names 
of  the  TJrgrund ,  and  Das  Nichts,  but  they  did 
not  always  succeed.  Their  motive  was  a  good  one. 
They  desired  to  express  the  truth  that  the  Divine 
Nature  is  a  mystery  which  can  never  be  fathomed 
to  the  bottom  by  any  finite  intelligence  ;  but  in  their 
representations  they  sometimes  ventured  upon  the 
dangerous  position,  that  the  Godhead  is  above  all 
essence,  and  without  essence  ( vTitgovotog ,  and  avov - 
6iog).  As  theological  science  advanced,  however, 
it  was  perceived  that  the  essence  of  the  Deity  can- 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  ATTRIBUTES. 


241 


not  safely  be  contemplated  apart  from  bis  attributes. 
The  essence  is  in  the  attributes,  and  the  attributes 
in  the  essence,  and  consequently  Christian  science 
must  seize  both  ideas  at  once,  and  hold  them  both 
together.  This  led  to  the  examination  and  exhibi¬ 
tion  of  the  Divine  attributes,  as  real  and  eternal 
characteristics  of  the  Deity. 

We  cannot  follow  out  the  developement  of 
thought  upon  the  Divine  attributes ;  for  this  would 
require  their  being  taken  up  one  by  one,  and  their 
history  exhibited  through  the  various  periods.  A 
single  remark,  only,  can  be  made  at  this  point.  In 
proportion  as  the  attributes  have  been  discussed  in 
connection  with  the  essence  of  the  Deity,  has  the 
doctrine  of  God  been  kept  clear  from  pantheistic 
conceptions.  In  proportion,  on  the  contrary,  as 
speculation  has  been  engaged  with  the  essence  of 
the  Godhead,  to  the  neglect  or  non-recognition  of  the 
attributes  in  which  this  essence  manifests  itself,  has 
it  become  pantheistic.  It  is  impossible  for  the  hu¬ 
man  mind  to  know  the  Deity  abstractly  from  his 
attributes.  It  may  posit,  i.  e.  set  down  on  paper, 
an  unknown  ground  of  being,  like  the  unknown  x 
in  algebra,  of  which  nothing  can  be  predicated,  and 
may  suppose  that  this  is  knowing  the  absolute 
Deity.  But  there  is  no  such  dark  predicateless 
ground ;  there  is  no  such  Gnostic  abyss.  The 
Divine  Nature  is  in  and  with  the  attributes,  and 
hence  the  attributes  are  as  deep  and  absolute  as  the 
Nature.  The  substance  and  attributes  of  God  are 


242 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


in  the  same  plane  of  being.  Neither  one  is  more 
aboriginal  than  the  other.  Both  are  equally  eter¬ 
nal,  and  equally  necessary.  Christian  science,  con¬ 
sequently,  has  never  isolated  them  from  each  other. 
It  distinguishes  them,  it  is  true,  in  order  that  it  may 
form  conceptions  of  them,  and  describe  them,  but  it 
is  ever  careful  to  affirm  as  absolute  and  profound  a 
reality  in  the  Divine  attributes  as  in  the  Divine 
essence.  It  never  recognizes  a  Divine  essence 
without  attributes,  any  more  than  it  recognizes 
Divine  attributes  without  a  Divine  essence.  The 
Gnostic  and  the  Pantheistic  speculatist,  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  has  bestowed  but  little  reflection  upon  the 
personal  characteristics  of  the  Deity.  He  has  been 
inclined  to  contemplate  and  discuss  the  bare  predi¬ 
cateless  Essence  or  Being, — to  ov  rather  than  6  cov} 
Attributes  like  personality,  unity,  immutability, 
and,  still  more,  moral  attributes  like  holiness,  jus¬ 
tice,  truth,  and  mercy,  enter  little,  or  none  at  all, 
into  the  ancient  Gnostic,  and  the  modern  Panthe¬ 
istic  construction  of  the  doctrine  of  God.  Yet  these 
constitute  the  very  divinity  of  the  Deity ;  and  hence 
the  Christian  theologian  made  them  the  object  of 
his  first  and  unceasing  contemplation.  These  attri¬ 
butes  are  personal  qualities,  and  thus  it  is  easy  to 
see,  that  theism  is  inseparably  and  naturally  con¬ 
nected  with  the  developement  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  Attributes. 

1  The  use  of  the  phrase,  “  The  an  example  of  this  predicateless 
Absolute,”  in  Hegel’s  system,  is  abstraction. 


THE  PAGAN  TRINITY. 


243 


§  5.  The  Pagan  Trinity. 

Some  of  the  theologies  of  pagan  antiquity  con¬ 
tain  intimations  of  trinality  in  the  Divine  Being. 
The  writings  of  Plato,  particularly,  in  Occidental 
philosophy,  and  some  of  the  Oriental  systems,  such 
as  the  Hindoo,  contain  allusions  to  this  mode  of  the 
Divine  Existence.  But  the  Pagan  trinity  is  one  of 
figurative  personification,  and  not  of  interior  hypostat- 
ical  distinctions  in  the  Divine  Essence  constituting 
three  real  persons  who  may  be  addressed  in  sup¬ 
plication  and  worship.  It  is  commonly  constructed 
in  one  of  two  ways.  Either  the  Triad  is  made  out, 
by  personifying  three  of  the  more  fundamental  fac¬ 
ulties  and  attributes  of  God, — as  Goodness,  Intel¬ 
lect,  and  Will, — which  is  Plato’s  method ; 1  or  else 


1  Cudworth  attempts  to  find  a 
hypostatical  trinity  in  Plato.  Mor¬ 
gan  (Trinity  of  Plato  and  Philo) 
concedes  the  monotheism  of  Pla¬ 
to,  but  denies  that  the  Christian 
or  hypostatical  trinity  is  to  be 
found  in  his  writings. 

The  following  passage  from  the 
Epinomis  (986.  d,  Ed.  Tauchnitz, 
VI.  495)  has  been  supposed  to 
teach  the  doctrine  of  the  Logos : 
“Each  [of  the  eight  heavenly 
powers  (Svi'd/^eir)  residing  in  the 
sun,  moon,  &c.]  goes  through  its 
revolution,  and  completes  the  or¬ 
der  (xoo-fxnv)  which  reason  (Xdyo<r), 
the  most  divine  of  all,  has  ap¬ 
pointed  to  be  visible.”  Here,  says 
Morgan  (Trinity  of  Plato,  p.  6), 


“  Plato  is  speaking  merely  of  the 
law  of  harmony  which  prevails  in 
the  material  universe ;  and  the 
word  Xoyoy  is  without  the  article. 
The  connection  shows  conclusive¬ 
ly,  that  he  is  speaking  of  an  ab¬ 
stract  principle,  and  not  of  a  per¬ 
son.” 

Another  passage  which  Cud- 
worth  and  others  suppose  teaches 
the  doctrine  of  a  hypostatical 
trinity  is  found  in  Plato’s  second 
Epistle  to  Dionysius  (Opera  VIII. 
118,  Ed.  Tauchnitz).  “As  re¬ 
gards  the  king  of  all,  all  things 
are  his,  and  all  are  for  his  sake, 
and  he  is  the  cause  of  all  beauti¬ 
ful  things.  And  there  is  a  second , 
in  respect  to  secondary  things, 


244 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


by  personifying  three  of  the  powers  of  nature, — as 
the  creating,  preserving,  and  destroying  forces  of 
the  Hindoo  Trimurti.  In  these  schemes,  the  facul- 


and  a  third ,  in  respect  to  tertiary 
things.” 

According  to  Cudworth  (In¬ 
tellectual  System,  II.  364  sq. 
Tegg’s  Ed.),  Plato  held  a  hypo- 
statical  trinity,  consisting  of  to 
fiyaSoi/,  vov s,  and  \Jsu)(r].  These, 
he  thinks,  are  what  Plato  meant 
by  his  “king  of  all,”  “second,” 
and  “third,”  in  his  Epistle  to 
Dionysius.  Respecting  the  first 
and  second  hypostases,  he  con¬ 
tends  that  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  Plato  held  them  to  be  uncre¬ 
ated  and  eternal  subsistences.  Re  - 
specting  the  third,  the  so-called 
“  mundane  soul,”  he  concedes  that 
there  “  may  be  some  more  reason 
to  make  a  question  ”  whether  Pla¬ 
to  held  to  its  eternity.  He  is  him¬ 
self  of  the  opinion  that  Plato  “held 
a  double  Psyche,  or  Soul ;  one 
mundane,  which  is,  as  it  were, 
the  concrete  form  of  this  corporeal 
world  [the  plastic  principle  in  na¬ 
ture]  ;  another,  supermundane, 
which  is  not  so  much  the  form  as 
the  artificer  of  the  world.”  This 
latter,  Cudworth  contends  is  the 
third  hypostasis  in  the  Platonic 
trinity,  and  is  uncreated  and  eter¬ 
nal. 

The  Platonic  and  Pythagorean 
trinity,  Cudworth  (Intel.  Syst.  II. 
333,  339,  340)  holds  to  be  a  “  the¬ 
ology  of  Divine  tradition,  or  reve¬ 
lation, — %eo7rapd$oTos  SfoXoyta,  a 
Divine  cabala, — amongst  the  He¬ 


brews  first,  and  from  them  after¬ 
wards  communicated  to  the  Egyp¬ 
tians,  and  other  nations.”  He 
also  distinguishes  the  genuine  Pla¬ 
tonic  from  the  pseudo-Platonic 
trinity  of  the  later  Platonists. 
This  latter  consisted  in  deifying 
with  the  first  universal  Mind,  ma¬ 
ny  secondary  particular  minds, — 
namely,  all  particular  souls  above 
the  human.  In  this  way,  they 
“  melted  the  deity  by  degrees, 
and  bringing  it  down  lower  and 
lower,  they  made  the  juncture 
and  commixtion  betwixt  God  and 
the  creature  so  smooth  and  close, 
that  where  they  indeed  parted 
was  altogether  undiscoverable.” 
In  this  way,  they  “  laid  a  founda¬ 
tion  for  infinite  polytheism,  cos- 
molatry  (or  world-idolatry)  and 
creature  worship.” — Theodoret 
(De  affect.  II.  750)  remarks,  that 
“  Plotinus  and  Numenius,  ex¬ 
plaining  the  sense  of  Plato,  say, 
that  he  taught  three  Principles, 
beyond  time,  and  eternal :  name¬ 
ly  Good,  Intellect,  and  the  Soul 
of  All.”  Plotinus  (4  Ennead,  iv. 
16)  says  of  this  trinity  :  “  It  is  as 
if  one  were  to  place  Good  as  the 
centre,  Intellect  like  an  immova¬ 
ble  circle  round,  and  Soul  a  mov¬ 
able  circle,  and  movable  by  ap¬ 
petite.” 

The  Hindoo  trinity  is  a  combi¬ 
nation  of  three  powers,— that  of 
creation  (Brahma),  preservation 


THE  PAGAN  TRINITY. 


245 


ties,  attributes,  and  functions  of  the  Deity  take  the 
place  of  interior  and  substantial  distinctions  in  his 
Essence.  There  is,  therefore,  when  the  ultimate 
analysis  is  made,  no  true  and  proper  tripersonality. 
There  is  merely  a  personification  of  three  imperson¬ 
alities.  The  Pagan  trinity,  consequently,  is  only  a 
figurative  and  nominal  one. 

This  examination  of  the  Pagan  trinitarianism 
refutes  the  assertion  of  Socinus  that  the  Church 
derived  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  from  the  writings 
of  Plato.  The  two  doctrines  are  fundamentally 
different.  At  the  same  time,  however,  they  have 
just  sufficient  resemblance  to  each  other,  to  justify 
the  assertion,  that  the  Biblical  doctrine  of  the  trin¬ 
ity  cannot  be  so  utterly  contrary  to  the  natural 
apprehensions  of  the  human  mind,  as  its  opponents 
represent,  inasmuch  as  the  most  elaborate  and 
thoughtful  of  the  pagan  philosophies  and  theologies 
groped  towards  it,  though  they  did  not  reach  it. 
An  inadequate  and  defective  view  of  truth  is  better 
than  none  at  all ;  and  although  it  is  insufficient  for 
the  purposes  of  either  theory  or  practice,  it  is  yet  a 
corroboration,  so  far  as  it  reaches,  of  the  full  and 
adequate  doctrine.  Both  the  copy  and  the  counter¬ 
feit  are  evidences  of  the  reality  of  the  original. 

(Vishnu),  and  destruction  (Siva),  or  Time  without  bounds.  “  The 
And  these  three  are  emanations  dualism  of  Persia  made  the  two 
from  the  original  Monad  (Brahm).  antagonist  powers  to  be  created 
The  Persian  worship  recognizes  by,  or  proceed  from,  the  One  Su- 
two  great  principles,  Ormusd  and  preme  or  Uncreated.”  Milman  : 
Ahriman,  both  subordinate  to  History  of  Christianity,  p.  200, 
Mithra,  the  great  Primal  Cause,  Harper’s  Ed 


CHAPTER  II. 

ANTE-NICENE  TRINIT  ARIANISM. 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements . 

The  early  history  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity 
shows  that  Christian  faith  may  exist  without  a  sci¬ 
entific  and  technical  expression  of  it.  This  ability 
comes  in  only  as  those  heresies  arise  which  necessi¬ 
tate  the  exact  and  guarded  statements  of  systematic 
theology.  Waterland,  in  alluding  to  the  severity 
of  the  criticisms  which  Photius  makes  upon  the 
trinitarianism  of  the  Ante-Nicene  writers,  justly  re¬ 
marks,  that  he  did  not  “  consider  the  difference  of 
times,  or  how  unreasonable  it  is  to  expect  that  those 
who  lived  before  the  rise  and  condemnation  of  her¬ 
esies  should  come  up  to  every  accurate  form  of 
expression  which  long  experience  afterwards  found 
necessary,  to  guard  the  faith.”1  Many  a  man  in  the 
very  bosom  of  the  church  at  this  day  cherishes  a 


1  Waterland:  Preface  to  Second  Defence,  p.  17. 


PRELIMIN ARY  STATEMENTS. 


247 


belief  in  tlie  triune  God,  that  involves  a  speculative 
definition  of  the  three  persons  and  their  mutual  re¬ 
lations,  which  in  his  present  lack  of  theological  dis¬ 
cipline  he  could  no  more  give  with  exactness,  and 
without  deviation  towards  Sabellianism  on  the  right 
hand,  and  Arianism  on  the  left,  than  he  could 
specify  the  chemical  elements  of  the  air  he  breathes, 
or  map  the  sky  under  whose  dome  he  walks  every 
day.  The  same  fact  meets  us  upon  ‘the  wider  arena 
of  the  Universal  Church.  The  Christian  experience 
is  one  and  the  same  in  all  ages  and  periods,  but  the 
ability  to  make  scientific  statements  of  those  doc¬ 
trines  which  are  received  by  the  believing  soul, 
varies  with  the  peculiar  demands  for  such  state¬ 
ments,  and  the  intensity  with  which,  in  peculiar 
emergencies,  the  theological  mind  is  directed  towards 
them.  We  do  not,  therefore,  find  in  the  first  two 
centuries  of  the  history  of  Christian  Doctrine,  so 
much  fullness  and  exactitude  of  technical  definition 
as  in  after  ages,  though  there  was  undoubtedly  full 
as  much  unity  of  internal  belief.  The  Primitive 
Christians  received  the  doctrines  in  the  general  form 
in  which  they  are  given  in  Scripture,  and  were  pre¬ 
served  from  the  laxness  of  theory,  and  the  corrup¬ 
tion  of  experience  and  practice  so  liable  to  accompany 
indefinite  and  merely  general  views,  by  the  unusual 
vitality  and  vigour  of  the  divine  life  within  their  souls. 
General  statements  of  Christian  doctrine  satisfy  two 
extremes  of  religious  character.  They  are  sufficient 
for  a  warm  and  glowing  piety,  which,  because  it 


248 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


already  holds  the  truth  in  all  its  meaning  and  corn 
prehensiveness  within  the  depths  of  a  believing 
spirit,  can  dispense  with  technical  and  scientific 
statements.  They  are  satisfactory  to  a  cold  and 
lifeless  religionism,  which,  because  it  rejects  the 
essential  truth  in  the  depths  of  an  unbelieving  spirit, 
prefers  an  inexact  phraseology,  because  of  the  facility 
with  which  it  may  be  twisted  and  tortured  to  its 
own  real  preconceptions  and  prejudices.  The  ab¬ 
sence  of  a  scientific  phraseology  is  characteristic, 
consequently,  either  of  the  most  devout,  or  the  most 
rationalistic  periods  in  Church  History. 

The  difference  between  the  mental  attitude  of 
each  of  these  two  classes  towards  the  truth  is  per¬ 
ceived  in  the  difference  in  the  feeling  exhibited  by 
each,  respectively,  when  a  systematic  and  technical 
statement  is  made.  The  catholic  mind  accepts  the 
creed  when  constructed,  because  it  sees  in  it  only  an 
exact  and  full  statement  of  what  it  already  holds  in 
practical  experience.  The  heretical  mind,  on  the 
contrary,  rejects  the  creed-statement  when  made, 
because  it  knows  that  it  does  not  receive  the  tenets 
taught  by  it,  and  because  the  logical  and  technical 
articles  of  the  creed  preclude  all  equivocation  or 
ambiguity.  The  Catholic  welcomed,  therefore,  the 
explicit  trinitarian  statements  of  Nice,  but  the  Arian 
rejected  them.  A  recent  writer  exhibits  the  con¬ 
nection  between  the  practical  faith  of  the  common 
believer,  and  the  scientific  statements  of  the  theo¬ 
logian,  in  the  following  exceedingly  clear  and  truth- 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


24U 


ful  manner.  “No  one  professes  to  maintain  that 
the  disciples  of  St.  John  habitually  used  such  icords 
as  4  hypostatic,’  4  consubstantiality,’  &c. — What  pro¬ 
portion  of  the  whole  multitude  of  perfectly  ortho- 
dox  believers  on  earth,  even  at  this  hour,  habitually 
use  them,  or  have  ever  used  them  ?  It  may  be  fur¬ 
ther  admitted,  that  when  a  doctrine  has  come  to  be 
intellectually  analysed  and  measured,  certain  rela¬ 
tions  may  be  seen  to  be  involved  in  it,  the  distinct 
expression  of  which  may  become  thenceforth  useful, 
and  even  necessary ;  and  that  until  circumstances, 
usually  heresy,  have  led  to  this  close  intellectual 
survey,  these  relations,  though  involved  in  the  ex¬ 
isting  belief,  and  logically  deducible  therefrom,  may 
not  occupy  a  prominent  position  in  the  common 
expositions  of  the  faith.  In  what  precise  degree  this 
holds  in  such  a  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
trinity  as  the  Athanasian  Creed  is  another  question ; 
the  principle  is  exemplified  in  every  stage  of  the 
history  of  theology.  Those, — not  even  to  investi¬ 
gate  their  expressed  dogmatic  belief, — who  were 
taught  to  equally  worship  the  mysterious  Three 
into  whose  single  Divine  Name  they  had  been  bap¬ 
tized, — to  look  on  them  habitually  as  Protecting 
Powers  equally  because  infinitely  above  them,  sep¬ 
arate  in  their  special  titles,  offices,  and  agency,  and 
so  a  real  Three,  yet  One  (as  the  very  act  of  supreme 
worship  implied), — would  probably  see  little  in 
even  that  elaborate  creed  beyond  the  careful  intel¬ 
lectual  exhibition  of  truths  necessarily  involved  in 


250 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


that  worship.  They  would  easily  see  that  to  con* 
tradict  explicitly  any  proposition  of  that  creed  would 
be  directly  or  indirectly  to  deny  the  faith ;  while 
at  the  same  time  they  may  have  held,  as  the  infinite 
majority  of  the  Christian  world  have  since  held, 
the  pure  faith  of  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost, 
without  perpetually  retaining  a  distinct  explicit 
recollection  of  all  the  separate  propositions  that 

creed  contains . In  short,  that  creed  gives  us, 

as  it  were,  the  intellectual  edition  of  the  doctrine 
held  from  the  beginning, — the  doctrine  expressed 
(as  mathematicians  say)  ‘in  terms  of’  the  pure 
intellect. 

“It  would  probably  illustrate  this  process,  if 
any  one  were  to  reflect  upon  the  quantity  of  minute 
and  refined  thought,  and  the  extreme  accuracy  of 
expression,  required  to  fix  and  secure,  so  as  at  once 
to  discriminate  them  from  all  rival  hypotheses,  some 
of  those  elementary  and  fundamental  notions  of 
simple  theism ,  which  yet  no  one  doubts  to  be  the 
real  belief,  not  merely  of  all  classes  of  Christians, 
but  of  the  greater  portion  of  the  civilized  world.- 
For  example,  to  fix  the  precise  and  formal  notion 
of  creation  out  of  nothing  (so  as  to  distinguish  it 
absolutely  from,  e.  g.,  the  hypothesis  of  emanation)  ; 
to  state  the  precise  relation  of  the  Divine  Power  to 
the  Divine  Rectitude, — such,  that  the  Almighty 
God  can  never  do  but  what  is  right;  to  deliver 
with  accuracy  liable  to  no  evasion  the  exact  relation 
of  the  Divine  Omnipotence  and  Goodness  to  the 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


251 


existence  of  moral  evil,  &c.  On  all  such  subjects, 
every  ordinary  Christian  has  a  sufficiently  decisive 
practical  belief,  a  belief  which  would  at  once  be 
shocked  by  any  express  assertion  of  its  contradic¬ 
tory :  he  tells  you,  ‘  God  made  all  things  from 
nothing 1  God  can  never  do  wrong ;  ’  4  God  makes 
no  man  sin,  it  is  the  devil  who  tempts  him,  it  is 
man’s  own  corrupt  choice  to  do  evil :  ’  and  yet  it  is 
easy  to  conceive  how  very  different  an  aspect  these 
simple  but  profound  truths  would  assume  in  an 
Athanasian  creed  of  theism  ;  how  novel  might  ap¬ 
pear  doctrines,  before  almost  too  universally  recog¬ 
nized  to  be  laboriously  insisted  on,  if  it  became 
necessary  to  exhibit  them  guarded  at  all  points 
against  the  subtlety  of  some  Arius  or  Sabellius  of 
Natural  Theology.” 1 

But  although  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  like 
other  doctrines  of  the  Christian  system,  did  not  ob¬ 
tain  a  technical  construction  in  those  first  two  cen¬ 
turies  and  a  half,  during  which  the  Church  was 
called  chiefly  to  a  general  defence  of  Christianity, 
rather  than  to  define  its  single  dogmas,  it  would  be 
a  great  error  to  infer  that  there  were  no  results  in 
this  direction.  The  controversies  that  were  neces¬ 
sitated  by  the  Gnostic  heresies  led  indirectly  to  some 
more  exact  statements  respecting  the  doctrine  of  the 
trinity ;  but  the  defective  and  inadequate  trinita- 
rianism  of  certain  men  of  this  period,  some  of  whom 
were  excommunicated  because  of  their  errors,  while 

1  Archer  Butler  :  Letters  on  Romanism,  p.  224. 


252 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


some  still  remained  within  the  pale  of  the  church, 
either  because  of  the  comparative  mildness  of  their 
heterodoxy,  or  because  a  less  rigorous  and  scientific 
spirit  prevailed  in  those  portions  of  the  church  to 
which  they  belonged,  contributed  far  more  than 
any  other  cause,  to  the  scientific  and  technical  enun¬ 
ciation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  three  Persons  in  the 
one  Essence. 

Some  writers  have  attempted  to  prove  that  the 
Ante-Nicene  Church  held  only  the  most  vague  and 
shadowy  species  of  trinitarianism.  But  a  church 
that  was  capable  of  grappling  with  the  emanation- 
ism  of  the  Gnostic,  and  saw  the  fatal  error  in  the 
modal  trinitarianism  of  the  Patripassians, — the  most 
subtle,  and  also  the  most  elevated  of  all  the  forms 
of  spurious  trinitarianism, — must  have  possessed  an 
exceedingly  clear  intuition  of  the  true  doctrine. 
The  orthodoxy  of  the  Primitive  Church  is  demon¬ 
strated  by  the  heterodoxy  which  it  combatted  and 
refuted.  “  Had  we  no  other  ways  to  know  it,”  says 

V 

Sherlock,  “  we  might  learn  the  faith  of  the  catholic 
Church,  by  its  opposition  to  those  heresies  which  it 
condemned.”  We  shall  therefore,  first  specify  and 
delineate  those  heterodox  theories  of  the  Apologetic 
period  which  elicited  the  clearest  counter  state¬ 
ments,  and  thereby  contributed  in  a  negative  way, 
to  the  early  orthodox  construction  of  the  dogma 
whose  historical  development  we  are  describing.1 

1  “Improbatio  quippe  haereti-  tna  sentiat,  et  quid  habeat  sana 
corum  facit  eminere  quid  ecclesia  doctrina.  Oportuit  enim  et  hae- 


ANTI -TRINITARIANS. 


253 


§  2.  Classes  of  Anti- Trinitarians . 

In  the  course  of  the  first  three  centuries,  three 
sects  were  formed,  with  varieties  of  view  and 
phraseology,  all  of  whom  were  characterized  by  an 
erroneous  apprehension  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trin¬ 
ity;  owing,  in  most  instances,  to  an  attempt  to 
fathom  the  depths  of  this  mystery  by  a  process  of 
speculation,  instead  of  by  a  comprehensive  reflection 
upon  the  Biblical  data  for  its  construction.1  As  we 
examine  them,  we  shall  perceive  that  the  mind 
looked  at  only  one  side  of  the  great  truth,  and  dwelt 
upon  only  a  single  one  of  the  several  representations 
in  the  revealed  word.  Some  sought  to  affirm,  and 
that  very  strongly,  the  doctrine  of  the  deity  of 
Christ ;  but  denied  his  distinct  personality.  Christ, 
they  held,  was  God  the  Father  himself,  in  a  partic¬ 
ular  aspect  or  relationship.  Essence  and  Person 
were  identical,  for  them ;  and  as  there  was  but  one 
Essence  there  could  be  but  one  Person.  Others 
denied  the  proper  deity  of  Christ,  assumed  only  an 
extraordinary  and  pre-eminent  connection  of  the 
man  Jesus  with  the  Divine  Essence,  and  made  two 
divine  powers  (Suva  at  to),  not  persons  ( vnoarccosig ), 

reses  esse,  ut  probati  manifesti  ample,  is  quite  intelligible.  It  is 
fierent  inter  infirmos  (1  Cor.  xi.  a  significant  remark  of  Hooker 
19).”  Augustinus :  Confessiones  (Eccl.  Pol.  I.  586),  that  “the 
VII.  xix.  Scripture  doctrine  of  the  Trinity 

1  In  some  instances,  probably,  is  more  true  than  plain,  while  the 
there  was  a  desire  to  explain  the  heretical  doctrine  of  the  Trinity 
doctrine  and  relieve  it  of  its  mys-  is  more  plain  than  true.” 
tery.  The  modal  trinity,  for  ex- 


254 


HISTORY  OR  THEOLOGY. 


of  the  Son  and  the  Holy  Spirit.  Others  still,  held 
Christ  to  be  a  mere  man.  Anti-Trinitarians  of  this 
period  were,  consequently,  of  three  classes ;  namely 
Patripassians  or  Monarchians ,  Nominal  Trinita¬ 
rians ,  and  Humanitarians .  The  Church,  however, 
engaged  in  controversy  with  only  the  first  two ; 
because  the  third  class  did  not  pretend  to  hold  the 
doctrine  of  the  trinity  in  any  form,  while  the  others 
claimed  to  teach  the  true  Biblical  trinitarianism. 

I.  The  first  class  of  Anti-Trinitarians  were  de¬ 
nominated  P at/ripassians  or  Monarchians ,  because 
they  asserted  the  Monad  and  denied  the  Triad. 
They  asserted  the  deity  of  Christ,  but  held  the 
church  doctrine  of  three  persons  to  be  irreconcilable 
with  that  of  the  unity  of  God.  Hence  they  affirmed 
that  there  is  only  one  divine  Person.  This  one  only 
Person  conceived  of  in  his  abstract  simplicity  and 
eternity  was  denominated  God  the  Father  ;  but  in 
his  incarnation,  he  was  denominated  God  the  Son. 
Sometimes,  a  somewhat  different  mode  of  apprehen¬ 
sion  and  statement  was  employed.  God  in  his  con¬ 
cealed  unrevealed  nature  and  being  was  denominated 
God  the  Father,  and  when  he  comes  forth  from  the 
depths  of  his  essence,  creating  a  universe,  and  re¬ 
vealing  and  communicating  himself  to  it,  he  therein 
takes  on  a  different  relation,  and  assumes  another 
denomination :  namely,  God  the  Son,  or  the  Logos. 

In  their  Christology,  the  Patripassians  taught 
that  this  single  divine  Person,  in  his  form  of  Son  or 
Logos,  animated  the  human  body  of  Christ ;  and 


ANTI-TKINITAEIANS. 


255  * 


denied  the  existence  of  a  true  human  soul  in  the 
Person  of  Jesus  Christ.  It  was,  consequently,  the 
divine  essence  itself  in  alliance  with  a  physical  or¬ 
ganization  and  nature,  that  suffered  for  the  sin  of 
mankind ;  and  hence  the  term  Patripassians  was 
given  to  the  advocates  of  this  doctrine. 

The  principal  Patripassians  were  the  following : 1 2 

1.  Praxeas  of  Asia  Minor,  originally,  who  ap¬ 
pears  at  Pome  about  the  year  200,  and  was  opposed 
by  Tertullian  in  his  tract  Adversus  Praxean.  The 
opening  sentences  of  this  treatise  are  characteristic. 
“The  devil  is  jealous  of  the  truth  in  various  ways. 
Sometimes  he  affects  it,  in  order  by  defending,  to 
overthrow  it.  He  maintains  one  only  supreme  Lord, 
the  omnipotent  former  of  the  world,  in  order  to 
construct  a  heresy  out  of  this  unit  (unico).  He 
says  that  the  Father  descended  into  a  virgin,  was 
himself  born  of  her,  himself  suffered,  and  finally 
that  the  Father  himself  is  Jesus  Christ.” 

2.  Noetus  at  Smyrna,  about  230,  was  excom¬ 
municated  on  account  of  heresy.  His  principal 
opponent  was  Hippolytus  in  his  tractate,  Contra 
haeresin  Noeti? 

3.  Beryl ,  bishop  of  Bostra  in  Arabia,  about  250. 
He  was  tried  for  heresy  by  an  Arabian  Synod,  in 
244,  and  by  the  arguments  of  Origen,  whom  the 


1  Compare  Guericke  :  Church  more  reliable  work  than  that  of 

History,  §  56.  Bunsen,  in  regard  to  the  doctrinal 

2  See  Wordsworth’s  Hippoly-  opinions  of  Hippolytus,  and  the 
tus,  pp.  243,  261  sq.,  281  sq., — a  Ante-Nicene  period  generally. 


256 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


synod  had  called  to  their  aid,  was  convinced  of  his 
error,  and  renounced  his  Patripassianism.  Accord¬ 
ing  to  Jerome,  he  sought  further  instruction  from 
Origen,  in  a  correspondence  with  him  upon  the 
doctrine  of  the  trinity. 

II.  The  second  class  of  Anti-Trinitarians,  whom 
we  denominate  Nominal  Trinitarians ,  conceded  no 
proper  deity  to  Christ,  but  only  a  certain  species  of 
divinity.  The  distinction  between  deity  and  divinity 
is  important  in  the  history  of  Trinitarianism.  The 
former  is  an  absolute  term,  and  implies  essential 
and  eternal  godhood.  The  latter  is  relative,  and  is 
therefore  sometimes  applied  to  a  created  essence  of 
a  high  order,  and  sometimes  to  human  nature  itself. 
This  second  class,  who  attributed  divinity  but  de¬ 
nied  deity  to  Christ,  held  that  the  concealed  unre¬ 
vealed  God, — corresponding  to  the  Father  in  the 
Patripassian  theory, — reveals  himself  by  means  of 
two  Powers  which  stream  forth  from  him,  as  rays 
of  light  are  rayed  out  from  the  sun :  one  an  illumi¬ 
nating  Power,  the  other  an  enlivening.  The  illumi¬ 
nating  Power  is  the  divine  Wisdom,  or  Reason,  or 
Logos,  which  exists  in  two  forms :  first,  the  indwell¬ 
ing  reflective  reason  of  the  Deity,  whereby  he  is 
capable  of  rational  intelligence  (Xoyog  svdia&srog)  ; 
secondly  the  outworking  self-expressive  reason  of 
the  Deity,  whereby  he  creates,  and  makes  commu¬ 
nications  to  his  creation  (Xoyog  n QocpoQixog).  The 
enlivening  Power  is  the  Holy  Spirit.  With  the 
divine  Logos,  or  the  illuminating  Power, — which  is 


ANTI-TRINITARIANS. 


251 


not  an  hypostasis,  but  only  an  emanation  issuing 
from  the  essential  Deity, — the  man  Jesus  was  united 
from  his  birth  in  a  pre-eminent  manner,  and  in  a 
degree  higher  than  the  inspiration  of  any  prophet ; 
and  as  a  man  thus  standing  under  this  pre-eminent 
illumination  and  guidance  of  the  Logos,  he  is  called 
the  Son  of  God. 

1.  A  representative  of  this  second  class  of  Anti- 
Trinitarians,  is  Paul  of  Samosata,  bishop  of  Antioch 
for  some  time  after  260,  a  man  of  great  vanity  and 
love  of  show.  He  was  pronounced  heretical  by  two 
Antiochian  synods,  in  264  and  269,  and  deposed 
from  his  bishopric  by  the  last  synod,  but  found 
powerful  support  from  Queen  Zenobia,  and  con¬ 
tinued  to  discharge  the  functions  of  his  office.  On 
the  conquest  of  the  queen  by  the  emperor  Aurelian, 
the  synodal  decree  of  deposition  was  carried  into 
execution,  after  a  new  preferring  of  charges  by  the 
bishops  of  the  region,  and  the  urgent  co-operation 
of  the  bishop  of  Rome.1 

2.  A  second  representative  of  this  second  class 
of  Anti-Trinitarians  is  Sabellius,  presbyter  of  Ptole- 
mais  in  Pentapolis,  250-260 ;  though  he  stands 
somewhat  between  the  first  and  second  classes.  He 
belongs  to  the  second  class,  so  far  as  he  understands 
by  the  Logos  and  the  Holy  Spirit  two  Powers 
( Svvccjuecs )  streaming  forth  from  the  divine  Essence, 
through  which  God  works  and  reveals  himself;2 

1  Eusebius  :  Eccl.  Hist.,  VII. 

27-30. 


11 


2  Sabellius  seems  to  have  re¬ 
garded  the  Monad  as  antithetic 


258 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


hut  departs  from  this  class  and  approximates  to  the 
Patripassians,  in  denying  that  Christ  was  merely  an 
ordinary  man  upon  whom  the  divine  Logos  only 
exerted  a  peculiar  influence,  and  affirming  that  the 
Logos-Power  itself  belonged  to  the  proper  person¬ 
ality  of  Christ,  and  thereby  determined  and  shaped 
his  personal  consciousness  during  the  period  of  his 
earthly  life.  The  Logos  entered  into  union  with 
Christ’s  humanity,  and  not  merely  inspired  it.  But 
this  more  exalted  view  of  the  Person  of  Christ  is 
immediately  depressed  again  to  the  humanitarian 
level  of  the  second  class,  by  the  further  assertion, 
that  this  divine  Logos-Power,  which  had  thus  issued 
forth  from  God,  and  united  itself  with  a  human 
body,  and  formed  one  communion  of  life  and  con¬ 
sciousness  with  it  during  the  period  of  Christ’s 
earthly  existence,  was  at  the  ascension  of  Jesus 
again  withdrawn  into  the  depths  of  the  Divine 


to  the  Triad,  thus  introducing 
four  factors  i>  to  the  problem. 
Whether  he  regarded  the  Father 
as  the  Monad,  or  supposed  the 
Father  to  stand  in  the  same  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  Monad,  that  the  Lo¬ 
gos  and  Spirit  do,  is  uncertain. 
Meander  (I.  595)  is  of  opinion 
that  Sabellius  held  the  Father  as 
unrevealed  to  be  the  Monad,  and 
as  revealed  to  be  the  Father  prop¬ 
erly  so  called.  He  employed  the 
following  comparison  to  illustrate 
his  view  of  the  Trinity.  “  As  in 
the  sun  we  may-  distinguish  its 
proper  substance,  its  round  shape, 


and  its  power  of  communicating 
heat  and  light,  so  in  God  we  may 
distinguish  his  self-subsistent  es¬ 
sence  (judi/ar),  the  illuminating 
power  of  the  Logos,  and  the  en¬ 
livening  energy  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
in  the  hearts  of  believers.”  N  e~ 
ander  (I.  596)  also  remarks  that 
Sabellius  employed  the  catholic 
phrase,  “three  Persons,”  but  in 
the  sense  of  personifications,  or 
characters  which  the  one  essence 
assumed  according  to  varying 
occasions.  Compare  Eusebius  : 
Eccl.  Hist.  VII.  vi;  Epiphanius: 
Haereses,  LXII. 


ANTI-TRINITARIANS. 


259 


Nature.1  Sabellianism  maintained  itself  down  into 
the  4th  century,  chiefly  at  Rome  and  in  Mesopo¬ 
tamia. 

III.  The  third  class  of  Anti-Trinitarians,  whom 
we  denominate  the  Humanitarians ,  were  those  who 
asserted  the  mere  and  sole  humanity  of  Christ,  and 
denied  his  divinity  in  any  and  every  sense  of  the 
term ;  some  of  them  holding,  however,  to  an  extra¬ 
ordinary  humanity  in  Christ,  and  others  only  to  an 
ordinary.2  The  views  of  this  class  were  so  palpably 
in  conflict  with  the  representations  of  Scripture  that 
the  Church  became  engaged  in  no  controversy  with 
them.  It  was  only  with  those  parties  who  held  a 


1  Sabellius’s  trinity,  says  Nean- 
der  (I.  598-9),  is  transitory. 
When  the  purposes  of  its  forma¬ 
tion  are  accomplished,  the  Triad 
is  resolved  again  into  the  Monad. 
Sabellius  did  not  apply  the  name 
of  Son  to  the  Logos ;  but  only  to 
the  Person  resulting  from  the 
union  of  the  Logos  with  the  man 
Jesus.  He  maintains,  that  in  the 
Old  Testament  no  mention  is 
made  of  the  Son  of  God,  but  only 
of  the  Logos. 

2  We  group  under  this  general 
name  of  Humanitarians  all  those 
sects,  such  as  the  Ebionites,  Theo- 
dotians,  Artemonites,  and  Alogi, 
who  denied  both  the  deity  and 
the  divinity  of  Christ.  Water- 
land,  upon  the  strength  of  a  state¬ 
ment  ofEpiphanius,  maintains  that 
the  doctrine  that  Christ  was  only 
a  mere  and  ordinary  man  was  not 
taught  until  Theodotus  (A.  D.  196) 


broached  it.  The  earlier  heretics, 
like  the  Ebionites,  Cerinthus,  and 
Carpocrates,  all  held  to  a  spe¬ 
cies  of  connection  between  Christ 
and  a  superior  being,  which  made 
his  humanity  an  extraordinary 
one.  These  sects  held  that  upon 
the  mere  and  ordinary  man  Jesus, 
who  was  born  by  ordinary  gen¬ 
eration  of  Joseph  and  Mary,  the 
aeon  Christ  descended  at  his 
baptism,  investing  him  with  mi¬ 
raculous  powers,  but  left  him  again 
at  the  time  of  his  death.  All 
these  representations  were  reject¬ 
ed  by  Theodotus,  who  held  that 
Christ  was  in  every  respect  an 
ordinary  mortal  man  dv- 

Spcrrrof).  Neander(I.  580),  on  the 
contrary,  quotes  Theodotus’s  ex¬ 
planation  of  Luke  i.  31  to  show 
that  he  did  not  deny  the  super¬ 
natural  character  of  Christ’s  na¬ 
tivity. 


260 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


species  of  trinit arianism  that  the  catholic  mind  en¬ 
tered  into  earnest  and  prolonged  discussion. 

Criticising  the  first  two  classes,  in  reference  to 
whom  the  term  Anti-Trinitarian  has  its  weightiest 
application,  it  is  obvious  that  the  Patripassians  or 
Monarchians  approached  nearer  to  the  revealed  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  absolute  deity  of  Christ  than  did  the 
Nominal  Trinitarians.  According  to  them,  God  in 
his  essential  being  was  in  Christ.  The  Logos  was 
not  a  mere  emanation  from  the  divine  nature,  but 
was  the  very  divine  nature  itself.  Their  conception 
of  Christ  as  to  his  deity  was  elevated,  and  hence,  as 
Neander  remarks,  u  the  more  profound  pious  feeling 
in  those  of  the  laity  who  were  not  well  indoctrinated 
seems  to  have  inclined  them  rather  to  that  form  of 
Monarchianism  which  saw  in  Christ  nothing  but 
God,  and  overlooked  and  suppressed  the  human 
element,  than  towards  the  other.”1  In  respect  to 
Christology,  the  emanationism  of  the  second  class 
was  further  from  the  truth,  than  was  the  monarchi¬ 
anism  of  the  first  class.  But  in  respect  to  Trinita- 
rianism,  the  Patripassians  admitted  no  interior  and 
immanent  distinctions  in  the  Godhead.  Their  Su¬ 
preme  Deity  was  a  monad, — a  unit,  without  any 
inward  and  personal  subsistences.  This  unit  was 
only  expanded  or  metamorphosed .2  A  trinality  in 

1  ISTeandek:  Church  History,  I.  phraseology:  fj  povas  n\aTvv%e7(ra 
577.  yeyove  rpias  *  enXaTvv^rj  rj  povas 

3  Athanasius  (Contra  Arianos,  els  rpiada.  Again  (Cont.  A.  IY. 
IY.  14,  22),  describes  the  Monar-  6)  he  describes  the  Sabellian 
chian  theory  in  the  following  trinitarian  process  as  a  “  dilatation 


PRIMITIVE  TRENTTARIAISTSM. 


261 


the  Divine  Nature  itself  was  denied.  The  Nominal 
Trinitarians,  on  the  other  hand,  approached  nearer 
to  the  truth,  so  far  as  concerns  the  doctrine  of  a 
Trinity  in  the  Unity.  They  admitted  three  distinc¬ 
tions  of  some  sort.  But  they  diverged  again  from 
the  common  faith  of  the  church,  in  holding  that 
these  were  only  modal  distinctions.  The  Logos  and 
the  Holy  Spirit  possessed  no  essential  being.  The 
only  essence  was  the  monad, — the  Father.  The 
Logos  and  the  Holy  Spirit  were  merely  effluences , 
radiations ,  powers ,  energies  streaming  out  like  rays 
from  the  substance  of  the  sun,  which  might  be 
and  actually  were  retracted  and  re-absorbed  in  the 
Divine  Essence.  Tested  rigorously,  indeed,  both 
classes  held  a  common  view.  Both  alike  denied  a 
trinity  of  essence ,  and  affirmed  only  a  monad  with¬ 
out  hypostatical  distinctions,  or  persons  in  it.  But 
having  regard  only  to  phraseology,  it  may  be  said, 
that  Patripassianism  approached  nearest  to  ortho¬ 
doxy  upon  the  side  of  Christology ;  Nominal  Trini- 
tarianism  nearest,  upon  the  side  of  Trinitarianism. 

§  3.  Trinitarianism  of  the  Apostolic ,  and  Primitive 

Fathers. 

The  foundation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  in 
the  Primitive  Church  was  the  baptismal  formula, 
and  the  doxologies  in  the  Epistles,  together  with 

and  contraction,”  an  “  expand-  Essence.  See  Baur  :  Dreieinig- 
ing  and  collapsing  ”of  the  Divine  keitslehre,  I.  257  sq. 


262 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


the  Logos-doctrine  of  the  apostle  John.  The  creed- 
statement  of  the  dogma  did  not  go  beyond  the 
phraseology  of  these.  The  catechumen  upon  his 
entrance  into  the  Christian  Church  professed  his 
faith  in  “  God  the  Father  almighty,  and  in  his  Son 
Jesus  Christ,  and  in  the  Holy  Ghost.”  This  is  the 
formula  employed  in  the  so-called  Apostles’  Creed, 
and  is  as  definite  a  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
trinity  as  was  made  in  any  public  document,  pre¬ 
vious  to  those  Sabellian  and  Arian  controversies 
which  resulted  in  the  more  exhaustive  and  technical 
definitions  of  the  Nicene  Symbol. 

The  construction  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity 
started  not  so  much  from  a  consideration  of  the 
three  Persons,  as  from  a  belief  in  the  deity  of  one 
of  them,  namely  the  Son.  This  was  the  root  of  the 
most  speculative  dogma  in  the  Christian  system. 
The  highly  metaphysical  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  as 
Guericke1  remarks,  u  had  its  origin,  primarily,  in  a 
living  belief  /  namely,  in  the  practical  faith  and  feel¬ 
ing  of  the  primitive  Christian  that  Christ  is  the  co¬ 
equal  Son  of  God.”  For  if  there  is  any  fact  in 
history  that  is  indisputable,  it  is  that  the  Apostolic 
and  Primitive  Church  worshipped  Jesus  Christ. 
This  was  the  distinctive  characteristic  of  the  ad¬ 
herents  of  the  new  religion.  Pliny’s  testimony  is 
well  known,  that  the  Christians  as  a  sect  were 
accustomed  to  meet  before  day-break,  and  sing  a 
responsive  hymn  (carmen  dicere  secum  invicem)  to 

1  Church  History,  §  56. 


PRIMITIVE  TRIN  IT  A  RIAN  ISM. 


263 


Christ,  as  to  God  (Christo  quasi  Deo).1  The  earliest 
liturgies  are  full  of  adoration  towards  the  sacred 
Thi  *ee,  and  particularly  towards  the  second  and 
middle  Person.  The  liturgy  of  the  Church  of  Alex¬ 
andria,  which  in  the  opinion  of  Bunsen2  was  adopted 
about  the  year  200,  and  the  ground  plan  of  which 
dates  back  to  the  year  1 50,  teaches  the  u  People  ” 
to  respond:  u  One  alone  is  holy,  the  Father;  One 
alone  is  holy,  the  Son ;  One  alone  is  holy,  the 
Spirit.”  The  religious  experience  of  the  Primitive 
Church  was  marked  by  joy  at  the  finished  work  of 
redemption ;  and  this  joy  was  accompanied  with 
profound  and  thankful  adoration  towards  its  Author. 
If  regard  be  had  to  the  emotional  utterances  and 
invocations  of  the  first  generations  of  Christians, 
there  is  full  as  much  evidence  for  the  deity  of  the 
Son  as  of  the  Father.  The  religious  feeling  in  all 
its  varieties  terminated  full  as  much  upon  the  second 
Person  of  the  trinity,  as  upon  the  first,  in  that  early 
period  in  the  history  of  Christianity  that  was  near¬ 
est  to  the  living  presence  and  teachings  of  its 
Founder.  The  incarnation  of  the  Logos, — God  be¬ 
coming  man, — is  the  great  dogmatic  idea  of  the 
first  Christian  centuries,  and  shapes  the  whole  think¬ 
ing  and  experience  of  the  Church.  This  accounts 
for  the  absence  of  such  technical  terms  as  appear  in 
the  Nicene  Symbol ;  and  explains  why  it  was,  that 

‘Plinius:  Ep.  x.  96.  that  the  deity  of  Christ  was  con- 

a  Bunsen  :  Analecta  Ante-lSTicae-  stantly  asserted  from  the  begin- 
na,  III.  23.  Compare  Eusebius  ning,  and  constantly  claimed  to  be 
(Eccl.  Hist.  Y.  28),  for  the  proofs  the  apostolical  doctrine. 


264 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


the  general,  and  purely  Biblical  language  of  the 
Apostles’  Creed  was  sufficient  for  the  wants  of  the 
Apostolic  and  Primitive  Church.  The  actual  and 
reverent  worship  of  the  believer  was  constantly 
going  out  towards  the  Son  equally  with  the  Father 
and  the  Spirit ;  and  in  this  condition  of  things,  met¬ 
aphysical  terms  and  distinctions  were  not  required. 
The  faith  and  feeling  of  the  catholic  heart  were 
sufficient.  Until  pretended  and  spurious  forms  of 
trinitarianism  arose,  that  compelled  it,  there  was 
no  necessity  of  employing  in  the  creed  for  the  cate¬ 
chumens,  a  rigorous  and  exact  trinitarian  nomen¬ 
clature, — no  use  for  the  terms  “  essence  ”  and  “  hy¬ 
postasis,”  “generation”  and  “procession.”  Hence 
the  Ante-Nicene  Church  contented  itself  with  em¬ 
bodying  its  reverence  and  worship  of  the  Eternal 
Three,  in  hymns  and  liturgical  formularies,  and 
with  employing  in  its  creed  statements  the  general 
and  untechnical  language  of  the  Scriptures.1 

The  Apostolic  Fathers  lived  before  the  rise  of 
the  two  principal  Anti-Trinitarian  theories  described 
in  a  previous  section,  and  hence  attempted  no  spec- 

J“It  hath  been  the  custom  of  of  speech  they  used.”  Hooker 
the  Church  of  Christ  to  end  Eccl.  Pol.  Y.  xliii. — Hooker  adds, 
sometimes  prayers,  and  sermons  that  Basil,  because  he  sometimes 
always,  with  words  of  glory  employed  the  words  u with  the 
(gloria  Patri) ;  wherein,  as  long  Son,”  and  “  by  the  Son,  in  the 
as  the  blessed  Trinity  had  honor,  Spirit,”  felt  compelled  to  allay 
and  till  Arianism  had  made  it  a  the  suspicions  which  he  thereby 
matter  of  great  sharpness ,  and  sub-  had  unintentionally  awakened  in 
tlety  of  wit ,  to  be  a  sound  belier-  some  minds,  by  writing  his  tracts 
ing  Christian ,  men  were  not  cu-  upon  the  Trinity, 
rious  what  syllables  or  particles 


PRIMITIVE  TRINIT ARIANISM. 


265 


1 


ulative  construction  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity. 
They  merely  repeat  the  Biblical  phraseology,  with¬ 
out  endeavouring  to  collect  and  combine  the  data  of 
revelation  into  a  systematic  form.  They  invariably 
speak  of  Christ  as  divine ;  and  make  no  distinction 
in  their  modes  of  thought  and  expression,  between 
the  deity  of  the  Son  and  that  of  the  Father.  These 
immediate  pupils  of  the  Apostles  enter  into  no  spec¬ 
ulative  investigation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Logos, 
and  content  themselves  with  the  simplest  and  most 
common  expressions  respecting  the  trinity.  In 
these  expressions,  however,  the  germs  of  the  future 
scientific  statement  may  be  discovered ;  and  it  is 
the  remark  of  Meier,  one  of  the  fairest  of  those  who 
have  written  the  history  of  Trinitarianism,  that  the 
beginnings  of  an  immanent  trinity  can  be  seen  in 
the  writings  of  the  practical  and  totally  unspecula- 
tive  Apostolic  Fathers.1 

The  following  extracts  from  their  writings  are 
sufficient  to  indicate  the  freedom  with  which  the 
Apostolic  Fathers  apply  the  term  God  (Otog)  to 
the  second  Person,  who  is  most  commonly  conceived 
of  as  the  God-man,  and  called  Jesus  Christ  by  them. 

“  Brethren,”  says  Clement  of  Rome  (Ep.  II.  c. 
1),  “  we  ought  to  conceive  of  ( cpQovtlv  nafi)  Jesus 
Christ  as  of  God  ( cog  nafl  fraouf  as  of  the  judge  of 
the  living  and  the  dead.”  Ignatius  addresses,  in 
his  greeting,  the  church  at  Ephesus,  as  u  united  and 
elected  by  a  true  passion,  according  to  the  will  of 

1  Meier  :  Geschichte  der  Trinitatslehre,  pp.  47,  54. 


266 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


the  Father,  and  of  Jesus  Christ  our  God”  ('Iqoov 
Xqlotov,  tov  &tov  /j/LLcov).  Writing  to  the  church 
at  Koine,  he  describes  them,  in  his  greeting,  as  “  il¬ 
luminated  by  the  will  of  Him  who  willeth  all  things 
that  are  according  to  the  love  of  Jesus  Christ  our 
God  ”  {tov  &8ov  r)/ucov) ;  and  desires  for  them  “  abun¬ 
dant  and  uncontamibated  salvation  in  Jesus  Christ 
our  God”  (r<y  r)jucov).  He  also  urges  them 
(c.  3),  to  mind  invisible  rather  than  earthly  things, 
for  “  the  things  that  are  seen  are  temporal,  but  the 
things  that  are  not  seen  are  eternal.  For  even  our 
God,  Jesus  Christ  (o  yaq  fitog  ?/jucov,  ’ IrjOovg 
Xqlotoq)  being  in  the  Father,  [i.  e.  having  ascend¬ 
ed  again  to  the  Father]  is  more  glorified  ”  [in  the 
invisible  world  than  when  upon  earth].  He  en¬ 
joins  it  upon  the  Trallian  Church  (c.  7),  to  “con¬ 
tinue  inseparable  from  God,  even  Jesus  Christ  ” 
( &tov  'Irjaov  XqlOtov)  ;  and  says  to  the  Smyrnaean 
Church,  (c.  1),  “I  glorify  Jesus  Christ,  even  God 
(z 1o£a£oj  * Irjoovv  XqlOtov  tov  ftidv'),  who  has  given 
you  such  wisdom  ” 1 


1  Meier,  a  recent  critic,  con¬ 
tends  for  the  genuineness  of  the 
“  longer  recension  ”  of  the  Igna- 
tian  Epistles,  rather  than  the 
“  shorter  recension,”  because  the 
latter  he  thinks  contains  the  dis¬ 
tinct  Nicene  statement  of  Christ’s 
deity,  while  the  former  enunci¬ 
ates  the  doctrine  of  Christ’s  deity 
in  the  more  general  form  of  the 
Ante-Nicene  trinitarianism.  To 
which  Hefele  replies,  in  favor  of 


the  “  shorter  recension,”  “  Verum 
acrior  utriusque  recensionis  in- 
spectio  docet,  longiorem  quoque 
octies  decies  Christum  Deurn  nom- 
inare,  earn  magis  definite  de  per¬ 
sona  Spiritus  Sancti  loqui,  ple- 
niorique  formula  Trinitatis  esse 
usam ;  quo  fit,  ut  merito  poste- 
rioribus  sit  temporibus  tribuen- 
da.”  Hefele:  Patrum  Aposto- 
licorum  Opera  (Prolegomena, 
xlv.). 


PRIMITIVE  TRINITARIANISM. 


267 


The  following  allusions  to  the  trinity  occur  in 
the  Apostolic  Fathers.  Clement  of  Rome ,  in  his 
first  epistle  to  the  Corinthians  (c.  46),  asks :  u  Have 
we  not  one  God,  and  one  Christ  ?  Is  there  not  one 
Spirit  of  grace,  who  is  poured  out  upon  us,  and  one 
calling  in  Christ  ?  ”  Roly  carp,  according  to  the 
Letter  of  the  Smyrna  Church  (c.  14),  closed  his 
prayer  at  the  stake  with  the  glowing  ascription : 
“  For  this,  and  for  all  things,  I  praise  thee,  I  bless 
thee,  I  glorify  thee,  together  with  the  eternal  and 
heavenly  Jesus,  thy  beloved  Son ;  with  whom  to 
thee,  and  the  Holy  Ghost,  be  glory,  both  now,  and 
to  all  succeeding  ages.  Amen.”  Ignatius ,  in  his 
epistle  to  the  Magnesians  (c.  13),  places  the  Son 
first  in  the  enumeration  of  the  three  Persons  in  the 
trinity :  “  Study,  that  whatsoever  ye  do,  ye  may 
prosper  both  in  body  and  spirit,  in  faith  and  charity, 
in  the  Son,  and  in  the  Father,  and  in  the  Holy 
Spirit,” — following  in  this  particular  St.  Paul  in  2 
Cor.  xiii.  13.  Barnabas  (Epist.  c.  5)  finds  the  trin¬ 
ity  in  the  Old  Testament.  “  For  this  cause,  the 
Lord  endured  to  suffer  for  our  souls,  although  he 
was  Lord  of  the  whole  earth,  to  whom  he  [the 
Father]  said  before  the  making  of  the  world  :  4  Let 
us  make  man  after  our  own  image  and  likeness.’  ” 1 

1  Hefele  :  Patrum  Apostolico-  compact  account  of  the  course  of 
rum  Opera,  in  locis.  The  ques-  criticism  upon  these  earliest  Chris- 
tion  of  authenticity  cannot  be  tian  writings,  after  the  close  of 
examined,  of  course,  in  such  a  the  Canon  ;  and  a  defence  of  their 
work  as  this.  The  reader  will  genuineness  that  accords  substan- 
find  in  the  edition  of  Hefele  a  tially  with  the  results  of  the  in- 


268 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Those  of  the  Primitive  Fathers  who  speculated 
at  all  upon  the  trinity  confined  their  reflections 
mostly  to  the  relations  of  the  first  and  second  Per- 
sons.  Justin  Martyr  (f  163),  and  Clement  of  Alex¬ 
andria  (f  about  220),  whose  literary  activity  falls 
between  150  and  250,  represent  the  Greek  trin- 
itarianism  of  the  second  century ;  and  Irenaeus 
(f  about  202),  Hippolytus  (f  235),  and  Tertullian 
(f  about  220),  represent  the  Latin  trinitarianism 
of  the  same  time.  An  examination  of  the  writings 
of  these  Fathers  will  evince  that  they  held  the 
two  fundamental  positions  of  catholic  trinitarian¬ 
ism  :  namely,  unity  of  essence  between  the  Father 
and  Son,  and  distinction  of  persons} 

Justin  Martyr  affirms  that  the  Person  who  spoke 
to  Moses  out  of  the  burning  bush  was  the  Logos  or 
Son,  and  not  the  Father.  This  Being,  who  then 


vestigations  of  English  and  Con¬ 
tinental  scholars,  in  the  17th, 
18th,  and  19th  centuries.  That 
the  Epistles  of  Ignatius  have  un¬ 
dergone  no  interpolations  is  far 
from  the  truth ;  but  that  they 
are  spurious  down  to  every  para¬ 
graph  and  letter,  is  still  farther. 
The  learning  of  such  scholars  as 
Usher,  Vossius,  Pearson,  Bull,  Mo- 
sheim,  Neander,  Gieseler,  Rothe, 
and  Dorner, — all  of  whom  affirm 
the  genuineness  of  the  “  shorter 
recension 11  of  the  seven  Ignatian 
Epistles  mentioned  by  Eusebius, 
though  some  of  them,  as  Mosheim 
and  Neander,  contend  for  con¬ 


siderable  interpolation  in  them, 
much  outweighs  the  learning  of 
those  who  have  affirmed  the  spu¬ 
riousness.  Even  Baur,  while  dis¬ 
puting  their  genuineness,  concedes 
to  them  a  very  early  origin ;  re¬ 
garding  them  as  a  “  Pauline  pro¬ 
duct  of  the  second  half  of  the  2d 
century.”  Compare  Guericke  : 
Church  Hist.,  §  57 ;  and  Schaff  : 
Church  Hist.,  §119. 

1  The  text  John  x.  30  enunciates 
unity  of  essence  with  distinction 
of  persons  :  eyoj  <a\  6  TvciTrjp  ev  (not 
ear)  eo-pfv ;  I  and  my  Father  are 
one  being  (not  one  person). 


PRIMITIVE  TRINITARIANISM. 


269 


and  there  styled  himself  the  self-existent  I  AM,  or 
The  Eternal,  he  maintains  became  incarnate  in  Jesus 
Christ.  In  his  First  Apology  to  the  emperor,  he 
argues  this  position  with  great  earnestness  in  the 
following  manner.  44  ‘  And  the  angel  of  God  spake 
unto  Moses  in  a  flame  of  fire  out  of  the  midst  of  a 
bush,  and  said,  I  am  that  I  am,  the  God  of  Abra¬ 
ham,  the  God  of  Isaac,  and  the  God  of  Jacob,  the 
God  of  your  fathers,  go  down  into  Egypt  and  bring 
up  my  people  from  thence.’  ....  These  words  were 
spoken  to  demonstrate  the  Son  of  God  and  Apostle, 
to  be  our  Jesus  Christ,  who  is  the  very  pre-existing 
Logos;  who  appeared  sometimes  in  the  form  of 
fire,  sometimes  in  the  likeness  of  angels,  and  in  these 
last  days  was  made  man  by  the  will  of  God,  for  the 
salvation  of  mankind,  and  was  contented  to  suffer 
what  the  devils  could  inflict  upon  him,  by  the  in¬ 
fatuated  Jews ;  who,  notwithstanding  that  they 
have  these  express  words  in  the  writings  of  Moses : 
4  And  the  angel  of  the  Lord  spake  with  Moses  in 
a  flame  of  fire  out  of  the  bush,  and  said,  I  am  that 
I  am,  the  self-existent,  the  God  of  Abraham,  the 
God  of  Isaac,  and  the  God  of  Jacob ;  ’  notwithstand¬ 
ing  this,  I  say,  they  affirm  these  words  to  be  spoken 
by  God  the  Father  and  Maker  of  all  things.  For 
which  oversight  the  Prophetic  Spirit  thus  charges 
them :  4  Israel  hath  not  known  me,  my  people  have 
not  understood  me  ;  ’  and  as  I  have  said,  Jesus  taxed 
them  again  for  the  same  thing,  while  He  was 
amongst  them:  4 No  man  hath  known  the  Father 


270 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


but  the  Son,  nor  the  Son,  but  those  to  whom  the 
Son  will  reveal  Him.’  The  Jews,  therefore,  for 
maintaining  that  it  was  the  Father  of  the  universe 
who  had  the  conference  with  Moses,  when  it  was 
the  very  Son  of  God  who  had  it,  and  who  is  styled 
both  angel  and  apostle  (Heb.  iii.  1),  are  justly  ac¬ 
cused  by  the  Prophetic  Spirit,  and  Christ  himself, 
for  knowing  neither  the  Father  nor  the  Son;  for 
they  who  affirm  the  Son  to  be  the  Father,  are  guilty 
of  not  knowing  that  the  Father  of  the  universe  has 
a  Son,  who,  being  the  Logos,  and  first-begotten  of 
God,  is  God  (xcu  fitog  vnaQ/ti).  And  He  it  is 
who  heretofore  appeared  to  Moses  and  the  rest  of 
the  prophets,  sometimes  in  fire,  and  sometimes  in 
the  form  of  angels ;  but  now  under  your  empire,  as 
I  mentioned,  was  born  of  a  virgin,  according  to  the 
will  of  his  Father,  to  save  such  as  believe  in  Him.” 1 

Respecting  the  nature  and  dignity  of  the  Logos, 
Justin  remarks  that  “  God  in  the  beginning,  before 
all  creation  ( nqo  tzgcvtgov  tcov  xtlo /uccrcov\  begat 
from  himself  a  certain  rational  Power  ( ytysvvrjxs 
Svvci/luv  Ttvtc  €§  havrov  Xoycxrjv),  who  is  called  by 
the  Holy  Spirit,  the  Glory  of  the  Lord,  sometimes 
the  Son,  sometimes  the  Wisdom.”  “  This  rational 
Power,”  he  says  in  another  passage,  “  was  generated 
from  the  Father  by  his  energy  and  will,  yet  without 

1  Justin  Martyr  :  Apologia  I.  39,  for  a  list  of  the  passages  in 
63  (Ed.  Cong.  St.  Mauri.  Par.  the  Early  Fathers,  in  which  this 
1742).  See  Burton’s  Testimonies  same  view  of  Christ  as  the  Jehovah 
of  Ante-Nicene  Fathers,  pp.  38,  of  the  Old  Testament  is  taught. 


PRIMITIVE  TRINITARIANISM. 


271 


any  abscission  or  division  of  the  essence  of  the 
Father.” 1  In  these  passages  Justin  teaches  the 
Nicene  doctrine  of  eternal  generation,  as  distin¬ 
guished  from  creation.  For  in  asserting  that  God 
the  Father  begat  the  Son  from  Himself  (eg  huvrov ), 
he  teaches  that  the  Son’s  constitutional  being  is 
identical  with  that  of  the  Father.  If  the  Father 
had  created  the  Son  de  nihilo ,  the  Son’s  sub¬ 
stance  or  constitutional  being  would  not  have  been 
eg  eccvrov ,  but  would  have  been  an  entirely  new 
and  secondary  one.  Such  phraseology  is  never  ap¬ 
plied  either  by  Justin  Martyr,  or  any  of  the  Fathers, 
to  the  act  of  pure  creation.  Justin’s  idea  of  eternal 
generation,  like  that  of  Athanasius,  is  the  direct 
contrary  to  that  of  creation.  That  which  is  eter¬ 
nally  generated  cannot  be  a  created  thing,  because 
it  is  ex  ibeov  havroi 7, — in  and  of  His  own  substance. 
And  that  which  is  created  de  nihilo ,  at  a  certain 
punctum  temporis,  cannot  be  an  eternal  generation, 
because  it  is  a  new  substance  willed  into  being  from 
absolute  nonentity.  The  statement  that  the  Logos 
was  generated  from  the  Father  “by  his  will”  is 
one  that  appears  occasionally  in  the  writings  of 
some  of  the  Post-Nicene  trinitarians,  and  is  capable 
of  an  explanation  in  harmony  with  the  doctrine  of 
the  absolute  deity  of  the  second  Person.  For  it  is 
qualified  by  the  explanation,  that  the  generation 
occurs  without  “  any  abscission  or  division  of  the 

‘Justin  Martyr:  Dialogus  cum  Tryphone,  61,  128  (Ed.  Cong.  St. 
Mauri,  Par.  1742). 


272 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


essence  of  the  Father .”  It  must  therefore  be  an 
immanent  act  in  the  Divine  Essence;  yet  volun¬ 
tary,  in  the  sense  of  not  being  necessitated  db  extra. 
The  generation  is  by  both  nature  and  will,  which 
in  the  Godhead  are  one. 

Concerning  the  distinct  personality  of  the  Logos, 
Justin  makes  the  following  statement:  “This  ra¬ 
tional  Power  is  not,  like  the  light  of  the  sun,  merely 
nominally  different  [from  the  Father],  but  really 
another  numerically  ( ovx  cog  to  ifk'iov  cpcog  ovo/lioctl 
[xovov  dqid jluItcu,  d'k'kd  xai  dqi&/u(p  ereqov  t! 
earl).1  In  this  passage,  Justin  teaches  that  the 
second  Person  does  not  merely  sustain  the  relation 
to  the  Divine  Essence  that  a  sunbeam  does  to  the 
sun.  He  is  numerically  distinct,  ertqov  t\  a  sub¬ 
sistence,  and  not  a  mere  effluence  or  emanation. 
The  pre-existence  and  eternity  of  the  Logos  are 
asserted  by  Justin  in  the  following  passages  :  “  The 
Son  of  the  Father,  even  he  who  is  properly  called 
his  Son,  the  Word,  was  with  him,  and  begotten  of 
him  before  the  creation  (nqb  rcov  nocrj/uccTcor),  be¬ 
cause  he  in  the  beginning  made  and  disposed  all 
things.”  “  This  Being  who  was  really  begotten  of 
the  Father,  and  proceeded  from  him,  existed  before 
all  creatures  ( nqo  navrcov  noirifxdrcov)  with  the 
Father,  and  conversed  with  him.” 2  Justin  also  re¬ 
peatedly  denominates  the  Logos,  God.  The  passage 


1  Justin  Martyr  :  Dialogus  cum  2  Justin  Martyr:  Apologia,  I. 
Tryphone,  128,  129  (Ed.  Cong.  31 ;  Dialogus  cum  Tryphone,  129 
St.  Mauri,  Par.  1742).  (Ed.  Cong.  St.  Mauri,  Par.  1742). 


PRIMITIVE  TRINITARIANISM. 


273 


in  the  First  Apology  (c.  63)  has  already  been  cited, 
in  which  he  says  that  u  the  Logos  is  the  First-Be¬ 
gotten  of  God,  and  he  is  God  ”  (xcci  &t6g  vnaQ^ti). 
In  the  Dialogue  with  Trypho,  Justin  remarks  con¬ 
cerning  Joshua,  that  he  distributed  to  the  Israelites 
an  inheritance  which  was  not  eternal,  but  only  tem¬ 
poral,  “forasmuch  as  he  was  not  Christ  who  is  God, 
nor  the  Son  of  God  ”  (art  ov  X^uarog  6  &tog  civ, 
ovds  vtog  &tov)} 

Justin’s  recognition  of  the  trinity  appears  in 
the  following  extracts.  Defending  the  Christians 
against  the  charge  of  atheism,  he  says:  “We  wor¬ 
ship  the  creator  of  this  universe . Again,  we 

have  learned  that  he  who  taught  us  these  things, 
and  who  for  this  end  was  born  ( ytvvrj&svTa ),  even 
Jesus  Christ,  who  was  crucified  under  Pontius  Pilate 
the  procurator  of  Judea  in  the  time  of  Tiberius 
Caesar,  was  the  Son  of  him  who  is  truly  God ;  and 
we  esteem  him  in  the  second  place  (^coqcc).  And 
that  we  with  reason  honor  the  Prophetic  Spirit  in 
the  third  rank  we  shall  hereafter  shew.” 2 

Again  he  says,  “We  bless  the  creator  of  all,  through 
his  Son  Jesus  Christ,  and  through  the  Holy  Ghost. 

. We  confess,  indeed,  that  we  are  unbelievers 

in  such  pretended  gods,  but  not  of  the  most  true 
God,  the  Father  of  righteousness  and  temperance, 
and  of  all  other  virtues,  in  whom  is  no  mixture  of 
evil.  But  we  worship  and  adore  Him,  and  his  Son 

1  Dialogue  cum  Tryphone,  118  *  Apologia  I.  13  (Ed.  Cong.  St. 

(Ed.  Cong.  St.  Mauri,  Par.  1742).  Mauri,  Par.  1742). 

18 


274 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


who  came  out  from  him,  and  has  taught  us  respect¬ 
ing  these  things,  and  respecting  the  host  of  the 
other  good  angels  who  follow  him,  and  are  made 
like  unto  him ;  and  [we  worship  and  adore]  the 
Prophetic  Spirit ;  honoring  them  in  reason  and 
truth.”  Justin  also  represents  baptism  as  admin¬ 
istered  in  the  church,  “in  the  name  of  God  the 
Father  and  Lord  of  all,  and  of  our  Saviour  Jesus 
Christ,  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit.” 1 

Cleinent  of  Alexandria  asserts  unity  of  essence 
between  the  Father  and  the  Logos  in  the  most 
explicit  manner.  Speaking  of  the  Father  and  the 
Son,  he  says :  u  The  two  are  one,  namely  God.” 
(tv  yccQ  d/Licpco,  6  fitogi)  Speaking  of  the  Son,  he 
describes  him  as  u  the  Divine  Word  who  is  most 
manifestly  true  God  (owdjg  zitogf  who  is  equalized 
(fjzioco&tcg)  with  the  Lord  of  the  universe,  because 

he  was  his  Son,  and  was  the  Word  of  God . 

There  is  one  Unbegotten  Being,  even  God,  who 
rules  over  all  ( navzoxQccTcoQ )  ;  and  there  is  one 
First-Begotten  Being,  by  whom  all  things  were 
made.” 2 

The  following  extracts  from  Clement  contain 
very  plain  statements  of  the  trinality  in  the  God¬ 
head  :  “  There  is  one  Father  of  the  universe  ;  there 
is  also  one  Word  of  the  universe ;  and  one  Holy 
Spirit,  who  is  everywhere.”  “  Be  propitious  to  thy 

Apologia  I.  67,  6,  61  (Ed.  Cong,  dagogus,  III.  12;  Cohortatio  ad 
St.  Mauri,  Par.  1742).  Gentes,  p.  68  ;  Stromata,  Lib.  VI. 

2  Clemens  Alexandrintts  :  Pae-  (Ed.  Potter). 


PRIMITIVE  TRINIT  ARIANISM. 


275 


children,  O  Teacher,  Father,  Chariot  of  Israel,  Son 
and  Father  both  One,  O  Lord  ”  (vis  xdi  narrjQ,  tv 
a/Licpco,  xvQct).  “Let  us  give  thanks  to  the  only 
Father  and  Son,  Son  and  Father,  our  Teacher  and 
Master,  together  with  the  Holy  Spirit,  one  God 
through  all  things,  in  whom  are  all  things,  by  whom 
alone  are  all  things  ....  to  whom  be  glory  now  and 
forever,  Amen.”1 

These  early  Greek  Trinitarians,  as  did  the  early 
Latin  to  some  extent,  made  use  of  figures  and  anal¬ 
ogies  borrowed  from  external  nature,  and  from  the 
mind  of  man,  to  illustrate ,  but  not  to  explain,  the 
personal  existence  of  the  Logos,  and  his  relation  to 
the  Father.  They  asserted  that  the  Son  was  not 
created  a  new  essence  from  nonentity,  but  was  gen¬ 
erated  out  of  an  eternal  essence ;  and  this  genera¬ 
tion  they  sought  to  render  intelligible  by  a  variety 
of  images.  The  human  logos,  or  word,  they  said,  is 
uttered,  is  emitted  from  the  human  soul,  without 
the  soul’s  thereby  losing  anything  from  its  essence. 
In  like  manner,  the  generation  of  the  Son,  or  Logos 
as  he  was  more  commonly  termed,  left  the  Divine 
Nature  unimpaired,  and  the  same.  The  ray  of 
light  streams  forth  from  the  substance  of  the  sun, 
without  any  waning  or  loss  in  the  luminary  itself. 
In  like  manner  the  Reason,  or  Wisdom,  of  God 


1  Clemens  Alexandrinus  :  Pae-  Bull  :  Defensio  Fidei  Nicaenae, 
dagogus,  I.  6;  Paedagogus,  sub  II.  6;  Waterland  :  Second  De¬ 
fine.  For  other  extracts  to  the  fence,  Query  IL 
same  effect  from  Clement,  see 


276 


HISTOKY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


manifests  and  mediates  God’s  absolute  essence,  with 
out  any  subtraction  from  it. 

It  is  evident  that  these  analogical  illustrations 
were  not  adequate  to  a  complete  statement  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  trinity.  They  would  serve  for  only 
one  part  of  the  dogma :  that  viz.  of  the  unity  of 
essence.  Such  illustrations  would  suffice  to  show 
how  the  generation  of  the  Son  did  not  infringe  upon 
the  oneness  of  the  Divine  Nature ;  but  they  would 
convey  an  inadequate  notion  of  the  hypostasis,  or 
personal  distinction.  The  word  uttered  from  the 
lips  of  a  human  being  does  not,  indeed,  diminish 
anything  from  his  soul ;  but  then  this  word  has  no 
distinct  subsistence  like  his  soul.  The  ray  from  the 
sun  is  not  a  luminous  centre  like  the  orb  itself. 
These  figures,  consequently,  would  not  afford  a  just 
and  full  analogon  to  the  personal  distinction  ;  for 
this,  though  discriminated  from  the  Divine  Essence, 
is  yet  substantial  enough  to  possess  and  wield  all 
the  attributes  of  the  Essence.  Yet,  so  long  as  the 
distinct  and  real  personality  of  Father  and  Son  was 
not  called  in  question,  such  illustrations  as  these 
were  naturally  and  safely  employed  to  guard  against 
the  notion,  that  the  generation  of  the  second  Person 
implied  abscission  or  division  of  the  one  eternal 
Essence  of  the  Godhead.1  These  figurative  repre- 

1  Upon  the  use  of  these  illustra-  fountain  and  stream,  root  and 
tions  by  the  Early  Trinitarians,  branch,  body  and  effluvia,  light 
Waterland  (Second  Defence,  and  light,  fire  and  fire,  and  such 
Query  VIII.)  makes  the  following  like,  served  more  peculiarly  to 
remarks.  “  The  comparisons  of  signify  the  consubstantiality  ;  but 


PRIMITIVE  TRINITARIANISM. 


277 


sentations,  moreover,  prepared  the  way  for  the  con* 
ceptional  and  technical  statement  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  trinity.  They  implied,  and,  so  far  as  it  could 
be  done  in  this  manner,  they  explained,  that  the 
Son  is,  in  respect  to  constitutional  substance ,  iden¬ 
tical  with  the  Father,  and  yet  in  a  certain  other 
respect,  is  different  from  the  Father.  And  these 
two  positions  constitute  the  substance  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  trinity.  But  as  trinitarian  science  ad¬ 
vanced,  under  the  pressure  from  Patripassianism 
and  Arianism,  distinct  metaphysical  conceptions  of 
“  essence  ”  and  u  hypostasis  ”  were  formed,  and 
were  expressed  in  a  technical  nomenclature  and  dia¬ 
lectical  propositions  ;  and  under  these  circumstances, 
the  figurative  representations  of  Justin  and  Tertul- 
lian  gave  way  to  the  analytic  and  carefully  guarded 
clauses  of  the  Nicene  and  Athanasian  Creeds. 

The  trinitarian  positions  of  Tertullian  were  call¬ 
ed  out  by  the  Patripassian  theory,  and  have  refer¬ 
ence  chiefly  to  that  heresy.  As  his  opponents 
strongly  asserted  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  es¬ 
sence,  and  of  the  deity  of  Christ,  there  was  no 
special  necessity  for  him  to  discuss  this  side  of  the 
subject.  Tertullian’s  main  force  is  devoted  to  the 

those  of  mind  and  thought,  light  to  he  so,  by  the  ancient  Fathers, 
and  splendour  ( dnavyacrfj.a ),  were  It  is  certain  that  sometimes  it 
more  peculiarly  calculated  to  de-  was  looked  upon  as  a  mere  energy 
note  co-eternity ,  abstracting  the  or  quality  (Justin  Martyr,  Euse- 
notion  of  consubstantiality.  For  bius,  Damascene).  I  say  then, 
thought  is  not  anything  substan-  that  co-eternity  was  more  fitly 
tial.  I  know  not  whether  splen-  represented  by  those  similitudes, 
dour  (dnavyao-ya)  was  ever  taken  than  consubstantiality.” 


278 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


doctrine  of  the  distinct  personality  of  the  Son  and 
Spirit.  In  so  doing,  he  makes  a  real  contribution 
to  the  scientific  construction  of  the  trinitarian  dog¬ 
ma.  In  affirming  sameness  of  essence  between 
Father  and  Son,  the  church  had  from  the  first  de¬ 
nied  that  the  Son  is  a  creature.  The  Patripassian 
also  affirmed  this,  but  at  the  expense  of  the  Son’s 
distinct  personality.  Tertullian  grasps  both  con¬ 
ceptions,  and  while  maintaining  that  the  Father  and 
Son  are  one  in  one  respect,  contends  that  they  are 
two  in  another  respect.  The  positiveness  with 
which  Tertullian  defends  the  doctrine  of  unity  of 
essence  between  the  Father  and  Son,  together  with 
that  of  a  personal  distinction  between  them,  is  ap¬ 
parent  in  the  following  extracts  from  his  writings. 
Having  employed  the  examples  of  a  river  which  is 
never  separated  from  its  source,  and  of  a  ray  which 
is  never  separated  from  the  sun,  in  order  to  illus¬ 
trate  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  Divine  Nature, 
he  then  proceeds  to  argue  for  the  distinction  of 
Persons  in  the  following  manner.  “  Wherefore,  in 
accordance  with  these  examples,  I  assert  that  there 
are  tivo ,  God  and  his  Word,  the  Father  and  his 
Son.  For  the  root  and  the  trunk  are  two  things, 
but  conjoined  ;  and  the  fountain  and  stream  are  two 
phenomenal  appearances  (species),1  but  undivided  ; 
and  the  sun  and  ray  are  two  forms  (formae),  but 

JThe  reader  will  observe  how  which  his  mind  was  full.  The 
Tertullian  labors  to  find  terms  in  terms  taken  singly,  and  by  them- 
the  rude  Punic  Latin,  to  express  selves,  are  inadequate,  like  any 
the  trinitarian  conceptions  with  and  every  other  term ;  but  the 


PRIMITIVE  TRINITARIANISM. 


279 


coherent.  Everything  that  issues  from  another 
thing  (prodit  ex  aliquo)  is  a  second  thing  in  relation 
to  that  from  which  it  issues  ;  but  it  is  not  for  that 
reason  separate  from  it.  But  where  there  is  a  second 
thing,  there  are  two  things ;  and  where  there  is  a 
third  thing,  there  are  three.  For  the  third  is  the 
Spirit,  from  God  and  the  Son;  as  the  fruit  from 
the  trunk  is  third  from  the  root,  and  the  canal 
(rivus)  from  the  stream  is  third  from  the  fountain, 
and  the  scintillation  (apex)  from  the  ray  is  third 
from  the  sun.  Nevertheless  nothing  becomes  for¬ 
eign  to  the  source  whence  it  derives  its  properties. 
In  like  manner  the  trinity  (trinitas)  flowing  down 
(decurrens)  from  the  Father,  through  continuous 
and  connected  gradations,  interferes  not  with  the 
Divine  monarchy,  and  preserves  the  status  of  the 
Divine  economy  (monarchiae  nihil  obstrepit,  et 

oixovopiccQ  statum  protegit) . I  say  that  the 

Father  is  one,  the  Son  is  another,  and  the  Spirit 
another.  Nevertheless  the  Son  is  not  another  than 
the  Father  by  diversity  [of  essence],  but  by  distri¬ 
bution  [of  essence] ;  not  another  by  division  [of 
essence],  but  by  distinction  [of  essence]  ;  because 
the  Father  and  Son  are  not  one  and  the  same  [per¬ 
son],  but  one  differs  from  the  other  in  a  certain 
special  manner”  (modulo).1 

whole  connection  of  thought  1  Tertulliantjs.  Adversus  Prax- 
evinces  plainly,  that  like  the  Ni-  ean,  Cap.  8,  9,  13. — Tertullian’s 
cene  trinitarians  he  is  endeavoring  “  distribution  ”  [of  essence]  is  the 
to  hold  in  one  intuition,  unity  of  es-  same  as  the  Nicene  “  communi- 
sence  with  distinction  of  persons,  cation  ”  of  essence. 


280 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


On  the  other  side  of  the  subject,  namely  the 
unity  of  essence,  Tertullian  is  equally  explicit. 
“They  [the  Monarchians,  or  Patripassians]  assume 
that  the  number  and  disposition  of  the  trinity  is  a 
division  of  the  unity ;  whereas  the  unity  deriving 
the  trinity  out  of  itself  is  not  destroyed,  but  is  ad¬ 
ministered  by  it  (quando  unitas,  ex  semet  ipsa  deri- 
vans  trinitatem,  non  destruatur  ab  ilia,  sed  admin- 

istretur) . I  who  derive  the  Son  not  from  a 

foreign  source  (aliunde),  but  from  the  substance  of 
the  Father, — a  Son  who  does  nothing  without  the 
will  of  the  Father,  and  has  received  all  power  from 
the  Father, — how  is  it  possible  that  I  destroy  the 
Divine  monarchy  ?  On  the  contrary,  I  preserve  it 

in  the  Son,  delivered  to  him  from  the  Father . 

In  this  way, . also,  One  is  All,  in  that  All  are  One; 
by  unity  of  substance,  that  is.  Whilst,  neverthe¬ 
less,  the  mystery  of  the  economy  ( oixovo^iaq )  is 
guarded,  which  distributes  the  unity  into  a  trinity, 
placing  in  their  order  three  [persons],  the  Father, 
the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Ghost, — three,  however,  not 
in  condition  (statu),  but  in  degree  (gradu) ;  not  in 
substance,  but  in  form  ;  not  in  power,  but  in  aspect ; 
yet  of  one  substance ,  and  of  one  condition  (status), 
a/nd  of  one  power T1 

Tertullian  also  anticipates  an  argument  for  the 
doctrine  of  the  three  Persons  in  the  one  Nature, 
which  we  shall  find  employed  by  Athanasius,2  and 

1  Teetullianus:  Ad  versus  Prax-  2  Athanasius:  Nicaenae  Fidei 

ean,  Cap.  3,  4,  2.  Defensio,  Cap.iii. 


PRIMITIVE  TRINITARIANISM. 


281 


others  of  the  Nicene  trinitarians.  It  is  the  argu¬ 
ment  that  the  eternity  of  the^^  person  is  con¬ 
ditioned  by  that  of  the  second,  and  vice  versa.  If 
there  be  a  time  when  there  is  no  second  Person, 
there  is  a  time  when  there  is  no  first  Person.  First 
and  second  are  necessarily  correlated  to  each  other. 
Father  and  Son  have  no  meaning  except  in  co¬ 
existence  and  correlationship ;  and  the  same  ar¬ 
gument  that  disproves  the  eternity  of  the  Son, 
disproves  the  eternity  of  the  Father.  “  It  is  neces¬ 
sary,”  says  Tertullian,  “  that  God  the  Father  should 
have  God  the  Son,  in  order  that  he  himself  may  be 
God  the  Father;  and  that  God  the  Son  should 
have  God  the  Father,  that  he  himself  may  be  God 
the  Son.  Yet  it  is  one  thing  to  ha/ve ,  and  another 
thing  to  be  ”  (aliud  est  autem  habere,  aliud  esse).1 

Dorner,  in  summing  up  respecting  Tertullian’s 
trinitarianism,  remarks  that  the  fact  that  Tertullian 
distinctly  teaches  an  essential  trinity  is  very  signifi¬ 
cant  and  important  in  the  history  of  Trinitarianism, 
and  exerted  much  influence  upon  the  subsequent 
developement  of  the  doctrine.  “  Seine  Trinitat  fallt 
nicht  in  die  Sphare  des  Werdens,  ohnehin  nicht  der 
ytvrjroc,  sondern  in  die  ewige  Sphare.  Der  Sohn  ist 
ihm  ewige  Plypostase ;  Gott  ist  ihm  statu,  nicht  erst 
gradu  dreieinig.”2 

’Tertullianus:  Adversus  Prax-  non  statu ,  sed  gradu ,  nec  substan- 
ean,  Cap.  10.  tia,  sed  forma,  nec  potestate,  sed 

’Dorner  :  Person  Christi,  I.  specie,  unius  autem  substantiae, 
641.  Dorner,  however,  is  mis-  et  unius  status,  et  unius  potes- 
taken  in  this  last  remark.  Ter-  tatis,  quia  unus  deus  est.7’  Adv. 
tullian’s  language  is,  “  tres  autem,  Praxean,  Cap.  2. 


282 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Irenaeus ,  partly  from  his  practical  spirit,  which 
inclined  him  to  adopt  traditional  views,  and  partly 
from  his  abhorrence  of  Gnostic  speculations,  is  dis¬ 
posed  to  accept  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  as  one  of 
pure  revelation.  He  affirms  the  eternal  pre-exist 
ence  of  the  Logos  ;  regards  him  as  the  Jehovah  of 
the  Old  Testament,  agreeing  in  this  with  Tertullian,1 
and  Justin  Martyr ;  attributes  deity  to  him  as  to 
his  essence ;  and  represents  him  as  an  object  of 
worship.  He  also  distinctly  teaches  the  doctrine 
of  three  Persons  in  the  Godhead.  The  following 
extracts  from  his  great  work,  written  in  defence  of 
the  Christian  system,  in  opposition  to  the  heretical 
theories  of  his  time,  will  exhibit  the  general  charac¬ 
ter  of  Irenaeus’s  trinitarianism. 

Irenaeus  argues  for  the  eternal  pre-existence 
of  the  Son  as  follows:  “Having  shown  that  the 
Word  who  existed  in  the  beginning  with  God,  by 
whom  all  things  were  made,  and  who  wras  always 
present  to  the  human  race,  has  in  these  last  times 
become  a  patible  man,  .  .  .  the  objection  is  excluded 
of  those  who  say  :  1  If  Christ  was  bom  at  that  time, 


1  Irenaeus  :  Adversus  Haereses, 
III.  vi.  1  (Ed.  Harvey).  “Inever- 
sione  Sodomitarum  scriptura  ait 
1  Et  pluit  Dominus  super  Sodomam 
et  Gomorrham  ignem  et  sulfur 
a  Domino  de  coelo.’  Filium  enim 
hie  significat,  qui  et  Abrahae 
collocutus  sit ,  a  Patre  accepisse 
potestatem  judicandi  Sudomitas 
propter  iniquitatem  eorum.”  Ter¬ 
tullian  :  De  Praescriptionibue, 


c.  13.  “Id  Yerbum  Filius  ejus 
appellatum,  in  nomine  Dei,  varie 
visum  patriarch is,  in  prophetis 
semper  auditum ,  postremo  dela- 
tum  ex  spiritu  Patris  Dei  et  vir- 
tute  in  virginem  Mariam,  etc.” 
— See  other  extracts  from  the 
Primitive  Fathers,  to  the  same 
effect,  in  the  Oxford  Library  of 
the  Fathers,  Tertullian’s  Works, 
I.  447.  (Note). 


PRIMITIVE  TRINITARIANISM. 


283 


then  before  that  time  he  did  not  exist.’  For  we 
have  shown  that  because  he  always  existed  with 
the  Father,  he  did  not  at  that  time  begin  to  be  the 

Son  of  God . Wherefore,  in  the  beginning,  God 

formed  Adam,  not  as  though  God  needed  man,  but 
that  he  might  have  one  upon  whom  he  could  be¬ 
stow  benefits.  For  not  only  before  Adam,  but 
before  all  creation  (ante  omnem  condi tionem),  the 
Word  was  glorifying  his  Father,  being  immanent 
(manens)  in  Him  ;  and  He  himself  was  glorified  by 
the  Father,  as  he  himself  says  :  4  Father,  glorify  thou 
me  with  the  glory  which  I  had  with  thee  before  the 
world  was.’  ....  The  Jews  departed  from  God,  be¬ 
cause  they  did  not  receive  his  Word,  but  supposed 
that  they  could  know  the  Father  alone  by  himself, 
without  his  Word,  that  is  his  Son;  not  knowing 
God  who  spake  in  a  visible  form  (figura)  to  Abra¬ 
ham,  and  again  to  Moses,  saying :  4 1  have  seen  the 
affliction  of  my  people  in  Egypt,  and  have  come 
down  to  deliver  them.’  ”  After  remarking  that 
God  does  not  need  either  men  or  angels  as  the  me¬ 
dium  by  which  to  create,  Irenaeus  assigns  as  the 
reason,  that  He  has  as  his  medium,  44  his  own  off¬ 
spring  (progenies),  and  his  own  image  (figuratio), 
viz:  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit,  the  Word  and  Wis¬ 
dom  ;  to  whom  all  angels  are  servants  and  subject.” 1 

The  trinality  in  the  Godhead  is  taught  by 

1  Irenaeus  :  Adversus  Haereses  Adv.  Haer.  IV.  xxxiv.  7 ;  II. 
(Ed.  Harvey),  III.  xix.  1 ;  IV.  xxxvii.  3  ;  II.  xlvii.  2 ;  and  Index, 
xxv.  1 ;  IV.  xiv. — Compare  also  sub  voce  Logos. 


284 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Irenaeus,  in  the  following  statements.  “  But  if  we 
are  not  able  to  find  solutions  of  everything  that  is 
required  in  the  Scriptures,  we  ought  not  to  seek 
another  God  than  him  who  is  God.  For  this  is  the 
highest  impiety.  But  we  should  commit  such  things 
to  God  who  made  us,  and  gave  us  accurate  knowl¬ 
edge  because  the  Scriptures  are  perfect,  since  they 
were  uttered  (dictae)  by  the  Word  of  God,  and  his 
Spirit . In  the  name  Christ  [Anointed]  is  im¬ 

plied,  He  who  anoints,  He  who  is  anointed,  and  the 
Unction  with  which  the  anointing  is  made.  The 
Father  anoints,  but  it  is  the  Son  who  is  anointed, 
in  the  Spirit,  who  is  the  unction ;  as  the  Word 
(Sermo)  says  by  Isaiah,  ‘  The  Spirit  of  God  is  upon 
me,  because  he  hath  anointed  me.1  .....  Man  is  a 
tempering  together  of  the  spirit  and  flesh,  formed 
after  the  similitude  of  God,  and  shaped  by  his 
hands,  that  is  by  the  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  to  whom 
he  also  said :  ‘  Let  us  make  man.1  ....  There  is  one 
God  the  Father,  in  all  and  through  all,  and  one 
Word,  and  one  Son,  and  one  Spirit,  and  one  salva¬ 
tion  to  all  who  believe  in  Him.”  1 

Irenaeus  testifies  to  the  worship  of  Christ  by  the 
church,  and  against  the  Papal  doctrine  of  saint- 
worship,  in  the  following  passage,  which  is  only 
one  of  multitudes  in  his  writings.  aThe  Church 
does  nothing  by  angelic  invocations  or  incantations, 

Irenaeus:  Adversus Haereses  Haer.  IY.  xxxiv.  1,  5,  6,  12;  IV. 
(Ed.  Harvey),  III.  xli.  1 ;  III.  xix.  xliii.  2  ;  Y.  i.  2;  and  Index,  sub 
8 ;  IY.  xi.  5. — Compare  also,  Adv.  voce  Trinity. 


PRIMITIVE  TRINITARIAXISM. 


285 


, .  .  but  directing  its  prayers  purely  and  openly  to 
the  Lord  who  made  all  things,  and  invoking  the 
name  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  performs  miracles 
for  the  benefit  of  mankind,  but  not  for  their  seduc¬ 
tion  ”  [as  do  the  Gnostics].1 

Tertullian  and  Irenaeus  differ  from  Justin  Mar¬ 
tyr,  in  more  frequently  employing  the  term  Son,  in 
the  discussion,  and  thereby  introduce  more  of  the 
personal  element  into  the  doctrine.  Distinguishing, 
as  they  generally  do,  the  second  person  in  the  God¬ 
head  by  the  name  Son,  rather  than  Logos,  they 
prepared  the  way  for  that  distinct  enunciation  of 
hypostatical  or  personal  distinctions  in  the  Divine 
Nature,  which  we  find  in  the  Polemic  period.2  For 
the  terms  Logos,  Reason,  and  Wisdom,  while  they 
direct  attention  to  the  eternity  and  essentiality  of 
the  second  distinction  in  the  Godhead,  are  not  so 
well  adapted  to  bring  out  the  conception  of  con¬ 
scious  personality,  as  the  term  Son.  Hence  we 
shall  find  one  great  difference  between  the  trinita¬ 
rian  writings  of  Justin  Martyr  in  the  middle  of  the 
2d  century,  and  those  of  the  Nicene  period,  to  con¬ 
sist  in  the  comparative  disuse  of  the  term  Logos, 
and  the  more  common  use  of  the  term  Son,  to  desig¬ 
nate  the  second  hypostasis. 

Hippolytus ,  the  disciple  of  Irenaeus,  also,  ex¬ 
plicitly  teaches  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  and 
argues  for  the  catholic  doctrine  of  interior  distinc* 

1  Ikenaeus  :  Adversus  Haereses  2  Dorner  :  Person  Christi,  I. 

(Ed.  Harvey),  II.  xlix,  3.  600. 


286 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


tions,  in  opposition  to  tlie  modalism  of  Noetus. 
Having  affirmed  that  Christ  is  the  Word  by  whom 
all  things  were  made,  and  having  quoted  the  be¬ 
ginning  of  John’s  gospel  in  proof  of  this,  he  proceeds 
to  say  that,  “  we  behold  the  Word  incarnate  in 
Him ;  we  understand  the  Father  by  him ;  we  be¬ 
lieve  the  Son ;  we  worship  the  Holy  Ghost.” 1  He 
then  encounters  the  argument  of  the  Noetians,  who 
charged  the  orthodox  with  belief  in  two  Gods,  be¬ 
cause  they  maintained  that  the  Father  is  God,  and 
the  Son  is  God,  and  replies :  “  I  will  not  say  two 
Gods,  but  one  God,  and  two  Persons.  For  the 
Father  is  one ;  but  there  are  two  Persons,  because 
there  is  also  the  Son,  and  the  third  Person  is  the 

Holy  Ghost . The  Word  of  God,  Christ,  having 

risen  from  the  dead,  gave  therefore  this  charge  to 
his  disciples,  4  Go  and  teach  all  nations,  baptizing 
them  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  and  of  the  Son, 
and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,’  showing  that  whosoever 
omits  one  of  these,  does  not  fully  glorify  God.  For 
through  the  trinity,  the  Father  is  glorified.  The 
Father  willed,  the  Son  wrought,  the  Holy  Spirit 
manifested.  All  the  scriptures  proclaim  this.” 
Hippolytus  likewise  affirms  the  deity  of  the  Son, 
and  carefully  distinguishes  between  generation  out 
of  the  Divine  Essence,  and  creation  from  nothing. 
44  The  Word  alone  is  God,  of  God  himself.  Where¬ 
fore  he  is  God ;  being  the  substance  of  God.  But 
the  world  is  of  nothing;  wherefore  it  is  not  God 

1  Hippolyttjb:  In  Noet.  c.  12. 


PRIMITIVE  TRESTITARIANISM.  287 

The  world  is  liable  to  dissolution,  also,  when  He 
who  created  it,  so  wills,” — 6  Aoyog  uovog  avxov ' 
Bio  xcu  &tog,  ovoia  vtvccq/cov  Aeov.  c0  §£  xoo^iog 
eg  ovdtvog  *  §co  ov  &tog. 1 

W e  close  this  survey  of  the  trinitarianism  of  the 
principal  Ante-Nicene  Fathers,  with  the  following 
particulars  mentioned  by  "Waterland,  which  cannot 
be  invalidated,  and  which  prove  conclusively  that 
they  held  the  same  trinitarianism  with  the  Nicene 
and  Post-Nicene  divines. 

1.  The  Ante-Nicene  Fathers  employed  the  word 
God  in  the  strict  sense  of  signifying  the  Divine 
substance ,  and  applied  it  to  the  Son  in  this  sense. 
2.  They  admitted  but  one  substance  to  be  strictly 
Divine,  and  rejected  with  abhorrence  the  notion  of 
inferior  and  secondary  divinities.  3.  They  confined 
worship  to  the  one  true  God,  and  yet  worshipped 
the  Son.  4.  They  attributed  eternity,  omnipotence, 
and  uncreatedness  to  the  Son,  and  held  him  to  be 
the  Creator  and  Preserver  of  the  universe.  5.  Had 
the  Ante-Nicene  Fathers  held  that  the  Son  was 
different  from  the  Father  in  respect  to  substance, 
eternity,  omnipotence,  uncreatedness,  &c.,  they 
would  certainly  have  specified  this  difference  in  the 
Sabellian  controversy ;  for  this  would  have  proved 
beyond  all  dispute  that  the  Son  and  Father  are  not 
one  Person  or  Hypostasis.  But  they  never  did.2 


1  Wordsworth*.  Hippolytus, pp.  2  Waterland:  First  Defence, 
175,  176,  287.  Query  XXV. 


288 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


§4.  Origen!  s  Trinitarianism. 

The  speculations  of  Origen  mark  an  epoch  in 
the  history  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  and  we 
shall,  therefore,  examine  them  by  themselves. 

Origen  joined  on  where  his  cautious  and  prac¬ 
tical  predecessors  Tertullian  and  Irenaeus  had  left 
off ;  but  seeking  to  unfold  the  doctrine  by  a  spec¬ 
ulative  method,  in  which  the  scriptural  data  did  not 
receive  sufficient  examination  and  combination,  he 
laid  the  foundation  for  some  radical  errors,  which 
it  required  a  whole  century  of  discussion  to  dis¬ 
tinctly  detect,  explicitly  guard  against,  and  con¬ 
demn. 

Origen  seized  upon  the  idea  of  Sonship,  which 
had  shaped  the  views  of  his  predecessors,  and  which 
it  must  be  acknowledged  is  a  more  frequent  idea  in 
the  New  Testament  than  the  Logos-idea,  with  great 
energy.  This  idea  led  him  to  discuss  the  doctrine 
of  the  eternal  generation  of  the  second  Person  in  the 
trinity,  which  was  afterwards  authoritatively  taught 
by  the  Nicene  Symbol,  and  which  enters  into  that 
construction  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  in  the 
most  thorough  manner. 

So  far  as  Origen’s  general  trinitarian  position  is 
concerned,  it  is  past  all  doubt  that  he  was  himself 
sincerely  concerned  for  the  orthodox  statement  of 
the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  as  it  had  been  made  in 
the  Apostles’  Creed.  He  was  the  most  intellectual 
and  ablest  opponent  that  the  Monarchianism  of  his 


origen’s  trinitarianism. 


289 


day  had  to  contend  with,  and  we  have  already 
noticed  the  fact,  that  by  his  logic  and  learning  he 
brought  off  Beryl  from  his  Patripassian  position. 
At  the  same  time  he  was  always  ready  to  attempt 
the  difficult  task  of  reconciling  opposing  views,  and 
particularly  of  detecting  and  conceding  the  element 
of  truth  in  the  mass  of  heterodoxy,  in  order  to  con¬ 
ciliate  the  errorist,  and  carry  him  up  to  that  higher 
orthodox  position  where  the  whole  truth  is  to  be 
seen  without  the  mixture  of  foreign  and  contra¬ 
dictory  opinions.  Origen  belonged  to  that  enter¬ 
prising  and  adventurous  class  of  theologians,  who 
attempt  more  than  they  accomplish,  and  more,  per¬ 
haps,  than  the  human  mind  is  able  to  accomplish. 
In  all  his  controversies, — and  his  whole  life  was  a 
controversy, — he  seems  to  have  been  actuated  by  a 
single  steady  theological  endeavour, — the  endeav¬ 
our,  namely,  to  exhibit  the  doctrinal  system  of  the 
Church  as  the  solvent,  not  only  for  all  the  prob¬ 
lems  that  press  upon  the  general  human  mind,  but 
for  all  the  doubts,  difficulties,  and  errors  of  heresy 
itself.  He  strove  with  an  energy  of  intellect,  and  a 
wealth  of  learning,  that  made  him  the  greatest  man 
of  his  century,  to  show  the  heretic  that  the  scattered 
atoms  of  truth  in  his  radically  defective  apprehen¬ 
sion  of  Christianity  were  to  be  found  in  greater  ful¬ 
ness,  in  the  orthodox  system,  and,  what  was  of  still 
more  importance,  in  juster  proportions  and  more 
legitimate  connections ;  and  that  only  in  the  com¬ 
mon  faith  of  the  church ,  was  that  all-comprehending 
19 


290 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


and  organic  unity  of  system  to  be  found,  in  which 
truth  receives  a  developement  in  all  legitimate 
directions,  while  no  single  constituent  part  is  so 
magnified  or  distorted  as  to  become,  virtually,  the 
sum-total. 

That  Origen  did  not  succeed  in  this  grand  and 
noble  endeavour,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  both 
parties  claimed  him  as  their  authority.1  Arius  in¬ 
sisted  that  the  doctrine  of  the  eternal  generation  of 
the  Son,  which  Origen  urged  so  earnestly,  when 
fully  unfolded,  involved  the  constituent  doctrine  of 
his  own  scheme, — namely,  that  the  Son  is  finite  and 
created.  The  opponents  of  Arius,  on  the  other 
hand,  affirmed  that  Origen  intended,  equally  with 
the  Nicene  theologians  who  also  maintained  the 
doctrine  of  eternal  generation,  to  distinguish  be¬ 
tween  generation  and  creation  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  uphold  the  true  and  proper  deity  of  the  Son ; 
and  that  even  if  he  were  not  entirely  successful,  the 
will  should  be  taken  for  the  deed.  Athanasius 

i 

claims  Origen,  as  teaching  the  same  doctrine  with 


1  “Athanasius,  Gregory  Nazian- 
zen,  Basil  (though  Basil  thought 
Origen  not  altogether  accurate  re¬ 
specting  the  Holy  Ghost),  claimed 
Origen  as  against  the  Arians.  Je¬ 
rome  at  first  defended  him,  but  af¬ 
terwards  attacks  his  writings  as 
unsound  ;  in  which  attack  he  was 
joined  hy  Epiphanius,  Theophi- 
lus,  Anastasius  of  Rome.  Gregory 
Nyssen  and  Chrysostom  defend 
him.  Augustin©  (Haereses,  xliii.) 


appears  doubtful,  but  leans  to  the 
severer  side.”  See  Wateeland’s 
recital,  in  his  Second  Defence,  Qu. 
xii.  pp.  352-357. — The  trinitarian- 
ism  in  Origen’s  work  Contra  Cel- 
sum,  is  better  than  that  in  his  other 
works;  and  Bull  maintains  his 
orthodoxy  chiefly  by  citations 
from  it.  It  has  been  supposed 
that  Origen’s  writings  have  been 
corrupted  by  interpolations,  by 
latitudinarian  hands. 


ORIGEn’s  TEimTAKIANISM.  291 

that  which  he  is  himself  maintaining.1  But  we 
shall  find  the  difference  to  be  a  marked  one,  be¬ 
tween  the  Athanasian  and  the  Origenistic  definition 
of  “  eternal  generation ;  ”  and  it  is  a  difference  of 
the  utmost  importance  in  the  history  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  trinity. 

In  order  to  form  a  just  estimate  of  Origen’s 
scheme,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  point  from 
which  he  started,  and  the  position  from  which  he 
viewed  the  whole  subject.  Inasmuch  as  Monarchi- 
anism,  and  the  denial  of  the  hypostases,  was  the 
form  of  error  to  which  the  catholic  statement  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  trinity  was  most  exposed  in  the 
time  of  Origen,  it  was  natural  that  his  speculations 
should  take  form  from  his  endeavour  to  refute,  and 
guard  against  this.  Monarchianism,  or  Patripas- 
sianism,  affirmed  the  unity,  and  denied  the  trinality, 
in  the  divine  essence.  The  hypostatical  distinctions 
in  the  nature  of  the  Godhead  would  consequently  be 
the  side  of  the  subject  that  would  be  most  consid¬ 
ered,  and  urged  by  an  opponent  of  Monarchianism. 
Origen’s  great  endeavor,  consequently,  was  to  de¬ 
fend  the  real  personality  of  both  the  Father  and  the 


’De  decretis  synodi  Nicaenae, 
Cap.  vi.  §27.  Athanasius,  how¬ 
ever,  implies  that  Origen  had  said 
some  things  that  appeared  to  con¬ 
flict  with  the  Nicene  doctrine. 
For  he  remarks:  “Let  no  one 
take  as  expressive  of  Origen’s  own 
ientiihents  what  he  has  written 


as  though  inquiring,  and  exer¬ 
cising  himself  (aw  ^tjtcov  kci'i  yvuva- 
but  as  expressive  of  parties 
who  are  disputing  in  the  investi¬ 
gation.  Only  what  he  distinctly 
declares  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
sentiment  of  the  labour-loving 
(< 'pikonovos )  man.” 


292 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Son,  the  strict  hypostatical  character  of  each,  against 
that  confusion  and  mixture  of  subsistence  which 
leaves  for  the  mind,  only  a  single  essential  Person 
in  the  Godhead.  It  was  his  aim  to  show,  that  the 
Son  was  as  truly  and  distinctly  a  hypostasis  as  the 
Father,  and  that  the  personal  pronouns  could  be 
applied  as  strictly  and  properly  to  one  as  to  the 
other.  In  this  particular,  he  made  a  positive  ad¬ 
vance  upon  the  views  of  his  teacher  Clement  of 
Alexandria,  and  upon  the  general  views  of  this 
school,  by  more  sharply  distinguishing  three  hypos¬ 
tases, — an  expression  that  had  not  previously  been 
employed, 1 — and  rejecting  every  identification  of 
the  Logos  with  the  Father,  as  if  he  were  only  a 
power  proceeding  from  him,  and  working  in  Christ, 
as  the  Holy  Spirit  does  in  the  believer.  In  Clem¬ 
ent,  the  hypostatical  distinction,  though  asserted,  is 
not  so  definitely  and  energetically  asserted,  but  that 
the  Logos,  somewhat  as  in  the  trinitarian  writings 
of  Justin  Martyr,  runs  some  hazard  of  evaporating 
into  the  conception  of  the  Universal  Reason.2  Ori- 
gen  is  not  satisfied  with  any  vagueness  upon  this 
side  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  and  firmly  an¬ 
nounces  that  the  Father  and  Son  are  two  real  hy¬ 
postases,  or  personal  subsistences. 

1  Origen  very  seldom  denomi-  2  “  Clement  sometimes  fails  to 
nates  the  three  hypostases  a  triad,  distinguish  carefully  between  the 
The  Greek  word  rpias  is  found  Son  and  Spirit,  though  reckoning 
only  twice :  Tom.  in  Joann,  vi.  them  as  two  Persons  in  the 
133;  in  Matt.  xv.  698, — though  trinity.”  Munsoher- Von  Oolln  : 
the  translation  by  Rufinus  em-  Dogmengeschichte,  I.  183. 
ploys  trinitas  oftener  than  this. 


origen’s  trinitarianism. 


293 


But  how  is  the  unity  of  the  Godhead  to  be 
maintained  in  consistence  with  this  trinal  distinc¬ 
tion,  was  a  question  which  must  be  answered.  The 
attempt  to  answer  it  introduced  a  radical  defect  into 
the  Origenistic  construction  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
trinity.  In  opposing  the  Monarchianism  which 
fixed  its  eye  too  exclusively  upon  the  unity  of  the 
Divine  Essence,  Origen,  while  doing  a  valuable 
work  for  Christian  trinitarianism,  in  forming  and 
fixing  the  doctrine  of  hypostatical  distinctions,  at 
the  same  time,  by  his  inadequate  statements,  laid 
the  foundation  for  the  Arian  heresy  of  a  created 
Son  of  God. 

Origen  endeavoured  to  harmonize  the  doctrine 
of  three  Persons,  with  the  doctrine  of  one  Essence, 
by  employing  the  idea  of  eternal  generation ,  sug¬ 
gested  by  the  term  Son,  which  is  so  generally  used 
in  the  New  Testament  to  designate  the  second  dis¬ 
tinction  in  the  trinity.  In  so  doing,  he  took  the 
same  method  with  the  Nicene  theologians.  But 
unlike  the  Nicenes,  he  so  defined  this  phrase  as  to 
teach  the  subordination  of  the  second  to  the  first 
hypostasis,  in  respect  to  essence .  He  explained  his 
view  in  the  following  manner.  It  is  necessary,  he 
said,  to  distinguish  between  &tog  and  6  zitog.  The 
Father  alone  is  6  tfedg  ;  the  Son  is  &ebg.  The  Son 
is  not  God  in  the  primary  and  absolute  sense ;  and 
hence  the  apostle  John  omits  the  article  (John  i.  1), 
when  he  denominates  the  Logos  God,  but  employs 
it  when  speaking  of  the  absolute  God,  in  the  same 


294 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


verse/  The  Son  does  not  participate  in  the  self 
subsistent  substance  of  the  deity,  and  therefore  it 
is  not  proper  to  denominate  him  consubstantial 
( 6/uoovoiog )  with  the  Father.  He  is  God  only  by 
virtue  of  the  communication  of  a  secondary  grade 
or  species  of  divinity,  which  may  be  termed  1 9ebg, 
but  not  6  &tog.  The  first  Person  in  the  trinity, 
alone,  possesses  the  absolute  and  eternal  essence  of 
the  Godhead.  The  eternal  generation  does  not 
communicate  this  to  the  second  Person.  That  which 
is  derived  by  the  Father  to  the  Son,  in  the  eternal 
generation,  is  of  another  essence  than  that  of  the 
Father, — trtQog  xar  ova  lav  xa\  vjcoxti/Litvov  eorlv 
6  viog  rov  narqog?  Accordingly,  Origen  some¬ 
times  denominates  the  Son  d'tog  SbvrtQog?  He  will 
call  the  Son  avrooocpla,  avr oahrj&tia ,  etc.,  but  will 
not  call  him  avr  oft  tog.  God  the  Father  of  the 
Truth  is  greater  than  the  Truth  itself,  and  God  the 
Father  of  Wisdom  is  greater  than  Wisdom  itself. 

A  few  extracts  will  exhibit  Origen’s  mode  of 
reasoning  upon  this  distinction  so  fundamental  in 
his  scheme,  and  so  fatal  to  the  co-equality  of  the 
second  Person.  “ Avro&sog  is  God  per  se,  God  with 
the  article.  *  Wherefore  the  Saviour,  in  his  prayer 


1  Origenes  :  In  Joann.  Tom.  II. 
p.  271.  Ed.  Basil.  u  When  the  term 
God  is  employed  in  reference  to 
the  unbegotten  (ingenitus)  Au¬ 
thor  of  all,  he  [John]  uses  the 
article,  omitting  it  when  the 
Word  is  denominated  God.” 

*  Origenes  :  De  Oratione,  222. 


3  Obigenes  :  Cont.  Celsum,  V . 
608.  For  further  citations  upon 
this  point,  see  Redepenning  : 
Origenes,  II.  304  sq.  ;  Baub  : 
Dreieinigkeitslehre,  I.  197  sq. ; 
Thomasius  :  Origenes,  118  sq.  ; 
Guericke  :  De  Schola  Alexandria 
na,  201  sq. 


origen’s  trinitarianism. 


295 


to  the  Father,  says:  ‘That  they  may  know  thee, 
the  only  true  God.’  But  whatsoever  is  deified 
(deificatum)  over  and  beside  him  who  is  denomi¬ 
nated  ccvTofrtog  or  God  per  se,  by  a  participation 
and  communion  of  that  divinity,  is  not  to  be  de¬ 
nominated  God  with  the  article,  but  more  properly 
God  without  the  article  ;  which  latter  designation 
belongs  to  the  First-Begotten  of  every  creature, 
because  inasmuch  as  he  first  attracted  divinity  to 
himself,  he  is  more  honourable  than  the  other  gods 
who  exist  besides  himself ;  according  as  it  is  said  : 
‘  God  the  Lord  of  gods  spake  and  called  the  earth.’  ” 1 
“  Him  [Jesus],  we  affirm  to  be  the  Son  of  God,  of 
God,  I  say,  whom  (to  employ  the  phrase  of  Celsus) 
we  worship  supremely  (magnopere)  ;  and  his  Son 
we  acknowledge  as  exalted  (auctum)  by  the  Father, 
by  the  greatest  honours.  Grant  that  there  are  some, 
as  might  be  expected  in  so  great  a  multitude  of  be¬ 
lievers,  who  differing  from  the  others,  rashly  affirm 
that  the  Saviour  himself  is  God  the  Lord  of  the 
universe  :  we  certainly  do  not  do  this,  for  we  be¬ 
lieve  the  Saviour  himself  when  he  says  :  ‘  My  Father 
is  greater  than  I.’  Wherefore  we  do  not  subject 
him  whom  we  denominate  the  Father,  to  the  Son 
of  God,  as  Celsus  falsely  alleges.  .  .  .For  we  plainly 
teach  that  the  Son  of  the  Creator  who  formed  this 
'  sensible  world  is  not  mightier  than  the  Father,  but 
inferior.  This  we  affirm,  on  the  authority  of  the 
Son  himself,  who  says:  ‘The  Father  who  sent  me  is 

1  Origenes  :  In  Joannem,  Tom.  II.  p.  272,  Ed.  Basil. 


296 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


greater  than  I.’  Nor  is  there  any  one  of  us  so  de¬ 
mented  as  to  say,  that  the  Son  of  Man  is  the  Lord 
of  God.  Yet  we  ascribe  divine  authority  (impe- 
rium)  to  him  as  the  Word,  Wisdom,  Justice,  and 
Truth  of  God,  against  all  who  are  suspicious  of  him 
under  this  name,  but  not  against  God  the  omnipo¬ 
tent  Father  of  all”1 

At  the  same  time,  Origen  denied  that  the  Son 
is  a  creature.  In  his  treatise  against  Celsus,  he 
maintains  that  the  second  Person  in  the  trinity  is 
not  to  be  numbered  with  the  yevrjrcc,  or  created 
existences,  but  “  he  is  of  a  nature  midway  between 
that  of  the  Uncreated,  and  that  of  all  creatures,” — 
library  tt]v  tov  dyevrjTOV  rrjg  tcov  yirr/rcov  n «V 
tcov  cpuObcog.2  As  such  he  is  higher  than  the  whole  se¬ 
ries  of  creatures  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest.  For 
Origen  held  to  the  existence  of  “  a  world  of  spirits, 
who,  as  they  are  allied  to  the  absolute  deity  by 
nature,  are  also  by  their  communion  with  him  dei¬ 
fied,  and  raised  superior  to  the  limitations  of  a  finite 
existence.  By  virtue  of  this  divine  life,  the  more 
exalted  of  these  spirits  may  be  denominated  in  a 
certain  sense  divine  beings ,  gods? 3  The  difference 


1  Origenes  :  Oont.  Celsum,  Lib. 
VIII.  pp.  793,  794.  Ed.  Basil. 
From  these  passages,  it  would 
seem  that  Celsus  supposed  the 
Christians  to  subordinate  the  Fa¬ 
ther  to  the  Son.  Origen  in  cor¬ 
recting  this  error,  however,  dis¬ 
tinctly  teaches  the  subordination 
of  the  Son  to  the  Father.  And 


that  the  subordination  is  not  that 
of  order  and  relationship  merely, 
as  the  Nicenes  themselves  held, 
but  of  essence,  is  proved  by  his 
distinction  between  3e<k  and  6  3eoy. 

2 Origen:  Contra  Celsum,  III. 
34,  p.  469  (Ed.  La  Rue). 

8  Neander  :  Church  History,  I. 
587.  Neander  also  adds,  that  Or- 


OEIGEN’s  TRINITARIANISjyl.  297 


between  the  Son  and  the  created  universe  lies  in 
the  fact,  that  the  Son  derives  his  (secondary)  divin* 
ity  immediately  from  the  absolute  deity  (o  &tdg), 
while  the  created  universe,  including  the  highest 
celestial  spirits  or  “  gods,”  derives  its  existence  me¬ 
diately  through  the  Son,  from  the  Father,  who  is 
the  first  ground  and  cause  of  all  things.1  The  Logos 
is  the  creator  of  the  universe,  in  Origen’s  theory, 
because,  according  to  his  citation  of  Christ’s  words, 
God  the  Father  has  given  to  God  the  Son,  to  have 
life  in  himself  \  and  he  who  has  life  in  himself  is 
capable  of  creating.2 


igen  argued  for  a  certain  neces¬ 
sity  for  polytheism,  or  the  wor¬ 
ship  of  these  “gods,”  as  one  step 
in  the  religious  education  of  man, 
ordained  by  God. 

irThis  position  was  afterwards 
taken  by  the  Arians.  Athana¬ 
sius  (Nic.  Def.  III.  7)  represents 
them  as  explaining  the  application 
of  the  term  Only-Begotten  to  the 
Son  as  follows:  “We  consider 
that  the  Son  has  this  prerogative 
over  others,  and  therefore  is  to 
be  called  Only-Begotten,  because 
he  alone  was  brought  into  exist¬ 
ence  by  God  alone,  and  all  other 
things  were  created  by  God 
through  the  Son.” 

2  Baur  (Dreieinigkeitslehre,  I. 
197  sq.)  makes  the  following 
points  in  his  summary  of  Origen’s 
trinitarianism.  1.  Origen  starts 
with  the  fact  of  difference  between 
Father  and  Son  ;  in  other  words, 


from  the  hypostatioal  character. 
2.  This  difference  is  marked  by 
the  Apostle  John,  in  the  first 
verse  of  his  Gospel,  by  the  use  of 
the  article  when  the  Unbegotten 
is  meant,  and  its  omission  when 
the  Begotten  is  signified.  3.  This 
difference  implies  the  subordina¬ 
tion  of  the  Son  to  the  Father,  as 
to  essence;  for  though  he  calls 
the  Son  avrocroffia,  avToaX^fia^ 
etc.,  he  will  not  call  him  avroSeos ; 
he  interprets  Matt.  xix.  16  to  mean 
that  only  God  in  the  absolute  sense, 
and  not  God  the  Son,  is  “  good  ;” 
and  holds  that  the  sphere  in 
which  the  Son  acts  is  second  to 
that  in  which  the  Father  acts, 
and  that  of  the  Holy  Ghost  is 
second  to  that  of  the  Son, — the 
Father’s  sphere  being  all-compre 
hending,  including  those  of  the 
Son  and  the  Spirit, — the  Son’s  be¬ 
ing  comprehensive  only  of  crea- 


298 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


1.  In  this  distinction  between  6  &aog  and  &aogy 
lies  the  first  defect  in  Origen’s  construction  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  trinity.  Two  species  of  divinity 
are  sought  to  be  maintained ;  two  grades  of  divine 
existence  are  attempted  to  be  established.  That 
idea  of  deity,  which  is  the  simplest,  as  it  is  the  most 
profound  of  all  ideas,  is  made  a  complex  notion,  so 
as  to  include  species  under  a  genus.  The  distinction 
between  the  finite  and  infinite  is  annihilated;  so 
that  there  is  a  variety  of  grades  and  a  series  of 
gradations  of  existence,  in  the  sphere  of  the  infinite 
and  eternal,  as  there  is  in  that  of  the  finite  and 
temporal.  Instead  of  leaving  the  conception  of 
Godhood  in  the  pure  and  uncompounded  form  in 
which  a  true  theism  finds  it  and  leaves  it,  Origen,  in 
reality,  though  without  intending  it,  brought  over 
into  the  sphere  of  Christian  speculation  a  poly¬ 
theistic  conception  of  the  deity.  Godhood,  in  his 
scheme,  as  in  polytheism,  is  a  thing  of  degrees. 
The  Father  possesses  it  in  a  higher  grade  than  the 
Logos ;  and  the  nature  of  Logos  again,  is  more  ex¬ 
alted  than  that  of  the  descending  series  of  the 
heavenly  hierarchies.1  The  gulf  between  the  finite 
and  infinite  is  filled  up  by  an  interminable  series  of 
intermediates ;  so  that  when  this  theogony  is  sub¬ 
jected  to  a  rigorous  logic  and  examination,  it  is 

tion,  and  the  Holy  Spirit’s  agency  of  unity  of  essence,  but  of  moral 
being  limited  to  the  minds  of  the  harmony  of  will, 
holy.  4.  Origen  reduces  the  tri-  1  Ttiomasius:  Origenes,  pp.  120, 
plicity  to  a  unity,  not  by  means  121. 


origen’s  trinitarianism. 


299 


found  not  to  differ  in  kind  from  the  pagan  emana¬ 
tion-scheme  itself. 

2.  The  second  defect  in  Origen’s  construction  of 
the  doctrine  of  trinity  is  the  position,  that  the  gen¬ 
eration  of  the  Son  proceeds  from  the  will  of  the 
Father .  There  is  some  dispute  among  writers 
whether  Origen  did  actually  adopt  this  view ;  but 
the  great  preponderance  of  opinion  is  in  favour  of 
the  affirmative.  Neander  remarks  that  Origen 
“  affirmed  that  we  are  not  to  conceive  of  a  natural 
necessity  in  the  case  of  the  generation  of  the  Son 
of  God,  but,  precisely  as  in  the  case  of  the  cre¬ 
ation,  we  must  conceive  of  an  act  flowing  from  the 
divine  will;  but  he  must  have  excluded  here  all 
temporal  succession  of  the  different  momenta.  From 
this  view  of  the  subject,  Origen  was  also  led  to  ob¬ 
ject  emphatically  to  the  notion  of  a  generation  of 
the  Son  out  of  the  essence  of  the  Father.1’1  Neander 
takes  the  ground,  that  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of 
essence  of  the  Son  with  the  Father,  was  the  dis¬ 
tinctive  peculiarity  of  the  Western  theology,  and 
that  the  subordination-theory,  which,  he  thinks,  de¬ 
nied  unity  of  essence  and  affirmed  only  similarity 
of  essence,2  was  peculiar  to  the  Eastern,  and  that 

Meander:  Church  History,  I.  lar  with  him  who  is  a  participant 
589.  in  the  same  thing,  is  without 

a  Origen’s  conception  of  “  par-  doubt  of  one  substance  and  one 
ticipation  ”  is  indicated  in  the  nature  with  him.  Every  mind 
following  extract  from  De  Prin-  which  participates  in  intellectual 
cipiis,  IY.  381.  “  Every  being  light  is,  without  doubt,  of  one  na- 

who  participates  in  any  particu-  ture  with  every  other  mind  that 


300 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Origen’s  writings  were  the  principal  source  of  this 
view.  Ritter  thinks  that  Origen  held  to  a  genera^ 
tion  by  the  will  of  the  Father,  but  out  of  his 
essence.  Baur  is  of  opinion  that  Origen  really 
wavered  in  his  own  mind,  between  the  doctrine  of 
a  generation  out  of  the  divine  essence,  and  a  gen¬ 
eration  by  the  divine  will, — an  opinion  which  cer¬ 
tainly  has  something  to  support  it,  in  the  apparently 
contradictory  statements  of  this  mind  so  desirous  of 
reconciling  opposing  views,  and  of  bringing  all  par¬ 
tial  statements  into  the  full  comprehensiveness  of 
an  all-embracing  theological  system.  Meier  agrees 
with  Neander  in  his  judgment ;  while  Dorner  differs 
from  all  these  authorities,  and  by  a  minute  exami¬ 
nation  of  Origen’s  positions,  and  an  ingenious  specifi¬ 
cation  of  subtle  distinctions,  endeavours  to  establish 
the  position  that  Origen  did  not  hold  that  the  ex¬ 
istence  of  the  second  hypostasis  is  dependent  upon 
the  will  of  the  first.  Yet  after  all  his  investigation, 
Dorner  himself  is  compelled  to  acknowledge  that 
Origen’s  scheme  does  in  reality  make  the  Father 
the  Monad, — not  merely  one  of  the  three  hypostat- 
ical  distinctions,  but  the  Godhead  itself  in  its  orig¬ 
inal  and  absolute  unity,  in  respect  to  which  the 
second  and  third  hypostases  have  only  a  relative 
existence.  Comparing  Origen’s  opinions  with  those 
of  the  later  Semi-Arian  party,  who  unquestionably 


in  like  manner  participates  in  ness  of  essence ;  o/uotoucnor,  not 
intellectual  light.” — But  this  is  6/j.oovo-los.  Compare  Redepen- 
plainly  similarity,  and  not  same-  ning  :  Origenes,  II.  345. 


origen’s  trinitarianism. 


301 


drew  their  opinions  in  a  great  measure  from  Ori- 
gen’s  writings,  Dorner  concedes,  that  as  the  Semi- 
Arians  made  the  Father  more  than  a  single  member 
of  the  trinity, — in  their  phraseology,  qi£oc  ndorjg 
&torj]rog, — so  Origen  regards  the  Father  alone  the 
n i]yr]  TtaOr/g  fi&OTrjTog,  while  the  Son  is  Tvrjyr]  fieo- 
TY]rog  only  for  the  world,  or  creation.1 


Corner:  Person  Christi,  I. 
663.  Redepenning-  (Origenes  II. 
302)  also  inclines  to  the  position 
that  Origen’s  trinitarianism  agrees 
with  that  of  the  Church.  After 
quoting  the  passage,  ovtos  Be  6  vids 
e<  ^eXrjparos  tov  narpos  yevvrfSeU 
(Fragm.  1.  iv.  De  Princ.  5.  p.  80), 
he  adds  :  “  Origenes  beliauptet 
nicht  direct  die  Erzeugung  des 
Sohnes  aus  dem  Wesen  des  Va- 
ters,  aber  sucht  doch  hier,  mehr, 
als  eine  Erzeugung  durcli  einen 
einzelen  Willensact  desselben,  ein 
Erschaffen.  So  schwankt  er  denn 
nicht,  wie  Baur,  in  der  Geschichte 
der  Lehre  von  der  Dreieinigkeit, 
I.  204,  es  angiebt :  er  will  nur 
jede  Emanation  beiseitigen.  Und 
wenn  er  sagt,  der  Wille  des  Va- 
ters  geniige  zur  Hervorbringung 
des  Sohnes  (De  Princip.  I.  112), 
so  ist  ihm  da  der  Wille, — in  der 
That  das  concentrirteste  Geistes- 
leben, — eben  Wesenheit  Gottes 
selber.” — But  by  “  will,”  Origen 
here  means  a  volition,  and  not 
the  voluntary  faculty  itself.  His 
statement  in  Rufinus’s  version  is : 
“filius  utique  natus  ex  patre  est, 
velut  quaedam  voluntas  ejus  ex 
mente  procedejis”  (De  Princip.  I. 


112).  There  is  a  passage  in  the 
De  Principiis  (I.  ii.  4)  that  seems 
to  teach  the  doctrine  of  consub- 
stantiality :  “Non  per adoptionem 
spiritus  filius  fit  extrinsecus ,  sed 
natura  filius  est.”  But  this  “  na¬ 
ture  ”  was  not,  in  Origen’s  view, 
the  absolute  and  primary  nature 
of  God.  It  was  a  secondary  na¬ 
ture,  indicated  by  the  omission 
of  the  article.  Yet  it  was  a  real 
nature,  and  not  an  effluence  or 
emanation,  and  a  highly  exalted 
one ;  so  that  Christ  was  the  Son 
of  God  by  more  than  a  mere 
“  adoption  ”  of  an  ordinary  hu¬ 
man  nature.  Origen,  from  his 
position,  could  energetically  re¬ 
ject  the  low  theory  of  adoption, 
and  yet  not  accept  the  high  theory 
of  consubstantiality.  Bull  (Fid. 
Nic.  Sec.  III.  cap.  iii)  attempts  to 
prove  that  Origen  was  orthodox 
according  to  the  Nicene  standard. 
He  relies  chiefly  upon  the  fact, 
that  Origen  clearly  and  often  as¬ 
serts  the  eternity  of  the  Son.  But 
this  is  not  sufficient  in  Origen’s 
case,  because  he  also  asserted  the 
eternity  of  creation.  Nothing  but 
the  assertion  of  consubstantiality 
would  be  sufficient  to  prove  Ni- 


302 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


But  the  decisive  evidence  that  Origen  did  not 
clearly  see,  and  firmly  assert  the  doctrine  of  an  im¬ 
manent  trinity,  so  far  as  the  true  and  proper  deity 
of  the  second  hypostasis  is  concerned,  is  found  in 
the  fact  of  his  opposition  to  the  fundamental  position 
that  the  Son  is  of  the  same  essence ,  o/uoovoiog,  with 
the  Father.1  It  is  indeed  true,  that  he  opposed 
the  doctrine  of  an  identity  of  essence  between  the 
Father  and  the  Son,  primarily  because  he  deemed  it 
to  be  Sabellian,  and  incompatible  with  hypostatical 
distinctions  in  the  Deity  ;  but  it  was  the  duty  of  a 
scientific  theologian,  as  it  ever  has  been  the  problem 
of  scientific  theology,  to  rise  above  this  erroneous 
supposition,  and  evince  the  logical  consistency  of 
three  personal  distinctions  in  one  and  the  same 
essence.  While,  therefore,  due  weight  is  to  be 
given  to  the  motive  that  impelled  Origen  to  oppose 


cenism,  and  this  is  wanting. — 
Waterland  (Second  Defence,  Qu. 
XVII.)  also  endeavours  to  explain 
the  following  passage  from  Origen 
in  accordance  with  the  Nicene 
trinitarianism  :  “  All  supplication 
and  prayer,  and  intercession,  and 
thanksgiving  are  to  he  sent  up  to 
the  God  over  all,  by  the  High 
Priest,  who  is  above  all  angels, 
being  the  living  Word,  and  God. 
And  we  may  also  offer  supplica¬ 
tions  to  the  Word  himself,  and 
intercession,  and  thanksgiving, 
and  prayer  ;  if  we  can  understand 
the  difference  between  prayer  lit¬ 
erally ,  and  prayer  figuratively  ” 
(npoaevxris  Kvpio\e£f(os  na\  Kara- 


X  pi]  ere  cos').  His  explanation  is,  that 
prayer  is  most  commonly  ad¬ 
dressed  to  the  first  Person,  and 
that  this  is  what  Origen  means  by 
prayer  “  literally.”  Neander  (I. 
591)  interprets  a  similar  passage 
in  Origen’s  treatise  De  Oratore 
(c.  15),  in  the  opposite  and  ob¬ 
vious  manner.  Compare  Thoma- 
sius:  Origenes,  p.  128. 

J  “It  appeared  to  Origen  some¬ 
thing  like  a  profanation  of  the 
first  and  supreme  essence,  to  sup¬ 
pose  an  equality  of  essence,  or  a 
unity  between  him  and  any  other 
being  whatever,  not  excepting  the 
Son  of  God.  As  the  Son  of  God 
and  the  Holy  Spirit  are  incom- 


origen’s  trinitarianism. 


303 


the  catholic  doctrine  of  the  consubstantiality  of  the 
Son  with  the  Father,  his  scientific  merits  must  be 
judged  of  by  the  results  at  which  he  actually  ar¬ 
rived,  and  the  critical  estimate  which  came  to  be 
put  upon  his  views,  as  the  developement  of  the 
revealed  dogma  proceeded. 

Origen’s  views  respecting  the  third  Person  in 
the  trinity  were  still  farther  removed  from  the 
catholic  type  of  doctrine.  Those  who  would  defend 
his  orthodoxy  in  regard  to  the  Son,  hesitate  to  do 
so  in  regard  to  the  Spirit.  “  Basil,”  remarks  Water- 
land,1  “  thought  Origen’s  notion  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
not  altogether  sound.”  Redepenning,  who  we  have 
seen  is  inclined  to  maintain  the  orthodoxy  of  Origen 
in  respect  to  the  deity  of  the  second  Person,  re¬ 
marks  that  in  Origen’s  scheme,  “  the  Holy  Ghost  is 
the  first  in  the  series  of  creatures,  but  it  is  peculiar 
to  him  to  possess  goodness  by  nature  and  that 
“the  Holy  Ghost  is  a  creature  in  the  literal  sense 
of  the  term,  the  first  creature  made  by  the  Father 
through  the  Son,” — rd^ti  narrow  (lege  nqurov) 
tcov  vno  tou  narQog  did  XqiOtov  ysysvri/u&voiv 
(Tom.  in  Joann.  II.  60).2 

We  close  this  sketch  of  Origen’s  trinitarianism, 
by  summing  up  in  the  words  of  Meier.  “  The 

parably  exalted  above  all  other  1Waterland  :  Second  Defence, 
existences,  even  in  the  highest  Query  XII. 
ranks  of  the  spiritual  world,  so  2  Redepenning  :  Origenes,  II. 
high  and  yet  higher  is  the  Father  317,311.  Compare  also,  Guer- 
exalted  even  above  them.”  Nean-  ioke:  De  Schola  Alexandrina,  p. 
der  :  I.  590.  197  sq. 


804 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


meaning  and  importance  of  Origenism,  in  the  his¬ 
tory  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  does  not  lie  in 
the  intrinsic  worth  of  the  system,  so  much  as  in  its 
connections,  and  relations,  and  general  influence. 
If  the  system  itself  is  followed  out  with  rigour,  it 
conducts  to  a  deity  who  is  involved  in  a  constant 
process  of  developement, — a  doctrine  which  is  ut¬ 
terly  incompatible  with  an  immanent  and  eternal 
trinity  in  the  Godhead.  Its  chief  value  consists  in 
its  connection  with  the  antecedent  trinitarianism  of 
Tertullian  and  Irenaeus ;  first,  by  its  frequent  use 
of  the  term  Son,  as  well  as  Logos,  to  denote  the 
true  personality  of  the  second  distinction,  and, 
secondly,  by  its  strenuous  resistance  of  the  Sabellian 
doctrine  of  only  one  Person,  and  its  assertion  of 
real  hypostatical  distinctions.”1 


1  Meier:  Trinitatslehre,  109, 
110.— Tlie  views  of  Dionysius, 
bishop  of  Rome,  260,  are  of  much 
value  as  indicating  the  condition 
of  trinitarianism  in  the  time  of 
Origen,  and  the  state  of  the  ques¬ 
tion.  Dionysius  of  Alexandria, 
in  opposing  Sabellianism,  had 
made  the  distinction  between  the 
Father  and  Son  so  wide  as  to 
lead  him  to  some  statements  that 
implied  diversity  in  essence  be¬ 
tween  them.  Dionysius  of  Rome 
made  a  statement  that  combined 
unity  of  essence,  with  distinction 
of  persons,  in  such  a  clear  and 
satisfactory  manner  that  Diony¬ 
sius  of  Alexandria  accepted  it  in 
the  place  of  his  own.  A  frag¬ 


ment  of  this  letter  of  the  Roman 
Dionysius  has  been  preserved  by 
Athanasius  (De  sententia  Dio- 
nysii ;  and  De  decretis  synodi 
Nic.),  from  which  it  appears  that 
there  were  four  hypotheses  in 
existence  at  the  time  when  he 
wrote;  of  which,  three  are  re¬ 
jected  by  Dionysius  as  heretical, 
and  not  received  by  the  church. 
The^rs^  theory  was  the  Sabellian, 
which  made  the  Son  the  Father, 
and  the  Father  the  Son.  The 
second  was  the  theory  of  those 
who,  in  their  opposition  to  Sabel¬ 
lianism,  made  rpels  ap^as,  three 
Principles,  and,  consequently, 
Tpcls  vnocrraaeis  aWrjXoov 

navranacn  Ke^tuptcrpeVas',  three  in- 


305 


origen’s  trinitarianism. 


dependent  separate  Hypostases 
unallied  to  each  other,  and  not 
united  in  one  Substance  or  Na¬ 
ture.  This  is  condemned  as  trithe¬ 
ism.  A  third  opinion,  which  also 
arose  in  opposition  to  Sabellian- 
ism,  made  the  Father  alone  the 
one  God,  and  reduced  the  Son 
and  Spirit  to  the  condition  of 
creatures.  The  fourth  view  is 
that  which  Dionysius  holds,  and 
defends,  as  the  faith  of  the  church, 
in  the  following  phraseology : 
“  Therefore  it  concerns  us  by  all 
means,  not  to  divide  the  venera¬ 
ble  Divine  Unity  or  Monad  (ftom- 
5a)  into  three  deities  (SeoV^rar), 
nor  to  diminish  the  preeminent 
majesty  and  greatness  of  our  Lord 
by  making  him  a  creature;  but 
to  believe  in  God  the  Father  Al¬ 
mighty,  and  in  Christ  Jesus  his 
Son,  and  in  the  Holy  Ghost ;  and 


that  the  Word  is  united  (unified, 
rjvcoaZcu)  with  the  God  over  all : 
For  he  says,  lI  and  my  Father 
are  one  ;  ’  and,  ‘  I  am  in  the  Fa¬ 
ther  and  the  Father  in  me.’  So 
shall  the  Divine  Trinity  (  rj  %eia 
rpias ),  as  also  the  sacred  doctrine 
of  the  Unity  (povapfia)  be  pre¬ 
served.”  In  another  passage,  pre¬ 
served  by  Athanasius,  Dionysius 
remarks  that :  “  The  Divine  Word 
must  of  necessity  be  united  (uni¬ 
fied)  with  the  God  of  the  universe 

( rjvooa^ai  -yap  avciyKrf  tco  Sew  tcop 
o\(ov  rov  Seioi/  \6yov ) ;  and  it  is 
necessary  that  the  Holy  Spirit 
abide  and  be  immanent  in  God ; 
and  the  Divine  Trinity  (rpuida) 
be  gathered  together,  and  united 
into  One,  as  into  a  certain  Head 
( Kopv(fu)v ),  viz :  the  God  of  the  uni¬ 
verse,  the  Almighty.”  See  Water- 
land’s  Second  Defence,  Query  II. 


CHAPTER  III. 


NICENE  TRINIT  ARIANISM. 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements . 

We  pass  now  to  the  examination  of  that  more 
completely  scientific  statement  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  trinity  which  was  the  consequence  of  the  Arian 
controversy,  and  was  fixed  in  a  creed-form  in  the 
Nicene  Symbol. 

Origen,  we  have  seen,  rejected  the  doctrine  of 
identity  of  essence  between  the  Father  and  Son 
(o/Lioovotov),  and  took  the  ground  that  the  Son  is 
of  another  essence,  or  nature,  than  the  Father.1  In 


L  De  Oratione,  c.  15  :  ko.t  ova'iav 
koli  acuS’  vnoKetpevov,  eanv  6  vios  e-re¬ 
po?  tov  narpos. — In  the  Apologia 
Pamphili  pro  Origine  (Origenis 
Opera,  I.  767,  Ed.  Bas.  1571),  the 
term  bpoovaios  is  accepted,  but 
illustrated  by  the  “vapour”  or 
“effluence”  that  radiates  from 
any  substance.  The  Son  is  opoov- 


aios  with  the  Father,  “  enim 
aporrhoea  opoovaios  videtur,  id 
est  unius  substantiae  cum  illo 
corpore  ex  quo  est  vel  aporrhoea 
vel  vapor.”  Origen  himself  (De 
Princ.  I.  c.  ii.  Ed.  Bas.  1571.  I. 
671)  employs  the  same  terms 
“vapor”  and  “aporrhoea”  in 
illustrating  the  relation  of  the 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


307 


his  scheme,  “  eternal  generation  ”  is  the  commu¬ 
nication  of  a  secondary  substance.  The  Son,  con¬ 
sequently,  does  not  participate  in  the  Father’s 
primary  essence.  The  nature  of  the  second  Person 
is  not  identical  or  equal  with  that  of  the  first.  It  is 
another  nature,  and  inferior  to  that  of  the  Father, 
the  ocvrodbog,  though  highly  exalted  above  the 
nature  of  creatures.  Upon  this  notion  of  a  second: 
ary  essence,  Arius ,  a  man  of  less  devout  spirit  and 
less  profundity  than  Origen,  seized,  and,  contending 
with  logical  truth  that  there  can  be  no  third  spe¬ 
cies  of  essence  midway  between  that  of  God  and 
that  of  the  creature,  deduced  the  doctrine  that  the 
Son  is  not  divine  in  any  sense,  but  is  strictly  a  crea¬ 
ture,  though  the  very  highest  and  first  of  all.1 

The  opposition  to  Arianism  began  at  Alexan¬ 
dria,  from  Arius’s  own  bishop  Alexander.  This 
theologian  contended  for  the  true  and  proper  deity 
of  the  Son,  at  the  same  time  maintaining  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  eternal  Sonsliip,  or  generation.  He  agreed 
with  Origen  in  respect  to  the  latter  point,  but  dif¬ 
fered  from  him,  by  asserting  that  eternal  generation 
is  a  communication,  not  of  a  secondary  essence,  but 
of  the  identical  and  primary  substance  of  the  Father, 

Son  to  the  Father.  Such  phrase-  and  that  rjv  7 rore,  ore  ovk  rjv. 
ology  would  place  Origen  in  the  These  were  phrases  that  were  in 
class  of  Nominal  Trinitarians,  who  continual  use  during  the  whole 
made  the  Son  an  effluence,  and  controversy,  as  the  exact  con- 
not  a  hypostasis.  traries  of  the  orthodox  yeweais  i* 

1  Arius  held  that  the  Son  of  rrjs  ova  las* 

God  was  a  KTiafxa  e’£  ov<  QVTOiv , 


308 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


and  that,  consequently,  there  must  be  a  perfect 
equality  between  the  first  and  second  hypostatical 
distinctions.  Furthermore,  as  Arius  had  advanced 
the  doctrine,  never  advanced  it  should  be  observed 
by  Origen,  that  the  Son  has  only  a  temporal  nature 
and  existence,  though  running  back  indeed  ages 
upon  ages  into  the  past  eternity,  Alexander  insisted 
very  fully  upon  the  eternity  of  the  Logos.  The  Son 
as  Logos,  he  says,  must  be  eternal,  otherwise  the 
Father  must  originally  have  been  a'koyo g, — a  being 
without  reason.  This  is  a  form  of  argument  which 
we  find  often  employed  in  the  controversy. 

The  views  of  Arius  were  condemned  by  the 
Synod  of  Alexandria  in  321 ;  but  so  many  difficult 
questions  were  involved  in  the  whole  subject,  that 
it  was  impossible  for  a  provincial  synod  to  answer 
them  all,  or  still  more  to  construct  a  creed  that 
should  secure  the  confidence  of  the  universal  Church, 
and  be  generally  authoritative.  This  led  to  the 
summoning  of  an  oecumenical  council  at  Nice,  in 
325  ;  composed  of  upwards  of  three  hundred  bishops. 

§  2.  Problem  before  the  Nicene  Council . 

The  problem  to  be  solved  by  the  Nicene  council 
was  to  exhibit  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  in  its 
completeness  /  to  bring  into  the  creed  statement  the 
total  data  of  Scripture  upon  the  side  of  both  unity 
and  trinity.  Heresy  had  arisen,  partly,  from  incom¬ 
plete  exegesis.  Monarchianism,  or  Patripassianism, 


PROBLEM  BEFORE  THE  NICENE  COUNCIL.  309 


had  seized  only  upon  that  class  of  texts  which  teach 
the  unity  of  God,  and  neglected  that  other  class 
which  imply  His  real  and  not  modal  trinality.  This 
led  to  an  assertion  of  the  consubstantiality  of  the 
Son,  at  the  expense  of  his  distinct  personality.  Or- 
igenism  and  Arianism,  at  the  other  extreme,  follow¬ 
ing  the  same  one-sided  exegesis,  had  asserted  the 
distinct  personality  of  the  Son,  at  the  expense  of  his 
unity  of  essence,  and  equal  deity  with  the  Father. 
It  now  remained  for  the  catholic  scientific  mind,  to 
employ  an  all-comprehending  exegesis  of  the  Bibli¬ 
cal  data,  and  assert  both  consubstantiality  and  hypo- 
statical  distinction ;  both  unity  and  trinity. 

In  doing  this,  the  Nicene  Council  made  use  of 
conceptions  and  terms  that  had  been  employed  by 
both  of  those  forms  of  error,  against  which  it  was 
their  object  to  guard.  Sabellianism  had  employed 
the  term  bfxoovGiog^  to  denote  the  conception  of 
consubstantiality.  The  Monarchians  were  strong 
in  their  assertion  that  God  is  one  Essence  or  Being. 
On  the  side  of  the  Divine  Unity,  they  were  scrip¬ 
tural  and  orthodox.  The  Nicene  trinitarians  rec¬ 
ognized  this  fact,  and  hence  adopted  their  term. 
Athanasius  insisted  as  earnestly  as  ever  Sabellius 
did,  that  there  is  but  one  Essence  in  the  Godhead ; 
that  there  is  but  one  Divine  Substance ,  or  Nature , 
or  Being.  Hence  the  Nicene  Council  adopted  that 
very  term  o/uoovcnog,  which  the  orthodox  mind  one 
hundred  years  before,  in  the  controversy  with  Paul 
of  Samosata  and  the  Anti-trinitarianism  he  repre* 


310 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


sented,  had  rejected  as  a  distinctively  heretical 
term.  The  persistence  with  which  Athanasius 
sought  to  establish  the  doctrine  that  the  Son  is  of 
the  very  same  substance  with  the  Father,  evinces 
the  depth  and  subtlety  of  that  remarkable  mind, 
which  exerted  so  great  an  influence  upon  the  scien¬ 
tific  construction  of  the  Trinitarian  creed  of  the 
church.1  Two  creeds,  one  by  Eusebius  of  Nicome- 
dia,  and  another  by  Eusebius  of  Caesarea,  were  in¬ 
troduced,  which  conceded  everything  except  the 
single  position  that  the  Son  is  of  the  very  same  and 
identical  substance  with  the  Father.  The  position 
of  Eusebius  of  Caesarea  was,  that  the  Son  is  of 
u similar ”  essence  {6 /lio  to  vo  cog)  with  the  Father; 
he  is  “  God  of  God,  Light  of  Light,  and  begotten 
of  God  the  Father  before  all  worlds.”  2  But  the 


1  Upon  the  logical  inconceiv¬ 
ableness  of  a  nature  midway  be¬ 
tween  the  uncreated  and  the  creat¬ 
ed,  which  was  the  vice  of  Ori- 
genisin,  see  Guericke’s  Church 
History,  pp.  318  and  324  (Notes). 
Athanasius  argued,  that  because 
there  is  no  middle  essence,  the 
Son  must  be  God  absolute ;  and 
the  Eunomians,  or  extreme  Arians, 
argued  that  because  there  is  no 
middle  essence,  the  Son  must  be 
man  merely,  and  simply.  Au¬ 
gustine  (De  Trinitate,  I.  vi.)  also 
argues  the  same  point  with  Athan¬ 
asius,  in  the  following  terse  style  : 
“  Unde  liquido  apparet  ipsum 
factum  non  esse  per  quem  facta 
sunt  omnia.  Et  si  factus  non  est, 


creatura  non  est :  si  autem  crea- 
tura  non  est,  ejusdem  cum  Patre 
substantiae  est.  Omnis  enim  sub¬ 
stantia  quae  Deus  non  est ,  creatura 
est  ;  et  quae  creatura  non  est , 
Deus  est .” 

2  Eusebius  employs  the  follow¬ 
ing  phraseology  regarding  the 
Son,  in  his  Demonstratio  Evan- 
gelica  (IV.  ii.) :  “This  offspring, 
He  [the  Father]  first  produced 
from  Himself,  as  a  foundation  of 
those  things  which  should  follow, 
the  perfect  handi-worJc  (bqpiovpyq- 
pa)  of  the  Perfect,  and  the  wise 
structure  (ap^LTeKTovrjpa)  of  the 
Wise.”  This  phraseology  looks 
in  the  direction  of  the  doctrine 
that  the  Son  is  a  Kricrpa , — only  of 


PROBLEM  BEFORE  THE  NICENE  COUNCIL.  311 


essence  of  the  human  soul  is  “  like ”  that  of  the 
Deity,  and,  consequently,  there  was  nothing  in  the 
term  bpotovoiog  that  would  imply  that  the  essence 
of  the  Son  differs  in  kind  and  grade  from  that  of 
any  finite  spirit  made  after  the  likeness  of  Deity. 
The  time  had  now  come,  when  silence  on  the  highly 
metaphysical  but  vitally  fundamental  point  of  the 
substance  of  the  second  Person  in  the  trinity  could 
not  be  allowed.  It  was  now  necessary  to  employ  a 
technical  term  that  could  not  by  any  possibility  be 
explained  or  tortured  into  an  Arian  signification. 
The  term  opoovotog  could  not  by  any  ingenuity  be 
made  to  teach  anything  but  that  the  essence  of  the 
Son  is  one  and  identical  with  that  of  the  Father ; 
and  this  placed  him  in  the  same  grade  of  uncreated 
being  with  the  Father,  and  made  him  avroO'tog} 


the  highest  order  of  creatures, 
fabricated  as  an  instrument  to  the 
creation  of  the  lower  creatures. 
In  his  Demonstratio  Evangelica 
(IV.  i.),  Eusebius  denies  that  any 
being  whatever  is  “from  noth¬ 
ing.”  “  God,”  he  says,  “  propos¬ 
ed  his  own  will  and  power,  as  a 
sort  of  matter  and  substance  of  the 
production  and  constitution  of 
the  universe,  so  that  it  is  not 
reasonable  to  say  that  anything 
is  ‘  out  of  nothing.’  For  what 
is  from  nothing  cannot  he  at  all. 
How,  indeed,  can  nothing  he  to 
anything  a  cause  of  being  ?  But 
all  that  is  takes  its  being  from 
One  who  only  is,  and  was,  and 
who  also  said,  ‘  I  am  that  I  am.’  ” 


Again,  Eusebius  (Eccl.  Theol.  I. 
ix.),  speaking  of  the  Son,  remarks : 
“He  who  was  from  nothing 
would  not  truly  he  Son  of  God, 
as  neither  is  any  other  of  things 
generate .” — This  reasoning,  to  say 
the  least,  certainly  does  not  tend 
to  discriminate  the  substance  of 
the  Son  from  that  of  the  creation, 
or  to  demonstrate  that  his  essence 
is  one  and  identical  with  that  of 
the  Father 

1  “Unable  to  resist  the  clear  tes¬ 
timonies  of  the  Scriptures,  Arius 
confessed  Christ  to  he  God,  and 
the  Son  of  God  ;  and,  as  though 
this  were  all  that  was  necessary, 
he  pretended  to  agree  with  the 
church  at  large.  But  at  the  same 


312 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOOY. 


The  two  Eusebiuses,  and  many  of  the  Oriental 
bishops,  were  Origenistic  in  their  views  upon  this 
part  of  the  doctrine.  With  some  of  this  party, 


time  lie  continued  to  maintain 
that  Christ  was  created,  and  had 
a  beginning  like  other  creatures. 
To  draw  the  versatile  subtlety  of 
this  man  from  its  concealment, 
the  ancient  Fathers  proceeded 
further,  and  declared  Christ  to  be 
the  eternal  Son  of  the  Father,  and 
consubstantial  with  the  Father. 
Here  impiety  openly  discovered 
itself,  when  the  Arians  began  in- 
veterately  to  hate  and  execrate 
the  name  oyoovcrios.  But,  if  in 
the  first  instance,  they  had  sin¬ 
cerely  and  cordially  confessed 
Christ  to  be  God,  they  would  not 
have  denied  him  to  be  consub¬ 
stantial  with  the  Father.”  Cal¬ 
vin  :  Institutes,  I.  xiii.  4.  “  The 

Arians,  those  eminent  masters  of 
pretence  and  dissimulation,  did 
not  reject  any  one  form  of  speech, 
which  the  Catholics  had  adopted 
and  used,  either  out  of  Scripture 
or  from  tradition,  with  the  sole 
exception  of  the  word  oyoovaios ; 
as  being  a  word  of  which  the 
precision  and  exactness  preclud¬ 
ed  all  attempt  at  equivocation. 
When  they  were  asked,  whether 
they  acknowledged  that  the  Son 
was  begotten  of  the  Father  Him¬ 
self?  they  used  to  assent,  under¬ 
standing,  as  is  plain,  the  Son  to 
be  of  God  in  such  sense  as  all 
creatures  are  of  God,  that  is,  have 
the  beginning  of  their  existence 


from  him.  When  the  Catholics 
enquired  of  them,  whether  they 
confessed  that  the  Son  of  God 
was  God,  they  forthwith  answer¬ 
ed,  4  Most  certainly.’  Nay  more, 
they  used  of  their  own  accord 
openly  to  declare  that  the  Son  of 
God  is  true  God.  But  in  what 
sense  ?  Forsooth  being  made  true 
God,  He  is  true  God  ;  that  is,  He 
is  true  God  who  was  truly  made 
God.  Lastly,  when  they  were 
charged  by  the  Catholics  with 
asserting  that  the  Son  of  God  is 
a  creature,  they  would  repel  the 
charge,  not  without  some  indig¬ 
nation,  with  the  secret  reserva¬ 
tion  of  its  being  in  this  sense,  that 
the  Son  of  God  is  not  such  a 
creature  as  all  other  creatures 
are, — they  being  created  by  God 
mediately  through  the  Son,  not 
immediately  as  the  Son  himself. 
The  word  oyoovaios ,  “  of  one  sub¬ 
stance,”  was  the  only  expression 
which  they  could  not  in  any  way 
reconcile  with  their  heresy.” 
Bull  :  Def.  Fid.  Nic.  II.  i.  12, 13. 

The  Arians  at  Antioch  (A.  D. 
349)  altered  the  Gloria  Patri,  sub¬ 
stituting  prepositions  for  the  con¬ 
junction  ;  so  that  instead  of  glo 
rifying  the  Father,  and  the  Son, 
and  the  Spirit,  they  glorified  the 
Father  by  the  Son,  in  the  Spir¬ 
it.  Theodoeet:  Eccl.  Hist.  IL 
xxiv. 


PROBLEM  BEFORE  THE  NICENE  COUNCIL.  313 


which  was  considerably  numerous,  and,  as  it  after¬ 
ward  appeared,  able  to  re-open  the  subject,  and  in¬ 
volve  the  church  in  another  controversy,  the  diffi¬ 
culty  was  a  speculative  one,  certainly  to  some  extent. 
They  were  afraid  of  Sabellianism,1  and  supposed  that 
by  affirming  a  unity  and  sameness  of  essence  between 
the  Father  and  the  Son,  they  necessarily  denied  the 
distinction  of  persons  between  them.  This  portion, 
consisting  of  the  more  devout  minds,  who  practically 


1  It  is  with  reference  to  this 
class  of  Semi-Arians,  who  finally 
passed  over  to  Nicenism,  that 
Athanasius  (De  Synodis,  §  41) 
makes  the  remark :  npos  de  rods 
anodexopevovs  ra  pev  aXXa  navra 
Toav  ev  N iKaia  ypa(j)evr a>v,  nep\  de 
povov  to  opoovcnov  ap(f)il3dWovTas} 
Xpr]  prj  <b?  npos  ex^pods  diaKelcrSai  • 
kii'i  yap  k at  ■qpe'is  odx  tbs  npos  ’A peio- 
pavlras ,  odd'  a>s  paxopevovs  npos 
rods  narepas  evurrape^a^  aXX’  tbs 
ade\(f)o\  npos  ade\(f)ods  dia\eyope%a , 
Tr/v  avTrjv  pe v  fjp7v  diavoiav  e'xovras: 
nep\  de  to  ovopa  povov  durrd^ovTas. 
Athanasius  does  not  seem  to  have 
put  much  confidence  in  the  sin¬ 
cerity  of  Eusebius  in  subscribing 
the  Nicene  symbol,  notwithstand¬ 
ing  that  he  opposed  the  Arians  so 
decidedly.  In  his  Nicaenae  fidei 
Defensio,  Chap.  II.  §  3,  he  re¬ 
marks:  “And  what  is  strange 
indeed,  Eusebius  of  Caesarea  in 
Palestine,  who  had  denied  the 
day  before,  but  afterwards  sub¬ 
scribed,  sent  to  his  church  a  let¬ 
ter,  saying  that  this  was  the 


church’s  faith,  and  the  tradition 
of  the  Fathers  ;  and  made  a  pub¬ 
lic  profession  that  they  were  be¬ 
fore  in  error,  and  were  rashly 
contending  against  the  truth.  But 
though  he  was  ashamed  at  that 
time  to  adopt  these  phrases,  and 
excused  himself  to  the  church  in 
his  own  way,  yet  he  certainly 
means  to  imply  all  this  in  his 
letter,  by  his  not  denying  the 
opoovc nov,  and  the  e<  Trjs  ovaias. 
And  in  this  way,  he  got  into  a 
difficulty;  for  while  he  was  ex¬ 
cusing  himself,  he  went  on  to  at¬ 
tack  the  Arians,  as  stating  that 
‘  the  Son  was  not  before  his  (tem¬ 
poral)  generation.’  ”  In  §  4,  Chap. 
II.  of  Nic.  Def.  (comp,  also  §  5), 
Athanasius  says:  “And  suppos¬ 
ing,  even  after  subscription,  the 
Eusebians  did  change  again,  and 
return  like  dogs  to  their  vomit, 
do  not  the  present  gainsayers  [the 
followers  of  Acacius,  who  had 
been  a  pupil  of  Eusebius]  deserve 
still  greater  detestation  ?  ”  Aca- 
cius’s  formula  was  opoios,  simply. 


314 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


held  very  exalted  views  of  the  Person  of  Christ, 
were  the  true  representatives  of  Origen  in  this  coun¬ 
cil.  Others  probably  held  low  and  latitudinarian 
views,  and  in  reality  desired  that  the  council  should 
dissolve  without  a  distinct  condemnation  of  Arian- 
ism.  These  mid- way  statements  were  rejected  by 
the  council,  and  it  was  laid  down  as  the  scriptural 
doctrine  to  be  universally  received,  that  “  the  Son 
is  begotten  out  of  the  essence  of  the  Father,  God 
of  God,  Light  of  Light,  very  God  of  very  God  ( fttov 
dhfiivbv  [o  &toQ  of  Origen]  ),  begotten  not  created 
( ytvvr]dsvTa  ov  nouj&svra)^  consubstantial  with  the 
Father  (o^oovolov  tco  naxQi)?  1  This  last  impor¬ 
tant  clause  was  added  to  the  preceding  statement 
that  the  Son  is  “  God  of  God,  begotten  and  not 
created,”  in  order  so  to  define  the  idea  of  eternal 
generation  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  mistaking 


1  Ilio-Tevopev  ...  els  eva  Kvpiov 
T tj(tovv  XpiaTov ,  tov  vlov  tov  3eoG, 
yevvrj'SevTa  tov  narpos  povoyevrj , 

TOVT'CTTIV  €K  TT/S  OVdlaS  TOV  7 TClTpOS, 

%(6v  e<  3eoG,  €K  <j)<x>Toe,  Seoi' 

dXrj^Lvov  e<  3 eov  aXrj^ivov,  ycvvij- 
SeVra  ov  TToirjZevTci,  opoovaiov  ra> 
narp]  *  .  .  .  Tovs  8e  Xeyovras  otl  rjv 
wore  ore  ovk  rjv,  Kai  irp\v  yei >vrfir)vai 
ovk  rjv ,  Kat  on  ovk  ovtcov  cy eWo, 
f/  e repas  vnoo-Tao-coos  r/  ovalas 
(fidcrKOVTas  civcu,  fj  ktuttov ,  rpenTov 
rj  dXXuorov  tov  vlov  tov  Seou,  araSlf* 
paTt^ei  rj  Ka%o\iKr)  eKKXrjrrla. — Three 
particulars  are  noteworthy  in  this 
statement.  1.  The  son  is  denom¬ 
inated  3e6i>  aXrj?Siv6v  (equivalent 
to  Origen’s  6  3eos),  to  preclude 


the  notion  of  a  secondary  divinity. 
2.  Those  are  anathematized  who 
assert  that  the  Son  did  not  exist 
before  his  generation  ;  because 
this  implies  that  his  generation 
is  in  time,  and  that  “  there  was  a 
when ,  when  he  was  not.”  3.  The 
term  vnoo-rdacs  is  employed  as 
synonymous  with  ovcrla. — show¬ 
ing  that  at  this  time  these  two 
technical  terms  were  not  yet,  as 
they  afterwards  were,  strictly  ap¬ 
propriated,  the  one  to  the  perso¬ 
nal  distinction,  and  the  other  to 
the  one  Nature.  This  led  to  some 
misapprehension,  particularly  in 
the  Oriental  Church.  Justin 
Martyr  :  Apol.,  I.  10,  25,  53. 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  315 


it,  either  for  the  creation  of  a  substance  confessedly 
temporal  and  finite,  or  the  communication  of  a  sec¬ 
ondary  substance  midway  between  the  finite  and 
infinite.  This  clause  contained  the  metaphysical 
kernel  of  the  dogma,  and  was  the  crucial  test  of 
trinitarian  orthodoxy  and  heterodoxy. 

§  3.  Nicene  doctrine  of  Eternal  Generation . 

The  Nicene  Symbol,  while  adopting  from  Mo- 
narchianism  a  conception  and  a  term  that  had  been 
vehemently  opposed  by  Origen,  at  the  same  time 
adopted  with  Origen  the  idea  of  eternal  generation. 
This  idea,  suggested  by  the  Biblical  terms  “Son,” 
“  Only  Begotten,”  and  “  First  Begotten,”  all  of 
which  the  Nicene  theologians  maintained  to  be 
literal  and  not  metaphorical  terms,  and  descriptive 
of  the  eternal  and  metaphysical  relations  of  the 
second  Person,  they  technically  distinguished  from 
that  of  creation,  by  the  clause :  “  begotten  not  created .” 
In  conducting  the  discussion  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
trinity  upon  the  side  of  the  personal  distinctions,  it 
was  necessary  for  the  Nicene  theologians  to  correct 
two  errors  that  w^re  current  among  their  opponents. 
In  the  first  place,  the  Essence  of  the  Godhead  was 
confounded  with  a  personal  distinction  in  that  Es¬ 
sence.  For  those  who  were  involved  in  this  con¬ 
fusion  of  ideas,  the  “  generation  ”  of  a  Person  would 
be  the  same  as  the  generation  of  the  Essence ;  and 
the  u  procession  ”  of  a  Person  would  be  the  same  as 


316 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


the  procession  of  the  Essence.  And  this  would  re« 
suit  in  the  destruction  of  the  Divine  Unity,  and  the 
multiplication  of  deities.  The  second  error  consist¬ 
ed  in  supposing  that  generation  is  the  same  as  crea¬ 
tion  from  nothing.  For  those  who  took  this  view, 
the  “  generation  ”  of  a  Person  would  be  the  same  as 
the  origination  of  a  creature ;  and  since  the  defini¬ 
tion  of  the  term  u  procession  ”  was  inevitably  deter¬ 
mined  by  that  of  “generation,”  the  “procession” 
of  a  Person  would  also  be  the  same  as  making  a 
creature  de  nihilo.  And  this  would  result  in  the 
degradation  of  the  Son  and  Spirit  to  the  rank 
of  creatures.  The  Nicene  trinitarians  directed  the 
best  energies  of  their  vigorous  and  metaphysical 
intellects  to  a  correction  of  these  two  errors.  They 
carefully  discriminate  the  Divine  Essence  from  a 
Divine  Person.  They  are  not  the  same.  They  are 
two  distinct  conceptions  ;  to  one  of  which  unity  re¬ 
lates,  and  to  the  other  trinality.  This  being  so, 
unity  of  Essence  could  be  combined  with  the  gener¬ 
ation  of  a  Person,  or  with  the  procession  of  a  Per¬ 
son,  without  any  self-contradiction.  Athanasius 
and  his  co-adjutors  did  not  pretend  to  explain  either 
the  eternal  generation,  or  the  eternal  procession. 
They  supposed  that  in  these  ineffable  and  immanent 
activities  in  the  Godhead  lies  the  heart  of  the  trini¬ 
tarian  mystery.  At  the  same  time,  however,  they 
laid  down  certain  positions  for  the  purpose  of  pre¬ 
cluding  the  false  inferences  which  the  Arians  were 
drawing  from  the  doctrine  of  eternal  generation ; 


NTCENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  317 


and  these  positions  give  some  clue  to  the  idea  itself, 
as  it  lay  in  the  Nicene  mind.1 

The  Nicene  theologians  distinguish  eternal  gen¬ 
eration  from  creation,  by  the  following  particulars : 
1.  Eternal  generation  is  an  offspring  out  of  the 
eternal  essence  of  God ;  creation  is  an  origination 
of  a  new  essence  from  nothing.  2.  Eternal  genera¬ 
tion  is  the  communication  of  an  eternal  essence ; 
creation  is  the  origination  of  a  temporal  essence. 

3.  That  which  is  eternally  generated  is  of  one  es¬ 
sence  with  the  generator ;  but  that  which  is  created 
is  of  another  essence  from  that  of  the  creator.  The 
substance  of  God  the  Son  is  one  and  identical  with 
that  of  God  the  Father;  but  the  substance  of  a 
creature  is  diverse  from  that  of  the  creator.  The 
Father  and  Son  are  one  Nature,  and  one  Being ; 
God  and  the  world  are  two  Natures,  and  two  Beings. 

4.  Eternal  generation  is  necessary,  but  creation  is 
optional.  The  filiation  of  the  second  Person  in  the 
trinity  is  grounded  in  the  nature  of  deity;  but 
the  origination  of  the  world  depends  entirely  upon 
arbitrary  will.  It  is  as  necessary  that  there  should 
be  Father  and  Son  in  the  Godhead,  as  that  the 
Godhead  should  be  eternal,  or  self-existent ;  but 
there  is  no  such  necessity  for  creation.2  5.  Eternal 
generation  is  an  immanent  perpetual  activity  in  an 

1  Respecting  generation  and  another  by  voluntary  production, 
creation,  compare  Watkrland’s  that  it  cannot  by  necessary  em- 
First  Defence,  Queries  XIII-X Y.  anation,  I  think  not  so.”  Howe  : 

3  “  I  think  it  demonstrable,  that  1. 155  (New  York  Ed.).  “The  be- 
one  Infinite  can  never  he  from  ing  of  God  is  a  kind  of  law  to  his 


318 


HISTOKY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


ever-existing  essence  ;  creation  is  an  instantaneous 
act,  and  supposes  no  elements  of  the  creature  in 
existence.1 

By  these  characteristics  the  eternal  generation 
of  the  Son  was  differentiated  from  creation  de  nihilo , 
and  raised  entirely  above  the  sphere  of  material  and 
created  existence.  The  idea  of  time  is  excluded,  for 
it  is  an  activity  immanent  and  perpetual  in  the 
Divine  Essence,  and  is  therefore  as  strictly  eternal 
as  any  activity  of  the  Godhead.  The  idea  of  con¬ 
tingency  is  excluded,  because  the  generation  of  the 
Son  does  not  depend  upon  the  optional  will  of  either 
the  first  or  the  third  Persons,  but  is  a  necessary  act 
underlying  a  necessary  relationship.  Eternal  gen¬ 


working  ;  for  that  perfection 
which  God  is,  giveth  perfection 
to  that  he  doth.  Those  natural, 
necessary,  and  internal  operations 
of  God,  the  generation  of  the  Son, 
the  proceeding  of  the  Spirit,  are 
without  the  compass  of  my  pres¬ 
ent  intent  ;  which  is  to  touch 
only  such  operations  as  have  their 
beginning  and  being  by  a  volun¬ 
tary  purpose,  wherewith  God 
hath  eternally  decreed  when  and 
how  they  should  be.”  Hookek  : 

Ecclesiastical  Polity,  Book  I.  ch. 

•  • 

11. 

1  At  this  point,  we  may  also 
specify  the  ditference  between  the 
Nicene  “  eternal  generation,”  and 
the  Oriental  “emanation.”  1. 
That  which  is  eternally  generated 
is  infinite,  and  not  finite ;  it  is  a 


divine  and  eternal  Person,  who  is 
not  the  world,  or  any  portion  of 
it.  In  the  Oriental  schemes,  em¬ 
anation  is  a  mode  of  accounting 
for  the  origin  of  the  Finite.  But 
in  the  Nicene  trinitarianism,  eter¬ 
nal  generation  still  leaves  the 
Finite  to  be  originated.  The  be¬ 
getting  of  the  Son  is  the  genera¬ 
tion  of  an  Infinite  Person,  who 
afterwards  creates  the  finite  uni¬ 
verse  de  nihilo .  2.  Eternal  gen¬ 

eration  has  for  its  result  a  sub¬ 
sistence,  or  personal  hypostasis, 
totally  distinct  from  the  world ; 
but  emanation,  in  relation  to  the 
deity,  yields  only  an  impersonal, 
or  at  most  a  personified,  energy 
or  effluence,  which  is  one  of  the 
powers  or  principles  of  nature,— 
a  mere  anima  mundi . 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  319 


eration,  therefore,  according  to  the  Nicene  theolo¬ 
gians,  is  the  communication  of  the  one  eternal  essence 
of  deity  by  the  first  Person  to  the  second  Person,  in 
a  manner  ineffable,  mysterious,  and  abstracted  from 
all  earthly  and  human  peculiarities.  And  the  pe¬ 
culiarity  in  the  manner  in  which  the  communication 
takes  place,  in  the  instance  of  the  second  Person, 
constitutes  “filiation;”  and  in  the  instance  of  the 
third  Person  constitutes  “  procession.” 1 

In  the  Nicene  trinitarianism,  the  terms  Father 


1  Pearson,  who  thoroughly  un¬ 
derstood  the  Nicene  trinitarian¬ 
ism,  and  has  stated  it  with  great 
accuracy  and  acumen,  remarks 
(Apostles’  Creed,  Art.  II.)  that, 
“  the  communication  of  the  divine 
essence  by  the  Father  was  the 
true  and  proper  generation  by 
which  he  hath  begotten  the  Son.” 
This  communication  of  essence, 
however,  he  proceeds  to  say,  is 
free  from  the  imperfections  and 
limitations  of  the  finite.  In  hu¬ 
man  generation,  though  the  son 
is  begotten  in  the  same  nature 
with  the  father,  yet  the  father 
necessarily  precedes  the  son  in 
time ;  but  the  Divine  generation 
is  not  in  time,  and  there  is  no 
temporal  precedence.  Human 
generation  is  corporeal,  and  by  de¬ 
cision  of  substance;  but  Divine 
generation  is  incorporeal  and  by 
a  total  and  plenary  communica¬ 
tion  of  the  entire  essence. 

Pearson  answers  the  objection, 
that  if  generation  is  the  commu¬ 


nication  of  essence,  then  the  Holy 
Spirit  is  generated,  and  is  conse¬ 
quently  a  Son,  equally  with  the 
Son,  by  reference  to  the  difference 
in  the  mode  in  which  Eve  and 
Seth  were  respectively  produced 
from  Adam.  “  Eve  was  produced 
out  of  Adam,  and  in  the  same  na¬ 
ture  with  him,  and  yet  was  not 
born  of  him,  nor  was  she  truly 
the  daughter  of  Adam;  whereas 
Seth  proceeding  from  the  same 
person  in  the  similitude  of  the 
same  nature,  was  truly  and  prop¬ 
erly  the  son  of  Adam.  And  this 
difference  was  not  in  the  nature 
produced,  but  in  the  manner  of 
production.  ...  The  Holy  Ghost 
proceedeth  from  the  Father  in  the 
same  nature  with  him,  the  Word 
proceedeth  from  the  same  Person 
in  the  same  similitude  of  nature 
also;  but  the  Word  proceeding 
is  the  Son,  the  Holy  Ghost  is  not, 
because  the  first  procession  is  by 
the  way  of  generation,  the  other 
is  not.” 


320 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


and  Son  are  held  as  correlates ;  so  that  one  has  no 
meaning  except  in  reference  to  the  other,  and  the 
one  hypostasis  has  no  existence  without  the  other. 
The  Father  is  not,  as  in  Origen’s  scheme,  a  Monad 
existing  anterior  in  the  order  of  nature  to  the  Son, 
but  is  simply  one  member  of  the  trinity.  Though 
his  relation  to  the  Son  implies  an  inequality  in  re¬ 
spect  to  the  order  and  relative  position  of  the  hypos¬ 
tases,  it  implies  no  inequality  in  respect  to  their 
constituent  substance  or  nature.  The  characteristic 
of  Sonship  is  second  to  that  of  Paternity ;  but  so 
far  as  concerns  the  essence  of  Father  and  Son,  both 
alike,  and  in  precisely  the  same  degree,  participate 
in  the  eternal  and  uncreated  substance  of  the  God¬ 
head.  An  entire  and  perfect  co-equality  in  respect 
to  the  constitutional  being  of  both  is  affirmed.  The 
Son  does  not  belong  to  a  grade  of  being  inferior  to 
that  of  the  Father,  for  the  Origenistic  distinction  of 
zlsog  and  6  Utog  is  not  allowed,  but  he  is  of  the  very 
same  identical  species :  “  very  God  of  very  God.” 
But  when  we  dismiss  the  conception  of  constituent 
essence,  and  take  up  that  of  hypostatical  character , 
and  mutual  relationship ,  Athanasius  and  the  Nicene 
trinitarians  contend  that  subordination  may  be  af¬ 
firmed,  without  infringing  upon  the  absolute  deity 
of  the  Son.  The  filial  peculiarity  and  relation  is 
second  and  subordinate  to  the  paternal,  though  the 
filial  essentiality  is  equal  and  identical  with  the  pa¬ 
ternal.1  As  in  the  human  sphere,  father  and  son 

% 

1  “  When  we  speak  simply  of  the  Son,  without  reference  to  the 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  321 


belong  to  the  same  grade  of  being,  and  so  far  as 
their  constitutional  nature  is  concerned,  neither  is 
superior  to  the  other,  both  being  alike  and  equally 
human  beings,  yet  the  latter  is  second  in  dignity  to 
the  former,  so  far  as  personal  attitude  and  relation¬ 
ship  are  concerned ;  so  in  the  sphere  of  the  divine 
and  uncreated,  God  the  Father  and  God  the  Son 
are  on  the  same  common  level  of  eternal  and  neces¬ 
sary  existence,  both  alike  being  of  one  and  the  same 
essence  or  substance,  while  yet  the  latter  stands 
second  in  the  order,  and  relationships,  of  the  three 
personal  distinctions.1 

In  endeavouring  to  establish  the  consistency  of 
the  doctrine  of  eternal  generation  with  the  doctrine 
of  the  true  deity  of  the  Son,  Athanasius  relies  much 


Father,  we  truly  and  properly 
assert  him  to  be  self-existent,  and 
therefore  call  him  the  sole  first 
cause;  but  when  we  distinctly 
treat  of  the  relation  between  him 
and  the  Father,  we  justly  repre¬ 
sent  him  as  originating  from  the 
Father.”  Calvin  :  Institutes,  I. 
xiii.  19. 

1  “  Your  new  reply  to  this  query 
is  that  the  word  God  when  applied 
to  the  Father,  denotes  Him  who 
alone  has  all  perfections  in  and  of 
Himself,  original ,  underived ,  &c., 
but  when  applied  to  the  Son,  it 
denotes  one  who  has  not  his  per¬ 
fections  of  Himself,  but  derived, 
and  so  the  word  God  is  used  in 
different  senses,  supreme  and  sub¬ 
ordinate.  You  might  as  well  say 

21 


that  the  word  man,  when  applied 
to  Adam  denotes  the  person  of 
Adam  who  was  unbegotten  ;  but 
when  applied  to  Seth  it  denotes 
the  person  of  Seth  who  was  be¬ 
gotten  ;  and  therefore  the  word 
man  does  not  signify  the  same 
thing,  or  carry  the  same  idea  in 
both  cases,  but  is  used  in  differ¬ 
ent  senses.  What  I  assert  is,  that 
the  word  God  signifies  or  denotes 
absolute  perfection,  whether  ap¬ 
plied  to  Father  or  Son ;  and  is 
therefore  applied  in  the  same  sense 
to  both.  He  that  is  possessed  of 
all  perfection  (whether  originally 
or  derivatively  [i.  e.,  whether  un¬ 
begotten  or  begotten] )  is  God.” 
Waterland  :  Second  Defence, 
Query  III. 


322 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


upon  the  phrases,  lx  rijg  ova  lag,  and  6[iooovoiq,  as 
explanatory  of  the  difference  between  generation 
and  creation.  “  Let  it  be  repeated,”  he  says,  “  that 
a  created  thing  is  external  to  the  nature  of  the  be¬ 
ing  who  creates ;  but  a  generation  is  the  proper 
offspring  of  the  nature.1  The  Son,  not  being  a 
creation  from  nothing,  but  proper  to  the  Father’s 
substance,  always  is.  For  since  the  Father  always 
is,  whatever  is  proper  to  His  substance  must  always 
be  ;  and  this  is  his  Word  and  his  Wisdom.  And  that 
creatures  should  not  be  in  existence,  does  not  dis¬ 
parage  the  Creator, — for  He  has  the  power  of  fram¬ 
ing  them  out  of  nothing  when  he  wills, — but  for  the 
Son  not  to  be  ever  with  the  Father  is  a  disparage¬ 
ment  of  the  perfection  of  his  substance.”  2  In  such 
statements  as  these,  which,  in  these  Discourses  against 
the  Arians,  are  repeated  and  enforced  in  a  great 
variety  of  ways,  and  with  great  earnestness,  Athana¬ 
sius  argues  that  as  it  is  the  very  definition  of  the 
eternal  Son  to  be  connatural  with  the  eternal 
Father,  so  is  it  the  very  definition  of  a  creature  to  be 
from  nothing,  ovx  ovrcov ;  and  that  while  it  was 
not  necessary  from  the  very  nature  of  the  Godhead , 
that  there  should  be  eternally  a  Creator,  and  eter- 
nally  a  creation,  it  was  necessary,  from  the  very 


1  “  It  were  madness  to  say,  that  co-essential  or  consnbstantial  with 
a  house  is  co-essential  or  consub-  his  father.”  Athanasius  :  Ep. 
stantial  with  the  builder,  or  a  ship  ad  Serapion. 
with  the  shipwright ;  but  it  is  2  Athanasius  :  Contra  Aria- 
proper  to  say,  that  every  son  is  nos,  I.  viii. 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  323 


nature  of  the  Godhead,  that  there  should  be  eter- 
nally  a  Father,  and  eternally  a  Son. 

Hence  the  Nicene  theologians  harmonized  the 
doctrine  of  eternal  generation  with  that  of  unity  of 
essence,  by  teaching  the  necessity  of  this  generation. 
The  Arians  insisted  that  the  generation  of  the  Son 
must  be  dependent  upon  the  arbitrary  choice  of 
the  Father, — that  it  was  optional  with  the  first 
Person  in  the  Godhead,  whether  the  second  Person 
should  be,  or  not  be.  To  this  Athanasius  replies, 
that  because  the  being  of  the  Son  is  in  and  of  the 
eternal  substance  of  the  Deity,  it  cannot  be  a  con¬ 
tingent  being.  Whatever  necessity  of  existence 
attaches  to  the  substance  of  the  Godhead,  attaches 
equally  to  the  hypostatical  distinctions  in  it,  because 
these  distinctions  are  in  and  of  this  substance. 
When,  therefore,  the  Arians  asserted  that  the  Son 
is  a  pure  product  of  the  Father’s  will,  and  was  con¬ 
sequently  a  creature,  the  Nicene  trinitarian  affirmed 
that  the  generation  of  the  Son  was  as  independent 
of  an  arbitrary  volition  of  the  Father,  as  is  the  ex¬ 
istence  of  any  one  of  the  divine  attributes,  or  even 
the  divine  existence  itself.  Athanasius,  in  his  third 
Discourse  against  the  Arians,  argues  as  follows : 
“  When  the  Arians  themselves  say  that  God  is 
good  and  merciful,  does  this  attribute  attach  to  Him 
by  optional  will,  or  by  nature  ?  if  by  optional  will, 
we  must  frifer  that  He  began  to  be  good,  and  that 
his  not  being  good  is  possible :  for  to  counsel  and 
choose  implies  an  inclination  two  ways.  But  if  it  be 


324 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


too  extravagant  to  maintain  that  God  is  good  and 
merciful  by  optional  will,  then  what  the  Arians 
have  said  themselves  [in  regard  to  the  Nicene  doc¬ 
trine  of  eternal  generation]  must  be  retorted  upon 
them  [in  regard  to  the  attribute  of  divine  goodness 
and  mercy]  :  ‘  Therefore  by  external  necessity,  and 
not  voluntarily,  God  is  good,’  and :  ‘  Who  is  it  that 
imposes  this  necessity  upon  Him  ?  ’  But  if  it  be  ex¬ 
travagant  to  speak  of  compulsory  necessity  in  the 
case  of  God,  and  therefore  it  is  by  nature  that  He 
is  good,  much  more  is  He  Father  of  the  Son  by  na¬ 
ture  and  not  by  optional  will.  Moreover  let  the 
Arians  answer  us  this:  The  Father  himself,  does  He 
exist ,  first  having  counselled,  and  then  being  pleased 
to  come  into  being?  For  they  must  know  that 
their  objections  reach  even  to  the  existence  of' the 
Father  himself.  If,  then,  they  shall  say  that  the 
Father  exists  from  optional  will,  what  then  was  He 
before  he  counselled  and  willed,  or  what  gained  He 
after  such  counselling  and  option  ?  But  if  such  a 
question  be  extravagant,  and  absurd,  in  reference 
to  the  Father,  will  it  not  also  be  against  reason  to 
have  parallel  thoughts  concerning  God  the  Word, 
and  to  make  pretences  of  optional  will  and  pleasure 
in  respect  to  his  generation  ?  For,  as  it  is  enough 
only  to  hear  God’s  name,  for  us  to  know  and  under¬ 
stand  that  He  is  that  He  is  [i.  e.,  that  His  existence 
is  necessary],  so,  in  like  manner,  it  is  enough  only 
to  hear  the  name  of  the  Word,  to  know  and  un¬ 
derstand  that  He  who  is  God  not  by  optional 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  325 


will,  has  His  proper  Word,  not  by  optional  will, 
but  by  nature.”  In  another  place,  Athanasius  em¬ 
ploys  the  following  phraseology  to  teach  a  necessity 
of  existence  in  the  Son,  that  is  equal  to  that  of  the 
Father:  “  The  Son  is  the  Father’s  All ;  and  nothing 
was  in  the  Father  before  the  Word.”  1 

i 


1  Athanasius  :  Contra  Aria- 
nos,  III.  xsx.  6.  12. — The  Nicene 
trinitarians  did  not  hold  that  the 
generation  of  the  Son  is  against 
the  will  of  the  Father.  It  was 
only  when  their  opponents  sepa¬ 
rated  the  will  from  the  nature  of 
God,  that  they  denied  that  gene¬ 
ration  is  by  will.  If  the  will  be 
regarded  as  one  with  the  nature, 
they  granted  that  the  generation 
of  the  Son,  like  any  immanent 
activity  in  the  Godhead,  is  accord¬ 
ing  to  will,  and  is  not  compulsory. 
It  is  in  this  sense,  that  those  pas¬ 
sages  in  Justin  Martyr  (ante,  p. 
271),  and  the  earlier  trinitarians, 
are  to  he  taken,  which  speak  of 
the  generation  of  the  Son,  dno  tov 
narpos  dvvapei,  Kai  (3ov\rj  avrov 
(Dial.  cont.  Tryph.  353.  D.).  Some 
of  the  Post-Nicene  writers  make 
the  distinction  of  a  concurrent 
and  a  fore-going  will, — ^'X^crts- 
awSpopos  and  SeX^o-is  npoTjyovpevT] 
(Cyril.  Trin.  ii.  p.  56,  Par.  Ed.), — 
and  say  that  the  generation  is  by 
the  former,  and  not  the  latter.  Cy¬ 
ril  also  remarks  that,  “  the  Father 
wills  his  own  subsistence,  SeX^s 
eVrt ;  and  yet  he  is  not  what  he 
is,  by  any  volition  antecedent  to 
his  existence,  ^ovX^aecos  tivos .” 
(Thes.  p.  56.)  Athanasius  does  not 


make  this  distinction  between  a 
concurrent  and  an  antecedent 
will,  but  says  that  the  Son  is 
generated  by  nature,  and  “  nature 
transcends  will  and  necessity 
also;”  and  that,  “concerning  His 
proper  Word,  begotten  from  Him 
by  nature,  God  did  not  counsel 
beforehand ;  for  in  Him,  the 
Father  makes  other  things  what¬ 
ever  he  counsels.”  Cont.  Arianos, 
III.  61.  Augustine  (Trin.  xv.  20) 
speaks  of  the  Son,  as  “  voluntas 
de  voluntate.” 

Waterland,  in  reference  to  the 
internal  acts  of  generation  and 
procession  distinguishes  between 
will,  and  arbitrary  will,  and  says 
that  Dr.  Clark’s  distinction  be¬ 
tween  will  of  approbation  and 
will  of  choice,  is  the  same  thing. 
(2d  Defence,  Qu.  VIII.  p.  314). 

“  Upon  this  ground  or  princi¬ 
ple,  of  God  having  an  arbitrary 
contingent  free  will  to  all  things, 
did  some  of  the  Arian  party  en¬ 
deavor  to  overthrow  the  divinity 
of  the  Son  or  Word.  Because 
God  must  needs  beget  him  un¬ 
willingly,  unless  he  begot  him  by 
an  arbitrary  contingent  free  will, 
which  would  make  him  have  a 
precarious  existence,  and  to  be 
destroy  able  at  pleasure,  and  con- 


326 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


In  this  way,  the  Nicene  symbol  sought  to  guard 
the  doctrine  of  eternal  generation,  against  those 
conceptions  of  creation,  and  contingent  existence, 
which,  we  have  seen,  were  latent  in  the  scheme  of 
Origen,  and  were  developed  in  the  scheme  of  Arius. 
When  the  ideas  of  consubstantiality  and  immanent 
necessity  are  combined  with  the  idea  of  eternal 
generation,  they  so  regulate  and  control  it,  as  to 
preclude  a  degradation  of  the  second  Person  in  the 
trinity,  either  to  the  level  of  a  secondary  divinity, 
or  of  a  creature.  If,  instead  of  holding  that  the 
Father  communicates  a  secondary  essence  to  the 
Sou,  Origen  had  maintained  that  the  second  Person 
participates  in  the  absolute  essence  of  the  Godhead, 
just  as  fully  as  the  first  Person  does,  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  Arius  to  have  derived  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  a  created  Son  of  God  from  his  scheme.  For 
the  absolute  divine  essence  is  confessedly  uncreated, 
and  eternal ;  and  any  personal  hypostasis  that  pos- 


sequently  to  be  a  creature.  But 
Athanasius  and  the  other  catholic 
fathers  in  opposition  hereunto, 
maintain  that  God  the  Father 
begot  a  Son  not  by  arbitrary  free 
will,  but  by  way  of  natural  ema¬ 
nation,  incorporeal,  and  yet  not 
therefore  unwillingly,  nor  yet 
without  will  neither,  but  his  will 
and  nature  here  concurring  and 
being  the  same ;  it  being  both  a 
natural  will  and  a  willing  nature. 
So  that  the  Son  begotten  thus 
from  eternity,  by  the  essential 


foecundity  of  the  Father,  and  his 
overflowing  perfection  (which  is 
no  necessity  imposed  upon  him, 
nor  yet  a  blind  and  stupid  nature, 
as  that  of  fire  burning  or  the  sun 
shining),  this  divine  apaugasma , 
or  outshining  splendour  of  God 
the  Father,  hath  no  precarious, 
but  a  necessary  existence,  and  is 
undestroyable.”  Cudworth  :  On 
Free  Will,  pp.  50,  51.  London, 
1838.  Compare  Billroth:  Re- 
ligionsphilosophie,  §  80. 


NIC^E  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  327 


sesses  it  as  tlie  constituent  substance  of  his  own  be¬ 
ing  is  by  this  very  fact,  real  deity,  and  “  very  God.1’ 
It  was  because  they  so  perceived,  and  so  thought, 
that  the  Nicene  theologians  retained  in  the  catholic 
creed  of  the  Church  that  doctrine  of  eternal  genera¬ 
tion  which  was  so  prominent  in  the  defective  scheme 
of  Origen,  and  which  in  later  times,  in  some  indi¬ 
vidual  instances,  has  been  misunderstood,  and  con¬ 
strued  after  the  Origenistic,  as  distinguished  from 
the  Athanasian  manner. 

With  respect  to  the  .explanation  of  the  term 
“  generation,”  suggested  by  the  Biblical  word  “  Son,” 
and  employed  to  denote  the  relation  existing  be¬ 
tween  the  second  and  the  first  hypostasis  in  the 
trinity,  the  Nicene  theologians  are  not  full  in  their 
statements,  and  did  not  pretend  to  be.  A  complete 
definition  of  the  term  would,  in  their  judgment, 
involve  an  explanation  of  the  mystery  of  the  trini¬ 
ty.  They  held  that  an  exhaustive  comprehension 
of  the  mode  in  which  the  Person  subsists  in  the 
Essence  is  possible  only  to  the  Infinite  Mind.  The 
Trinal  Unity  is  self-contemplative,  and  self-compre¬ 
hending.  Only  God  can  comprehend  the  Godhead. 
Athanasius,  in  his  Epistle  to  the  Monks,  written 
about  358,  thus  expresses  himself  respecting  the 
mysteriousness  of  the  trinity.  “  The  more  I  desired 
to  write,  and  endeavoured  to  force  myself  to  under¬ 
stand  the  divinity  of  the  Word,  so  much  the  more 
did  the  knowledge  thereof  withdraw  itself  from  me ; 
and  in  proportion  as  I  thought  that  I  apprehended 


328 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


it,  I  found  myself  to  fail  of  doing  so.  Moreover,  I 
was  unable  to  express  in  writing,  even  what  I  seem¬ 
ed  to  myself  to  understand ;  and  that  which  I  wrote 
was  unequal  to  the  imperfect  shadow  of  the  truth 
which  existed  in  my  conceptions.  Considering, 
therefore,  how  it  is  written  in  the  book  of  Eccle¬ 
siastes  :  4  I  said,  I  will  be  wise,  but  it  was  far  from 
me  ;  that  which  is  far  off,  and  exceeding  deep,  who 
shall  find  it  out?’  and  what  is  said  in  the  Psalms: 
4  The  knowledge  of  Thee  is  too  wonderful  for  me  ; 
it  is  high,  I  cannot  attain  unto  it,’  I  frequently  de¬ 
signed  to  stop,  and  to  cease  writing :  believe  me,  I 
did.  But  lest  I  should  be  found  to  disappoint  you, 
or  by  my  silence  to  lead  into  impiety  those  who 
have  made  inquiry  of  you,  and  are  given  to  dispu¬ 
tation,  I  constrained  myself  to  write  briefly,  what  I 
have  now  sent  to  your  piety.  For  although  a  per¬ 
fect  apprehension  of  the  truth  is  at  present  far  re¬ 
moved  from  us,  by  reason  of  the  infirmity  of  the 
flesh  ;  yet  it  is  possible,  as  the  Preacher  himself  has 
said,  to  perceive  the  madness  of  the  impious,  and 
having  found  it,  to  say  that  it  is  4  more  bitter  than 
death  ’  (Eccles.  vii.  26).  Wherefore,  for  this  rea¬ 
son,  as  perceiving  this,  and  able  to  find  it  out,  I  have 
written,  knowing  that  to  the  faithful,  the  detection 
of  error  is  a  sufficient  information  wherein  truth 
consists .”  The  Patristic  statements,  consequently, 
respecting  the  meaning  of  the  term  44  generation  ” 
are  generally  negative.  Says  Cyril,  44  How  the 
Father  begat  the  Son,  we  profess  not  to  tell ;  only 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  329 


we  insist  upon  its  not  being  in  tbis  manner,  or 
that.”1  Says  Augustine,  “If  asked  to  define  the 
trinity,  we  can  only  say,  it  is  not  this  or  that.” 2 
Says  John  of  Damascus,  “  All  we  can  know  about 
the  divine  nature  is,  that  it  is  not  to  be  known.”  3 
Yet  the  Nicene  trinitarians  did  make  some  ap¬ 
proximations  to  a  positive  statement,  of  which  the 
two  following  particulars  embrace  the  substance. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  they  held  that  the  term 
“  Son  ”  is  employed  in  Scripture,  to  denote  the  deity 
of  the  second  Person.  The  Logos  is  eternally, 
really,  and  naturally  the  Son  of  God,  and  not  meta¬ 
phorically  or  adoptively.  For  the  term  “Father,” 
they  argued,  denotes  the  eternal  and  real,  and  not 
the  temporal  and  metaphorical  character  of  the  first 
Person,— a  position  conceded  by  their  opponents. 
But  th^j  term  “Son”  is  correlative  to  the  term 
“  Father,”  and  hence  must  have  the  same  literal 
force.  If  the  godhood  of  the  first  hypostasis  is  not 
invalidated  by  his  being  truly  and  properly  the 
Father,  neither  is  the  godhood  of  the  second  hypos¬ 
tasis  vitiated  by  his  being  truly  and  properly  the 
Son.  Furthermore,  the  Scripture  texts  which  are 
relied  upon  to  establish  the  divinity  of  the  first  and 
second  Persons  in  the  Godhead  employ  the  terms 
Father  and  Son,  by  which  to  designate  them.  But 

1  Cyrillus  Hierosol.  :  Cate-  positio  Fidei,  I.  iv.  —  Compare 
clieses,  XI.  ii.  upon  the  general  subject  of  eter- 

*  Augustinus  :  Ennar.  in  Ps.  nal  generation,  Pearson  :  On  the 

Xxvi.  8.  Creed,  Article  II.  pp.  203  sq.  (Ed. 

*  Johannes  Damasoenus  :  Ex-  Dobson). 


330 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


if  these  terms  denote  only  temporal  and  finite  rela 
tionships,  it  is  impossible  to  harmonize  the  subject 
with  the  predicates, — to  justify  the  attribution  of 
omnipotence,  omnipresence,  and  infinity  to  a  Person 
whose  very  name  signifies  limitation  and  finiteness. 
“Unto  the  Son,  He  saith,  thy  throne  O  God  is 
forever  and  ever”  (Heb.  i.  8).  Here  the  second 
Person  in  the  trinity  is  denominated  “  Son,”  and  as 
so  denominated  is  addressed  as  Deity.  This  could 
not  have  been,  they  argued,  unless  Sonship  in 
the  Godhead  is  eternal.  To  a  merely  temporal 
hypostasis,  it  could  not  have  been  said :  “  Thy  throne 
O  God  is  forever  and  ever.”  Again,  baptism  was 
to  be  administered  in  the  name  of  the  “  Son ;  ”  but 
this  would  have  been  impious,  had  filiation  in  the 
Godhead  denoted  only  a  finite  and  created  relation¬ 
ship.  The  candidate  would,  in  this  case,  have  been 
baptized  into  a  name  that  designated  nothing  eter¬ 
nal  or  divine ;  and,  furthermore,  a  merely  finite  and 
temporal  hypostasis  would  thereby  have  been  asso¬ 
ciated,  in  a  solemn  sacramental  act,  in  the  eternal 
trinity.  In  the  controversy  respecting  the  validity 
of  heretical  baptism,  the  Church  came  to  the  deci¬ 
sion  that  baptism  in  the  name  of  Christ  is  not  valid. 
It  must  be  administered  according  to  the  Scriptural 
formula,  in  the  name  of  the  Eternal  Three.  But  if 
baptism  in  the  name  of  the  God-man,  solely,  is  not 
justifiable  ;  still  less  would  it  be  proper  to  baptize  in 
the  name  of  the  “  Son,”  if  that  term  denoted  a  merely 
temporal  and  transitory  distinction  and  relationship. 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  331 


Hence,  the  Nicene  trinitarians  regarded  Pater- 
ternity  and  Filiation  as  immanent  and  necessary 
relationships  in  the  Godhead,  and  the  ineffable  di¬ 
vine  archetypes  of  all  that  corresponds  to  these 
relationships  in  the  sphere  of  created  existence.  Son- 
ship,  in  its  abstract  and  generic  definition,  is  parti¬ 
cipation  in  a  common  nature  or  essence.  The  man¬ 
ner  in  which  this  participation  is  brought  about  in 
the  Godhead  is  spiritual,  and  in  accordance  with  the 
transcendence  of  the  Deity ;  while  in  the  sphere  of 
the  creature  it  is  material,  and  mediated  by  sex.1 
But  in  both  spheres  alike,  Sonship  implies  sameness 
of  nature.  The  eternal  Son  is  consubstantial  with 
the  eternal  Father ;  and  the  human  son  is  consub¬ 
stantial  with  the  human  father.  For  this  reason, 
the  Nicene  trinitarians  represent  Sonship  in  the 
Godhead  as  the  absolute  Sonship,  of  which  all 
created  and  finite  sonship  is  only  a  faint  and  im¬ 
perfect  pattern ;  even  as  the  finite  individuality  is 
only  a  faint  and  imperfect  pattern  of  the  Divine  per¬ 
sonality,  and  as  human  justice,  mercy,  and  love,  are 
merely  shadows  of  the  absolute  justice,  mercy,  and 
love  of  God.  Athanasius  interprets  the  text :  u  I 
bow  my  knees  unto  the  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ,  of  whom  the  whole  family  in  heaven  and 
earth  is  named ”  (Eph.  iii.  14,  15),  as  teaching  that 


1  This,  however,  is  not  abso-  Adam  without  the  instrumentali- 
lutely  necessary  even  in  the  hu-  ty  of  sex.  Our  Lord  partook  of 
man  sphere.  Eve  was  made  to  human  nature  fully  and  complete- 
participate  in  the  substance  of  ly,  yet  not  by  ordinary  generation. 


332 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


God  the  Father  of  the  Son  is  the  only  absolute 
Father,  in  the  same  manner  that  he  is  the  only  ab¬ 
solute  Good,  and  that  all  created  paternity  is  only 
a  shadow  of  the  divine  and  uncreated.  “It  be¬ 
longs,”  he  says,  “to  the  Godhead  alone,  that  the 
Father  is  Father  absolutely  and  in  the  highest  sense 
(xvQicog)  ;  and  the  Son  is  Son  absolutely  and  in  the 
highest  sense  ( xvqicoq ) ;  for  in  them,  and  in  them 
only,  does  it  hold,  that  the  Father  is  ever  Father, 
and  the  Son  is  ever  Son.” 1  The  eternity  of  the 
Divine  Fatherhood  and  the  eternity  of  the  Divine 
Sonship,  constitutes  an  absoluteness  and  perfection 
in  the  relationship  such  as  cannot  be  found  in  the 
sphere  of  the  creature.  Paternity  and  filiation  be¬ 
long  to  the  deity  of  necessity .  God  is  not  God 
without  them.  But  in  the  sphere  of  the  creature, 
paternity  and  filiation  are  only  temporal  and  con¬ 
tingent.  There  is  no  such  relation  in  the  angelic 
world,  and  man  may  not  be  a  father  and  yet  be 
human,  as  was  Adam  at  the  moment  of  his  creation. 

The  following  train  of  reasoning,  employed  by 
Athanasius  in  his  “  Defence  of  the  Nicene  Faith,” 
throws  light  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  natural  and 
eternal  Sonship  of  the  second  Person,  as  held  and 
maintained  against  the  Arians,  wrho  denied  it.  There 

1  Athanasius  :  Contra  Arianos,  who  alone  is  true  (Rom.  iii.  4) 
I.  xxiii,  xxi.  Jerome  remarks,  imparts  the  name  of  truth ;  so, 
“  As  He  who  alone  is  good  (Luke  too,  the  only  Father,  in  that  He 
xviii.  19)  makes  men  good,  and  is  the  creator  of  all,  and  the  cause 
who  alone  is  immortal  (1  Tim.  of  substance  to  all,  gives  to  the 
vi.  16)  bestows  immortality,  and  rest  to  be  called  Father.” 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  333 


are  two  senses,  in  which  the  Scripture  employs  the 
word  son.  The  first  is  found  in  passages  like  Deu¬ 
teronomy,  xiii.  18,  and  John,  i.  12:  “  When  thou 
shalt  hearken  to  the  voice  of  the  Lord  thy  God  .  .  . 
ye  shall  be  children  of  the  Lord  your  God.”  “  As 
many  as  received  him,  to  them  gave  he  power  to 
become  the  sons  of  God.”  The  other  sense  is  that 
in  which  Isaac  is  the  son  of  Abraham.  If,  now,  the 
Son  of  God  is  a  son  only  in  the  first  sense,  as  the 
Arians  assert,  then  he  does  not  differ  in  his  nature 
and  grade  of  being  from  any  creature,  and  could 
not  be  denominated  the  6Wy-Begotten.  To  the 
Arian  answer,  that  the  Son  is  called  the  Only-Be¬ 
gotten  because  he  was  brought  into  existence  by 
God  alone,  while  all  other  things  were  created  by 
God  through  the  Son,  Athanasius  replies  that  this 
certainly  could  not  be  because  God  had  exhausted 
himself  in  creating  the  Son,  and  needed  rest,  and  so 
devolved  the  creation  of  all  other  things  upon  him. 
But  perhaps  it  was  because  all  other  creatures  could 
not  endure  to  be  produced  by  the  unapproachable 
and  transcendent  deity, — a  reason  assigned  first  by 
Asterius,  and  afterwards  adopted  by  Arius.  But 
if  created  things  cannot  be  created  directly  by  the 
deity,  and  must  come  into  existence  through  a  mid¬ 
dle  Being,  then  the  Son  (since  he  is  a  creature) 
would  need  a  mediator  to  his  creation.  And  this 
medium  would  also  require  a  medium,  and  so  on 
ad  infinitum ;  and  thus  there  could  be  no  creation 
at  all.  The  Son  of  God,  is,  therefore,  so  called,  in 


334 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


the  sense  in  which  Isaac  was  the  son  of  Abraham, — • 
by  nature  and  participation  in  the  same  substance. 
“  What  is  naturally  begotten  from  any  one,  and 
does  not  accrue  to  him  from  without,  that,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  is  a  son”  But  the  generation  of 
the  Eternal  Son  differs  from  a  human  generation,  in 
the  following  particulars.  The  offspring  of  men  are 
portions  of  their  progenitors ;  since  their  bodies  are 
not  uncompounded,  but  transitive.  But  God  is 
without  parts,  and  is  Father  of  the  Son  without 
partition  or  passion.  Again,  men  lose  substance  in 
generation,  and  gain  substance  again  from  the  ac¬ 
cession  of  food;  and  thus  become  the  parents  of 
many  children.  But  God,  being  without  parts, 
neither  loses  nor  gains  substance;  and  thus  he  is 
the  Father  of  one  Only-Begotten  Son.  “  Let  every 
corporeal  thought  be  banished  upon  this  subject, 
and,  transcending  every  imagination  of  sense,  let  us, 
with  the  pure  understanding  and  mind  alone,  appre¬ 
hend  the  Son’s  genuine  relation  towards  the  Father, 
and  the  Word’s  individuality  (idcorrira)  in  reference 
to  God,  and  the  unvarying  likeness  of  the  radiance 
to  the  light.  For,  as  the  words  c  Offspring  ’  and 
1  Son  ’  bear,  and  are  meant  to  bear,  no  human  sense, 
but  one  suitable  to  God,  in  like  manner  when 
we  hear  the  phrase,  4  one  in  substance,’  let  us  not 
fall  upon  human  senses,  and  imagine  partitions 
and  divisions  of  the  Godhead ;  but  as  having  our 
thoughts  directed  to  things  immaterial,  let  us  pre¬ 
serve  undivided  the  oneness  of  nature,  and  the 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  335 


identity  of  light.  For  this  is  the  individuality,  or 
hypostatical  character,  of  the  Son  in  relation  to  the 
Father ;  and  in  this  is  shown  that  God  is  truly  the 
Father  of  the  Word.  Here,  again,  the  illustration 
of  light  and  its  radiance  is  in  point.  Who  will  pre¬ 
sume  to  say  that  the  radiance  is  unlike,  and  foreign 
to,  the  sun  ?  Rather,  who  thus  considering  the  ra¬ 
diance  relatively  to  the  sun,  and  the  identity  of  the 
light  both  in  the  sun  and  the  sunbeam,  would  not 
say  with  confidence :  4  Truly  the  light  and  the  ra¬ 
diance  are  one,  and  the  radiance  is  in  the  sun,  so 
that  whoever  sees  this  sees  the  sun  also?’  But 
what  should  such  a  oneness  and  personal  peculiarity 
(idtorrjg)  be  called  but  1  Offspring,’  4  one  in  sub¬ 
stance  ’  ?  And  what  should  we  fittingly  consider 
God’s  Offspring,  but  the  Divine  Word,  and  Wis¬ 
dom  ?  ” 1 

Similar  arguments  and  illustrations  are  also  set 
forth  by  Athanasius,  in  his  singularly  logical  and 
powerful  “  Orations  against  the  Arians.”  “We 
must  not  understand,”  he  says,  “  those  words,  4 I 
am  in  the  Father,  and  the  Father  in  me,’  as  if  the 
Father  and  the  Son  were  two  distinct  essences  or 
natures,  blended  or  inlaid  into  one  another ;  as  if 
they  had  that  property  which  philosophers  call 
penetration  of  parts :  that  is  to  say,  as  if  they  were 
a  vessel,  supposed  to  be  capable  of  being  doubly 
filled  at  once ;  as  if  the  Father  occupied  the  same 

1  Athanasius  :  Defensio  Fidei  Nicaenae,  III.  vi,  vii,  viii,  x,  xi, 
xxiv. 


336 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


quantity  or  region  of  space  witli  the  Son,  and  the 
Son  the  same  as  the  Father.  The  Father’s  per¬ 
sonality  is  infinitely  perfect  and  complete ;  and  the 
Son’s  personality  is  the  plenitude  of  his  Father’s 
substance.  The  Son  has  not  his  Sonship  derived  or 
communicated  to  him  by  any  sort  of  intervention, 
or  mediation.  No;  it  is  of  the  Son’s  very  nature, 
of  the  Father’s  substance,  and  immediate  from  the 
Father . There  is  an  entire  propriety  and  com¬ 

munity  of  nature  between  the  Son  and  the  Father, 
in  like  manner  as  there  is  between  brightness  and 
light,  between  the  stream  and  the  fountain;  and, 
consequently,  he  that  sees  the  Son,  sees  in  him  the 
Father,  and  cannot  but  know  that  the  Son  is  in  the 
substance  of  the  Father,  as  having  his  subsistence 
(i/TTooraoig)  communicated  to  him  out  of  that  sub¬ 
stance  (ova La) ;  and,  again,  that  the  Father  is  in 
the  Son,  as  communicating  his  substance  to  the  Son, 
as  the  nature  of  the  solar  substance  is  in  the  rays, 
the  intellectual  faculty  in  the  rational  soul,  and  the 
very  substance  of  the  fountain  in  the  waters  of  the 
river . The  Son  cannot  be  otherwise  than  be¬ 

gotten  of  the  Father,  and  consequently,  cannot  be 
the  Father ;  yet  as  being  begotten  of  the  Father,  he 
cannot  but  be  God ;  and  as  being  God,  he  cannot 
but  be  one  in  essence  with  the  Father :  and  there¬ 
fore  he  and  the  Father  are  One, — one  in  propriety 
and  community  of  nature,  and  one  in  unity  of  God¬ 
head.  Thus  brightness  is  light ;  the  splendour  or 
radiance  of  the  sun  is  coeval  with  the  body  of  the 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  337 


sun.  It  is  of  its  very  substance.  It  is  not  a  second¬ 
ary  flame  kindled  or  borrowed  from  it,  but  it  is 
the  very  offspring  and  issue  of  the  sun’s  body.  The 
sunbeams  cannot  be  separated  from  that  great  fund 
of  light.  No  man  in  his  senses  can  suppose  them 
subsisting,  after  their  communication  with  the 
planet  is  cut  off.  And  yet  the  sun  and  the  bright¬ 
ness  that  flows  from  it  are  not  one  and  the  same 
thing.  They  are  at  once  united,  and  yet  individual, 
in  the  substance  of  that  total  light  and  heat  which 
cherishes  the  world,  and  paints  the  face  of  nature. 
And  this  is  an  imperfect  emblem  of  the  all-glorious 
divinity  of  the  Son  of  God,  which  is  essentially  one 
with  that  of  his  Father.  They  are  one  numerical 
substance.  They  are  one  God,  and  there  are  no 
other  Gods  besides  that  one.  And  both  being  one 
in  essence  and  divinity,  it  follows  that  whatever  can 
be  affirmed  of  the  Father  may  as  truly  and  properly 
be  affirmed  of  the  Son,  except  only  the  relation  of 

Paternity . That  the  Son  is  co-eternal  with  the 

Father  is  evinced  by  the  very  nature  of  the  relation 
of  sonship.  For  no  one  is  father  of  a  son,  nor  can 
in  a  physical  sense  be  called  so,  until  he  has  a  son. 
The  relationship  of  artist  or  workman  does  not 
necessarily  imply  a  co-existence  of  mechanical  works 
or  productions  with  their  maker ;  and  therefore  it 
does  not  follow  that  God  could  not  be  a  Creator, 
before  the  existence  of  his  creatures.  Put  he  could 
not  be  a  Father  before  he  had  a  Son  of  his  very  sub¬ 
stance  ;  and  therefore  his  Paternity  must  have  been 

99 


338 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


co-eternal  with  his  Godhood. 1  From  such  reason¬ 
ings  as  these,  it  is  evident  that  the  Nicene  trinita- 
rians  regarded  u  generation  ”  and  u  procession  ”  as 
necessary  and  immanent  activities  in  the  Eternal 
Essence,  and  held  that  the  Godhead  cannot  be  con¬ 
ceived  of  without  them,  any  more  than  without  the 
activities  of  reason  and  will.  Cyril  of  Alexandria, 
in  answer  to  the  inquiry  whether  the  Son  existed 
before  his  generation,  says :  u  The  generation  of  the 
Son  did  not  precede  his  existence,  but  he  always  ex¬ 
isted,  and  that  by  generation.” 2 


1  Athanasius  :  Contra  Arianos, 
III.  i,  iii,  iv,  vi. 

2  Cyrillus  Alexandrinus  :  The¬ 
saurus,  Y.  p.  35. — We  here  throw 
into  a  note,  some  of  the  historical 
statements  of  Waterland,  and 
Bull,  respecting  the  Nicene  doc¬ 
trine  of  eternal  generation. — Ac¬ 
cording  to  Waterland  (Second 
Defence,  Qu.  VIII.),  there  was 
some  querying  after  the  Nicene 
Council  among  orthodox  Fathers, 
whether  the  idea  of  generation 
could  apply  to  the  eternal  and 
immanent  relation  of  the  Son  to 
the  Father.  u  Whether,”  says 
Waterland,  u  the  Logos  might  be 
rightly  said  to  be  begotten  in  re¬ 
spect  of  the  state  which  was  an¬ 
tecedent  to  the  npofXtvcns  was 
the  point  in  question.  Athana¬ 
sius  argued  strenuously  for  it, 
upon  this  principle,  that  what¬ 
ever  is  of  another,  and  referred  to 
that  other,  as  his  Head  (as  the 
Logos,  considered  as  such,  plainly 


was),  may  and  ought  to  be  styled 
Son,  and  Begotten.  Besides,  the 
Arians  had  objected  that  there 
would  be  two  unbegotten  Per¬ 
sons,  if  the  Logos  always  existed, 
and  yet  not  in  the  capacity  of 
Son.  These  considerations,  besides 
the  testimonies  of  elder  Fathers 
who  had  admitted  eternal  gener¬ 
ation,  weighed  with  the  general¬ 
ity  of  the  Catholics  ;  and  so  eter¬ 
nal  generation  came  to  be  the 
more  prevailing  language,  and 
has  prevailed  ever  since.”  Water- 
land  remarks,  that  those  of  this 
class  who  doubted  respecting  the 
eternal  generation  did  not  doubt 
concerning  the  eternal  existence 
of  the  second  Person.  The  only 
orthodox  Fathers,  however,  whom 
he  cites  as  doubtful  are  Hilary, 
“  though  he  seems  to  have  chang¬ 
ed  his  language  and  sentiments 
too,  afterward,”  Zeno  Veron. 
(apud  Bull,  p.  200),  Phaebadius 
(Contra  Arianos),  and  Ambrose. 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  339 


2.  In  the  second  place,  the  Nicene  trinitarians 
rigorously  confined  the  ideas  of  “Sonship”  and 
“  generation  ”  to  the  hypostatical  character.  It  is 


These  Fathers,  he  thinks,  would 
confine  the  term  generation,  to 
the  oeconomical  mission  and  mani¬ 
festation  of  the  Son  in  Creation 
and  Redemption, — the  npoeXevais 
spoken  of  in  the  extract  from 
Waterland  above. 

Waterland  (First  Defence,  Qu. 
VIII.)  finds  three  generations,  in 
all,  spoken  of  in  the  patristic 
writings.  The  first  and  most 
proper  filiation  and  generation  is 
the  Son’s  eternally  existing  in  and 
of  the  Father;  the  Eternal  Logos 
of  the  Eternal  Mind.  In  respect 
to  this,  chiefly,  he  is  the  Only- 
Begotten,  and  a  distinct  Person 
from  the  Father.  His  other  gen¬ 
erations  were  rather  condescen¬ 
sions,  first  to  creatures  in  general, 
and  next  to  men  in  particular. 
His  second  generation  was  his  con¬ 
descension,  manifestation,  coming 
forth  (7 rpoeXf  vo-tp),  as  it  were,  from 
the  Father  (though  never  separa¬ 
ted  or  divided  from  him),  to  cre¬ 
ate  the  worlds ;  and  in  this  re¬ 
spect  properly  he  may  be  thought 
to  be  npoiTOTOKos  TTciarjs  KTicrecos , 
first  born  of  every  creature,  or 
before  all  creatures  [The  preposi¬ 
tion  in  composition  here  govern¬ 
ing  the  genitive].  His  third  gen¬ 
eration  or  filiation  was  when  he 
condescended  to  be  born  of  a  vir¬ 
gin,  and  to  become  man. 

Bull’s  theses  are  as  follows: 
1.  That  decree  of  the  Nicene 


Council,  in  which  it  is  decided 
that  the  Son  of  God  is  Qebv  £k  ©eof), 
was  approved  by  those  catholic 
doctors  who  wrote  previously  to 
the  synod,  as  well  as  by  those 
who  wrote  after  it.  For  they  all 
with  one  breath  taught,  that  the 
Divine  nature  and  perfections  be¬ 
long  to  the  Father  and  Son,  not 
collaterally,  or  co-ordinately,  but 
subordinately ;  that  is  to  say,  that 
the  Son  has  the  same  Divine  na¬ 
ture  in  common  with  the  Father, 
but  communicated  by  the  Father ; 
so  that  the  Father  alone  has  this 
Divine  nature  from  himself,  or 
from  no  other,  but  the  Son  has  it 
from  the  Father;  and  hence  the 
Father  is  the  fountain,  origin, 
and  principle  (principium)  of  the 
divinity  which  is  in  the  Son.  2. 
The  catholic  doctors,  both  before 
and  after  the  Nicene  council, 
unanimously  affirm  that  God  the 
Father  is  greater  than  God  the 
Son  even  in  regard  to  divinity ; 
that  is  to  say,  not  in  respect  to 
nature,  or  any  essential  perfec¬ 
tion  that  is  in  the  Father  and  not 
in  the  Son,  but  in  respect  to  dig¬ 
nity  only,  or  origin, — since  the 
Son  is  from  the  Father,  and  not 
the  Father  from  the  Son.  [Bull 
means,  as  is  evident  from  his 
reasoning  throughout  his  work, 
that  the  Person  of  God  the  Father 
is  greater  than  the  Person  of  God 
the  Son.  Fatherhood  is  primal, 


340 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


not  the  essence  of  Deity  that  is  generated,  but  a 
distinction  in  that  essence.  And,  in  like  manner, 
the  term  “  procession,”  applied  to  the  Holy  Spirit, 
pertains  exclusively  to  the  third  hypostasis,  and 
has  no  application  to  the  substance  of  the  Godhead. 

The  term  “  begotten,”  in  the  Nicene  trinitarian- 
ism,  is  descriptive  only  of  that  which  is  peculiar  to 
the  second  Person ,  and  confined  to  him .  The  Son 
is  generated  with  respect  only  to  his  Sonship,  or, 
so  to  speak,  his  individuality  ( i'diorr/g ),  but  is  not 
generated  with  respect  to  his  essence  or  nature. 
The  term  “  generation,”  being  thus  rigorously 
confined  to  the  hypostatical  character ,  as  distin¬ 
guished  from  the  unity  and  community  of  essence, 
denotes  only  a  relationship  between  the  first  and 
second  Persons.1  It,  consequently,  no  more  implies 


and  Sonship  secondary,  ex  vi  terra- 
inorum.  Th q  personal  peculiarity 
of  the  human  father  is  superior  to 
the  'personal  peculiarity  of  the 
human  son,  though  one  is  as  truly 
human  as  the  other.]  3.  The  an¬ 
cient  fathers  regarded  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  subordination  of  the 
Son  to  the  Father,  as  to  his  ori¬ 
gin  and  principle,  to  be  very  use¬ 
ful  and  necessary ;  because,  in 
this  mode,  the  divinity  of  the  Son 
can  be  affirmed,  and  yet  the  unity 
of  God,  and  the  Divine  monarchy, 
be  kept  intact.  For  though  there 
are  two,  viz.,  the  Father  and  the 
Son,  to  whom  the  Divine  name 
and  nature  are  common,  yet  inas¬ 
much  as  the  former  is  the  princi¬ 


ple  (principium)  of  the  latter, 
from  whom  he  is  propagated  (and 
that,  too,  by  an  interior  and  not 
exterior  production),  it  is  evident 
that  God  can  properly  be  denom 
inated  one  and  only.  And  the 
same  reasoning,  these  fathers  be¬ 
lieved  to  apply  equally  to  the 
divinity  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

1  “  The  truth  is,  the  word  God 
denotes  all  perfection,  and  the 
word  Father  denotes  a  relation 
of  order,  and  a  particular  manner 
of  existing .”  Watekland:  Sec¬ 
ond  Defence,  Query  II. — The  hy-’ 
postatical  character  is  incommu¬ 
nicable  to  the  other  Persons.  The 
Father  cannot  possess  the  filial 
characteristic  of  the  Son  ;  the  pa- 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  841 


a  subordination  with  respect  to  the  essence  of  the 
second  Person,  than  it  does  with  respect  to  the  es¬ 
sence  of  the  first.  For  if  the  Son  is  the  generated, 
the  Father  is  the  generator.1  The  idea  of  “  genera- 


ternal  relation  cannot  belong  to 
the  Son;  and  neither  paternity 
nor  filiation  can  attach  to  the 
Holy  Spirit.  “  The  Persons  of 
the  trinity,”  says  Hooker  (Eccles. 
Polity,  Y.  lvi.),  “are  not  three 
particular  substances  to  whom 
one  general  nature  is  common, 
but  three  that  subsist  by  one  sub¬ 
stance,  which  itself  is  particular : 
yet  they  all  three  have  it,  and 
their  several  ways  of  having  it  are 
that  which  maketh  their  personal 
distinction.”  The  Father  pos¬ 
sesses  the  Divine  Essence  by  pa¬ 
ternity,  the  Son  by  filiation,  the 
Spirit  by  procession.  The  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  trinity  is  not  that  of 
one  Nature  and  three  Persons, 
but  of  one  Nature  in  three  Per¬ 
sons. 

1  Hence  the  Father  was  often 
denominated  God  Unbegotten, 
and  the  Son  God  Begotten.  The 
term  dyevrjros,  though  etymologi¬ 
cally  a  good  one  to  apply  to  the 
first  Person,  in  the  sense  of  “  in- 
generate,”  was,  however,  not  so 
applied  by  the  catholic  Fathers, 
because  it  was  first  applied  to 
him  by  the  Arian  party  in  the 
sense  of  “  uncreated. ”  Athana¬ 
sius  himself  accepts  it  in  this 
sense,  and  consequently  argues 
that  the  Son  is  not  yevrjros ;  be¬ 
cause  yevrjros  would  mean  “  cre¬ 


ated,”  if  dyevrjTos  means  “uncre¬ 
ated.”  The  Vatican  manuscript, 
edited  byMai,  reads  yovoyevrjs  2s  e  6  s 
in  John  i.  18, — a  proof  that  this 
manuscript  is  of  very  early  date ; 
certainly  before  the  Euty chian 
controversy,  which  rendered  the 
orthodox  shy  of  a  phraseology 
that  was  quite  current  in  the 
earlier  ages.  In  the  Apostolical 
Constitutions,  III.  17,  we  find  the 
following :  7 rari^p,  6  eVt  navrcov 
Seos  •  Xpiards  6  /jiovoyevrjs  2Se6?,  6 

dycnrrjTos  vtos,  etc.  The  Peshito 
version  renders  the  verse  John  i. 
18,  “  the  only  God,”  showing  that 
3<ros  was  in  the  Greek  manuscript 
from  which  this  very  early  Syriac 
translation  was  made,  and  that 
povoyevrjs  was  imperfectly  trans¬ 
lated,  or  else  that  another  word 
stood  in  its  place.  In  the  early 
trinitarian  literature,  the  terms 
“  Unbegotten  ”  and  “  Begotten  ” 
merely  denote  a  peculiar  modus 
existendi  in  one  and  the  same 
Eternal  Essence.  In  the  first  Per¬ 
son,  the  divine  Nature  exists  as 
“  ingenerate  ;  ”  in  the  second  as 
“  generate.”  The  phrase  “  the 
Unbegotten  God  ”  expresses  no 
more  than  the  phrase  1  God  the 
Father ;  ”  and  the  phrase  “  the 
Begotten  God”  no  more  than 
“  God  the  Son.” 


342 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


tion,”  consequently,  has  an  application  to  the  first 
Person  as  much  as  to  the  second ;  and  if  there  is 
nothing  in  the  fact  of  being  a  Father  that  infringes 
upon  the  essential  deity  of  the  first  Person  in  the 
trinity,  then  there  is  nothing  in  the  fact  of  being  a 
Son,  that  infringes  upon  the  essential  deity  of  the 
second  Person.  Hence  Athanasius  represents  filia> 
tion  in  the  Son  as  the  necessary  and  eternal  antith¬ 
esis  to  paternity  in  the  Father,  and  argues  that  the 
passivity,  or  the  being  a  Son,  on  the  part  of  the 
second  hypostasis,  no  more  infringes  upon  his  par¬ 
ticipation  in  the  essence  of  the  Godhead,  than  the 
activity,  or  the  being  a  Father,  on  the  part  of  the 
first  hypostasis,  infringes  upon  his  participation  in 
the  same  essence  of  the  Deity.  The  Father  and 
Son  are  of  one  and  the  same  uncreated  and  infinite 
essence,  even  as  the  human  father  and  son  are  of 
one  and  the  same  created  and  finite  essence.  The 
participation  in  the  same  identical  nature  or  essence, 
or,  in  the  Nicene  phrase,  the  consubstantiality 
( d/uoovoiov ),  places  the  first  and  second  persons  in 
the  Godhead  in  the  same  class  or  grade  of  being. 
Both  are  equally  divine,  because  they  share  equally 
in  the  substance  of  deity ;  as,  in  the  sphere  of  the 
finite,  both  father  and  son  are  equally  human,  be¬ 
cause  participating  equally  in  the  substance  of  hu¬ 
manity.  The  category  of  substance  determines  the 
grade  of  being.  That  which  is  of  a  divine  substance 
is  divine ;  and  that  which  is  of  a  human  substance 
is  human.  And  the  mere  relationship  in  each  case, 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  343 


— the  mere  being  a  father,  and  the  mere  being  a 
son, — does  not  m  the  least  affect  the  grade  or  species 
of  being  to  which  each  belongs.  The  human  son  is 
as  truly  a  man  as  is  the  human  father ;  and  the 
Divine  Son  is  as  truly  God  as  is  the  Divine  Father. 
“We  men,”  says  Athanasius,  “  consisting  of  a  body 
and  a  soul,  are  all  piccg  cpvG&coQ  xai  ovciocg,  of  one 
nature  or  essence ;  but  we  are  many  persons.” 
Again,  when  his  Anomoean  opponent  compares  the 
Father,  Son,  and  Spirit,  to  a  bishop,  presbyter,  and 
deacon,  Athanasius  directs  his  attention  to  the  fact 
that  these  latter  have  all  the  same  nature,  being 
each  of  them  man.1 

In  this  way,  the  term  “generation”  was  em¬ 
ployed  to  discriminate  the  hypostatical  character 
from  the  essential  nature,  in  the  triune  Godhead, 
and  in  all  use  of  the  term,  or  criticism  upon  it,  it 
should  carefully  be  remembered  that  it  is  limited, 
in  the  Nicene  trinitarianism,  to  the  personal  subsist¬ 
ence,  and  has  no  legitimate  application  to  the 
eternal  essence.2  The  trinity  is  not  generated.  The 
essence  or  substance  of  deity  is  not  generated.  The 


1  Howe  :  View  of  the  late  Con¬ 
siderations,  &c. — It  should  be 
added  to  this  illustration  of  Atha¬ 
nasius,  that  the  whole  Nature  or 
Essence  is  in  the  divine  Person ; 
but  the  human  person  is  only  a 
part  of  the  common  human  na¬ 
ture.  Generation  in  the  Godhead 
admits  no  abscission  or  division 
of  substance;  but  generation  in 
the  instance  of  the  creature  im¬ 
plies  separation  or  division  of  es¬ 


sence.  A  human  person  is  an 
individualized  portion  of  human¬ 
ity. 

2  Ambrose  preached  a  sermon 
upon  the  Incarnation  before  the 
emperor  Gratian.  The  emperor 
“  proposed  to  him  an  objection, 
upon  which  the  Arians  greatly 
depended;  namely,  that  the  Son 
being  begotten  could  not  be  of 
the  same  nature  with  the  Father 
who  is  unbegotten.  He  therefore 


344 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


first  and  third  hypostases  are  not  generated.  But 
the  second  hypostasis  is  generated,  and  is  alone . 
The  same,  mutatis  mutandis,  is  true  of  the  term 
“  procession.”  And  with  reference  to  the  first  hy¬ 
postasis  or  Person,  the  agency  on  his  part  denoted 
by  the  term  u beget,”  the  correlate  to  “only-be¬ 
gotten,”  is  hypostatical  agency  solely.  It  sustains 
no  relation  to  the  trinity  as  a  whole.  For  God  the 
Father  does  not  generate  the  trinity.  He  is  not 
the  Father  of  the  triune  Godhead,  or  of  the  Divine 
Essence.  Neither  is  he  the  Father  of  the  third 
Person.  He  is  only  the  Father  of  the  Son.1  So 
that  the  term  “  generate,”  or  “  beget,” — which  is  the 
necessary  antithesis  to  the  term  “  only-begotten,”  so 
often  applied  in  the  Scriptures  to  the  second  Per- 


added  the  answer  to  this  objec¬ 
tion,  which  chiefly  consists  in 
showing  that  the  distinction  be¬ 
tween  begotten  and  unbegotten  re¬ 
lates  not  to  their  nature,  but  to 
their  personality.”  Fletjey  :  Eccl. 
Hist.  B.  xviii. 

1  “Non  ...  .  trinitatem  natam 
de  virgine  Maria,  et  sub  Pontio 
Pilato  crucifixam  et  sepultam, 
tertio  die  resurrexisse,  et  coelum 
ascendisse,  sed  tantummodo  Fil- 

ium.  Nec . trinitatem  de- 

scendisse  in  specie  columbae  su¬ 
per  Jesum  baptizatum.”  Augus¬ 
tinus  :  De  Trinitate,  I.  iv. — “  The 
divine  nature  of  the  Son  is  no 
more  begotten  than  the  divine 
nature  of  the  Father  and  of  the 
Holy  Ghost;  the  reason  is,  be¬ 


cause  it  is  the  same  divine  nature 
which  is  common  to,  and  pos¬ 
sessed  by  all  three.  Hence  it 
would  follow,  that  if  the  divine 
nature  of  the  Son  was  begotten, 
so  would  the  divine  nature  of  the 
Father  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
be  likewise.  The  divine  essence 
neither  begets  nor  is  begotten.  It 
is  a  divine  'person  in  the  essence 
that  begets,  and  a  divine  person 
is  that  essence  that  is  begotten. 
Essence  does  not  beget  essence, 
but  person  begets  person  ;  other¬ 
wise  there  would  be  more  than 
one  essence ;  whereas,  though 
there  are  more  persons  than  one, 
yet  there  is  no  more  than  one 
essence.”  Gill  :  Doctrine  of  the 
Trinity,  ch.  vii. 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  345 


son, — merely  denotes  the  individuality  of  the  first 
Person,  or  that  which  is  peculiar  to  him,  and  con¬ 
fined  to  him,  as  the  first  in  the  series  of  three.  Thus, 
from  first  to  last,  in  the  Nicene  construction  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  trinity,  the  terms  u  beget,”  “  begot¬ 
ten,”  and  “proceed,”  are  confined  to  the  hypostat- 
ical  distinctions,  and  have  no  legitimate,  or  technical 
meaning  when  applied  to  the  trinity  as  a  whole,  or, 
in  other  words,  to  the  Essence  in  distinction  from 


the  hypostasis.1 

*We  condense  the  following 
statement  of  the  relations  of  the 
Person  to  the  Essence  from  Twes- 
ten’s  Dogmatik  (§  42).  The  en¬ 
tire  section  is  a  fine  specimen  of 
analysis.  “  Since  God  is  pure  act 
and  life  (actus  purissimus) ;  since 
by  virtue  of  his  absolute  self-sub¬ 
sistence,  and  spontaneity,  nothing 
dead,  nothing  given  independent 
of  his  own  act,  nothing  externally 
necessary,  is  in  Him,  those  rela¬ 
tions  whereby  the  Divine  Per¬ 
sons  are  distinguished  from  each 
other  must  rest  upon  the  Divine 
activity , — viz:  upon  the  two  ab¬ 
solutely  immanent  actions ,  gen¬ 
eration,  and  procession.  These 
actions  are  ‘  opera  ad  intra,’  be¬ 
cause  they  have  nothing  but  God 
himself  for  an  Object;  and  are 
‘  actus  personales,’  since,  not  the 
Divine  Essence,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
common  to  the  three  Persons, 
but  only  in  so  far  as  it  subsists  in 
each  of  the  hypostatical  determi¬ 
nations  (Bestimmungen),  must  be 
considered  as  their  subject  or 


principle.  Hence,  it  follows  that 
these  ‘  actus  personales  ’  are  not 
to  be  considered  as  the  common 
action  of  all  three  Persons,  but  as 
the  activities  of  definite  individual 
Persons, — e.  g. :  of  the  Father,  or 
Son,  or  both  united,  as  in  the 
procession  of  the  Spirit. 

But  if  the  Father  is  unbegot¬ 
ten,  does  it  not  follows  that  He 
alone  is  the  absolute  Being  of 
Beings?  No,  for  there  is  no  in¬ 
equality  of  Essence ;  since  this  is 
in  all  three  Persons  equally  and 
alike.  The  inequality  can  only 
refer  to  subsistence ;  and  more¬ 
over,  not  to  the  notion  of  necessity 
of  subsistence,  but  to  the  notion 
of  order  of  subsistence,  by  virtue 
of  which  the  Father  is  first,  the 
Son  second,  and  the  Spirit  is 
third.  The  inequality  does  not 
relate  to  time ,  for  the  three  are 
equally  eternal ;  nor  to  nature, 
for  this  is  the  same  in  all  the  Per¬ 
sons,  since  the  Essence  is  identi¬ 
cal  in  all ;  but  to  the  relations  of 
Paternity  and  Filiation,  Mission 


846 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Perhaps  the  relationship  of  the  Person  to  the 
Essence,  in  the  Nicene  scheme,  has  not  been  ex¬ 
pressed  more  succinctly  than  by  Hooker,  in  a  sen¬ 
tence  which  condenses  the  whole  reasoning  of  the 
Nicene  controversy.  “  The  substance  of  God,  with 
this  property,  to  be  of  none,  doth  make  the  person 
of  the  Father;  the  very  self-same  substance,  with 
this  property,  to  be  of  the  Father,  maketh  the  per¬ 
son  of  the  Son ;  the  same  substance,  having  added 
to  it  the  property  of  proceeding  from  the  other  two, 
maketh  the  person  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  So  that  in 
every  person,  there  is  implied  both  the  substance 
of  God,  which  is  one,  and  also  that  property  which 
causeth  the  same  person  really  and  truly  to  differ 
from  the  other  two.  .  .  .  Each  person  hath  his  own 
subsistence  ( vnoGrcctug )  which  no  other  person  hath, 
although  there  be  others  besides  that  are  of  the 
same  substance  {ova la).  As  no  man  but  Peter  can 
be  the  person  which  Peter  is,  yet  Paul  hath  the  self¬ 
same  nature  which  Peter  hath.  Again,  angels  have 


and  Procession,  upon  which  rela¬ 
tions  the  distinction  of  Persons 
rests.  In  this  sense,  the  Athana- 
sian  symbol  can  assert,  that,  ‘  in 
trinitate  nihil  prius  aut  posterius 
(scil.  tempore),  nihil  majus  aut  mi¬ 
nus  (scil.  natura),  sed  tota  tres  per¬ 
sonas  coaeternas  sibi  et  coequales 
(scil.  propter  opoovaioT-qra  Kcii  rav- 
roTTjra  ouo-tas),’  and  yet  con¬ 
cede  an  inequality,  if  by  it  is  meant 
that  the  Father  is  constituted  the 
ground  or  principle  of  the  sub¬ 


sistence  of  the  Essence  in  the  Son, 
and  that  the  personality  of  the 
Spirit  is  grounded  in  the  Father 
and  Son. 

But  does  it  not  follow  from 
this  that  the  Father  alone  is  abso¬ 
lute  ?  No,  for  absoluteness  is  an 
indispensable  mark  of  the  Divine 
Essence ,  and  this  belongs  equally 
and  necessarily  to  all.  There  is 
but  one  Essence,  subsisting  under 
a  threefold  rponos  V7rap£ea>s.” 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  347 


every  one  of  them  the  nature  of  pure  and  invisible 
spirits,  but  every  angel  is  not  that  angel  which  ap¬ 
peared  in  a  dream  to  Joseph.”1 

The  nearest  approximation  to  a  metaphysical  defi¬ 
nition  of  the  ideas  of  eternal  generation,  and  proces¬ 
sion,  by  the  Nicene  theologians,  is  found  in  the  idea 
of  “  intercommunion,”  and  u  inter-agency.”  A  com¬ 
mon  word  employed  by  them,  as  a  suggestive  rather 


than  exhaustive  term,  is 

1  Hooker  :  Eccl.  Pol.  V.  li.  The 
term  “  property  11  in  this  extract 
must  be  taken  in  its  etymological 
signification.  Hooker  means  to 
denote  by  it,  the  individual  pecu¬ 
liarity  (tStoT^s),  and  not  that  the 
hypostasis  is  the  attribute  of  the 
Essence.  The  following  extract 
from  Alouin  (Quaestiones  De 
Trinitate,  in  Augustini  Opera, 
VIII.  473,  Ed.  Migne),  throws 
light  upon  the  distinction  be¬ 
tween  the  Person  and  the  Nature. 
“  If  we  may  say  that  there  are 
three  persons,  Father,  Son,  and 
Spirit,  why  may  we  not  say  there 
are  three  Gods,  three  Omnipo- 
tents,  three  Eternals,  and  three 
Infinites  ?  Because  the  terms  God, 
Omnipotent,  Eternal,  and  Infi¬ 
nite,  are  names  relating  to  the 
substance  (substantialia  nomina) ; 
hence  they  cannot  be  employed 
in  the  plural  number,  hut  only  in 
the  singular.  Every  term  that 
denotes  the  substance  or  essence 
of  God  must  always  be  used  in 
the  singular  number.  But  the 
terms  Father,  Son,  and  Spirit  are 


7t8Qt%CDQr}6iQ  (circulatio2} 

relative  names,  and  therefore 
are  rightly  called  three  persons. 
What  is  meant  by  a  relative  name  ? 
Relative  names  refer  one  thing  to 
another  thing ;  as  ‘  master  1  refers 
to  ‘slave,1  and  ‘slave1  to  ‘mas¬ 
ter;’  ‘  father 1  refers  to  ‘  son 1  and 
‘  son 1  to  ‘  father.1  When  I  speak 
of  a  ‘  father,1  I  imply  a  *  son 
for  there  cannot  be  a  father  un¬ 
less  there  be  a  son  in  relation  to 
whom  he  is  a  father.11 — Alcuin 
notices  the  following  difference 
between  the  first  and  second  per¬ 
sons  as  related  to  each  other,  and 
the  third  person  as  related  to  the 
first  and  second  :  “We  may  say, 
‘  Father  of  the  Son,1  and  ‘Son  of 
the  Father.1  We  may  say,  ‘Spirit 
of  the  Father,1  but  not  ‘Father 
of  the  Spirit,1— for  this  would 
imply  two  Fathers.  We  may  say, 
‘  Spirit  of  the  Son,1  but  not  ‘  Son 
of  the  Spirit,1 — for  this  would  im¬ 
ply  two  Sons.11 

2  Sherlock  (Vindication  of  the 
Trinity)  translates  it  by  cir cumin- 
cession.  Cudworth  (Intel.  Syst. 
I.  737,  Andover  Ed.)  employs  the 


348 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Starting  from  the  Scriptural  idea  and  term  of  the 
u  living  ”  God,  the  trinitarian  thinker  endeavored  to 
convey  to  the  mind  of  the  Arian  the  truth,  that  the 
one  Essence  is  all  in  each  of  the  Persons,  so  that  the 
three  Persons  constitute  but  one  Essence  or  Being, 
by  representing  this  threefoldness  as  an  immanent 
circulation  in  the  Divine  Nature, — an 

unceasing  and  eternal  movement  in  the  Godhead, 
whereby  each  Person  coinheres  in  the  others,  and 
the  others  in  each, — so  that  the  Essence  is  equally 
the  substance  of  all,  while  yet  each  Person  preserves 
and  maintains  his  own  distinctive  hypostatical  char¬ 
acter.  The  Father  begets,  but  is  not  begotten.  The 
Son  begets  not,  but  is  begotten.  The  Spirit  neither 
begets  nor  is  begotten,  but  proceeds.  Such  is  the 
phraseology  employed  to  hint  at,  rather  than  ex¬ 
plain,  the  mystery  of  the  eternal  interaction,  and 
intercommunion,  which  was  conceived  to  be  going 
on  in  a  Being  whom  the  Nicene  theologian  was  fond 
of  contemplating  under  the  idea  of  a  living  Unity, 
rather  than  under  the  notion  of  a  lifeless  Unit.1  He 


term.  “These  three  hypostases, 
or  persons,  are  truly  and  really 
one  God.  Not  only  because  they 
have  all  essentially  one  and  the 
same  will  (according  to  Origen, 
Cont.  Cels.  lib.  viii.  p.  386) 
but  also  because  they  are  physi¬ 
cally  (if  we  may  so  speak)  one 
also  ;  and  have  a  mutual  7repiyo)- 
p7jcm,  and  fVihrap^i?,  inbeing  and 
permeation  of  one  another, — ac¬ 
cording  to  that  of  our  Saviour 
Christ :  ‘  I  am  in  the  Father,  and 


the  Father  in  me ;  and  the  Father 
that  dwelleth  in  me,  he  doeth  the 
works.’  ”  For  a  full  discussion 
of  the  conception,  see  Athana¬ 
sius’s  third  Discourse  against  the 
Arians. 

1  The  distinction  between  a  unit 
and  a  unity  is  real  and  valid. 
The  former  denotes  mere  single¬ 
ness,  and  more  properly  pertains 
to  an  impersonal  thing,  than  to  a 
personal  being.  Self-conscious¬ 
ness  supposes  interior  distinctions 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  349 


employed  this  term  Tisgc^cogr/acg^  to  intimate  that 
the  Arian  notion  of  singleness  does  not  come  up  to 
the  Scriptural  idea  of  the  Divine  fullness  and  infin¬ 
itude  of  being.  God,  he  claimed,  is  a  plural  Unit. 
He  is  not  “  one  ”  in  the  same  sense  in  which  an  in¬ 
dividual  of  a  species  in  material  nature  is  “  one.” 
The  Deity  is  not  a  member  of  a  species,  and  the 
term  w  individual  ”  is  inapplicable  to  him.  And 
yet  the  Arian  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  the  tri¬ 
unity  of  God  proceeded  upon  the  assumption  that 
strict  individuality,  or  singleness,  is  attributable  to 
the  Godhead,  and  consequently  that  the  same  modes 
of  reasoning  that  apply  to  the  finite,  with  its  species, 
and  individuals,  apply  equally  to  the  Infinite.  It 
was  to  correct  this  erroneous  and  shallow  conception 
of  that  Eternal  One  who  belongs  to  no  species,  but 
whose  infinite  plenitude  of  being  sets  him  above 
finite  modes  of  existence,  that  the  Nicene  theolo¬ 
gians,  when  they  were  tempted  as  they  sometimes 
were  by  the  arithmetical  rather  than  philosophical 


in  the  self-conscious  essence. 
There  is  a  plenitude  of  existence 
in  self-consciousness  that  is  not 
exhausted  by  the  notion  of  mere 
singleness,  such  as  is  attributable 
to  a  stone,  or  stick,  or  any  pure 
unit  in  material  nature.  It  is 
noteworthy  that  the  denomina¬ 
tions  of  the  opposing  parties  sug¬ 
gest  this  distinction.  The  Unita¬ 
rian  holds  to  the  Arian  unit ;  the 
Trinitarian  believes  in  the  trinal 
unity.  Says  Ambrose  (De  fide,  v. 


1),  u  Singularitatem  hanc  dico, 
quod  Graece  ixovottjs  dicitur;  sin- 
gularitas  ad  personam  pertinet, 
unitas  ad  naturam.”  Cud  worth 
(Intellect.  Syst.  II.  445,  Tegg’s 
Ed.)  marks  this  distinction,  by 
the  phrases  “  general  essence,” 
and  “  singular  essence,” — the  for¬ 
mer  of  which  is  an  essence  that 
includes  u  subsistences,”  and  the 
latter  is  a  distinct  and  single 
“subsistence.”  Lessing:  Erzie- 
hung  des  Menschengeschlechts, 
73. 


350 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


objections  of  the  Arian  to  venture  upon  some  pos« 
itive  statements  and  definitions,  employed  a  term 
that  hinted  at  the  eternal  and  unchanging  circum- 
incession  and  intercommunion  of  the  three  Persons 
in  the  Godhead,  whereby  the  Essence  is  all  in  each, 
and  each  is  in  the  Essence ;  whereby  the  One  is 
Three,  and  the  Three  are  One. 

But  such  endeavors  to  explain  the  incomprehen¬ 
sible  mystery  of  the  trinity  were  not  carried  any 
further  than  to  this  point  and  degree.  The  catholic 
mind  followed  out  its  thoughts  in  this  direction  just 
far  enough  to  show,  that  the  truth,  though  tran¬ 
scending  reason,  did  not  contradict  reason, — in  other 
words  that  the  charge  of  palpable  absurdity  and 
self-contradiction,  so  often  advanced  by  the  Arian, 
could  not  be  made  good  respecting  one  of  the  plain¬ 
est  doctrines  of  revelation,  and  most  fundamental 
truths  of  Christianity  ;  but  that  even  before  the  bar 
of  metaphysical  reason  something  valid  might  be 
said  in  favour  of  it.  But  when  this  had  been  done, 
the  mind  of  an  Athanasius  was  disposed  to  stop, 
and  allow  speculation  to  pass  over  into  worship. 

The  last  and  most  comprehensive  results  of  the 
controversy  and  investigation  were  embodied  in  a 
creed,  which  by  its  negative  clauses  denied,  rejected, 
and  in  some  instances  anathematized,  the  false  state¬ 
ments  of  the  doctrine,  because  these  were  known 
to  be  unscriptural  and  untrue,  and  by  its  positive 
clauses  endeavoured,  though  inadequately,  to  con¬ 
vey  some  distinct  apprehension  of  the  abysmal  truth. 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  351 


The  so-called  Symbolum  Quicumque ,  falsely  ascribed 
to  Athanasius,  and  which  probably  originated  in 
the  school  of  Augustine,  affords  a  fine  specimen  of 
this  sort  of  dialectic  statement.1  It  runs  as  follows : 


1  At  this  point,  we  throw  into  a 
note  Augustine’s  explanation  of 
certain  difficult  texts  that  were 
often  quoted  by  the  Arians,  as 
casting  light  upon  the  general 
doctrine,  and  as  specimens  of 
the  best  patristic  exegesis. — Au¬ 
gustine  refers  the  words:  “My 
Father  is  greater  than  I  ”  to  the 
human  nature  of  Christ ;  and  re¬ 
marks  that  Christ  in  his  estate  of 
humiliation  was  inferior  not  only 
to  the  Father,  but  to  Himself  also. 
He  might  have  said :  “  The  Eter¬ 
nal  Word  is  greater  than  I.”  For 
illustration  he  refers  to  Philip- 
pians  ii.  6,  7,  where  Christ  is  rep¬ 
resented  as  having  the  “  form  of 
God,”  and  the  “  form  of  a  ser¬ 
vant.”  When  in  the  form  of  a 
servant,  and  having  respect  to 
that,  he  could  say  that  “  the 
Father  is  greater  than  I,”  because 
this  was  merely  saying  that  the 
“  form  of  a  servant  ”  is  inferior 
to  the  “  form  of  God.”  The  text 
1  Cor.  xv.  28,  Augustine  refers 
to  the  Mediatorial  character  of 
Christ.  When  he  has  completed 
the  work  of  recovering  the  elect, 
and  bringing  them  into  the  bea¬ 
tific  vision  of  God,  he  ceases  to 
be  Mediator  any  longer.  Hence, 
says  Augustine,  we  must  not  re¬ 
gard  Christ  as  giving  up  the  king¬ 
dom  “  to  God  and  the  Father,” 
in  such  a  sense  as  to  take  away 


the  kingdom  from  God  the  Son. 
For  the  Father  and  Son,  in  re¬ 
spect  to  their  nature  and  eternal 
relationship,  are  one.  The  text 
Mark  xiii.  32,  Augustine  (as  did 
Irenaeus  before  him)  explains  to 
mean,  that  the  disclosure  of  the 
day  and  hour  of  judgment  is  the 
prerogative  of  the  triune  God, 
and  is  not  a  part  of  the  Media¬ 
tor’s  official  work.  “  A  man,” 
says  Augustine,  “is  said  not  to 
‘know’  a  thing,  when  he  keeps 
others  in  ignorance  by  not  reveal¬ 
ing  it.  Thus  God  said  to  Abra¬ 
ham:  ‘Now  I  know  that  thou 
fearest  God  ’  (Gen.  xxii.  12). 
God,  in  the  strict  sense,  ‘knew’ 
that  Abraham  feared  him  before 
he  tried  him;  but  God  did  not 
know  it  in  the  sense  of  making 
Abraham  know  it,  or  of  telling 
Abraham  that  it  was  a  fact,  until 
after  the  temptation.”  In  like 
manner,  Christ  as  the  Eternal 
Word  knew  the  day  and  the  hour 
of  judgment ;  but  in  his  Mediato¬ 
rial  capacity  he  was  not  author¬ 
ized  to  announce  it,  and  as  Medi¬ 
ator  tells  his  disciples  that  he 
knows  nothing  about  it,  because 
it  is  a  matter  belonging  to  the 
eternal  councils  of  the  triune  God¬ 
head, — which  in  the  order  of  na¬ 
ture  are  anterior  to  the  council 
of  redemption.  “  Christ,”  says 


352 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


“  1.  Whoever  would  be  saved,  must  first  of  all 
take  care  that  he  hold  the  catholic  faith.  2.  Which, 
except  a  man  preserve  whole  and  inviolate,  he  shall 
without  doubt  perish  eternally.  3.  But  this  is  the 
catholic  faith,  that  we  worship  one  God  in  trinity, 
and  trinity  in  unity.  4.  Neither  confounding  the 
persons  nor  dividing  the  substance.  5.  For  the 
person  of  the  Father  is  one ;  of  the  Son,  another ; 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  another.  6.  But  the  divinity 
(divinitas)  of  the  Father,  and  of  the  Son,  and  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  is  one,  the  glory  equal,  the  majesty 
equal.  1.  Such  as  is  (qualis)  the  Father,  such  also 
is  the  Son,  and  such  the  Holy  Spirit.  8.  The 
Father  is  uncreated,  the  Son  is  uncreated,  the  Holy 
Spirit  is  uncreated.  9.  The  Father  is  infinite,  the 
Son  infinite,  the  Holy  Spirit  infinite.  10.  The 
Father  is  eternal,  the  Son  eternal,  and  the  Holy 
Spirit  eternal  11.  And  yet,  there  are  not  three 
eternal  Beings  (aeterni),  but  one  eternal  Being.1 
12.  As  also  there  are  not  three  uncreated  Beings 
(increati),  nor  three  infinite  Beings  (infiniti),  but 
one  uncreated  and  one  infinite  Being.  13.  In  like 
manner,  the  Father  is  omnipotent,  the  Son  omnipo¬ 
tent,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  omnipotent.  14.  And 
yet,  there  are  not  three  omnipotent  Beings,  but 

Augustine,  “  was  not  authorized  not  because  it  is  really  so,  but 
at  this  time  to  give  information  because  it  is  hidden  from  the 
to  his  disciples  respecting  the  day  sight  of  men.”  Augustinus  :  Op- 
of  judgment,  and  this  is  called  ig-  era  VIII.  829-30,  857,  (Ed. 
norance  upon  his  part ;  just  as  a  Migne). 
ditch  is  sometimes  called  4  blind,’  1  See  note  ante,  p.  347. 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  ETERNAL  GENERATION.  353 


one  omnipotent  Being.  15.  Thus  the  Father  is 
God,  the  Son,  God,  and  the  Holy  Spirit,  God.  16. 
And  yet,  there  are  not  three  Gods  (dii),  but  one 
God  only.  17.  The  Father  is  Lord,  the  Son,  Lord, 
and  the  Holy  Spirit,  Lord.  18.  And  yet,  there  are 
not  three  Lords  (domini),  but  one  Lord  only.  19. 
For  as  we  are  compelled  by  Christian  truth  to  con¬ 
fess  each  person  distinctively  to  be  both  God  and 
Lord,  we  are  prohibited  by  the  catholic  religion  to 
say  that  there  are  three  Gods,  or  three  Lords.  20. 
The  Father  is  made  by  none,  nor  created,  nor  be¬ 
gotten.  21.  The  Son  is  from  the  Father  alone,  not 
made,  not  created,  but  begotten.  22.  The  Holy 
Spirit  is  not  created  by  the  Father  and  Son,  nor 
begotten,  but  proceeds.  23.  Therefore,  there  is  one 
Father,  not  three  Fathers ;  one  Son,  not  three  Sons ; 
one  Holy  Spirit,  not  three  Holy  Spirits.  24.  And 
in  this  trinity  there  is  nothing  prior  or  posterior, 
nothing  greater  or  lesser,  but  all  three  persons  are 
coeternal,  and  coequal  to  themselves.  25.  So  that 
through  all  (omnia),  as  was  said  above,  both  unity 
in  trinity,  and  trinity  in  unity,  is  to  be  adored.  26. 
Whoever  therefore  would  be  saved,  let  him  thus 
think  concerning  the  trinity.” 

By  this  continual  laying  down  of  positions,  and 
equally  continual  retraction  of  them,  up  to  a  certain 
point,  in  order  to  prevent  their  being  pushed  too 
far,  the  theological  mind  endeavored  to  keep  clear 
of  the  two  principal  deviations  from  the  exact  truth, 
— Sabellianism  and  Arianism, — not  denying  the 
23 


354 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


unity  while  asserting  the  trinity,  nor  denying  the 
trinity  while  asserting  the  unity.  It  is  the  opinion 
of  Hagenbach,  that  so  far  as  the  first  two  hypostases 
are  concerned,  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  has  not 
received  any  clearer  or  fuller  scientific  statement 
than  that  which  is  contained  in  the  Nicene  Symbol , 
and  the  kindred  Symbolum  Quicumque ,  and  he 
seems  to  intimate  that  it  is  impossible  for  anything 
more  to  be  said  in  the  way  of  dialectic  and  scientific 
statement,  than  is  enunciated  in  these  creeds.  It 
appears  to  be  his  opinion,  that  the  principal  if  not 
all  the  fundamental  errors  to  which  the  human 
mind  is  liable  in  the  construction  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  trinity  are  specified,  rejected,  and  con¬ 
demned,  in  the  negative  side  of  the  symbol ;  while, 
so  far  as  concerns  the  positive  definition  and  enun¬ 
ciation,  the  human  mind  has  here  gone  as  far  in  this 

direction  as  is  possible  for  it.  “  Against  this  bulwark 

/ 

of  the  faith,”  he  says,  “  all  further  attempts  of  the 
human  understanding  to  reconcile  the  opposing  an¬ 
titheses  in  the  statement  of  the  doctrine,  and  to 
afford  a  full  direct  intuition  that  shall  clear  up  all 
the  mystery  of  the  subject,  must  dash  and  break 
themselves,  as  do  the  waves  of  the  sea  against  the 
inexorable  cliffs  and  rocks.” 1 


1  Hagenbach  :  Dogmengeschichte,  §  97.  3d  Auflag*. 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OE  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT. 


355 


§  4.  Nicene  Doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

The  Nicene  Symbol  is  remarkably  reticent  re¬ 
specting  the  third  Person  in  the  trinity.  It  con¬ 
tains  but  a  single  clause  respecting  Him,  in  these 
words :  “  And  we  believe  in  the  Holy  Spirit.1’  But 
so  little  was  the  theological  mind  occupied  with  the 
discrimination  and  definition  of  this  hypostasis,  that 
after  this  brief  statement  respecting  the  Holy  Spirit, 
it  immediately  recurs  again  to  the  second  Person, 
and  affirms,  that  u  those  who  say  that  there  was 
once  a  time  when  the  Son  of  God  was  not,  or  that 
before  he  was  begotten,  he  was  not  in  being,1  or 
that  he  became  existent  out  of  nonentity,  or  that  he 
is  of  another  substance  or  essence  [than  that  of 
Deity],  or  that  he  is  created,  or  mutable,  or  change¬ 
able  :  all  such,  the  catholic  and  apostolic  Church 
anathematizes.” 

The  controversy  had  been  so  deep  and  earnest, 
respecting  the  true  nature  and  position  of  the  Son 
that,  although  the  views  of  Arius  were  as  erroneous 
in  respect  to  the  Holy  Spirit  as  in  respect  to  the 
Logos,  the  Nicene  theologians  passed  by  his  heresy 
on  this  point,  without  noticing  it  in  their  systematic 
symbol.  Two  reasons  seems  to  have  operated  with 
them.  First,  they  were  not  willing,  unless  com- 

1  The  Arians  meant  by  this  to  said  that  he  was  not  before  his 
assert,  that  the  Son  was  not  be-  eternal  generation  would  have 
fore  his  temporal  generation, —  been  like  saying  that  God  did 
which  was  all  the  generation  not  exist  before  his  eternal  exist- 
they  would  concede.  To  have  ence. 


356 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


pelled  to  do  so,  to  embarrass  the  already  highly  ab¬ 
stract  and  metaphysical  discussion  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  trinity  with  further  matter  and  questions,  at 
this  time,  preferring  to  leave  the  unsettled  points 
for  a  future  discussion,  after  the  present  subject  had 
been  fully  disposed  of.  Secondly,  it  is  possible  that 
that  considerably  large  body  of  Semi-Arian  theolo¬ 
gians,  to  whom  we  have  alluded,  would  have  hesi¬ 
tated  to  extend  the  doctrine  of  consubstantiality  to 
the  Holy  Spirit.  Hence  the  leading  Nicene  theo¬ 
logians,  knowing  that  the  doctrine  of  the  equal 
deity  of  the  second  hypostasis  would  logically  lead 
to  the  equal  deity  of  the  third,  could  afford  to  post¬ 
pone  the  discussion  of  this  part  of  the  subject.  The 
personality  and  hypostatical  character  of  the  Son 
had  been  brought  to  view,  and  insisted  upon,  in  the 
Origenistic  scheme,  and  in  all  the  earlier  Trinitari- 
anism,  while  that  of  the  Holy  Ghost  had  been  left 
comparatively  without  examination,  or  specification. 
The  consequence  was,  that  at  the  time  of  the  Nicene 
Council  the  opinions  of  many  theologians  were 
vague  and  idefinite  with  respect  to  the  third  Person 
in  the  trinity. 

The  mind  of  the  leading  catholic  theologians, 
however,  was  fully  made  up,  even  at  this  period. 
Athanasius  distinctly  affirms  the  hypostatical  char¬ 
acter,  and  proper  deity  of  the  third  Person.1  His 

1  The  close  of  Athanasius’s  De-  ship,  with  his  co-existent  Son  and 
fence  of  the  Nicene  Symbol  is  as  Word,  together  with  the  All-Holy 
follows  :  “  To  God  and  the  Father  and  Life-giving  Spirit,  now  and 
is  due  glory,  honour,  and  wor-  unto  endless  ages  of  ages.  Amen.” 


NTCENE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT.  357 


four  Epistles  to  Serapion,  bishop  of  Thmuis,  were 
written  to  prove  the  consubstantiality  of  the  Holy 
Spirit.  In  the  fourth  Epistle,  he  endeavours  to 
show,  in  opposition  to  those  who  held  that  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  a  creature  ( xrio/Lta ),  that  Arianism 
is  not  fully  renounced,  unless  the  fact  is  explicitly 
acknowledged  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  Triad 
foreign  to  the  essence  of  God, — no  substance  from 
without  mingled  in,  that  is  not  in  harmony  with 
the  pure  essence  of  Deity,  and  consubstantial  with 
it.  He  refers  to  passages  of  Scripture,  and  also 
draws  an  argument  from  the  Christian  experience. 
“  How  can  that,”  he  says,  “  which  is  sanctified  by 
nothing  other  than  itself,  and  which  is  itself  the 
source  of  all  sanctification  for  all  rational  creatures, 
be  of  the  same  species  of  being  and  kind  of  essence, 
with  that  which  is  sanctified  by  another  than  itself?  ” 
In  and  by  the  Holy  Spirit  the  creature  obtains  com¬ 
munion  with  God,  and  participation  in  a  divine  life ; 
but  this  could  not  be  the  case  if  the  Holy  Spirit 
were  himself  a  creature.  So  certainly  as  man 
through  him  becomes  a  partaker  of  the  divine 
( dsonoul ),  so  certainly  must  He  himself  be  one 
with  the  divine  Essence. 

Basil  the  Great  (f  379)  wrote  a  tract  upon  the 
divinity  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  which  he  denomi¬ 
nates  the  Spirit,  God,  and  refers  to  passages  of 
Scripture  in  support  of  his  view,  and  particularly 
to  the  baptismal  formula,  in  which  the  Spirit  forms 
the  third  in  the  series,  with  the  Father  and  Son. 


358 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


His  brother  Gregory  of  Nyssa  394?),  in  the 
second  chapter  of  his  larger  Catechism,  employs  the 
comparison  suggested  and  warranted  by  the  ety¬ 
mology  of  the  word  Spirit,  and  which  had  been 
much  enlarged  upon  by  earlier  writers,  particularly 
Lactantius, — the  comparison  of  the  Spirit  to  the 
breath.  Unlike  Lactantius,  this  writer,  though  not 
inclined  to  a  strict  and  high  trinitarianism,  does  not 
identify  the  Word  and  the  Spirit,  but  marks  the 
hypostatical  distinction  between  them.  Gregw'y 
Nazicinzen  (f  390),  also,  agrees  in  opinion  and  in 
statement  with  Basil,  and  Gregory  of  Nyssa. 

A  portion  of  the  Semi-Arians,  however,  in  the 
further  discussion  of  the  general  doctrine,  would 
concede  only  a  relative  divinity  to  the  Son  (adopt¬ 
ing  the  doctrine  of  resemblance  or  kindredness  of 
essence,  o^loiovolov ),  and  denied  the  divinity  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  in  any  and  every  sense.  The  leading 
bishop  in  this  party  was  Macedonius,  and  hence  the 
name  of  Macedonians  was  given  to  it.  Of  this  man, 
Sozomen 1  remarks,  that  he  “  taught  that  the  Son  is 
God, — in  every  respect,  and  according  to  essence, 
like  the  Father ;  and  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not  a 
sharer  in  these  prerogatives,  but  a  minister  and  ser¬ 
vant.”  Theodoret 2  states  that  Macedonius  expressly 
denominated  the  Spirit  a  creature.  Some  of  the 

1  Sozomenits  :  Eccles.  Hist.  IV.  cedonius  “  taught  that  the  Son  of 
xxvii.  God  is  not  of  the  same  substance 

‘Theodoret:  Eccles.  Hist.  II.  as  the  Father,  but  that  he  resem- 
ri.  Theodoret  remarks  that  Ma-  bles  Him  in  every  particular.” 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT.  359 


objections  which  the  Macedonians  made  to  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  deity  and  hypostatical  character  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  were  of  a  frivolous,  as  well  as  blasphe¬ 
mous  nature.  The  following  is  a  specimen  of  their 
argumentation.  u  The  Holy  Ghost  is  either  begot¬ 
ten  or  unbegotten ;  if  he  is  unbegotten,  there  are 
two  unoriginated  beings  ( Svo  ra  uvccq/cc),  namely, 
the  Father  and  the  Spirit;  if  he  is  begotten,  he 
must  be  either  from  the  Father,  or  the  Son ;  if  he 
is  from  the  Father,  then  there  are  two  Sons  in  the 
Triad,  and  consequently  brothers, — when  the  ques¬ 
tion  arises,  whether  one  is  older  than  the  other,  or 
whether  they  are  twins ;  but  if  on  the  other  hand 
the  Spirit  is  begotten  from  the  Son,  then  there  is  a 
grandson  of  God.” 1  Such  objections  as  these  betray 
a  confusion  of  generation  with  creation,  and  show, 
also,  that  the  mind  of  the  objector  is  moving  in  the 
low  range  of  finite  existence,  and  is  unable  to  rise 
to  the  transcendence  of  the  Deity.  Such  a  mind 
associates  temporal  attributes,  and  material  quali¬ 
ties,  with  all  the  terms  that  are  applied  to  the  God¬ 
head  ;  and  should  it  carry  its  mode  of  conception 
into  all  the  discussions  that  relate  to  the  Divine 
Nature,  it  could  not  stop  short  of  an  anthropomor¬ 
phism  that  would  be  no  higher  than  the  grossest 
polytheism. 

These  Macedonian  views,  and  similar  ones,  led 
to  the  calling  of  a  second  Council  at  Constantinople , 

1  Gregorius  Naz.  :  Oratio  xxxi.  7.  Compare  Athanasius  :  Ad 
Serapion,  I.  xv. 


360 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


in  381,  which,  under  the  guidance  and  influence 
principally  of  Gregory  Nazianzen,  made  more  precise 
statements  respecting  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  term 
6[jloov6iov  did  not  appear,  however,  in  the  creed 
drawn  up  at  this  time,  though  the  Holy  Spirit  is 
represented  as  proceeding  from  the  Father,  and  be¬ 
ing  equal  in  honour  and  power  to  both  the  Father 
and  the  Son.  The  phraseology  of  the  clause  rela¬ 
ting  to  the  third  Person  runs  thus :  u  And  [we  be¬ 
lieve]  in  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  Lord,  the  Life-Giving, 
who  proceeds  from  the  Father,  who  is  to  be  wor¬ 
shipped  and  glorified  with  the  Father  and  the  Son, 
and  who  spake  through  the  prophets.” 

It  was  owing  to  this  failure  to  expressly  assert 
the  consubstantiality  of  the  Spirit  with  the  Father 
and  the  Son,  by  the  use  of  the  technical  term 
d/uoovotov ,  that  the  Constantinopolitan  Symbol  was 
not  satisfactory  to  all  parties.  The  position  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  in  the  trinity  generally  had  indeed 
been  established  by  it.  He  was  acknowledged  to 
be  one  of  the  Eternal  Three,  co-equal  in  power  and 
glory ;  but  his  special  relation  to  the  Father  and 
Son  was  left  indefinite.  While  the  creed  asserted 
that  the  Spirit  proceeds  from  the  Father,  it  did  not 
indeed  expressly  deny  that  He  proceeds  from  the 
Son ;  and  yet  the  omission  of  the  Son  seemed  to 
look  in  this  direction.  The  arguments  for  and 
against  the  procession  of  the  third  Person  from  the 
first  and  second  were  the  following.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  assertion  that  the  Spirit  proceeds  from 


NICENE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT.  361 


the  Father  only,  and  not  from  the  Son,  looked  like 
an  essential  inferiority  of  the  Son  to  the  Father ; 
while  on  the  other  hand  the  assertion  that  He  pro¬ 
ceeds  from  the  Father  and  the  Son  seemed  to  place 
the  Spirit  in  a  more  dependent  attitude, — his  hypo- 
statical  existence  issuing  from  two  hypostases  instead 
of  one.  The  endeavour  to  vindicate  the  deity  of  the 
Son,  by  asserting  the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
from  Him  as  well  as  the  Father,  looked  like  infringe¬ 
ment  upon  that  of  the  Holy  Spirit ;  and  conversely 
the  endeavour  to  give  to  the  Spirit  a  greater  inde¬ 
pendence,  by  disconnecting  his  procession  from  the 
second  Person,  endangered  the  dignity  and  deity 
of  the  Son.  The  Greek  theologians,  Athanasius, 
Basil,  and  Gregory  Nyssa,  asserted  procession  from 
the  Father,  without ,  however ,  opposing  the  doctrine 
of  procession  from  the  Son .  Epiphanius,  on  the 
contrary,  derived  the  Spirit  from  Father  and  Son, 
with  whom  Marcellus  of  Ancyra  agreed,  though 
holding  to  a  Sabellian  trinity. 

The  Western  theologians,  and  among  them  Au¬ 
gustine,  held  the  doctrine  of  procession  from  Father 
and  Son,  and  this  statement  established  itself  so 
firmly  and  generally  in  the  West,  that  at  the  third 
Synod  of  Toledo,  in  589,  the  clause  filioque  was  added 
to  the  Constantinopolitan  Symbol.  This  formed  one 
of  the  dogmatic  grounds  for  the  division  between 
the  Western  and  Eastern  Churches, — the  former  of 
which  to  this  day  asserts,  and  the  latter  denies,  that 
the  Holy  Spirit  proceeds  from  the  Father  and  Son. 


362 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


§  5.  Terminology  of  the  Nicene  Trinitarianism . 

The  deity  of  the  Son  and  Spirit  having  thus 
been  enunciated  in  a  creed  form,  the  discussions 
among  trinitarian  theologians  after  the  Councils  of 
Nice  and  Constantinople  had  reference  to  the  spe¬ 
cific  relations  of  the  three  Persons  to  each  other, 
and  especially  to  fixing  the  terminology  of  the  sub¬ 
ject.  Certain  terms  had  been  employed  during 
this  controversy  of  two  hundred  years1  duration, 
which  it  was  important  to  define,  and  thereby  estab¬ 
lish  their  technicality,  and  scientific  authority.  The 
success  and  enduring  influence  of  any  systematic 
construction  of  truth,  be  it  secular  or  sacred,  depends 
as  much  upon  an  exact  terminology,  as  upon  close 
and  deep  thinking  itself.  Indeed,  unless  the  results 
to  which  the  human  mind  arrives  are  plainly  stated, 
and  firmly  fixed  in  an  exact  phraseology,  its  think¬ 
ing  is  to  very  little  purpose  in  the  end.  “  Terms,” 
says  Whewell,  “record  discoveries.”1  There  may 
be  the  most  thorough  analysis,  and  the  most  com¬ 
prehensive  and  combining  synthesis ;  the  truth  in 
its  deepest  and  most  scientific  form  may  be  reached 
by  the  individual  mind ;  and  yet  the  public  mind 
and  after  ages  be  none  the  wiser  for  it.  That  which 
was  seen  it  may  be  with  crystal  clearness,  and  in 

’Whewell:  History  of  Indue-  und  bleibt  doch  eine  bestimmte 
tive  Sciences  (Introduction).  “Die  Terminologie.”  Schelling  :  Ideab 
Zierde, — und  das  aussere  Merk-  ismusder  Wissencbaftslebre(Pbil. 
inal, — einer  endlich  auf  sicbern  Scbriften,  205). 

Grund  erbauten  Wissenscbaft,  ist 


TERMINOLOGY  OF  NICENE  TBINITARIANISM.  363 


bold  outline,  in  tlie  consciousness  of  an  individual 
thinker,  may  fail  to  become  the  property  and  pos¬ 
session  of  mankind  at  large,  because  it  is  not  trans¬ 
ferred  from  the  individual  to  the  general  mind,  by 
means  of  a  precise  phraseology,  and  a  rigorous  ter¬ 
minology.  Nothing  is  in  its  own  nature  more  fuga¬ 
cious  and  shifting  than  thought ;  and  particularly 
thought  upon  the  mysteries  of  Christianity.  A  con¬ 
ception  that  is  plain  and  accurate  in  the  under¬ 
standing  of  the  first  man  becomes  obscure  and  false 
in  that  of  the  second,  because  it  was  not  grasped, 
and  firmly  held,  in  the  form  and  proportions  with 
which  it  first  came  up,  and  then  handed  over  to 
other  minds,  a  fixed  and  scientific  quantity. 

The  following  terms  compose  the  scientific  no¬ 
menclature  employed  in  defining  and  fixing  the  oecu¬ 
menical  statement  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity : 

1.  3 Ova  la ,  with  its  equivalent  cpvaig ;  to  which 
the  Latin  correspondents  are  substantia ,  essentia , 
natura ,  and  in  some  connections  res ;  and  the  cor¬ 
responding  English  terms,  essence ,  mbstance ,  nature , 
and  being.  2.  'YnoGraoig,  with  its  equivalents  to 
vTioxtifitvov,  and  % qogcotiov]  to  which  correspond 
the  Latin  hypostasis ,  substantia ,  aspectus,  and  per¬ 
sona,  and  the  English  hypostasis  and  person.  3. 
The  term  i'Scorrjg  was  employed  to  designate  the 
individual  peculiarity  of  the  hypostasis, — the  hy- 
postatical  character  by  which  each  divine  Person  is 
differentiated  from  the  others.  4.  TawriGig,  genera - 
tio,  generation ,  as  has  been  sufficiently  explained, 


364 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


designates  the  eternal  and  immanent  activity  by 
which  the  first  Person  communicates  the  divine 
essence  to  the  second.  5.  * ExnoQbvOLg  with  its 
equivalent  ixTitpipcg  ;  to  which  correspond  the  Latin 
processio  and  missio ,  and  the  English  procession 
and  mission . 

Vvoi a ,  or  Essence ,  denotes  that  which  is  com¬ 
mon  to  Father,  Son,  and  Spirit.  It  denominates  the 
substance,  or  constitutional  being,  of  the  Deity, 
which  is  possessed  alike,  and  equally,  by  each  of 
the  personal  distinctions.  The  Essence  is  in  its  own 
nature  one  and  indivisible,  and  hence  the  statement 
in  the  creed  respecting  it  affirms  simple  unity,  and 
warns  against  separation  and  division.  The  terms 
u  generation  ”  and  u  procession  ”  do  not  apply  to  it. 

Y tzootgcoiQ')  or  Hypostasis ,  is  a  term  that 
was  more  subtile  in  its  meaning,  and  use,  than  ovoia. 
It  denotes,  not  that  which  is  common  to  the  Three 
in  One,  but,  that  which  is  distinctive  of  and  peculiar 
to  them.  The  personal  characteristic  of  the  Hyposr 
tasis,  or  u  subsistence  ”  in  the  Essence,  was  denoted 
by  the  Greek  word  i'Scorrjg^  and  if  we  use  our  Eng¬ 
lish  word  “  individuality  ”  somewhat  loosely,  it  will 
convey  the  idea  sought  to  be  attached  to  the  Person 
in  distinction  from  the  Essence. 

Inasmuch  as  the  meaning  of  the  term  Person 
was  more  difficult  to  reach  and  state,  than  the 
meaning  of  the  term  Essence,  more  imperfection 
and  indefiniteness  appear  in  the  terminology  em- 
ployed.  The  three-foldness  is  more  difficult  to 


TERMINOLOGY  OF  NICENE  TRINITARIANISM.  365 


grasp  than  the  unity.  The  human  mind  quite 
readily  apprehends  the  notion  of  substance,  and  of 
attributes.  These  two  conceptions  apply  to  all 
forms  of  created  being,  and  are  familiar  to  the  re¬ 
flection  of  the  human  understanding, — though  when 
examined  they  baffle  a  perfectly  metaphysical  com¬ 
prehension.  But  the  doctrine  of  a  “subsistence” 
in  the  substance  of  the  Godhead  brings  to  view  a 
species  of  existence  that  is  so  anomalous,  and  unique, 
that  the  human  mind  derives  little  or  no  aid  from 
those  analogies  which  assist  it  in  all  other  cases. 
The  hypostasis  is  a  real  subsistence, — a  solid  essen¬ 
tial  form  of  existence,  and  not  a  mere  emanation,  or 
energy,  or  manifestation, — but  it  is  intermediate 
between  substance  and  attributes.  It  is  not  identi¬ 
cal  wdth  the  substance,  for  there  are  not  three  sub¬ 
stances.  It  is  not  identical  with  attributes,  for  the 
three  Persons  each  and  equally  possess  all  the 
divine  attributes.  “We  know,”  says  Howe,  “that 
the  hypostatical  distinction  cannot  be  less  than  is 
sufficient  to  sustain  distinct  predicates  or  attribu¬ 
tions,  nor  can  it  be  so  great  as  to  intrench  upon  the 
unity  of  the  Godhead.” 1  Hence  the  mind  is  called 
upon  to  grasp  the  notion  of  a  species  of  existence 
that  is  totally  sui  generis ,  and  not  capable  of  illus¬ 
tration  by  any  of  the  ordinary  comparisons  and 
analogies.2 

’Howe:  1.137-  (N.  York  Ed.)  sonal  material  creation ;  but  that 

2  This  remark  is  certainly  true  the  sphere  of  self-conscious  exist- 
within  the  sphere  of  the  imper-  ence  may  perhaps  furnish  an  ana- 


366 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


The  consequence  of  this  was,  that  the  term 
imoOTuoig  was  sometimes  attended  with  ambiguity, 
though  the  meaning  attached  to  the  idea  was  uni- 


logical  illustration  seems  to  be 
less  and  less  doubted,  as  met¬ 
aphysical  psychology  advances. 
Some  of  the  Fathers,  as  Augus¬ 
tine  for  example,  found  a  trinity 
in  the  human  spirit.  As  a  tenta¬ 
tive  effort  in  this  direction,  we 
subjoin  the  following  positions  in 
proof  that  the  necessary  condi¬ 
tions  of  self-consciousness  in  the 
finite  spirit  furnish  an  analogue 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  and 
go  to  prove  that  trinity  in  unity 
is  necessary  to  self-consciousness 
in  the  Godhead. 

God  is  not  “  one”  like  a  stone 
or  tree,  or  any  single  thing  in  na¬ 
ture.  He  is  “one  ”  like  a  person. 
It  may  be  presumed,  therefore, 
that  the  same  conditions  which 
we  find  to  exist  in  the  instance 
of  human  personality,  will  be 
found  in  the  instance  of  the  Di¬ 
vine  self-consciousness,  only  freed 
from  the  limitations  of  the  finite. 
What,  then,  are  these  conditions  ? 

In  order  to  self-consciousness 
in  man,  the  unity,  viz. :  the  hu¬ 
man  spirit,  must  first  become  dis¬ 
tinguished,  but  not  divided,  into 
two  distinctions  ;  one  of  which  is 
the  contemplating  subject,  and  the 
other  the  contemplated  object. 
The  I  must  behold  itself  as  an  ob¬ 
jective  thing.  In  this  first  step 
in  the  process  of  becoming  self- 
conscious,  the  finite  spirit  sets 


itself  off  over  against  itself,  in  or¬ 
der  that  it  may  see  itself.  That 
one  essence,  which,  before  this 
step,  was  an  unreflecting  and 
therefore  unconscious  unit,  now 
becomes  two  definitudes,  distinc¬ 
tions,  hypostases,  supposita.  There 
is  now  a  subject-ego,  and  an  ob¬ 
ject-ego.  There  is  a  real  dis¬ 
tinction,  but  no  division  in  the 
original  being, — in  the  primitive 
unity. 

But  this  is  not  the  end  of  the 
process.  We  have  not  yet  reached 
full  self-consciousness.  In  order 
to  the  complete  self-conscious  in¬ 
tuition,  the  finite  spirit  must,  yet 
further,  perceive  that  this  sub¬ 
ject-ego  and  object-ego,  this  con- 
templant  and  contemplated,  ar¬ 
rived  at  in  the  first  step  of  the 
process,  are  one  and  the  same 
essence  or  being.  This  second  act 
of  perception  completes  the  circle 
of  self-consciousness.  For  if  the 
human  spirit  stopped  with  the 
first  act  of  merely  distinguishing, 
and  never  took  the  second  step 
of  reuniting;  if  the  mind  never 
became  aware  that  the  object  con¬ 
templated  in  the  first  stage  of  the 
process  is  no  other,  as  to  essence, 
than  the  subject  contemplating; 
it  would  not  have  seZ/’-knowledge 
at  all.  It  would  not  perceive  that 
it  had  been  contemplating  self. 
Stopping  with  the  first  act  of  dra- 


TERMINOLOGY  OF  NICENE  TRIN ITARIANISM.  367 


form.  The  distinction  between  ovoia  and  vtiootccolq^ 
though  made  in  fact,  was  not  always  made  in  form, 
by  the  first  trinitarians.  Some  little  time  was 


tinguishing,  the  object-ego  would 
not  differ,  for  the  subject-ego, 
from  any  other  object, — a  tree  or 
a  stone  e.  g. ;  and  the  knowledge 
which  the  mind  would  have  of 
itself  as  an  object  would  not  differ 
from  that  which  it  has  of  objects 
in  nature,  or  of  the  not  me,  gen¬ 
erally.  It  would  not  be  self- 
consciousness,  consequently,  any 
more  than  the  consciousness  of 
any  other  thing  is  self-conscious¬ 
ness.  The  essence  of  the  object 
must  be  seen  to  be  the  essence  of 
the  subject,  or  else  seZ/’-knowledge 
is  both  incomplete  and  impossible. 

There  is  then  a  third  definitude, 
distinction,  hypostasis,  supposi- 
tum,  in  the  one  original  unity  of 
the  human  spirit,  which,  in  a 
second  act  of  perception,  beholds 
the  identity  of  the  first  and  sec¬ 
ond  determinations  or  distinctions 
— the  essential  oneness  of  the  sub¬ 
ject-ego  and  object-ego.  There 
is  now  full  self-consciousness.  In 
and  by  the  two  acts  of  percep¬ 
tion,  and  the  three  resulting  dis¬ 
tinctions,  the  human  spirit  has 
made  itself  its  own  object,  and 
has  perceived  that  it  has  done  so. 
There  is  real  triplicity  in  the 
unity.  For  the  subject- ego,  as 
such,  is  not  the  object-ego,  as 
such ;  and  the  third  distinction, 
which  reunites  these  two  in  the 
perception  of  their  identity  of 


essence  and  being,  is,  as  such, 
neither  the  subject-ego  nor  the 
object-ego,  yet  is  consubstantial 
with  them  both. 

If  it  be  asked,  why  a  fourth 
factor  is  not  needed  to  perceive 
the  unity  of  essence  between  the 
third,  and  the  first  two  distinc¬ 
tions,  the  answer  is:  that  the 
third  distinction  lias  not,  like  the 
first  one,  posited  an  object,  but 
has  only  perceived  an  act.  It 
has  simply  witnessed  and  noticed 
that  the  first  distinction  has  made 
the  second  distinction  an  object 
of  contemplation.  Hence  there 
is  no  second  object  that  requires 
to  be  reunited  in  the  unity  of  es¬ 
sence. 

These,  then,  are  the  necessary 
philosophical  conditions  of  per¬ 
sonality  in  the  finite  spirit.  If  a 
single  one  is  lacking  the  circle  is 
broken,  and  there  is  no  self-con¬ 
sciousness.  From  what  limita¬ 
tions,  now,  must  they  be  freed, 
in  order  that  they  may  be  trans¬ 
ferred  to  the  Infinite  Spirit  ?  The 
answer  is :  from  the  two  limita¬ 
tions  of  time  and  degree. 

In  the  instance  of  the  finite 
spirit,  these  acts  of  perception, 
which  have  been  described,  occur 
seriatim,  and  the  unity  comes  to 
self-consciousness  only  gradually, 
and  intermittently.  Man  is,  not 
self-conscious  at  every  instant.  He 


368 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


required  to  set  off  eacli  term  to  its  own  idea.  Thus, 
the  Nicene  Symbol  itself  anathematizes  those  that 
teach  that  the  Son  is  eg  hrkqag  vTioardatcog  rj  ova  lag. 
Athanasius  employs  the  two  terms  as  equivalents. 
u  As  to  those  who  receive  all  else  that  was  defined 
at  Nice,  but  doubt  about  consubstantiality  only,  we 
must  not  feel  as  towards  enemies  ....  for  in  con- 


becomes  so  by  voluntary  reflec¬ 
tion  ;  and  the  clearness  and  depth 
of  his  self-intuition  is  a  thing  of 
degrees.  No  man  has  ever  yet 
attained  to  an  absolutely  perfect 
self-consciousness,  as  the  baffled 
striving  of  the  philosopher  evinces. 

But  the  Divine  Essence  is  not 
Included  in  such  a  process  of 
gradually  becoming  self-conscious, 
instead  of  eternally  being  so.  God 
is  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and 
forever.  The  great  vice  of  the 
modern  pantheistic  speculation 
consists  in  transferring  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  gradual  self- evolution 
from  the  sphere  of  the  finite  to 
that  of  the  Infinite  ;  from  the  crea¬ 
ture  to  the  Creator.  God,  as  the 
schoolmen  define  him,  is  “  actus 
purissimus  sine  ulla  potentiali- 
tate .”  There  never  is  nor  can 
be  anything  potential  and  unde¬ 
veloped  in  the  Divine  Essence. 
Hence,  the  above-mentioned  con¬ 
ditions  of  self-consciousness  must, 
in  the  instance  of  the  Deity,  be 
freed  from  the  limitations  of 
time  and  degree.  That  self-con¬ 
sciousness  which  in  man  is  the 
result  of  a  deliberate  effort,  and 


which  continues  only  during  the 
time  of  voluntary  self-reflection, 
is  ever  present  and  ever  existent 
in  God.  From  eternity  to  eter¬ 
nity,  the  subject-ego  (The  Father) 
is  perpetually  beholding  itself  as 
the  object-ego  (The  Son),  and  the 
third  distinction  (The  Holy  Spirit) 
is  unintermittently  perceiving  the 
essential  unity  and  identity  of  the 
subject-ego  and  object-ego  (Father 
and  Son).  Furthermore,  the  self- 
knowledge,  in  this  instance,  is  an 
infinite,  and  fixed  quantity.  From 
the  fathomless  depths  of  the  Di¬ 
vine  Nature,  there  comes  up  at 
no  moment  during  the  eternal 
years  of  God,  a  yet  profounder 
knowledge,  a  yet  fuller  self-intui¬ 
tion,  than  has  before  been  gained ; 
but  this  Divine  self-consciousness 
is  the  same  exhaustive  self-con¬ 
templation  from  everlasting  to 
everlasting.  The  eternity  and 
immanency  of  these  activities  in 
the  Divine  Essence  are  expressed 
in  theological  phraseology  by  the 
Nicene  doctrine  of  the  eternal 
begetting  of  the  Father,  the  eter¬ 
nal  filiation  of  the  Son,  and  the 
eternal  procession  of  the  Spirit. 


TERMINOLOGY  OF  NICENE  TRINITARIANISM.  369 


fessing  that  the  Son  is  from  the  substance  of  the 
Father,  and  not  of  other  subsistence  (sW  rrjg  ova  lag 
zov  narqbg  tivai,  xul  /ur]  eg  krsqag  vnoorccatcog 
tov  vlov ),  they  are  not  far  from  receiving  the  phrase 
dfxoovOLOv  also.  ”  Again,  he  remarks :  “  Hypos¬ 
tasis  ( vTiooxaoig )  is  substance  ( ovola ),  and  means 
nothing  else  than  simple  being.”1  But  Athanasius 
continually  denies  that  there  are  three  ovalai ,  so 
that  his  use  of  vnooraoig  must  be  determined  in 
each  instance  from  the  connection  in  which  he  em¬ 
ploys  it.  His  object  in  asserting  that  “hypostasis 
is  substance ”  was  to  deny  that  the  personal  dis¬ 
tinction  in  the  Godhead  is  merely  an  energy  or 
effluence,  such  as  the  Nominal  Trinitarians  main¬ 
tained  it  to  be.2 


1  Athanasius  :  De  Synodis,  xli ; 
Ad  Afros,  iv. 

2  Bull  and  Petavius  differ  with 
regard  to  the  question  whether 
the  Nicene  Council  made  a  tech¬ 
nical  distinction  between  the  two 
terms.  Bull  (Fid.  Nic.  II.  ix.  11) 
contends  that  two  different  things 
were  intended  by  the  council  to 
be  designated  by  the  terms  <Wta 
and  vnoaracns.,  and  that  they  de¬ 
sired  to  condemn  two  classes  of 
errorists,— those,  namely,  who  de¬ 
nied  that  the  Son  is  from  the  Fa¬ 
ther’s  substance  (<Wia),  but  con¬ 
ceded  that  he  was  from  the  F ather’s 
hypostasis  ( vnoo-raais )  ;  and  those 
who  denied  that  he  was  from  either 
the  Father’s  substance,  or  the  Fa¬ 
ther’s  hypostasis.  The  latter  class 

24 


were  the  Arians,  and  the  former 
were  the  Semi-Arians.  The  Semi- 
Arians,  in  Bull’s  opinion,  would 
concede  that  the  Son  was  begot¬ 
ten  of  the  Father’s  hypostasis  in 
a  peculiar  manner  denoted  by  the 
term  6fi  o  i  overtop  and  was  not  cre¬ 
ated  from  nothing  like  ordinary 
creatures ;  but  would  not  concede 
that  he  was  begotten  of  the  same 
substance  with  the  Father,  or  ap¬ 
ply  to  him  the  term  6/jl  o  ovaios. 
The  Arians,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  deny  both  that  the  Son 
was  begotten  of  the  Father’s  sub¬ 
stance,  and  the  Father’s  hyposta¬ 
sis,  and  assert  that  he  was  created 
de  nihilo.  Petavius  (De  Trini- 
tate,  IV.)  regards  the  word  imoo 
rao-is,  in  the  nomenclature  of  the 


370 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Although  the  Latin  trinitarians  discriminated 
Person  from  Essence  with  full  as  much  clearness  as 
the  Greek  Nicene  Fathers,  yet  there  was  some  con¬ 
fusion  of  terms  among  them,  owing  to  the  poverty 
of  the  Latin  language.  One  and  the  same  word, 
substantia ,  was  often  employed  in  the  Latin  trinita- 
rianism,  to  denote  both  the  essentiality,  and  the 
personality.  Had  the  term  essentia  been  used  from 
the  very  first,  and  invariably,  to  translate  ovaia , 
and  substantia  to  denote  i/Tiooraocg,  the  confusion 
would  have  been  avoided.  But  the  term  substantia , 
in  the  Latin,  was  so  commonly  exchangeable,  and 
entirely  synonymous  with  essentia ,  (as  the  term 
substance,  in  English,  is  with  essence,)  that  no  term 
was  left  to  denote  that  peculiar  mode  of  existence 
which  is  intermediate  between  essence  and  attri¬ 
butes,  unless  these  two  synonymes  should  be  dis¬ 
tinguished  from  each  other,  and  one  rigorously  con¬ 
fined  to  one  conception,  and  the  other  to  the  other.1 

This  however  was  not  done  at  first,  and  the 


Nicene  council,  as  only  another 
term  for  ovaia,  and  contends  that 
the  two  terms  were  not  set  off, 
each  to  its  appropriate  idea,  until 
the  council  of  Alexandria,  in  362. 
“  V ox  hypostasis ,  non  modo  ante 
Nicaenum  concilium,  sed  ne  ab 
ipsis  quidem  Nicaenis  Patribus 
aliter  fere  accepta  sit,  quam  pro 
ovaia,  et  substantia,  rarissime 
vero  pro  persona,  et  proprietate 
biaKpiriKT),  ac  numerum  faciente.” 
(De  Trinitate,  I.  iii,  3). 


1  The  following  extract  from 
Anselm  illustrates  the  later  nee 
of  substantia  and  essentia.  “  Quod 
enim  dixi  summam  trinitatem 
posse  dici  tres  substantias,  Graecos 
secutus  sum,  qui  eonfitentur  tres 
substantias  in  una  essentia,  eadem 
fide,  qua  nos  tres  personas  in  una 
substantia.  Nam  hoc  significant 
in  Deo  per  substantiam  quod  nos 
per  personam.”  Anselmus  :  Mo* 
nologium  (Pi>efatio). 


TERMINOLOGY  OF  NICENE  TRLNTTARIANISM.  37 1 


consequence  was,  that  other  terms  came  to  be  em¬ 
ployed,  occasionally,  to  hint  at  and  suggest  the 
meaning  of  the  hypostatical  distinction.  Such  a 
term  is  ngoacoTiov.  This  corresponds  to  the  Latin 
persona ,  from  which  the  English  “  person”  is  derived. 
This  term,  it  is  obvious  to  remark,  though  the  more 
common  one  in  English,  and  perhaps  in  Protestant 
trinitarianism  generally,  is  not  so  well  adapted 
to  express  the  conception  intended,  as  the  Greek 
vnocraOLg.  It  has  a  Sabellian  leaning,  because  it 
does  not  with  sufficient  plainness  indicate  the  sub¬ 
sistence  in  the  Essence.  The  Father  Son  and  Spirit 
are  more  than  mere  aspects  or  appearances  of  the 
Essence.  The  Latin  persona  was  the  mask  worn  by 
the  actor  in  the  play,  and  was  representative  of  his 
particular  character  for  the  particular  time.  Now, 
although  those  who  employed  these  terms  undoubt¬ 
edly  gave  them  as  full  and  solid  a  meaning  as  they 
could,  and  were  undoubtedly  true  trinitarians,  yet 
the  representation  of  the  eternal  and  necessary 
hypostatical  distinctions  in  the  Godhead,  by  terms 
derived  from  transitory  scenical  exhibitions,  was 
not  the  best  for  purposes  of  science,  even  though 
the  poverty  of  human  language  should  justify  their 
employment  for  popular  and  illustrative  statements.1 

That  the  distinction  between  Essence  and  Hy- 

1  In  the  Semi-Arian  contro-  npocrGina,  while  the  “New  Ni- 
versy,  which  sprung  up  between  cenes,”  who  were  the  most  accu- 
the  Nicene  and  Oonstantinopoli-  rate,  contended  for  three  inoara - 
tan  Councils,  the  “  Old  Nicenes”  aeis. 
would  only  acknowledge  three 


372 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


postasis  became  a  fixed  one,  and  thus  came  down  in 
the  trinitarian  nomenclature  of  the  Modern  Church, 
was  owing,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  Western 
theologians  Augustine  and  Hilary,  whose  trea¬ 
tises  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  were  the 
principal  text-books  for  the  Schoolmen  in  their 
speculations. 

'ExTioQtvatg  and  txTztinpLQ  were  terms  employed 
to  denote  the  hypostatical  character  and  relation¬ 
ship  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  They  were  derived  from 
John  xv.  15,  and  kindred  passages.  “But  when 
the  Comforter  is  come,  whom  I  will  send  (n s/uipco) 
unto  you  from  the  Father,  even  the  Spirit  of  truth, 
which  proceedeth  (o  axnoqbvarai)  from  the  Father, 
he  shall  testify  of  me.”  The  attempt  to  define  the 
term  “  procession  ”  was  even  less  frequent  than  to 
define  the  term  “  generation.”  The  same  predicates, 
however,  were  applied  to  both.  It  was  an  eternal 
procession,  out  of  the  essence.  It  was  a  necessary 
procession  grounded  in  the  absolute  nature  of  the 
Deity,  and  not  dependent  upon  arbitrary  and  op¬ 
tional  will. 

§  6.  Critical  Estimate  of  the  Nicene  Controversy . 

We  have  now  traced  the  history  of  this  great 
doctrine  of  revelation  through  the  period  of  its 
theoretic  construction,  and  establishment.  We  have 
seen  the  theological  mind,  partly  from  its  own  im¬ 
pulse,  and  partly  from  the  necessities  of  its  position, 


ESTIMATE  OF  THE  NICENE  CONTPwOVEKSY.  373 


first,  collate  from  the  written  word  the  various  and 
scattered  data  there  given,  then  combine  them  into 
a  general  statement  as  in  the  Apostles’  Creed,  and 
then  expand  them  into  a  more  special  form  of  doc¬ 
trine,  as  in  the  Nicene  and  Athanasian  Symbols. 
Collation,  combination,  and  expansion  are  the  parts 
of  the  scientific  process.  This  process  went  on 
slowly,  but  continuously,  for  a  period  of  five  centu- 
ries, — as  long  a  time  as  was  required  for  pagan 
Rome  to  conquer  and  subjugate  the  Italian  tribes, 
and  lay  the  foundations  of  a  nationality  that  was  to 
last  a  millennium  in  its  own  particular  form,  and 
another  millennium  in  mixture  with  still  other  na¬ 
tionalities, — as  long  a  time  as  was  required  for  the 
thorough  mixing  and  fusion  of  British,  Saxon,  and 
Norman  elements  into  that  modern  national  char¬ 
acter  which  in  the  Englishman  and  Anglo-American 
is,  perhaps,  destined  to  mould  and  rule  the  future 
more  than  even  Rome  has  the  past.  These  historic 
parallels  are  interesting  and  illustrative.  Though 
the  processes  are  totally  unlike, — though  the  one  is 
metaphysical,  and  relates  to  the  mysterious  nature 
and  essence  of  the  Ancient  of  Bays,  before  whom 
all  the  nations  and  all  the  centuries  of  time  are  as 
nothing  and  vanity,  while  the  other  is  political,  and 
relates  to  the  rise  and  formation  of  merely  secular 
sovereignties,  exceedingly  impressive  to  the  natural 
mind  and  dazzling  to  the  carnal  eye,  constituting 
the  very  splendor  and  glory  of  secular  history,  yet, 
in  comparison  with  the  eternal  years  of  God,  passing 


374 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


away  like  a  morning  vapor, — though  these  pro¬ 
cesses  are  in  their  own  nature  so  different,  the  mind 
is  aided  in  forming  a  just  estimate  of  the  slowness 
and  grandeur  of  their  movement,  by  the  comparison 
of  one  with  the  other.  The  theological  controver¬ 
sies  that  resulted  in  forming  and  fixing  the  theoretic 
belief  of  Christendom  in  the  Triune  God  appear 
unprofitable  and  valueless  to  the  merely  secular 
mind, — to  the  mind  that  is  absorbed  in  the  finite, 
and  making  no  comparisons  between  time  and  eter¬ 
nity.  The  sneer  that  this  whole  contest  of  five  cen¬ 
turies  was  merely  about  a  single  letter,  merely 
whether  the  term  should  be  ofxoovOiov  or  o^oiov- 
dor y  expresses  the  feeling  of  many  a  mind,  for 
which,  notwithstanding  all  its  culture  in  other  direc¬ 
tions,  the  invisible  is  less  august  than  the  visible, 
and  the  temporal  more  impressive  than  the  eter¬ 
nal.1 

But  he  who  feels  a  proper  practical  and  philo¬ 
sophic  interest  in  the  paramount  questions  and  pro¬ 
blems  of  Christianity,  and  in  their  bearing  upon 
the  destiny  of  man  as  immortal  and  everlasting, 
will  always  look  upon  these  centuries  of  intense 
metaphysical  abstraction,  and  profound  moral  ear¬ 
nestness,  with  more  veneration  than  upon  any 
section  of  merely  pagan  and  secular  history,  how¬ 
ever  striking  or  imposing.  These  bloodless  meta- 


1  The  value  of  a  letter  in  an  al-  the  calculus,  is  not  greater  than 
gebraic  problem,  or  a  formula  of  in  this  trinitarian  technical  term. 


ESTIMATE  OF  THE  NICENE  CONTROVERSY.  375 


physical  victories  secured  to  the  Church  Universal 
a  correct  faith,  and  obtained  for  her  all  those  bene- . 
fits  that  flow  perennially  from  the  possession  of  the 
real  and  exact  truth, — from  the  revealed  idea  and 
definition  of  the  Triune  God. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


POST-NICENE  TRINITARIANISM. 


§  1.  Mediaeval  and  Pa/pal  Trinitarianism. 

The  history  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity  in 
the  Scholastic  and  Modern  Churches  can  be  com¬ 
pressed  into  a  brief  statement,  the  more  readily, 
because  this  doctrine,  more  than  is  the  case,  with 
any  other,  reached  its  approximately  full  develope- 
ment  in  the  first  stages  of  its  history.  After  the 
year  600,  expansion  in  theory,  and  technical  accu¬ 
racy  in  statement,  can  be  detected  much  more  plainly 
in  Soteriology,  and  even  in  Anthropology,  than  in 
Theology.  The  Scholastic  and  Protestant  systems 
have  unfolded  the  doctrines  of  sin  and  redemption, 
far  more  than  they  have  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity. 

In  the  Middle  Ages,  the  character  of  the  inves¬ 
tigation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  was  deter¬ 
mined  by  the  general  bent  of  the  individual  mind, 
or  of  his  school.  Men  like  Anselm,  Bernard,  and 


MEDIAEVAL  AND  PAPAL  TRINIT  A  RIANISM.  37 7 

Aquinas  joined  on  upon  tlie  views  of  the  past 
The  writings  of  the  Western  Latin  trinitarians,  par¬ 
ticularly  Hilary  and  Augustine,  as  we  have  already 
remarked,  were  resorted  to,  and  their  general  type 
of  doctrine  prevailed  among  thinkers  of  this  class. 
The  Greek  language  was  but  little  cultivated,  and 
hence  the  speculations  of  the  Greek  Fathers  exerted 
comparatively  little  direct  influence.  In  regard  to 
the  opinions  of  the  leading  theologians  of  the  Me¬ 
diaeval  Church,  it  may  be  summarily  remarked, 
that  the  trinitarianism  that  had  been  formed  and 
authoritatively  established  during  the  first  six  cen¬ 
turies  was  adopted  and  defended. 

In  that  class  of  speculative  minds,  to  which  we 
had  occasion  to  allude  in  the  history  of  Apologies, 
we  find  more  or  less  deviation  from  the  catholic 
creed  and  faith.  That  adventurous  thinker  of  the 
ninth  century,  Scotus  Erigena,  whose  philosophizing 
upon  the  general  doctrine  of  the  Deity  was  panthe¬ 
istic,  presented  views  of  the  trinity  that  were  Sabel- 
lian.  Abelard  was  charged  with  the  same  tendency. 
Roscellin  was  accused  of  tritheism,  and  Gilbert  of 
Poictiers  of  Damian’s  old  heresy  of  tetratheism.1  But 
such  opinions  were  regarded  by  those  who  con. 
trolled  the  public  sentiment  of  the  church,  and  by 
the  church  itself  as  represented  in  councils,  as  het¬ 
erodox.  The  Anselms,  Bernards,  and  Aquinases 


‘Damian  of  Alexandria  was  ac-  one),  and  three  persons,  or  indi- 
cused  of  holding  the  theory  of  a  vidualizations,in  addition,— Three 
Monad  (the  at>ro3eo?,  or  generic  and  One,  instead  of  Three  in  One. 


378 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


of  the  Mediaeval  Church  were  one  in  sentiment 
upon  this  doctrine,  with  the  Athanasiuses,  Basils, 
Gregories,  Augustines,  and  Hilaries  of  the  Ancient 
Church. 

§  2.  Trinitarianism  of  the  Continental  and  English 

Reformers \ 

At  the  Reformation,  the  Roman  and  Protestant 
churches  adopted  the  same  dogmatic  statement  of 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  This  is  the  only  car¬ 
dinal  truth  of  revelation  in  respect  to  which,  both 
parties  stood  upon  the  same  ground.  The  anthro¬ 
pology,  soteriology,  and  eschatology,  of  the  Council 
of  Trent  are  different  from  those  of  the  Reformers ; 
but  its  theology  is  the  same.  The  Tridentine 
scheme  presents  Semi-Pelagian  views  of  sin,  teaches 
the  doctrine  of  justification  in  part  by  works,  and 
nullifies  the  doctrine  of  endless  punishment  by  its 
purgatorial  fires.  But  it  adopts  the  trinitarian  sym¬ 
bols  of  the  Ancient  Church,  not  so  much  from  any 
vital  interest  in  them,  as  because  they  have  come 
down  from  the  past,  and  there  is  no  motive 
for  alteration,  and  no  intellectual  adventurousness 
prompting  to  the  formation  of  new  theories.  That 
the  Roman  Church  is  trinitarianly  orthodox,  because 
it  has  no  motive  to  be  otherwise,  is  proved  by  the 
fact  that  a  doctrine  which  lies  so  near  the  heart  of 
Christianity  as  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  and  which 
appeals  even  more  directly  to  the  heart  of  the  Chris- 


CONTINENTAL  AND  ENGLISH  REFORMERS.  379 


tian, — the  doctrine  of  forgiveness  solely  through 
the  atonement  of  Christ, — has  been  remorselessly 
mutilated,  and  in  effect  annihilated  by  it. 

The  Augsburg  Confession ,  the  chief  Lutheran 
symbol,  adopts  the  decisions  of  the  Nicene  Council 
respecting  the  unity  of  the  divine  Essence,  and  the 
three  Persons,  in  its  statement  that  there  is  “one 
divine  Essence  which  both  is,  and  is  called  God, 
eternal,  incorporeal,  indivisible,  infinite  in  power 
wisdom  and  goodness,  the  Creator  and  Preserver  of 
all  things  visible  and  invisible ;  and  yet,  there  are 
three  Persons,  of  the  same  essence  and  power,  co¬ 
eternal,  Fathei ,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit.” 1 

The  Second  Helvetic  Confession, ,  drawn  up  by 
Bullinger  in  1564,  is  as  fair  an  expression  of  the 
Reformed  or  Calvinistic  doctrine  as  any.  Its  teach¬ 
ing  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  is  as  follows : 
“We  believe  that  God,  one  and  indivisible  in  Es¬ 
sence,  is  without  division  or  confusion  distinct  in 
three  Persons,  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  so  that 
the  Father  generates  the  Son  from  eternity,  the  Son 
is  begotten  by  an  ineffable  generation,  but  the  Holy 
Spirit  proceeds  from  each  and  that  from  eternity, 
and  is  to  be  adored  together  with  each ;  so  that 
there  are  not  three  Gods,  but  three  Persons,  con- 
substantial,  coeternal,  and  coequal,  distinct  as  hy¬ 
postases,  and  one  having  precedence  of  another  as 
to  order,  but  with  no  un equality  as  to  essence.”  4 


1  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  p.  9  5  Niemeyer  :  Confessiones,  pp.  470, 471. 


380 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


The  trinit arianism  of  Calvin ,  as  enunciated  in 
his  Institutes,  is  a  very  clear  exhibition  of  the  Ni- 
cene  type  of  doctrine,  under  the  additional  light 
that  had  been  thrown  upon  the  subject  by  the 
thinking  of  Hilary  and  Augustine,  and  by  his  own 
profound  and  patient  study  of  the  Scriptures. 
uWhat  I  denominate  a  Person,”  he  says,1  “is  a 
subsistence  in  the  Divine  essence,  which  is  related 
to  the  others,  and  yet  distinguished  from  them  by 
an  incommunicable  property.  By  the  word  sub¬ 
sistence  we  mean  something  different  from  the  word 
essence.  For  if  the  Word  were  simply  God,  and 
had  no  peculiar  property,  John  had  been  guilty  of 
impropriety  in  saying  that  he  was  always  with  God. 
When  he  immediately  adds  that  the  Word  also  was 
God,  he  reminds  us  of  the  unity  of  the  essence. 
But,  because  he  could  not  be  with  God  without 
subsisting  in  the  Father,  hence  arises  that  subsist- 
ence,  which,  although  inseparably  connected  witk 
the  essence,  has  a  peculiar  mark,  by  which  it  is  dis¬ 
tinguished  from  it.  Now,  I  say  that  each  of  the  three 
subsistences  has  a  relation  to  the  others,  but  is  dis¬ 
tinguished  from  them  by  a  peculiar  property.  We 
particularly  use  the  word  relation  (or  comparison) 
here,  because  when  mention  is  made  simply  and  in¬ 
definitely  of  God,  this  name  pertains  no  less  to  the 
Son  and  Spirit,  than  to  the  Father.  But  whenever 
the  Father  is  compared  with  the  Son,  the  property 
peculiar  to  each  distinguishes  him  from  the  other. 


Calvin:  Institutes,  I.  xiii.  6. 


CONTINENTAL  AND  ENGLISH  REFORMERS.  381 


Thirdly,  whatever  is  proper  to  each  of  them,  I  assert 
to  be  incommunicable ,  because  whatever  is  ascribed 
to  the  Father  as  a  character  of  distinction,  cannot 
be  applied  or  transferred  to  the  Son.” 

Calvin,  as  did  the  Nicene  theologians,  carefully 
confined  the  term  “generation”  to  the  hypostatical 
character.  “We  teach,”  he  says,  “  according  to  the 
Scriptures,  that  there  is  essentially  but  one  God ; 
and  therefore,  that  the  essence  of  both  the  Son  and 
the  Spirit  is  unbegotten.  But  since  the  Father  is 
first  in  order,  and  hath  of  himself  begotten  his  Wis¬ 
dom,  therefore,  as  has  before  been  observed,  he  is 
justly  esteemed  the  original  and  fountain  of  the 
whole  Divinity.1  Thus  God,  indefinitely  [i.  e.  the 
Godhead,  the  Essence  in  distinction  from  the  Per¬ 
sons],  is  unbegotten ;  and  the  Father  also  is  unbe¬ 
gotten  with  regard  to  his  Person . The  Deity 

[the  Essence]  is  absolutely  self-existent ;  whence  we 
confess,  also,  that  the  Son,  as  God,  independently 
of  the  consideration  of  Person  is  self-existent ;  but 
as  the  Son,  we  say,  that  he  is  of  the  Father.  Thus 
his  essence  is  unoriginated ;  but  the  origin  of  his 
Person  is  God  himself.”2 


1  By  this  Calvin  means,  that  the 
Father  is  “  the  original  and  foun¬ 
tain  of  the  whole  Divinity,”  con¬ 
sidered  hypostatically ,  not  essen¬ 
tially  ;  for  he  expressly  says  that 
the  essence  is  unbegotten.  He 
means  that  the  Father  is  that 
hypostasis  from  whom  the  second 
and  third  hypostases  issue.  That 


this  is  the  correct  interpretation 
of  his  language,  is  proved  by  the 
fact,  that  in  the  section  following 
(§26)  that  from  which  the  above 
statement  is  taken,  Calvin  remarks 
that  utlie  Father  is  the  fountain 
of  the  Deity,  not  with  regard  to 
essence ,  but  in  respect  to  order.” 

2  Calvin  :  Institutes,  I.  xiii.  25. 


382 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Notwithstanding  the  clearness  and  explicitness 
of  Calvin’s  views,  he  was  accused  by  Caroli  of  both 
Arianism  and  Sabellianism.  He  defended  himself 
before  the  synod  of  Lausanne.  Caroli  held  it  to  be 
heresy  that  Calvin,  in  his  confession  there  presented, 
affirmed  that  Christ  is  that  Jehovah  who  of  himself, 
alone,  is  always  self-existent.  “  Certainly,”  said 
Calvin  in  reply,  “if  the  distinction  between  the 
Father  and  the  Word  be  attentively  considered,  we 
shall  say  that  the  one  is  from  the  other.  If  how¬ 
ever  the  essential  quality  of  the  Word  be  considered, 
in  so  far  as  He  is  one  God  with  the  Father,  what¬ 
ever  can  be  said  concerning  God  may  also  be  ap¬ 
plied  to  Him,  the  second  person  in  the  glorious 

Trinity . We  teach,  certainly,  that  Christ  is  the 

true  and  natural  Son  of  God,  who  has  possessed  the 
like  essential  deity  with  the  Father  from  all  eter¬ 
nity.”  1 

The  Nicene  trinitarianism  passed  also  into  the 
.  symbols  of  the  English  Churches  ;  both  the  Estab¬ 
lished  and  the  Non-Conforming.  The  Thirty-Nine 
Articles  teach  that  “  in  the  unity  of  the  Godhead 
there  be  three  Persons,  of  one  substance,  power,  and 
eternity ;  ”  and  that  the  Son  “  is  begotten  from  eter¬ 
nity  of  the  Father,  very  and  eternal  God,  of  one  sub¬ 
stance  with  the  Father.” 2  The  Westminster  Confes¬ 
sion  teaches  that  “  in  the  unity  of  the  Godhead  there 
be  three  Persons,  of  one  substance,  power,  and  eter- 

1  Calvin:  Letters,  Yol.  II.  pp.  s  Articles  I.  II. 

80,  31.  Edinburgh  Translation. 


UNITAKIANISM. 


383 


nity;  God  the  Father,  God  the  Son,  and  God  the 
Holy  Ghost.  The  Father  is  of  none,  neither  begot- 
ten,  nor  proceeding ;  the  Son  is  eternally  begotten 
of  the  Father ;  the  Holy  Ghost  eternally  proceed¬ 
ing  from  the  Father  and  the  Son.”1 


§  3.  Unitarianism . 

In  the  16th  century,  an  opposition  to  the  church 
doctrine  of  the  trinity  arose  in  the  modern  Uni¬ 
tarianism.  The  two  Italian  Socini  (Laelius  and 


1  Westminster  Confession  : 
Chapter  II. — The  Nicene  trin- 
itarianisra  came  with  the  English 
and  Continental  colonists  into  the 
American  churches.  The  Epis¬ 
copalian  Church  adopts  it,  in 
adopting  the  Thirty-Nine  Arti¬ 
cles.  The  Presbyterian  Church 
receives  it  in  the  Westminster 
Confession ;  as  did  also  the  early 
Congregational  churches.  The 
churches  of  New  England,  repre¬ 
sented  in  the  Synod  at  Boston  in 
1680,  made  their  statement  in  the 
following  phraseology:  “In  the 
unity  of  the  God-head  there  be 
three  persons,  of  one  substance, 
power,  and  eternity;  God  the 
Father,  God  the  Son,  and  God 
the  Holy  Ghost.  The  Father  is 
of  none,  neither  begotten,  nor 
proceeding;  the  Son  is  eternally 
begotten  of  the  Father;  the  Holy 
Ghost  eternally  proceeding  from 
the  Father  and  Son.”  (Boston 


Confession,  Chap.  II).  An  earn¬ 
est  defender  of  the  Nicene  doc¬ 
trine  of  “  eternal  generation  ” 
is  Samuel  Hopkins  (Works,  I. 
293  sq.),  the  leader  of  one  of  the 
later  New  England  schools.  The 
elder  Edwards  in  his  “Observa¬ 
tions  Concerning  the  Scripture 
Doctrine  of  the  Trinity”  (Scrib¬ 
ner’s  Sons,  1880),  adopts  sub¬ 
stantially  the  Nicene  trinitarian- 
ism.  During  the  present  century, 
some  opposition  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  Eternal  Sonship  lias  shown 
itself  in  a  few  New  England  writ¬ 
ers.  The  opposition,  however,  is 
founded  upon  an  inadequate  dog- 
matico-liistorical  knowledge, — 
the  Origenistic  theory  of  eternal 
generation,  as  revived  in  England 
in  the  last  century  by  Samuel 
Clarke,  being  mistaken  for  the 
historical  doctrine  of  Athanasius 
and  the  Nicene  theologians. 


384 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


Faustus),  by  their  writings  and  endeavours  in  other 
ways,  associated  and  centralized  those  in  the  midst 
of  Protestantism  who  agreed  in  their  rejection  of 
the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  and  gave  the  party  an 
external  form  and  position.  The  growing  spirit  of 
toleration  in  the  Protestant  Church  favoured  them, 
and  permitted  the  Socini  to  do  what  was  forbidden 
to  their  predecessor  Servetus ,  at  the  time  of  the 
Reformation,  and  for  attempting  which  he  lost  his 
life  at  the  stake, — a  measure,  it  should  be  observed, 
that  was  approved  in  that  age  by  theologians  of  all 
parties,  both  Roman  and  Protestant,  and  was  by  no 
means  a  distinctively  Calvinistic  procedure.  One  of 
the  Polish  Palatines  afforded  this  party  an  asylum, 
and  encouraged  it  in  many  ways.  It  flourished  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  produce  a  body  of  theologians, 
and  to  construct  a  creed.  The  writings  of  the 
Fratres  Poloni  are  to  this  day  the  ablest  in  the 
Unitarian  theology,  and  the  Racovian  Creed  and 
Catechism,  drawn  up  by  them,  contain  an  explicit 
and  logical  announcement  of  the  Unitarian  scheme, 
which  it  would  be  for  the  interest  of  their  modern 
successors  to  adopt,  and  of  their  modern  opposers 
to  examine.  The  only  statement  of  Unitarianism 
that  has  any  interest  for  the  scientific  theologian 
must  be  sought  for  in  that  period  of  its  history 
when  it  had  both  a  creed  and  a  catechism.1 

This  scheme  of  doctrine  did  not,  however,  attract 

1  Sohomann  in  1591,  Faustus  yius  in  1625,  published  cate 
Sooinus  in  1618,  and  Moscoko-  cliism#. 


LATITU  DINA  RIAN  TRINITARIANISM. 


385 


any  very  considerable  attention  on  the  part  of  the 
church.  It  was  a  less  profound  form  of  error,  than 
that  Sabellianism  and  Arianism  which  in  the 
first  centuries  had  compelled  the  theologian  to  em¬ 
ploy  his  most  extensive  learning,  and  his  subtlest 
thinking.  As  a  consequence,  it  has  been,  and  still 
is,  confined  to  but  a  small  portion  of  the  Protestant 
world.  Had  Unitarianism  adopted  into  its  concep¬ 
tion  of  Christ  those  more  elevated  views  of  his 
nature  and  person  which  clung  to  Sabellianism,  and 
even  to  Arianism,  it  would  have  been  a  more  influ¬ 
ential  system.  But  merely  reproducing  that  low 
humanitarian  view  of  Christ  which  we  found  in  the 
third  class  of  Anti-Trinitarians  of  the  2d  and  3d 
centuries, — the  Ebionites,  Artemonites,  Theodo- 
tians,  and  Alogi, — the  Unitarian  Christ  possessed 
nothing  that  could  lift  the  mind  above  the  sphere 
of  the  merely  human,  and  nothing  that  could  inspire 
the  religious  affections  of  veneration  and  worship. 

§  4.  Latitudinarian  Trinitarianism  in  the  English 

and  German  Churches. 

In  the  18th  and  19th  centuries,  the  history  of 
the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity  presents  little  that  is 
new.  The  English  Church  during  the  18th  centu¬ 
ry  was  called  upon  to  defend  the  catholic  faith  from 
the  attacks  of  Socinians  and  Allans, — the  former 
mostly  in  the  Dissenting  Churches,  and  the  latter 
within  its  own  communion.  The  opinions  and  state- 


386 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


merits  of  Priestley  were  reviewed  and  refuted  in  a 
superior  manner,  by  Horsley ,  bishop  of  St.  Asaph. 
Those  of  Samuel  Clarice,  who  was  court  preacher  to 
Queen  Anne,  and  by  her  deposed  from  his  office, 
were  examined  by  Water  land,  Master  of  Magdalen 
College. 

Clarke’s  views  were,  in  reality,  a  reproduction 
of  the  Origenistic  and  High-Arian  doctrine  of  sub¬ 
ordination,  as  distinguished  from  the  Athanasian. 
His  positions  were  the  following.  The  supreme 
and  only  God  is  the  Father,  the  sole  origin  of  all 
being,  power,  and  authority.  “  Concerning  the 
Father,  it  would  be  the  highest  blasphemy  to  affirm 
that  he  could  possibly  have  become  man ;  or  that 
he  could  possibly  have  suffered  in  any  sense,  in  any 
supposition,  in  any  capacity,  in  any  circumstance,  in 
any  state,  or  in  any  nature  whatsoever.” 1  With  the 
Father,  there  has  existed  u from  the  beginning”  a 
second  divine  Person,  who  is  called  his  Word  or  Son, 
who  derives  his  being  or  essence,  and  all  his  attri¬ 
butes,  from  the  Father,  not  by  mere  necessity  of  na¬ 
ture,  but  by  an  act  of  the  Father's  optional  will.  It 
is  not  certain  whether  the  Son  existed  from  all  eter¬ 
nity,  or  only  before  all  worlds  ;  neither  is  it  certain 
whether  the  Son  was  begotten  from  the  same  es¬ 
sence  with  the  Father,  or  made  out  of  nothing 
“  Both  are  worthy  of  censure,  who,  on  the  one  hand, 
affirm  that  the  Son  was  made  out  of  nothing;  or, 
on  the  other,  affirm  that  he  is  the  self-existent  sub- 

‘Clarke:  On  tlie  Trinity,  Ch.  II.  §  v. 


LATITUDINARIAN  TRINIT  ARIANISM. 


387 


stance.”  Clarke  will  not  be  positive  upon  these 
points,  because  of  the  danger  of  presuming  to  be 
able  to  define  the  particular  metaphysical  manner 
of  the  Son’s  deriving  his  essence  from  the  Father. 
With  the  Father,  a  third  Person  has  also  existed, 
deriving  his  essence  from  him  through  the  Son ; 
this  Person  has  higher  titles  ascribed  to  him  than 
to  any  angel,  or  other  created  being  whatsoever, 
but  is  nowhere  called  God  in  Scripture,  being  sub¬ 
ordinate  to  the  Son,  both  by  nature ,  and  by  the 
will  of  the  Father.1 2 

The  error  of  Clarke  originated  in  his  failure  to 
discriminate  carefully  between  the  essence  and  the 
hypostasis.  Hence,  in  quoting  from  the  Scriptures, 
and  the  Fathers,  he  refers  to  the  essential  nature 
phraseology  that  implies  subordination,  and  which 
was  intended  by  those  emploving  it,  to  apply  only 
to  the  hypostatical  character ?  He  even  cites  such 
high  trinitarians  as  Athanasius  and  Hilary,  as  hold¬ 
ing  and  teaching  that  the  subordination  of  the  Son 
to  the  Father  relates  to  the  Son’s  essence .  The 


1  Nelson:  Life  of  Bull,  p.  276. 

2  Clarke,  in  his  reply  to  Nel¬ 
son  (p.  4),  in  answering  the  com¬ 
plaint  of  Nelson  that  he  (Clarke) 
had  cited  Bull  to  prove  senti¬ 
ments  directly  contrary  to  those 
which  Bull  held,  says  :  u  This 
objection,  you  are  sensible,  I  had 
endeavored  to  prevent ;  by  de¬ 
claring  beforehand,  that  I  cited 
modern  authors,  and  the  Fathers 


too,  not  with  any  intention  to 
show  what  was  on  the  whole  the 
opinion  of  those  authors.  .  .  .  but 
only  to  show  what  important 
concessions  they  were  obliged  to 
make ;  even  such  concessions,  as 
of  necessity  and  in  strictness  of 
argument  inferred  my  conclusion , 
whether  the  authors  themselves 
made  any  such  inference  or 
no.” 


388 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


term  u  unbegotten  ”  be  also  held,  as  did  tbe  Arians, 
to  be  a  synonyme  with  u  uncreated,”  so  that  tbe 
term  “  begotten  ”  must  necessarily  signify  “  cre¬ 
ated.”  1  Thus  misconcei  ving  tbe  Nicene  use  of  these 
two  terms,  be  endeavours  to  prove  that  tbe  Nicene 
trinitarians  taught  that  the  Father  alone  possesses 
necessary  existence,  while  the  Son  exists  contin¬ 
gently.  But  both  of  these  terms,  as  we  have  seen, 
were  limited  by  the  council  of  Nice  to  the  Person, 
and  have  no  relation  to  the  Essence.  The  Essence, 
as  such,  neither  begets,  nor  is  begotten.  They 
merely  indicate  the  peculiar  manner  in  which  the 
first  and  second  hypostases  participate  in  one  and 
the  same  eternal  substance  or  nature.  In  this  use 
of  the  terms,  consequently,  “  begotten  ”  signifies 
u  uncreated  ”  as  much  as  does  “  unbegotten.”  The 
Begotten  Son  is  as  necessarily  existent  as  the  Un¬ 
begotten  Father,  because  the  Essence  is  the  seat 
and  source  of  necessary  existence,  and  this  is  pos¬ 
sessed  alike  by  both, — in  the  instance  of  the  first 
Person  by  paternity,  and  of  the  second  by  filiation. 

In  the  controversy  between  Clarke  and  Water- 
land,  a  distinction  was  made  by  the  latter  between 
self-existence,  and  necessary  existence,  which  it  is 
important  to  notice.  Waterland  attributes  neces¬ 
sary  existence  to  the  Son,  but  denies  self-existence 
to  him.  The  second  Person,  he  maintains,  is  neces¬ 
sarily  existent,  because  he  participates  in  the  one 


1  Olaeke  :  On  the  Trinity,  Pt.  I.  ch.  ii.  §  5  ;  Pt.  II.  §11,  12. 


L  ATITUDIN  ART  AN  TRIXITARIANISM. 


389 


substance  of  the  Godhead ;  but  he  is  not  ^Zf-exist- 
ent,  because  he  participates  in  it,  not  by  and  from 
himself,  but  by  communication  from  the  Father. 
The  first  Person  is  both  necessarily  existent  and 
self-existent,  because  he  not  only  participates  in  the 
Divine  Essence,  but  does  so  without  any  communi¬ 
cation  of  it  to  him  by  either  of  the  other  two  Per¬ 
sons  in  the  trinity.  According  to  this  distinction 
and  discrimination,  “self-existent”  simply  means 
“  unbegotten .”  “  I  suppose,”  says  Waterland,  “  the 

Father  to  be  Father  of  his  Son  ;  which  expresses  a 
relation  of  order ,  and  mode  of  existence ;  not  any 
difference  in  any  essential  perfection.  Neither  is 
there  any  greater  perfection  in  being  a  Father,  in 
this  case,  than  in  being  a  Son ;  both  are  equally 
perfect,  equally  necessary,  in  respect  of  existence, — 
all  things  being  common,  but  the  personal  charac¬ 
ters.  And  self- existence,  as  distinct  from  necessary 
existence,  is  expressive  only  of  the  order  and  man¬ 
ner  in  which  the  perfections  are  in  the  Father,  and 
not  of  any  distinct  perfection.  With  this  answer 
the  catholic  Fathers  baffled  the  Arians  and  Euno- 
mians.” 1  Waterland  thus  sums  up  the  difference 
between  himself  and  his  opponent.  “We  say  the 
Son  is  not  self-existent,  meaning  that  he  is  not  un¬ 
originate  [or  unbegotten].  You  not  only  say  the 
same,  but  contend  for  it,  meaning  not  necessarily 
existing .  We  say,  not  unoriginate,  meaning  that 


1  Waterland  :  Second  Defence,  Question  III. 


390 


HISTORY  OF  THEOLOGY. 


lie  is  not  the  head  or  fountain,  not  th e  first  Person 
of  the  trinity.  You  take  up  the  very  same  word, 
and  zealously  contend  that  the  Son  is  not  unorigi¬ 
nate,  understanding  it  in  respect  to  time  or  duration. 
We  say  the  Son  is  subordinate,  meaning  it  of  a  sub¬ 
ordination  of  order ,  as  is  just  and  proper.  You  also 
lay  hold  of  the  word  subordinate,  and  seem  won¬ 
derfully  pleased  with  it,  but  understanding  by  it  an 
inferiority  of  nature.  We  say,  that  the  Son  is 
not  absolutely  supreme  or  independent,  intimating 
thereby  that  he  is  second  in  order  as  a  Son,  and  has 
no  separate,  independent  existence  from  the  Father, 
being  coessentially,  and  coeternally  one  with  him. 
You  also  take  up  the  same  words,  interpret  them  in 
a  low  sense,  and  make  the  Son  an  inferior  depend¬ 
ent  Being , — depending  at  first  on  the  will  of  the 
Father  for  his  existence,  and  afterwards  for  the 
continuance  of  it.” 1 

On  the  Continent,  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity 
has  been  most  discussed,  during  the  present  century, 
within  the  German  Church.  The  nationalists  have 
rejected  trinitarianism  altogether,  and  have  adopted 
the  Deistical  conception  of  God, — substantially  that 
of  Socinianism.  So  far  as  the  Orthodox  theology 
has  been  affected  by  the  pantheistic  systems  of  phi¬ 
losophy,  it  is  easy  to  see  a  leaning  in  it  towards  the 
Sabellian  construction  of  the  trinity.  The  attempt 
of  Schleiermacher  to  evince  the  substantial  accord- 


1  Watekland  :  Vindication,  Question  XIII. 


LATIT UDIJST ARIAN  TRINITARI ANISM. 


391 


ance  of  the  Sabellian  with  the  catholic  scheme, 
while  unsuccessful  before  the  bar  of  science,  had  the 
effect  to  modify  the  views  of  his  school.  Some  of 
the  essays  upon  the  trinity  that  are  occasionally 
appearing  in  German  periodical  literature,  betoken 
an  inclination  towards  the  theory  of  a  modal  trinity. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  worthy  of  notice,  that  the 
learned  and  logical  histories  of  the  Doctrine  of  the 
Trinity  that  have  been  produced  in  Germany,  within 
the  last  half  century,  whether  proceeding  from  a 
friend  or  an  enemy  of  the  orthodox  creed,  from  a 
Dorner  or  a  Baur,  show  very  conclusively,  by  their 
manner  of  construing  the  historical  facts,  that  it  is 
the  received  opinion  that,  whether  true  or  false, 
the  Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan  symbol  contains  the 
historical  trinitarianism  adopted  by  the  Ancient, 
the  Mediaeval,  and  the  Modern  Church. 


CHAPTER  Y. 


DOCTRINE  OF  THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST. 


§  1.  Principal  Heresies  in  Christology. 

Four  factors  are  necessary  in  order  to  the  com¬ 
plete  conception  of  Christ’s  Person:  1.  True  and 
proper  deity;  2.  True  and  proper  humanity;  3. 
The  union  of  deity  and  humanity  in  one  Person ; 
4.  The  distinction  of  deity  from  humanity,  in  the 
one  Person,  so  that  there  be  no  mixture  of  natures. 
If  either  of  these  is  wanting,  the  dogmatic  statement 
is  an  erroneous  one.  The  heresies  which  originated 
in  the  Ancient  Church  took  their  rise,  in  the  failure 
to  combine  all  these  elements  in  the  doctrinal  state¬ 
ment.  Some  one  or  more  of  these  integral  parts  of 
the  subject  were  adopted,  while  the  others  were 
rejected.  The  classification  of  the  ancient  errors  in 
Christology  will,  therefore,  very  naturally  follow 
the  above  enumeration.1 

1  Compare  Guericke  :  Church  History,  §  87-90 ;  Hooker  :  Eccle¬ 
siastical  Polity,  Book  V.  Ch.  li-lv. 


HERESIES  IN  CHRISTOLOGY. 


393 


I.  The  Arians  would  not  concede  the  existence 
of  a  truly  and  properly  divine  nature  in  the  Person 
of  Jesus  Christ.  Even  the  Semi-Arians,  who  al¬ 
lowed  that  the  Son  of  God,  or  the  Logos,  was  of  a 
nature  similar  to  that  of  God,  yet  not  identical 
with  it,  could  not  attribute  absolute  divinity  to  the 
Redeemer  of  the  world.  That  exalted  and  pre¬ 
existent  being  who  became  incarnate  in  Christ,  even 
upon  the  Semi-Arian  theory  could  not  be  called 
God- man  with  technical  accuracy.  But  the  Arian 
Christ  was  confessedly  lacking  in  a  divine  nature, 
in  every  sense  of  the  term.  Though  the  Son  of 
God  was  united  with  human  nature,  in  the  birth  of 
Jesus,  yet  that  Son  of  God  was  a  xr io^ia,  He  in¬ 
deed  existed  long  before  that  birth,  but  not  from 
eternity.  The  only  element,  consequently,  in  the 
Arian  construction  of  Christ’s  Person  that  was  pre¬ 
served  intact  and  pure  was  the  humanity.  Upon 
this  point  the  Arians  were  orthodox. 

Into  the  same  class  with  the  Arians,  fall  the 
earlier  Nominal  Trinitarians .  Inasmuch  as,  in 
their  construction  of  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity,  the 
Son  is  not  a  subsistence  {ynooraOLg)  in  the  Essence, 
but  only  an  effluence  (dvvajucg)  or  energy  issuing 
from  it,  they  could  not  logically  assert  the  union  of 
the  divine  nature ,  or  the  very  substance  of  the  God¬ 
head,  with  the  humanity  of  Jesus.  A  merely  efflu¬ 
ent  energy  proceeding  from  the  deity,  and  entering 
the  humanity  of  Christ,  would  be  nothing  more 
than  an  indwelling  inspiration  kindred  to  that  of 


394 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTOLOGY. 


the  prophets.  The  element  of  true  essential  deity, 
in  union  with  true  essential  humanity,  in  the  Per¬ 
son  of  Christ,  was,  consequently,  wanting  in  the 
Christology  of  the  Nominal  Trinitarians. 

II.  The  Monarchians ,  or  Patripassians ,  went 
to  the  opposite  extreme  of  error.  They  asserted 
the  true  and  proper  deity  in  Christ’s  Person,  but 
denied  his  humanity.  According  to  them,  the  one 
single  Person  of  the  Godhead,  the  true  and  absolute 
deity,  united  itself  with  a  human  body,  but  not  with 
a  human  rational  soul.  The  humanity  in  Christ’s 
Person  was  thus  incomplete. j  It  lacked  the  rational 
part, — the  spirit  as  distinguished  from  the  flesh. 

This  Patripassian  Christology  received  a  slight 
modification  from  Apollinaris  bishop  of  Laodicea 
(f  382),  who  has  given  the  name  of  Apollinarism 
to  the  scheme.  The  threefold  division  of  human 
nature,  into  body  ( ocj/na ),  soul  {ipv/Ji),  and  spirit 
( nvkvpa ),  had  become  current,  and  Apollinaris  sup¬ 
posed  that  it  would  be  easier  to  conceive  of,  and 
explain  Christ’s  Person,  if  the  Logos  were  regarded 
as  taking  the  place  of  the  higher  rational  principle 
in  the  ordinary  threefold  nature  of  man,  and  there¬ 
by  becoming  an  integral  portion  of  the  humanity.1 
But  upon  this  scheme,  the  Divine  did  not  take  to 
itself  a  complete  and  entire  human  nature,  any  more 


According  to  Suidas  (sub  voce  Reason:  yap  bcrj'irivai  fya'i 

’ATToAXii'apiof),  Apollinaris  thought  rrjv  aapKa  e Kfiv-qv  av^Sponivov  voos , 
the  human  reason  would  be  a  su-  rjyepovevopti-rju  l mo  tov  avrrjv  ev$(- 
perfluity  in  union  with  the  Divine  8vn6ms  3fo£. 


HERESIES  IN  CHRISTOLOGY. 


395 


than  in  the  original  Patripassian  theory.  The  ma¬ 
terial  body,  with  the  animal  soul,  or  the  vital  prin¬ 
ciple,  is  by  no  means  the  whole  of  man.  The  Logos, 
upon  this  theory,  was  united  with  a  fundamentally 
defective  and  mutilated  humanity.  For  if  the  ra¬ 
tional  part  be  subtracted  from  man,  he  becomes 
either  an  idiot  or  a  brute.  It  is  true  that  Apollin- 
arism  supplies  the  deficiency  with  the  Divine  Rea¬ 
son  ;  but  it  is  no  less  true,  that  at  the  instant  of 
the  union  of  the  two  natures,  the  human  part  is 
merely  the  body  {adjjua)^  with  its  vital  principle 
(ipvyji).  It  is  irrational,  and  God  assumes  into  per¬ 
sonal  union  with  himself  a  merely  brutal  nature. 
The  human  factor,  consequently,  was  defective  in 
the  Apollinarian  Christology. 

III.  The  third  general  error  in  Christology,  that 
arose  in  the  Ancient  Church,  is  the  Nestorian } 
By  this  we  mean  the  theory  that  was  finally  elim¬ 
inated  by  the  controversies  between  Nestorius  and 
his  opponents.  Whether  it  was  a  theory  which 
Nestorius  himself  would  have  accepted  in  the  open¬ 
ing  of  the  controversy,  or  one  that  he  intended  to 
construct,  is  certainly  open  to  debate.  But  Nesto- 
rian/sm  was  a  definite  scheme,  when  ultimately 
formed,  and  is  wanting  in  some  essential  elements 
and  features. 

The  defect  in  the  Nestorian  Christology  relates 
not  to  the  distinction  of  the  two  natures,  but  to  the 

1  Compare  Walch:  Ketzerhistorie ;  and  Dollinger  :  Church  His¬ 
tory,  II.  150,  152  sq. 


396 


HISTORY  OF  CIIRISTOLOGY. 


union  of  the  two  in  one  Person.  A  true  and  proper 
deity  and  a  true  and  proper  humanity  are  conceded. 
But  they  are  not  united  in  a  single  self-conscious 
personality.  The  Nestorian  Christ  is  two  persons, 
— one  divine,  and  one  human.  The  important  dis¬ 
tinction  between  a  “  nature  ”  and  a  u  person  ”  is  not 
observed,  and  the  consequence  is  that  there  are  two 
separate  and  diverse  selves  in  Jesus  ChristJ  Instead 
of  a  blending  of  the  two  natures  into  only  one  self, 
(Che  Nestorian  scheme  places  two  selves  side  by  side, 
and  allows  only  a  moral  and  sympathetic  union  be¬ 
tween  them.  The  result  is  that  the  acts  of  each 
nature  derive  no  character  from  the  qualities  of  the 
other.  There  is  no  divine  humiliation,  because  the 
humanity  is  confessedly  the  seat  of  the  humiliation, 
and  the  humanity  is  by  itself,  unblended  in  the 
unity  of  a  common  self-consciousness.  And  there  is 
no  exaltation  of  the  humanity,  because  the  divinity 
is  confessedly  the  source  of  the  exaltation,  and  this 
tf  lso  is  insulated  and  isolated  for  the  same  reason. 


1  “Between  Nestorius  and  the 
church  of  God,  there  was  no  dif¬ 
ference,  saving  only  that  Nesto- 
rius  imagined  in  Christ  as  well 
a  personal  human  subsistence,  as 
a  divine  ;  the  church  acknowledg¬ 
ing  a  substance  both  divine  and 
human,  but  no  other  personal  sub¬ 
sistence  [i.  e.  personal  ego]  than 
divine,  because  the  Son  of  God 
took  not  to  himself  a  man’s  per¬ 
son,  but  the  nature,  only,  of  a 


man.”  Hooker:  Eccles.  Polity, 
Book  Y.  Ch.  liii.  The  anath¬ 
emas  which  Nestorius  uttered 
against  the  doctrine  of  Cyril 
separate  the  two  natures  very 
plainly.  He  appears  to  regard 
the  union,  or  rather,  the  associa¬ 
tion  of  deity  with  humanity  as 
occurring  at  birth,  and  represents 
the  humanity  as  laid  aside  again 
after  Christ’s  death  and  resurrec¬ 
tion.  Milman  :  Book  II.  Ch.  iii. 


HERESIES  IN  CHRISTOLOGY. 


397 


There  is  God,  and  there  is  man ;  but  there  is  no 
God-Man?) 

IV.  The  fourth  of  the  ancient  heresies  in  Christ- 
ology  is  the  Eutychian  or  Monophysite.  This  is 
the  opposite  error  to  Nestorianism.  It  asserts  the 
unity  of  self-consciousness  in  the  Person  of  Christ, 
but  loses  the  duality  of  the  natures^}  Eutyches 
taught  that  in  the  incarnation  the  human  nature 

O 


was  transmuted  into  the  divine ;  so  that  the  result¬ 
ant  was  one  person  and  one  nature.  For  this  reason, 
.the  Euty chians  held  that  it  was  accurate  and  proper 
to  say  that  u  God  suffered,” — meaning  thereby  that 
He  suffered  in  God’s  nature?^)  When  the  Catholics 
employed  this  phrase,  as  they  sometimes  did,  it  was 
with  the  meaning  that  God  suffered  in  man’s  nature. 
“When  the  apostle,”  remarks  Hooker,  “saith  of 
the  Jews  that  they  crucified  the  Lord  of  Glory 
(1  Cor.  ii.  8),  we  must  needs  understand  the  whole 
person  of  Christ,  who,  being  Lord  of  Glory,  was 
indeed  crucified,  but  not  in  that  nature  for  which  he 
is  termed  the  Lord  of  Glory.  In  like  manner,  when 
the  Son  of  Man,  being  on  earth,  affirmeth,  that  the 
Son  of  Man  was  in  heaven  at  the  same  instant  (John 
iii.  13),  by  the  Son  of  Man  must  necessarily  be 
meant,  the  whole  person  of  Christ,  who  being  man 
upon  earth,  filled  heaven  with  his  glorious  presence, 
but  not  according  to  that  nature  for  which  the  title 
of  Man  is  given  him.” 1 


1  Hooker  :  Eccl.  Pol.  Book  V.  Ch.  liv. 


398 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTOLOGY. 


The  councils  of  Nice  and  Constantinople,  in  de* 
termining  the  true  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity,  assisted  to  settle  the  doctrine  of  Christ's 
Person,  indirectly.  So  far  as  his  deity  was  con¬ 
cerned,  the  Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan  creed  fur¬ 
nished  material  that  must  necessarily  go  into  a 
scriptural  Christology.  But  it  did  not  come  within 
the  purpose  of  these  councils  to  make  statements 
respecting  Christ’s  humanity,  or  to  determine  the 
relations  of  the  two  natures  to  each  other.  It  was 
for  this  reason,  among  others,  that  the  subject  of 
Christology  was  less  developed  than  that  of  the 
Trinity ;  and  that  men  like  Apollinaris,  who  were 
correct  in  their  Trinitarian  views,  should  embody  an 
error  in  their  Christological  theory.  These  various 
errors  and  deficiencies  in  the  statement  of  the  doc* 
trine  of  Christ’s  Person  were  finally  corrected  and 
filled  out,  in  the  creed  drawn  up  by  the  Council  of 
Chalcedony  in  451.  The  Council  of  Ephesus ,  in 
431,  had  made  some  beginning  towards  the  settle¬ 
ment  of  the  questions  involved;  but  this,  though 
summoned  as  such,  was  not  strictly  an  oecumenical 
council,  and  was  too  much  under  the  influence  of 
the  then  Monophysitizing  Cyril 1  to  yield  a  compre¬ 
hensive  and  impartial  result. 

1  Cyril’s  anathematizing  posi-  incarnation,  the  distinction  be- 
tions,  which  he  succeeded  in  tween  the  two  natures  no  longer 
forcing  upon  the  Council  of  Ephe-  existed.  This  he  afterwards  tacit- 
sus,  in  481,  asserted  that  after  the  ly  retracted,  though  not  formally. 


THE  CHALCEDON  CHRISTOLOGY. 


399 


§  2.  The  Chalcedon  Christology . 

The  Chalcedon  Symbol1  defines  the  Person  of 
Christ  as  follows.  “  We  teach  that  Jesus  Christ  is 
perfect  as  respects  godhood,  and  perfect  as  respects 
manhood ;  that  he  is  truly  God,  and  truly  a  man 
consisting  of  a  rational  soul  and  a  body ;  that  he  is 
consubstantial  ( o/lioovolov )  with  the  Father  as  to 
his  divinity,  and  consubstantial  ( d/noovGtov )  with 
us  as  to  his  humanity,  and  like  us  in  all  respects  sin 
excepted.  He  was  begotten  of  the  Father,  before 
creation  (tiqo  aicovcov ),  as  to  his  deity  ;  but  in  these 
last  days  he  was  born  of  Mary  the  mother  of  God 
( Storoxog ),2 3  as  to  his  humanity.  He  is  one  Christ, 


1  See  Mansi,  VII.  108;  Gue¬ 
ricke’s  Church  History,  §  89  ; 
Gieseler’s  Church  History,  I. 

§  89. 

3  The  Catholics  were  tenacious 
of  this  word  as  applied  to  the 
“  person  ”  in  distinction  from  the 
“  natures.”  The  mother,  they 
maintained,  is  the  mother  of  the 
whole  person,  although  the  soul, 
as  the  immaterial  nature,  is  not 
conceived, — the  theory  of  Crea¬ 
tionism  being  adopted.  As  the 
human  mother  gives  birth,  not 
merely  to  the  body,  but  to  the 
whole  person,  which  consists  of 
a  real  and  essential  union  of 
body  and  soul,  so  the  Virgin  Ma¬ 
ry,  although  she  did  not  give  birth 
to  the  divine  nature,  as  such,  is 
nevertheless  the  mother  of  the 
God-Man,  who  is  a  Person  com¬ 


posed  of  deity  and  humanity. 
And  as  the  God-Man  may  be 
properly  denominated  God,  Mary 
was,  in  this  sense,  SforoVor.  That 
she  was  not  the  “  Mother  of  God,” 
in  the  sense  that  the  divine  na¬ 
ture  was  conceived  and  born  of 
her,  is  proved  by  the  guarding 
clause  in  the  creed  statement, — 
“  he  was  born  of  Mary  the  mother 
of  God,  as  to  his  humanity"  The 
object  of  the  Chalcedon  divines, 
in  the  use  of  the  term  SeoroKoy, 
was  to  teach,  that  Mary  was  not 
the  mother  of  a  mere  and  ordi¬ 
nary  man,  as  the  Nestorian  doc¬ 
trine  would  imply.  For,  accord¬ 
ing  to  Nestorianism,  Christ  was 
the  second  Person  in  the  Trinity 
associated,  by  a  merely  moral 
union,  with  a  distinct  human  per¬ 
son, — of  which  distinct  and  sepa* 


400 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTOLOGY. 


existing  in  two  natures  without  mixture  ( dovy^v « 
rcog ),  without  change  (diQbTrrcog),  without  division 
( ddiouQbTCQQ ),  without  separation  ( d^cjQiorcog ), — 
the  diversity  of  the  two  natures  not  being  at 
all  destroyed  by  their  union  in  the  person,  but 
the  peculiar  properties  (idcor^g)  of  each  nature 
being  preserved,  and  concurring  to  one  person 
( 7tqo6 coxov ),  and  one  subsistence  ( vttootgcolv ).”  j 

This  statement  not  only  asserts  that  thercr  are 
two  natures  in  Christ’s  Person,  but  also  adjusts  theii 
relation  to  each  other. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  according  to  the  Chalcedou 
symbol,  the  uniting  of  the  two  natures  in  one  person¬ 
ality  does  not  confuse  or  mix  them,  in  such  a  man¬ 
ner  as  to  destroy  their  distinctive  properties.  The 
deity  of  Christ  is  just  as  pure  and  simple  deity,  after 
the  incarnation,  as  before  it.  And  the  humanity 
of  Christ  is  just  as  pure  and  simple  human  nature  as 
that  of  Mary  his  mother,  or  any  other  human  indi¬ 
vidual,  sin  being  excluded.  The  unifying  act,  by 
which  the  nature  of  God,  and  the  nature  of  man, 
are  blended  into  one  personal  subsistence,  does  not 
in  the  least  alter  their  constituent  properties.  The 


rate  human  person  alone ,  Mary 
was  the  mother.  The  Clialcedon 
position  was  that  the  union  of  the 
two  natures  was  embryonic ,  in 
and  by  the  miraculous  conception 
in  the  womb  of  the  Virgin,  so 
that  “  that  holy  thing  born  ”  of 
her  (Luke  i  35)  was  theanthropic. 
It  was  not  a  mere  man,  but  a 


God-Man  that  was  conceived, 
and  not  a  mere  man,  but  a  God- 
Man  that  was  born.  And  in  de¬ 
nominating  Mary  SeoroKor,  as  the 
Catholic  Church  did,  they  meant 
that  she  was  the  mother  of  the 
entire  Divine-human  Person , — 
she  was  the  mother  of  Jesus 
Christ. 


THE  CIIALCEDON  CHRISTOLOGY. 


401 


human  nature  is  not  transmuted  into  the  divine ; 
the  divine  nature  is  not  transmuted  into  the  human ; ) 
neither  is  there  a  tertium  quid  formed  by  mixing 
the  two, — a  third  Divine-human  nature  that  is 
neither  human  nor  divineT) 

2.  In  the  second  place,  the  Chalcedon  statement 
prohibits  the  division  of  Christ  into  two  selves  or 
persons.  The  incarnating  act,  while  it  makes  no 
changes  in  the  properties  of  the  two  united  natures, 
gives  as  a  resultant  a  Person  that  is  a  tertium  quid , 
a  resultant  that  is  neither  a  human  person,  nor  a 
divine  person,  but  a  theanthropic  person.  For,  if 
we  have  reference  merely  to  his  self -consciousness, 
or  personality,  Jesus  Christ  is  neither  human,  nor 
divine,  but  is  Divine-human.  Contemplating  him 
as  the  resultant  of  the  union  of  God  and  man,  he  is 
not  to  be  denominated  God,  and  he  is  not  to  be  de¬ 
nominated  man ;  but  he  is  to  be  denominated  God- 
Man.  The  “  person  ”  of  Jesus  Christ,  as  distin¬ 
guished  from  the  “  natures  ”  that  compose  it,  is  a 
theanthropic  person^  Says  Leo  the  Great:  “Two 
natures  met  together  in  our  Redeemer,  and  while 
the  properties  of  each  remained,  so  great  a  unity 
was  made  of  either  substance,  that  from  the  time 
that  the  Word  was  made  flesh  in  the  virgin’s  womb, 
we  may  neither  think  of  Him  as  God  without  this 
which  is  man,  nor  as  man  without  this  which  is  God. 
Each  nature  certifies  its  own  reality  under  distinct 
actions,  but  neither  disjoins  itself  from  connexion 
with  the  other.  Nothing  is  wanting  from  either 
26 


402 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTOLOGY. 


towards  the  other ;  there  is  entire  littleness  in 
majesty,  entire  majesty  in  littleness;  unity  does  not 
introduce  confusion,  nor  does  propriety  divide  unity. 
There  is  one  thing  passible,  another  impassible,  yet 
his  is  the  contumely  whose  is  the  glory.  He  is  in 
infirmity  who  is  in  power ;  the  self-same  Person  is 
both  capable,  and  conqueror,  of  death.  God  did 
then  take  on  Him  whole  man,  and  so  knit  Him¬ 
self  into  him,  and  him  into  Himself,  in  pity 
and  in  power,  that  either  nature  was  in  the 
other,  and  neither  in  the  other  lost  its  own  prop¬ 
erty.”  1 

This  union  of  two  natures  in  one  self-conscious 
Ego  -may  be  illustrated  by  reference  to  man’s  per¬ 
sonal  constitution.  An  individual  man  is  one  per¬ 
son.  But  this  one  person  consists  of  two  natures, — 
a  material  nature,  and  a  mental  nature.  The  per¬ 
sonality,  the  self-consciousness,  is  the  resultant  of 
the  union  of  the  two.  Neither  one  of  itself  makes 
the  person.  Both  body  and  soul  are  requisite  in 
order  to  a  complete  individuality.  The  two  natures 
do  not  make  two  individuals.  The  material  nature, 
taken  by  itself,  is  not  the  man  ;  and  the  mental 
part,  taken  by  itself,  is  not  the  man.  But  only  the 
union  of  the  two  is.  Yet,  in  this  intimate  union  of 
two  such  diverse  substances  as  matter  and  mind, 
body  and  soul,  there  is  not  the  slightest  alteration 
of  the  properties  of  each  substance  or  nature  A  The 

1  Leo  Magnus  :  Sermo  LII.  ii.  II.  706  sq. ;  Hooker  :  ECcl.  Pol. 
Compare  Dorner:  Person  Christi,  Book  V.  Ch.  li.  sq. 


THE  CHALCEDON  CHRISTOLOGY. 


403 


body  of  a  man  is  as  truly  and  purely  material,  as  a 
piece  of  granite ;  and  the  immortal  mind  of  a  man 
is  as  truly  and  purely  spiritual  and  immaterial,  as 
the  Godhead  itself.  Neither  the  material  part,  nor 
the  mental  part,  taken  by  itself,  and  in  separation, 
constitutes  the  personality  ;  otherwise,  every  human 
individual  would  be  two  persons  in  juxtaposition. 
There  is,  therefore,  a  material  u  nature,”  but  no  ma¬ 
terial  “  person ;  ”  and  there  is  a  mental  u  nature,” 
but  no  mental  “  person.”  The  person  is  the  union 
of  these  two  natures,  and  is  not  to  be  denominated 
either  material  or  mental,  but  human .  In  like  man¬ 
ner  the  Person  of  Christ  takes  its  denomination  of 
theanthropic ,  or  Divine-human ,  neither  from  the 
Divine  nature  alone,  nor  the  human  nature  alone, 
but  from  the  union  of  both  natures. 

One  very  important  consequence  of  this  state¬ 
ment  of  the  Council  of  Chalcedon  is, (that  the  pyi'cp- 
erties  of  both  natures  may  be  attributed  to  the  one 
Person .  If  the  Person  be  called  Jesus  Christ,  then 
it  is  proper  to  say,  that  Jesus  Christ  wept,  and  Jesus 
Christ  is  the  same  yesterday  to-day  and  forever. 
The  first  statement  denotes  a  characteristic  of  hu¬ 
manity,  which  is  attributable  to  the  Person ;  the 
last  statement  a  characteristic  of  deity  which  is 
attributable  to  the  Person;  and  both  alike  are 
characteristic  of  one  and  the  same  theanthropic  Per¬ 
son/)  If,  again,  the  Person  be  called  the  God-Man, 
then  it  is  accurate  to  say  that  the  God-Man  existed 
before  Abraham  and  the  God-Man  was  born  in  the 


404 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTOLOGY. 


reign  of  Augustus  Caesar ;  that  He  was  David’s 
son,  and  David’s  Lord.  The  characteristics  of  the 
finite  nature,  and  of  the  infinite  nature,  belong 
equally  to  that  Ego,  that  conscious  self,  which  is 
constituted  of  them  both.1 

Another  equally  important  consequence  of  this 
Chalcedon  adjustment  of  the  relations  of  the  two 
natures  was,  that  the  suffering  of  the  God-Man  was 
truly  and  really  infinite ,  while  yet  the  Divine  na¬ 
ture  is  impassible.2  The  God-Man  suffered  in  his 
human  nature,  and  not  in  his  divine.  For,  although 
the  properties  of  each  nature  may  be  attributed  to 
the  one  Person,  the  properties  of  the  one  nature 
cannot  be  attributed  to  the  other  nature.  The  seat 
of  the  suffering,  therefore,  must  be  the  humanity, 
and  not  the  divinity,  in  the  Person.  But  the  Per¬ 
son  suffering  is  the  God-Man  ;  and  his  personality  is 
as  truly  infinite  as  it  is  truly  finite.  Jesus  Christ 
really  suffered ;  not  in  his  Divine  nature,  for  that 


1  “  By  reason  not  of  two  per¬ 
sons  linked  in  amity,  but  of  two 
natures,  human  and  divine,  con¬ 
joined  in  one  and  the  same  per¬ 
son,  the  God  of  glory  may  be  said 
as  well  to  have  suffered  death,  as 
to  have  raised  the  dead  from  their 
graves ;  the  Son  of  Man  as  well 
to  have  made  as  redeemed  the 
world.”  Hooker  :  Eccl.  Pol.  Book 
V.  Ch.  liii.  “A  man  is  called  tall, 
fair,  and  healthy,  from  the  state 
of  his  body;  and  learned,  wise, 
and  good,  from  the  qualities  of 


his  mind.  So  Christ  is  called 
holy,  harmless,  and  undefiled;  is 
said  to  have  died,  risen,  and  as¬ 
cended  up  to  heaven,  with  rela¬ 
tion  to  his  human  nature.  He  is 
also  said  to  be  in  the  form  of  God, 
to  have  created  all  things,  to  be 
the  brightness  of  the  Father’s 
glory,  and  the  express  image  of 
his  person,  with  relation  to  his 
Divine  nature.”  Burnet:  On  the 
Thirty-Nine  Articles  (Article  II). 

2  Compare  Pearson  :  On  the 
Creed  (Article  IY). 


THE  CHALCEDON  CH HISTOLOGY. 


405 


cannot  be  the  seat  of  suffering,  but  in  bis  human 
nature,  which  he  had  assumed  so  that  he  might 
suffer.  The  passion,  therefore,  is  infinite  because 
the  Person  is  infinite ;  although  the  nature  which 
is  the  medium  through  which  the  Person  suffers  is 
finite^ 

Here,  again,  the  analogies  of  finite  existence  fur¬ 
nish  illustrations.  A  man  suffers  the  sensation  of 
heat  from  a  coal  of  fire ;  and  a  brute  suffers  the 
same  sensation  from  the  same  coal.  The  seat  of  the 
sensation,  the  sensorium ,  in  each  instance  is  a  phys¬ 
ical  nature.  For  the  mental  and  immaterial  nature 
of  the  man  is  not  burned  by  the  fire.  The  point  of 
contact,  and  the  medium  of  suffering,  in  each  in¬ 
stance,  is  a  material  and  fleshly  substance.  But  the 
character  and  value  of  the  suffering,  in  one  instance, 
is  vastly  higher  than  in  the  other,  by  reason  of  the 
difference  in  the  subject,  the  Ego.  The  painful  sen¬ 
sation,  in  the  case  of  the  man,  is  the  suffering  of  a 
rational  and  immortal  person ;  in  that  of  the  brute, 
it  is  the  suffering  of  an  unreasoning  and  perishing 
creature.  The  former  is  human  agony  ;  the  latter 
is  brutish  agony.  One  is  high  up  the  scale,  and  the 
other  low  down,  not  because  of  the  sensorium,  or 
“nature,”  in  which  it  is  seated  (for  this  is  the  same 
thing  in  both),  but  because  of  the  person  or  subject 
to  which  it  runs  and  refers  back. 

Now  the  entire  humanity  of  Christ, — the  “true 
body  and  reasonable  soul,” — sustained  the  same  re¬ 
lation  to  his  Divinity,  that  the  fleshly  part  of  a  man 


406 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTOLOGY. 


does  to  his  rational  part.  It  was  the  sensorium, 
the  passible  medium  or  “  nature,”  by  and  through 
which  it  was  possible  for  the  self-conscious  ego, 
the  theanthropic  Person,  to  suffer.1  And  as,  in 
the  instance  of  an  ordinary  man,  the  mere  fleshly 
agony  is  converted  into  a  truly  human  and  rational 
suffering,  by  reason  of  the  humanity  that  is  united 
with  the  animal  soul  and  body,  so,  in  the  instance 
of  Jesus  Christ,  the  mere  human  agony  is  converted 
into  a  truly  divine  suffering,  by  reason  of  the  divin¬ 
ity  that  is  united  with  the  human  soul  and  body,  in 
the  unity  of  one  self-consciousness. 

Another  important  implication  in  the  Chalcedon 
Christology  is,  that  it  is  the  Divinity ,  and  not  the 
humanity ,  which  constitutes  the  root  and  basis  of 
Christ’s  personality.  The  incarnation  is  the  human- 

humanity. 

The  second  subsistence  in  the  Divine  Essenc4  as* 
sumes  human  nature  to  itself;  so  that  it  is  the  God- 
hood,  and  not  the  manhood,  which  is  prior  and 
determining  in  the  new  complex-person  that  results. 
The  redemption  of  mankind  is  accomplished,  not 


izing  of  deity,  and  not  the  deification  of 


1  Or  more  strictly,  perhaps,  to 
be  conscious  of  suffering.  In  the 
instance  of  an  ordinary  human 
suffering  that  arises  from  &  physi¬ 
cal  source,  the  immaterial  part 
of  man  does  not,  properly  speak¬ 
ing,  itself  suffer  a  sensation,  but 
is  conscious  of  a  painful  sensa¬ 
tion  occurring  in  the  material 


part.  In  like  manner,  the  deity 
in  Christ’s  Person  does  not  itself 
suffer,  but  is  conscious  of  a  suffer¬ 
ing  that  occurs  in  the  humanity. 
The  consciousness  itself  is  in  the 
divinity,  which  is  the  root  of  the 
personality  of  the  God-Man  ;  but 
the  material  of  the  consciousness 
is  in  the  humanity. 


THE  CHALCEDON  CHRISTOLOGY. 


407 


by  the  elevation  of  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  but  by 
the  humiliation  of  the  infinite  to  the 

It  is  further  to  be  noticed,  that,  according  to 
the  Chalcedon  doctrine,  the  Logos  did  not  unite 
Himself  with  a  distinct  individual ,  but  with  a  hu¬ 
man  nature .  An  individual  man  was  not  first  con¬ 
ceived  and  born,  with  whom  the  second  Person  in 
the  Godhead  then  associated  himself,  but  the  union 
was  effected  with  the  substance  of  humanity  in  the 
womb  of  a  Virgin \  Says  Hooker  :  w  ‘  He  took  not 
angels,  but  the  seed  of  Abraham.’C^If  the  Son  of 
God  had  taken  to  himself  a  man  now  made  and  al¬ 
ready  perfected ,  it  would  of  necessity  follow,  that 
there  are  in  Christ  two  persons,  the  one  assuming, 
and  the  other  assumed ;  whereas  the  Son  of  God 
did  not  assume  a  man’s  person  into  his  own  [person], 
but  a  man’s  nature  to  his  own(pyerson]^and  there¬ 
fore  took  semen ,  the  seed  of  Albraham,  the  very 
first  original  element  of  our  nature,  before  it  was 
come  to  have  any  personal  human  subsistence.  \  The 
flesh  and  the  conjunction  of  the  flesh  with  God,  be¬ 
gan  both  at  one  instant ;  his  making  and  taking  to 
himself  our  flesh  was  but  one  act,  so  that  in  Christ 
there  is  no  personal  subsistence  but  one,  and  that 
from  everlasting.’’. f  The  distinction  between  a  w  na¬ 
ture  ”  and  a  “  person  ”  is  of  as  great  consequence 


1  “  What  strikes  us  first  of  all,  in  but  His  condescending ;  not  rising 
comparing  the  greatness  of  Jesus  above  men,  but  letting  Himself 
with  that  of  the  heroes  of  an-  down  to  them.”  Ullmann  :  Sin- 
tiquity,  is,  that  the  source  of  His  lessness  of  Jesus,  p.  60. 
greatness  is  not  His  ascending,  8  Hooker:  Eccl.  Pol.  B.  V.  Oh. 


408 


HISTORY  OF  CHRISTOLOGY. 


in  Christology,  as  in  Trinitarianism  ;  and  the  Chal* 
cedon  divines  were  enabled,  by  carefully  observing 
it,  to  combine  all  the  Scripture  data  relating  to  the 
Incarnation^  into  a  form  of  statement  that  has  been 
accepted  by  the  church  universal  ever  since,  and 
beyond  which  it  is  probable  the  human  mind  is 
unable  to  go,  in  the  endeavor  to  unfold  the  mystery 
of  Christ’s  complex  Person,  which  in  some  of  its 
aspects  is  even  more  baffling  than  the  mystery  of 
the  Trinity. 

liii.  An  American  writer  seems 
to  have  had  this  statement  of 
Hooker  in  his  eye.  “  The  per¬ 
sonality  of  Jesus  Christ,”  says 
Hopkins:  (Works  I.  283),  “is 
in  his  divine  nature,  and  not 
in  the  human.  Jesus  Christ 
existed  a  distinct,  divine  person 
from  eternity,  the  second  person 
in  the  adorable  Trinity.  The 
human  nature  which  this  divine 
person,  the  Word,  assumed  into 
a  personal  union  with  himself,  is 
not ,  and  never  was ,  a  distinct  per¬ 
son  by  itself,  and  personality  can¬ 
not  be  ascribed  to  it,  and  does  not 
belong  to  it,  any  otherwise  than  as 
united  to  the  Logos,  the  Word  of 
God.  The  Word  assumed  the  hu¬ 
man  nature ,  not  a  human  person, 
into  a  personal  union  with  him¬ 
self,  by  which  the  complex  person 


exists,  God-man.  Had  the  second 
person  in  the  Trinity  taken  a  hu¬ 
man  person,  into  union  with  him¬ 
self,  and  were  this  possible,  Jesus 
Christ,  God  and  man,  would  be 
two  persons,  not  one.  Hence, 
(when  Jesus  Christ  is  spoken  of 
as  being  a  man,  ‘  the  Son  of  Man, 
the  man  Christ  Jesus,’  etc.,  these 
terms  do  not  express  the  personality 
of  the  manhood,  or  of  the  human 
nature  of  Jesus  Christ ;  but  these 
personal  terms  are  used  with  re¬ 
spect  to  the  human  nature,  as 
united  to  a  divine  person,  and  not 
as  a  mere  man.  For  the  personal 
terms,  He,  1,  and  Thou,  cannot, 
with  propriety  or  truth,  be  used 
by,  or  of,  the  human  nature,  con¬ 
sidered  cts  distinct  from  the  divine 
nature  of  Jesus  Christ.”  Owen  : 
Person  of  Christ,  Works,  X.  517. 
Ed.  Russell. 


END  OF  VOL  I. 


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